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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is relatively a new concept to 
developing countries, hence it is less prevalent as compared to developed countries. 
There is growing consensus that CSR is highly contextual. The literature indicates 
that the concept and practices of CSR vary depending on the country, region, culture, 
management perspectives, and geographical and business systems. Accordingly, it 
can be concluded that existing CSR in developed countries cannot be employed in 
developing countries. The need for companies to be positively perceived by their 
stakeholders and to stay competitive has led to the necessity of companies to 
communicate their social responsibility initiatives. Loss of social confidence due to 
crises has also prompted companies to report on their CSR activities to enable 
consumers and investors to make informed choices and rational investment 
decisions. Various efforts have been undertaken to encourage companies to report on 
CSR activities. Nevertheless, the practise of CSR reporting in developing countries 
remains in embryonic form. Researchers propose corporate governance good practice 
should promote ethics, fairness, transparency and accountability which form the 
foundation of CSR practices.  
Given the increasing importance attached to both corporate governance and 
CSR, this study’s primary objective is to investigate the effects of corporate 
governance practices on the extent of CSR reporting in Malaysia. Hypotheses are 
developed by reference to several theoretical constructs namely agency, resource 
dependence, neo-institutional sociology and stakeholder-agency theories. This study 
employs content analysis to examine the annual reports of 450 non-financial 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia over the years 2008-2013. A self-constructed 
CSR checklist consisting of 51 CSR-related items categorised under six themes was 
used to measure the extent of CSR reporting in the annual reports. To determine the 
influence of corporate governance on CSR reporting, multiple regression analysis 
was utilised.  
The results show that over time, companies are increasingly disclosing more 
information on CSR, suggesting that this area is increasingly gaining the attention of 
companies. The effective role played by government and regulators is seen as the 
likely reason for the increasing reporting trend. Theme wise, most companies are 
inclined towards reporting human resource information; demonstrating that 
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satisfying the needs of their workers is central to their success. Although on the 
whole the reported levels in Malaysia fall short of disclosure in developed countries 
and also several countries in the same region, the increasing trend appears promising. 
Given more time, CSR reporting levels may approach those reported in developed 
countries.  
This study also looks at the influence of ownership structure and board of 
directors attributes on the level of CSR reporting in Malaysia. Specifically, it 
attempts to examine the effect of ownership by directors and institutions, board 
independence, board meeting frequency, board diversity and CEO duality on CSR 
reporting. Nevertheless, despite continuous government efforts to improve the 
practise of corporate governance among companies, this study failed to find any 
significant impact of board meeting frequency, board diversity and CEO duality on 
CSR reporting level. Meanwhile, the association between board independence and 
directors who are finance experts and CSR reporting are found to be industry-
specific, suggestive that the environments in certain industries deter the board from 
increasing CSR. Interestingly, this study exhibits significant results for both 
ownership by directors and institutions. Shareholdings by directors prove to have 
negative bearing on CSR reporting due to the entrenchment effect. Institutional 
ownership while demonstrating a significant result, contributes to a lower reporting 
of CSR information. On the whole, the results imply that the prevalent dominant 
family ownership of companies in Malaysia is an impediment to the effective 
practise of CSR. 
This study is significant because it is one of the first to provide empirical 
evidence on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on CSR reporting in a 
developing country. This study provides feedback to regulators and policymakers on 
the effectiveness of their efforts in promoting accountability and transparency 
through increased CSR reporting. In addition, it also offers an overview of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practices in Malaysia which should enable 
regulators to improve the system of corporate governance especially increasing CSR 
practices.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Research is the process of going up alleys to see if they are blind  
– Marston Bates 
1.1 Introduction 
This study investigates Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting and 
how company reporting behaviour is impacted by corporate governance mechanisms. 
In doing so, this chapter introduces the broad overview of the topic, followed by the 
issues of the interest which leads to the purpose and research questions of the study. 
Research justifications and contributions are also presented. This chapter concludes 
with a brief outline of the remaining chapters. Figure 1.1 exhibits the flow of this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 1.1 Flow of Chapter 1 
 
        
 
1.2 Background to the research 
1.2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
CSR is a reaction to the public’s concerns about businesses’ pursuit of profit 
at the cost of social and environmental degradations (Li, Fetscherin, Alon, Lattemann 
&Yeh 2010). Over the past four decades, the pressure to consider the social and 
environmental impact of business operations has been growing steadily (Castelo 
Branco & Delgado 2011). Fundamentally, companies are accountable to stakeholders 
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in four areas: to ensure financial returns, to adhere to laws and regulations, to act 
ethically beyond legal requirement and be prepared to perform voluntary activities. 
Accordingly, the European Commission (2002, p. 5) defines CSR as “behaviour by 
businesses over and above legal requirements, voluntarily adopted because 
businesses deem it to be in their long-term interest”. At the start, the role of the 
company is viewed as shareholder primacy where maximising shareholder returns is 
the main purpose of its existence. However, as the consequences of globalisation, 
wider stakeholder activism, and the free flow of information, it has become 
necessary for companies to do their business in a socially responsible and transparent 
manner. Through adopting and nurturing social responsible practices, the role of a 
company has expanded to become a social agent with enormous responsibilities to 
society (Ghelli 2013). It is anticipated that companies will behave ethically and act as 
good corporate citizens with the intention to ensure a company’s long term existence. 
The concept of CSR takes into account the transparency of companies as well as 
stakeholder expectations and supports the notion that companies function better 
when they fuse together not only their business interests but also the interests of their 
stakeholders. In its broadest sense, CSR takes as its premise that companies ought to 
justify their existence in terms of service to the community rather than mere profit 
(Abaeian, Yeoh & Khong 2014).  
Nevertheless, acceptance of CSR is not without controversy. Business experts 
continually question the rationale of companies to be responsible for issues beyond 
their narrow technical, economic and legal requirements when their central role is to 
serve the interests of their shareholders. When individuals invest their capital in 
companies, management has the obligation to ensure the maximum return for those 
investments. Any activity that does not contribute to “the bottom line” or to 
maximizing shareholder wealth is a disruption to the functioning of modern business 
corporations. Furthermore, engagement in CSR would only meddle the processes 
that they either have no expertise in or should be better left to other actors in society, 
such as government. To society, CSR is not more than a facade for the sole purpose 
of concealing companies past deeds and also a way to distract the government from 
issuing new CSR regulations (Lu 2013). This has put companies in a quandary. They 
are pressured to improve their CSR practices but at the same time they are criticised 
by society and business experts when they engage in CSR. Yet, despite those 
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daunting obstacles, CSR has nowadays became one of the company’s priorities in 
order to attain its goals.  
CSR is a set of policies, practices, and programs that are integrated 
throughout business operations and decision-making processes. They are intended to 
ensure the company maximizes the positive impacts of its operations on society 
(Visser 2008). CSR holds many opportunities for the betterment of companies and 
the societies they operate in (KPMG 2013). Companies today engage in CSR with a 
strategic intent as it is considered to be a long-term investment. CSR has been 
associated with improved financial performance as it is a source of profits, creation 
of new business networks, improved recruitment and staff retention, enhanced brand 
image, all of which enhance a company’s reputation (Kahreh, Babania, Tive & 
Mirmehdi 2014). Companies that integrate CSR into corporate strategies enjoy better 
internal control and decision-making systems; producing cost-savings; and 
continuously improving products and services, besides minimising the risk of 
powerful consumer boycotts (Adams 2002). CSR also provide better access to 
valuable resources apart from creating unforeseen opportunities (Cheng, Ioannou & 
Serafeim 2014). In fact, CSR is believed to have the ability to mitigate the likelihood 
of negative regulatory, legislative or fiscal action (Cheng et al. 2014). Nevertheless, 
the issues of competitive advantage and good corporate governance are increasing in 
prevalence (Amaladoss & Manohar 2013). Imposing a framework like CSR onto a 
local business system presents a risk. Due to that, top management needs to prioritise 
their business practices strategically, optimise overall economic return on 
environmental investments and transform these investments into sources of 
competitive advantage (Yusoff, Othman & Yatim 2014).  
 
1.2.2 CSR in developing countries 
There is growing consensus that CSR is highly contextual. In a comparative 
survey of CSR in 15 countries across Europe, North America and Asia, it was 
speculated that the low response rates from countries like Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Mexico and Thailand may in itself be an indicator of CSR being less prevalent in 
developing countries (Welford 2004). These countries fairly consistently 
underperform when compared with developed countries across 20 measured aspects 
of CSR (Welford 2004). Several studies show that the concept and practices of CSR 
vary depending on the country, region, and corporation, with country of origin the 
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strongest influence (Amaladoss & Manohar 2013; Khan, Muttakin & Siddiqui 2013). 
The background to discussions about CSR and the important aspects and future 
challenges of CSR also vary. CSR practices in developing countries emphasise 
philanthropy and community development as compared to environmental, ethical, or 
stakeholder issues which are of major concern in developed countries (Amaladoss & 
Manohar 2013). Institutions, standards, and systems which are the foundation of 
CSR in Europe and the USA; are comparatively weak in developing countries 
(Amaladoss & Manohar 2013). For instance, the Asian equity markets are relatively 
more illiquid, when compared to western markets (Zain 1999). The Asian business 
community is characterised by high levels of family ownership and lack of 
transparency. Due to the absence of a separation of management from ownership, the 
traditional agency problem is generally not applicable in Asia. In addition, market 
discipline mechanisms, such as hostile takeovers, occur less regularly in Asia 
because of the concentrated family ownership. These factors strongly suggest why 
the take up of CSR in Asia specifically and developing countries generally is low. 
Not only do CSR practices differ between developed and developing 
countries, variations are also apparent among developing countries themselves.  
Chapple and Moon (2005) argue that CSR in Asia is not homogeneous because of 
factors such as the country’s level of development, globalisation, and national 
business systems. Asia is more diverse culturally, linguistically and economically 
than other regions of the world (Visser 2008). A number of quantitative studies 
confirm this picture of CSR variance. In a survey of CSR reporting in Asia, Chapple 
and Moon (2005) find that nearly 75% of large companies in India present 
themselves as having CSR policies and practices versus only 25% in Indonesia. 
Falling somewhere between these two extremes are Thailand (42%), Malaysia 
(32%), and the Philippines (30%) (Visser 2008). Birch and Moon (2004) also note 
that CSR performance varies greatly between countries in Asia, with a wide range of 
CSR issues being tackled (e.g. education, environment, employee welfare) and 
modes of action (e.g. foundations, volunteering, and partnerships). They also infer 
that the evolution of CSR in Asia tends to occur in three waves, with community 
involvement being the most established form of CSR, following by successive 
second and third waves of socially responsible production processes and employee 
relations, respectively (Visser 2008).  
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Although many believe CSR is a Western invention, there is ample evidence 
that CSR in developing countries draws strongly on deep-rooted indigenous cultural 
traditions of philanthropy, business ethics, and community embeddedness. For 
example, the spirit and practice of CSR in China has strong resonance with cultural 
and traditional communitarian values like coexistence (kyosei) and harmonious 
society (xiaokang) (Romero & Lamadrid 2014). In other words, CSR has long been 
practised in developing countries, yet it was not called CSR. In developing countries, 
CSR is a channel to in part overcome the shortcomings of the government in 
providing various social services such as housing, education, health care as well as 
poverty alleviation (Sharma 2013). Accordingly, companies have assumed many of 
these roles. Asia is experiencing the most rapid economic growth of any of the 
world’s regions. The promise and reality of rising living standards remain foremost 
in the minds of policymakers and businesses. Hence, it is not surprising that this 
forms the basis of the CSR approach adopted by many Asian companies. Moreover, 
making an economic contribution is often seen as the most important and effective 
way for business to make a social impact, i.e. through investment, job creation and 
technology transfer (Romero & Lamadrid 2014). CSR is also portrayed as an enabler 
for companies to access developed markets. This is especially relevant as more 
companies from developing countries are expanding internationally and need to 
comply with international stock market listing requirements, including various forms 
of sustainability performance reporting and CSR code compliance (Visser 2008). 
Peer pressure, particularly from leading-edge companies within each Asian country, 
also plays an important role in creating new demands on businesses to adopt greater 
responsibility. Business or industry associations play a dominant role in creating 
these pressures and in putting a spotlight on the CSR activities of their members 
(Visser 2008). In short, these factors have contributed to the initiation and also 
development of CSR in developing countries. With some of them being unique to 
developing countries, they build up a distinctive picture of how CSR is conceived 
and practised in these countries. 
Given the unique practices of CSR in developing countries, there were doubts 
as to whether the CSR model developed by Carroll (1991) is compatible. Carroll’s 
(1991) CSR Pyramid, comprising economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic 
responsibilities is almost entirely based on research in an American context (see 
Figure 1.2). While the pyramid illustrates the similar CSR constructs found in 
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developing countries, Visser (2008) has proposed a modified CSR model (see Figure 
1.3). 
 
Figure 1.2: Caroll’s CSR Pyramid                       Figure 1.3: Visser’s CSR Pyramid 
(Caroll 1991)                                                           (Visser 2008) 
 
Source: Visser (2008)     
 
Similar to developed countries, economic responsibilities remain the basis of 
CSR practices; owing to a shortage of foreign direct investment, presence of high 
unemployment and widespread poverty. Therefore, CSR is a way of generating 
investment and income, produces better products and services, creating local jobs 
and supporting technology transfers (Visser 2008). Philanthropy is given the second 
highest priority. This is a result of strong indigenous traditions of philanthropy in 
developing countries. Besides, companies require support from society in order to be 
successful. Hence, philanthropic activities are crucial to ensure society is in good 
shape to provide full support to companies. Legal responsibilities come next in the 
pyramid. Generally, developing countries are associated with poorly developed legal 
infrastructure besides lacking independence, resources and administrative efficiency 
(Visser 2008). This is the result of government’s role which is constrained and 
retracted. Given less pressure for good conduct, it reduces the effectiveness of 
legislation as a CSR driver. Unlike in developed countries, ethical responsibilities 
seem less prevalent as CSR catalyst. Despite attempts to improve governance, 
corruption and bribery are closely found. In other words, embedding ethical 
responsibilities requires a lot more effort and time than anticipated. Nevertheless, this 
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pyramid, according to Visser (2008) reflects the actual practice of CSR in developing 
countries. In fact, Nasir, Halim, Sallem, Jasni and Aziz (2015) mention that 
Malaysian stakeholders ranked the economic dimension as the most important 
dimension, followed by ethical, legal and philanthropic dimensions. This 
demonstrates that the CSR dimensions ranking from Malaysian perspective is almost 
similar to Visser (2008)'s proposed model. 
Despite the fact that CSR has long existed in developing countries, formal 
practise is challenging. The commonly held view is that profit is the primary reason 
for operating a business. Furthermore, many companies are still struggling in 
stabilising their positions to compete with other stable local companies. Hence, 
business ethics could undermine their competitive position in the market and be a 
constraint on shareholder wealth maximization. Besides, many Asian companies lack 
a sound leadership structure to spearhead CSR initiatives effectively (PwC 2013). 
However, due to profound external forces such as regulatory obligations and 
responding to public opinion that demand higher standards of accountability, CSR is 
currently progressing in developing countries. 
 
1.2.3 CSR reporting 
In the absence of legislative requirements, voluntary CSR disclosure 
demonstrates a commitment to society (Mathews 1997). While CSR brings enormous 
benefits to the company, practicing it, without doubt, costs money. Likewise, failing 
to report on social responsibility also generate costs, in terms of fines, increased 
regulation, negative publicity, public disfavour, or loss of customers (Deegan & 
Gordon 1996). Even worse, media scrutiny of a company’s environmental violations 
can lead to significant share price decline (Xu, Zeng, Zou & Shi 2014) which is the 
major concern of shareholders.  
Intrinsically, CSR is about a company’s action that has social consequences 
and causes public attention, and thus should be publicly conveyed through corporate 
communications (Li et al. 2010). The growing need for companies to be positively 
perceived by their stakeholders and be competitive has further intensify the need to 
communicate their social responsibility initiatives (Castelo Branco & Delgado 2011). 
CSR communications by companies is a reaction to the call by various stakeholders 
for more transparency and greater company involvement in community welfare (Li et 
al. 2010). Reporting on non-financial data is equally important as financial reporting 
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to overcome the loss of social confidence following the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
(Hąbek & Wolniak 2015).  
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines describes CSR reporting as the report 
made by the company on economic, environmental, and social impacts (Global 
Reporting Index 2006). It is a discrete, independent corporate editorial work that 
provides information about CSR and corporate citizenship (Lock & Seele 2015) 
which can take the form of online reporting or CSR information in annual reports or 
separate CSR reports. Producing a decent CSR report is imperative as it helps form 
stakeholders’ perceptions towards companies and their social responsibilities. At the 
same time, it reflects companies’ commitment to environmental and social issues 
(Brammer & Pavelin 2008). Relatively, CSR reporting practice supports the 
discharge of corporate accountability through transparency and completeness and the 
communication of actual and potential CSR performance (Yusoff et al. 2014). 
Therefore, a good CSR report should provide both positive and negative 
contributions to give a balanced representation of the company’s sustainability 
performance. CSR reporting is the process by which a company can gather and 
analyse the data it needs to create long term value and resilience to environmental 
and social change. Through CSR reporting, investors can be convinced of a 
continuous business future (KPMG 2013). Following this, there has been an 
increasing number of major companies proclaiming their social responsibility 
credentials, and backing up their claims by producing substantial environmental, 
social and sustainability reports (Cooper & Owen 2007).  
Reporting on CSR information is claimed to be a way to gain, maintain and 
repair legitimacy (Deegan 2002). This means gaining public and key stakeholders’ 
acceptance of the company’s operations. CSR reporting can enhance company 
reputation and also assist in risk management (Bebbington et al. 2008). Almost half 
of the reporting companies in KPMG 2013 Sustainability survey indicate this reason 
as one of the main push factors for CSR reporting.  Further, the report may serve to 
secure a continuing good relationship with the company’s stakeholders as it signals a 
company’s willingness to communicate about and deal with societal issues. These 
companies may face less friction and problems in their business relationships with 
suppliers, traders, public authorities and other stakeholders. As a result, companies 
gain a competitive advantage in comparison to other companies that do not engage in 
sustainability activities or that do not communicate their achievements effectively 
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enough (Herzig & Schaltegger 2006). While many believe that CSR reporting 
promises various benefits to companies, some people think that producing reports 
that are normally dense and dull is a waste of time and money (KPMG 2013). There 
are also those who consider CSR reporting as vehicles for corporate green wash. This 
happens when companies exaggerate their social and environmental credentials and 
do not report based on their concrete actions (KPMG 2013; Lock & Seele 2015). 
Normally this occurs among companies in sensitive industries (like chemicals), 
which are often subject to stakeholder criticism and scepticism regarding their 
corporate responsibilities toward the environment (Lock & Seele 2015). In addition, 
the fear of losing business opportunities to their competitors when they are being too 
transparent can deter them from disclosing CSR information. These views together 
with low stakeholders pressure and low CSR awareness, have made CSR reporting 
less prevalent, especially in developing countries. 
Studies have demonstrated that country-specific factors such as culture 
influence companies’ disclosure orientation (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Mohamed 
Adnan 2012). Countries with cultural values that promotes openness and 
transparency are driven to report more CSR information. This culture exists in 
developed countries. On the contrary, the dominant secretive culture of companies in 
many developing countries gives them less incentive for transparent disclosure. This 
culture has contributed to the low levels of CSR reporting in such countries (Yusoff 
et al. 2014). As a way of improving the level of reporting, regulators in several 
countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Taiwan have started 
introducing mandatory CSR reporting. Most of them are currently focusing on listed 
companies. The approach seems promising with an increase in the levels of CSR 
reporting of developing countries (KPMG 2013). Globalisation and increased 
number of multinational companies operating locally have also contributed to 
improved CSR reporting. With the passage of time, the importance of reporting CSR 
information has gradually been accepted among companies. Companies have started 
to integrate CSR practices into their core business activities, thereby embedding CSR 
behaviour in their central management processes (Amaladoss & Manohar 2013).  
 
1.2.4 CSR reporting and corporate governance 
More recent attention has focused on the association between the practice of 
CSR with a company’s governance (Jamali et al. 2008). This implies the possibility 
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of an overlap between CSR and corporate governance (Jamali et al. 2008). Sir Arthur 
Cadbury in his report (Cadbury Report 1993, p. 15) defines corporate governance as 
“the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Generally, this 
involves the establishment of structures and processes through which management is 
accountable to shareholders with the objective of enhancing shareholder value. 
Specifically, corporate governance is about how an organisation is managed, its 
corporate and other structures, its culture, its policies and the ways in which it deals 
with its various stakeholders. It is concerned with structures and processes for 
decision-making and with the control and behaviour that support effective 
accountability for performance outcomes (Siladi 2006). In his observation of CSR in 
developing countries, Visser (2008) proposes that incorporation of good governance 
in countries in Asia, Africa as well as Latin America should be prioritised in order to 
take CSR to the next level. To him, governance reform holds the key to 
improvements in all the other dimensions, including economic development, rule of 
law, and voluntary action. Hence, embracing more transparent and ethical 
governance practices should form the foundation of CSR practice in developing 
countries. In other words, good practice of corporate governance that promotes 
ethics, fairness, transparency and accountability is assumed to have a positive effect 
on a company’s overall performance, both financial and non-financial. Concurrently, 
better-governed companies are more likely to engage in CSR practices as a credible 
way of signalling their governance quality (Beekes & Brown 2006). Nevertheless, it 
can also be argued that institutional differences could influence governance and thus 
the level of disclosure (Mohamed Adnan 2012). Institutional environments comprise 
the variety of national institutions (e.g. political, economic and cultural institutions) 
that commonly shape the behaviour of companies (Jamali 2014). This in turn, would 
be reflected as the management response to their relevant stakeholders through the 
level and type of CSR disclosure (Van der Laan Smith et al. 2010). Hence, these 
differences help explain the variations in CSR reporting globally. Given this 
assumption, this study is concerned with the impact of corporate governance on CSR 
reporting in Malaysia. 
The following sections of this chapter outlines the research problem, the 
objectives of  the research, the research questions in assisting the fulfilment of  the 
research objectives, the justifications for conducting the research, the research 
contributions and finally an overview of the thesis. 
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1.3 Research problem 
In Malaysia, the CSR concept has been incorporated in the National Integrity 
Plan, the Malaysia Plan and the Capital Market Master Plan. CSR principles are also 
reflected in the plan to transform Malaysia into a developed country called Vision 
2020. The Vision outlines five strategic objectives of which one of it is the need to 
enhance the standards of corporate governance and business ethics as well as 
improving the quality of life and the quality of Malaysian citizens (Amran & Devi 
2008). Bursa Malaysia introduced the Bursa Malaysia CSR framework in 2006, 
followed by mandatory CSR reporting for all public listed companies in 2007. 
Together with other various initiatives by the government and regulators, there has 
been a significant increase over time in CSR reporting (Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012). 
A survey by KPMG in 2013 showed that 98% of companies in Malaysia produce 
such reports. Nevertheless, the contributing factors to the changes remains unclear. 
Some believe that corporate governance is instrumental in driving companies to 
report more on CSR information (e.g. Rashid & Lodh 2008; Giannarakis 2014; 
Muttakin & Subramaniam 2015; Haji 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013). Since being 
established in 2000, Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) has been 
reviewed twice, in 2007 and 2012, to ensure the management of company is always 
centred on shareholders’ interest. Besides strengthening the governance landscape, 
the 2012 amendment emphasised the importance of companies promoting 
sustainability through their strategies. This means, attention should be given to 
environmental, social and governance aspects in formalising their strategies. While 
the amendments are seen as strategies to bridge the trust between stakeholders and 
the company (Amran, Ishak, Zulkafli & Nejati 2010), their effectiveness in 
improving and enhancing CSR reporting in Malaysia is yet to be proven. The 
domination of family ownership in Malaysia is likely be a threat to effective 
corporate governance practices. Besides, whether there has been a change in what is 
reported is also vague. Hence, elucidation on these issues are imperative. 
 
1.4 Research objectives 
Operating in the modern business world requires companies to embrace and 
embed sustainability concept in their operations. Various initiatives (e.g. CSR 
rewards, tax incentives and introduction of CSR Framework) and regulation 
(mandating CSR reporting for PLCs) have been introduced by regulators to help 
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companies achieve their CSR goals. Whilst CSR concepts appear to have been 
accepted by most companies, there is still doubts as to whether its understanding is in 
tandem with implementation. CSR in developing countries is still embedded in a 
more philanthropic culture (Jamali & Mirshak 2007; Abdulrazak & Ahmad 2014) 
with little emphasis on formal accountability processes, namely formal planning and 
reporting of CSR activities. Furthermore, earlier reporting seems to be confined to 
community initiatives. Little is known whether there has been a shift in the type of 
information reported. Given this backdrop, the study wishes to undertake an 
empirical investigation of the current state of CSR reporting practices in Malaysia. 
Concurrently, the first objective of this study is: 
 
RO 1 To examine the nature and extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs 
 
Companies that perform CSR activities should report these activities to 
various stakeholders. CSR reporting enables companies to manage their socially 
responsible activities systematically, identify future risks and opportunities, 
contribute to increasing the competitiveness of the company and finally derive profit 
for the company. CSR reports also assist in the decision-making processes of 
different types of stakeholders. This points to the importance of CSR reporting to 
many parties. Thus producing a complete and credible CSR report is crucial. While 
there are many factors that can shape the production of CSR report, Li et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that a country’s governance environment is the most important driving 
force behind CSR communications intensity. Fundamentally, a good corporate 
governance environment has four principles namely; (1) transparency, (2) 
accountability, (3) responsibility and (4) fairness (Janggu, Darus, Zain & Sawani 
2014). These principles are important in safeguarding various stakeholders’ interests. 
Information disclosure is a necessary activity in corporate governance; information 
transparency plays a unique role in corporate governance in the era of knowledge-
based economy. Lack of transparency can lead to confusion, misinformation, and 
distrust. Interestingly, the concept of CSR embraces almost similar principles as 
corporate governance such as being responsible and accountable to the stakeholders. 
Aras and Crowther (2008) believed that corporate governance should address points 
of sustainable value creation, achieving the firm’s goals and keeping a balance 
between economic and social benefit. The similarities demonstrate the connection 
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between corporate governance and CSR and the likeliness of corporate governance 
influencing company’s CSR reporting behaviour. This view provides the path to the 
second objective of this study which is: 
 
RO 2 To examine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and 
CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
In an attempt to analyse the current state of CSR reporting in Malaysia as 
well as to understand the plausible influence of corporate governance attributes on 
company CSR reporting, this study has developed several research questions. The 
research questions are as depicted in Figure 1.4. These research questions provide the 
foundations for hypotheses development, which are portrayed in Chapter 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
and 10.  
 
Figure 1.4 Research questions 
 
1.6 Research justification 
This study is based on several justifications. Firstly, following the Asian 
financial crisis, many countries have attempted to improve corporate governance to 
•What is the nature and level of CSR reporting in 
Malaysia?
RQ 1
(To answer RO 1)
•What is the relationship between directors' 
ownership and CSR reporting?
RQ 2
(To answer RO 2)
•What is the relationship between institutional 
ownership and CSR reporting?
RQ 3
(To answer RO 2)
•What is the relationship between board 
independence and CSR reporting?
RQ 4
(To answer RO 2)
•What is the relationship between board meeting 
frequency and CSR reporting?
RQ 5
(To answer RO 2)
•What is the relationship between gender 
diversity and CSR reporting?
RQ 6
(To answer RO 2)
•What is the relationship between directors who 
are financial experts and CSR reporting?
RQ 7
(To answer RO 2)
RQ 8
(To answer RO 2)
RQ 9
(To answer RO 2)
*What is the relationship between directors who are 
law experts and CSR reporting?
* What is the relationship between CEO duality and
CSR reporting?
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protect shareholders wealth, since poor governance has been regarded as one of the 
main reasons for the massive decline in shareholder value during the crisis. In 
Malaysia, the MCCG has been revised twice; in 2007 and 2012. Not only they are 
meant to strengthen various corporate governance practices but the issue of enhanced 
transparency is also accentuated. Implicitly, this suggests a link between corporate 
governance and companies’ CSR reporting practices. The continuous process of 
reinforcing provides an opportunity for an in-depth study of the extent of information 
communicated to external users. Such an understanding is valuable to regulators, 
policy makers, professional bodies as well as to other users of financial information.  
Secondly, a great deal of previous research into CSR reporting has focused on 
developed countries (e.g. Harjoto & Jo 2008; Dienes & Velte 2016; Lewis, Walls & 
Dowell 2014; Lu, Abeysekera & Cortese 2015; Giannarakis 2014) where the capital 
markets are mature, the approach to CSR is more business model oriented and 
stakeholder awareness of business accountability is high (Muttakin & Subramaniam 
2015). However, there are scant studies that explore CSR reporting practices in 
developing countries, such as Malaysia (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Ramasamy & 
Ting 2004; Mohd Ghazali 2007; Haji 2013; Anas, Abdul Rashid & Annuar 2015), 
Indonesia (e.g. Djajadikerta & Trireksani 2012), Bangladesh (e.g. Rashid & Lodh 
2008; Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin, Khan & Subramaniam 2015), Africa (e.g. Ntim & 
Soobaroyen 2013), Sri Lanka (e.g. Shamil, Shaikh, Ho & Krishnan2014) and India 
(e.g. Muttakin & Subramaniam 2015). The evolving institutional frameworks of 
developing countries offer a valuable opportunity to generate new insights. 
Furthermore, developing countries are confronted with relatively dissimilar CSR 
challenges from those in developed countries (Visser 2008). Matten and Moon 
(2008) mention that country differences in CSR maybe due to governmental and 
legal institutions, as well as norms and incentives entrenched in institutions. There is 
a lack of understanding in the literature regarding CSR research within developing 
countries (Belal & Momin 2009). 
Thirdly, there are considerable differences of corporate governance practices 
in developed and developing countries. In developing countries, corporate 
governance practices are heavily influenced by cultural diversity and political and 
legal structures (Khan et al. 2013). Consequently, the corporate governance systems 
are typically embedded in close, usually, family relationships. This brings about the 
unique principal-principal conflicts in family companies which reflects a severe 
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corporate governance problem in developing countries (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton & Jiang 2008). Institutional differences, particularly in ownership structures 
and legal enforcement mechanisms, may lead to significant variations in information 
disclosure. Similar to other developing countries, Malaysia is characterised by high 
family ownership concentration and significant proportions of listed family-
controlled companies (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000). The existence of this 
unique agency problem results to the prevalence of expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders (Liew 2007). With the presence of strong 
family control, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has always 
been questioned. Given the institutional backdrop, there is likely to be less demand 
for corporate disclosures. Hence, family ownership may become a hindrance to 
transparent reporting. These environmental settings provide a compelling basis to 
examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on CSR reporting.  
Fourthly, this study looks at the impact of a set of corporate governance 
attributes on CSR reporting. Farooq, Ullah and Kimani (2015) mention that studying 
individual corporate governance attributes may provide useful information about the 
individual impact of each corporate governance factor on CSR practices as well as its 
remedy, if relevant. Nevertheless, the effect of individual corporate governance 
attributes may not necessarily reflect the impact of overall corporate governance 
improvement on CSR. Hence, to get a comprehensive view of whether the existing 
corporate governance attributes drive better CSR practices, it is logical to look at a 
set of governance attributes. This in turn, will not only assist government and 
regulators to better identify the best possible solutions to improve corporate 
governance practices, but also will enhance the reporting of CSR information.  
Fifthly, this study takes the form of a longitudinal study that relies on a large 
number of samples. Most prior studies have depended on a small number of 
companies, for example, 85 PLCs (Haji 2013), 99 PLCs (Nik Ahmad & Sulaiman 
2004) and 100 PLCs (Ho, Tower & Taylor 2013) while Das, Dixon and Michael 
(2015) cover 29 listed banking companies and Rahman, Zain and Al-Haj (2011) look 
at 44 government linked companies in Malaysia. With the intention of increasing the 
rate of generalizability, this study explores the CSR reporting trends of 450 
companies across a wide range of industries in Malaysia. Another distinguishing 
factor is the longer time frame used in this study. The six year time period should 
illustrate clearer CSR reporting trends. 
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1.7 Research contributions 
This study seeks to contribute to the extant literature by extending, as well as 
attempting to overcome the limitation of existing studies in a number of ways.  First, 
it will extend the literature on the extent of CSR reporting, particularly in the 
Malaysian context. Hence, it will provide a better picture of the influence of 
corporate governance on CSR reporting. In addition, Beekes and Brown (2006) 
mentioned that good corporate governance can enhance the dissemination of 
company information. Accordingly, this study will assists Malaysian policymakers to 
identify company’s best practices that can assist in achieving accountability thus 
improve CSR reporting. Further, it will offer useful insights to policy makers and 
regulators in facilitating their evaluation of the effectiveness of the revised corporate 
governance code. 
Second, this study contributes to the knowledge of CSR practices by 
expanding the scope of earlier studies to the context of Malaysia. While there are 
limited studies investigating the relationship between CSR reporting and corporate 
governance in the extant literature, this study fills several voids by including recent 
highlighted issues. For instance, examining specifically the link between CSR 
reporting and board diversity and also the impact of board meeting frequency on 
CSR reporting. This may help policymakers in Malaysia to embark on appropriate 
initiatives to improve diversity in the boardroom as well as making board meetings 
more effective.  
Third, this study is underpinned by four specific theoretical frameworks: 
agency, neo-institutional sociology, resource dependence and stakeholder-agency 
theory. The outcome of this study is expected to contribute to an enhanced 
understanding of the relevance of the aforementioned theories in explaining the 
behaviour of corporate governance practices in Malaysia. 
Fourth, this study will provide an insight of the current practises of CSR 
reporting. Furthermore, since Malaysia is in the midst of transforming into a 
developed country, adopting good CSR practices is imperative. Hence, this study 
will help government and regulators to identify useful measures to foster company 
CSR practices.  
Finally, this study aims to provide new evidence on how external forces such 
as legislation may influence CSR reporting practices. The positive impact of 
mandatory reporting is evident in more developed countries (Criado-Jiménez, 
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Fernández-Chulián, Larrinaga-González & Husillos-Carqués 2008). Hence it is 
beneficial to know whether such a command-and-control system may improve 
corporate social responsibility behaviour which would subsequently translate into 
better-quality CSR reporting.  
 
1.8 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis as outlined in Figure 1.5 has eleven chapters.  
 
Figure 1.5 Thesis outline 
 
 
Chapter 1 provides the background of the study; emphasizing CSR practices 
in developing countries and the emergence of CSR reporting. Connections between 
CSR reporting and corporate governance is also presented as a foundation for 
choosing this topic. This chapter also highlights the research problem, followed by 
the objectives of the research. Research justification is highlighted to reinforce the 
reasons for embarking on the research, followed by its contributions. This study 
looks at CSR reporting of public listed companies in Malaysia. Since CSR practices 
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generally differ contextually, thus to help better understand the practice, the 
overview of Malaysia is given in Chapter 2. Amongst others it focuses on the 
Malaysian economy, culture, legal system, the development of CSR practices as well 
as the evolution of the corporate governance system. Chapter 3 discusses the 
theoretical framework of the research. These theories: agency, neo-institutional 
sociology, resource dependence and stakeholder-agency are used to examine the 
research questions. Based on the perspectives of the theories, several hypotheses are 
formed in chapters 5 to 10 to accomplish the research objectives. Chapter 4 presents 
the adopted methodology for the study. It begins with an explanation of the research 
design and descriptions of all variables are also given. For data analyses, this study 
uses content analysis and regression analysis.  
Chapter 5 looks at the state of CSR reporting of public listed companies in 
Malaysia. This chapter also focuses on the reported CSR themes and attempts to 
reveal the possible motives behind reporting patterns. In doing so, content analysis is 
employed and descriptive statistics produced. The state of CSR reporting provides 
the basis for investigating the factors that prompt companies to produce CSR reports. 
This study looks at the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on company 
CSR reporting. This quest is initiated by examining the impact of ownership 
structure on company CSR reporting behaviour in Chapter 6. Directors owning a 
majority company shares threatens the practice of good governance when directors 
use the opportunity to meet their personal needs. Institutional investors are associated 
with better alignment of shareholders and management’s interests. Chapter 6 
examines these claims. Board of directors influence has been continuously debated 
as the most important mechanism of corporate governance practices. This study 
examines the effect of board of directors’ attributes on CSR reporting. Chapter 7 
looks at whether the presence of independent directors leads to a better CSR 
reporting. The role of independent directors is debated from a principal-principal 
agency conflict. This chapter provides a different perspective on the challenges 
confronted by independent directors in trying to enhance company CSR reporting. 
Attempts to determine whether board of directors impacts on CSR reporting 
level is continued in Chapter 8. Board meetings are presumed to be one of the 
governance mechanisms that has the ability to encourage better reporting. Board 
meetings offer an opportunity for vigilance by directors to reduced control 
management activities. Chapter 9 examines the influence of a diverse board on a 
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company’s reporting behaviour. Board diversity has received enormous attention 
from regulators given its ability to benefit the corporate governance of companies. 
Therefore, analyses have been carried out examining the role of female directors and 
directors with financial and law expertise. The final empirical analysis is presented in 
Chapter 10. This chapter explores whether combining the role of CEO and Chairman 
enhances CSR reporting. The practice of CEO duality occurs regularly in countries 
with concentrated ownership such as Malaysia. While some argue that the combined 
role can lead to better company management, others oppose to the idea claiming that 
CEO duality promotes the abuse of power. Given these divergent views, analyses 
were performed to test whether duality roles have a bearing on CSR reporting. 
Finally, conclusions of the study are given in Chapter 11. This chapter also outlines 
the research limitations and recommendations for future research. Figure 1.6 
provides the framework of the linkage between the empirical analysis chapters. 
 
Figure 1.6 Linkages between the empirical analysis chapters 
                           Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In brief, this study is interested in examining the corporate governance 
mechanisms impact on CSR reporting. In doing so, this objective is achieved through 
a series of empirical analyses chapters. As such, some repetition in Chapters 5 to 10 
are evident and listed as follows: 
a. CSR information is captured using the same CSR checklist. The process of 
preparing the checklist is initially explained in detail in Chapter 4 (Section 
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4.4.1.2). However, the similar procedure has been briefly explained in Chapters 
5 to 10 with the inclusion of the CSR checklist in each respective chapter.  
b. Derivation of the CSR index is based on the same formula which appears 
firstly in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.1.2) and repeated in Chapters 6 to 10. 
c. Data testing using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis is based on 
the same assumptions, discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.6.3) and appears in 
Chapters 6 to 10.  
d. To examine the link between corporate governance mechanisms and CSR 
reporting, this study employs OLS regression analysis in Chapters 6 to 10. 
e. Econometric models to analyse the association between board of directors 
attributes and CSR reporting have been developed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5) 
but each model reappears in the related chapter (either Chapter 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10). 
 
Nevertheless, Chapter 5 is somewhat different where it highlights descriptive 
analysis as well as content analysis in determining the level of CSR reporting. As 
stated previously, this study consists of discussions on institutional background, 
theoretical background and research methodology, presented by Chapter 2, 3 and 4 
respectively. While the information contained in Chapter 2 (Institutional 
Background) and Chapter 4 (Research Methodology) are discussed in every 
empirical analysis chapter, they are not deliberated upon in depth. Chapters 2 and 4 
offer a better understanding of the study as a whole. Likewise, Chapter 3 (Theoretical 
Background) although discussed in the related empirical analysis chapters, is fully 
explained here. 
 
1.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has summarised the foundations and structure of this thesis. It 
provides a brief overview of the thesis: the background of the research problem, its 
objective, the research questions; the contribution this study makes to the current 
literature and justifications of the study. Seemingly, CSR has been touted as an 
effective management tool to strengthen organisations’ performance through more 
responsible behaviour toward society and the environment. Although CSR is more 
prevalent in environmental organisations, the interest in using CSR is increasing in 
every type of business. This includes reporting on CSR activities. Of late, many 
believe that good practise of corporate governance can assist companies in producing 
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better CSR reporting. This is the association between corporate governance and 
reporting behaviour linkage discussed earlier. As both CSR practices and corporate 
governance are highly contextual, the next chapter, Chapter 2 provides the overview 
of both practices in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF MALAYSIA 
 
A nation’s culture resides in the heart and in the soul of its people 
Mahatma Ghandi 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the institutional context of Malaysia. Nevertheless, 
other dimensions relevant to the existence and roots of CSR in Malaysia such as 
economic history are also discussed for better understanding. This chapter also looks 
at development and the current state of corporate governance. Sections 2.2 to 2.6 
outline the historical development, legal system, cultural and social factors, 
economic development and company ownership structures respectively. The 
corporate governance features are explained in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 looks at the 
development of CSR practices. Finally, the conclusion to this chapter is in Section 
2.9. 
 
2.2 Historical development 
Malaysia is a federation of 13 states and three federal territories, located in 
Southeast Asia. These are divided between two regions, with 11 states and two 
federal territories on Peninsular Malaysia and the other two states and one federal 
territory in East Malaysia. Malaysia is the 66th largest country by total land area, with 
a land area of 330,803 square kilometres (Nations On Line 2016). It has land borders 
with Thailand in West Malaysia, and Indonesia and Brunei in East Malaysia. 
Governance of the states is divided between the federal and the state 
governments, with different powers reserved for each, and the Federal government 
has direct administration of the federal territories. Lower-level administration is 
carried out by local authorities, which include city councils, district councils, and 
municipal councils (Ministry of Urban Wellbeing 2016). Autonomous statutory 
bodies can be created by the federal and state governments to deal with certain tasks. 
The federal constitution puts local authorities outside of the federal territories under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of state governments, although in practice the federal 
government has intervened in the affairs of state and local governments. Currently, 
there are 149 local authorities, consisting of 13 city councils, 38 municipal councils, 
and 98 district councils (Ministry of Urban Wellbeing 2016). 
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2.3 Legal system 
Malaysia is a federal constitutional elective monarchy. Since Malaysia was a 
former British colony, the government system is closely modelled on that of the 
Westminster parliamentary system while the legal system is based on common law 
(Ahmad 1999). It has three branches of government, namely the Executive, the 
Legislature and the Judicial (Ahmad 1999). The head of state is the king, known as 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. He is an elected monarch chosen from the hereditary 
rulers of the nine traditional Malay states every five years. The government is headed 
by the prime minister which is elected through national elections held every five 
years.  
Governance of companies’ activities is done through the Companies Act 
1965. This act is based originally on the UK Companies Act 1948 and the Australian 
Uniformed Companies Act 1961 with several amendments to account for 
developments in the corporate sector (Liew 2007). Until today, the act remains as the 
principal Malaysian company law. Meanwhile, the Malaysian accounting and 
auditing standards replicate those found in the UK as well as other Commonwealth 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand (Hashim 2012). 
 
2.4 Cultural and social factors 
As of July 2016, Malaysia has a population of 31,417,124 which ranks it as 
the 44thmost populous country in the world (Worldometers 2016).Malaysia is a 
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country with the main ethnic groups being Malay 
(54.8 percent), Chinese (24.2 percent) and Indians (7.3 percent) (Economic Planning 
Unit 2013). The Malays are also known as Bumiputera. Islam is the dominant 
religion of the Malays. Thus, Malaysia is a Muslim-majority nation and they play a 
dominant role politically. Their native language is Malay (Bahasa Melayu), which is 
also the national language of the country and the official language of civil 
administration. Nevertheless, due to colonial British rule, English is the business 
language. While Malaysia declares Islam as the state religion, it allows freedom of 
religion for all people. For instance, Chinese who constitutes almost a quarter of the 
Malaysian population, are mostly Buddhists, Taoists or Christian, and speak a variety 
of Chinese dialects. Indians comprise about 7.3 percent of the population, and 
include Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists. They are mainly Hindu 
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Tamils from southern India, speaking Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and Hindi (Lu 
2013). 
Since pre-independence, each ethnic group has played an important role in 
the development of the Malaysian economy (Yusoff 2010). Although the Malays are 
the majority group in Malaysia, the Malays were left out of the economic mainstream 
during the colonial period (Hashim 2012). They were often associated with 
agriculture and farming. As such, the Malays did not have the same strong history of 
entrepreneurial involvement as other ethnic groups in Malaysia. In contrast, Chinese 
people in Malaysia, have been business oriented particularly in mining, retail and 
wholesale trade. That experience provides the Chinese leaders with excellent 
entrepreneurship skills, good self-discipline and assists them to think strategically 
(Wah 2002). This expertise has successfully help them to lead and grow their family-
managed businesses into professionally-managed companies (Wah 2002). A similar 
situation can be observed in many East Asian countries where Chinese family groups 
have played a dominant role in business (Ball, Robin & Wu 2003). In 1994, Hong 
Kong companies top the list of market capitalisation of 500 largest public companies 
in Asia with $155 billion, followed by Malaysia ($55 billion), Singapore ($42 
billion) and Thailand ($35 billion) (Ball et al. 2003). The economic power of ethnic 
minority Chinese is more than double that of Malays. The Indian community was 
synonymous with rubber plantations. Obviously, separation of ethnic groups in 
Malaysia has occurred not only in culture and society but has triggered a huge 
economic gap between them (Hashim 2012). These variances have been argued as 
sources of racial tension in many Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia (Ball et al. 2003).  
Following ethnic rioting in 1969, the government intervened in an attempt to 
eliminate the identification of race with economic functions (Tam & Tan 2007). As a 
result, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated in 1970 with a twenty year 
effective period. The NEP had two main objectives: to reduce poverty and inequality 
among different sections of the Malaysian population, and to abolish inter and intra 
racial concentrations of monopolistic economic power in various professions and 
enterprises (Economic Planning Unit 2016). To put it simply, the NEP aimed to 
foster inter-ethnic economic parity and eradicate poverty by 1990 through the 
restructuring of the economic activity of the corporate sector (Yusoff 2010). In 
fulfilling the objectives, the NEP aimed to achieve 30 percent Bumiputera ownership 
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of companies by 1990. Literally, Bumiputera means “prince of the soil” in the Malay 
language and consisted of Malays, native groups in Sabah, Sarawak and Peninsular 
Malaysia (Yusoff 2010). This policy resulted in affirmative action in favour of the 
Bumiputera. Since then, the Bumiputera have been given priority of various 
concessions. Among others, preferred share allocation schemes, whereby all 
Malaysian companies listing on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) must 
offer at least 30% of their shares to Bumiputera, 20% of loans offered by commercial 
banks must go to Bumiputera and 30% of government tenders were reserved for 
Bumiputera (Yusoff 2010). To ensure the achievement of 30% Bumiputera equity, 
various state agencies were also established. These agencies acquire about 20% to 
50% of company shares on behalf of Bumiputera (Yusoff 2010). As a result, 
Bumiputera ownership has grown tremendously from 2.4 percent in 1970 to 18.9 
percent in 2004 (Hashim 2012). Thus the Malaysian corporate sector is characterised 
by the existence of politically favoured companies (Hashim 2012). NEP has been the 
catalyst for the development of Bumiputera capitalists (Yusoff 2010). The 
involvement of political individuals especially in securing government projects has 
led to the low accountability and transparency among these companies (Yusoff 
2010). Further, the 30% share allocation schemes for Bumiputera is seen as 
constraining companies’ ability to raise capital from other sources, thus deterring 
overall investment. On a negative note, NEP has weakened corporate governance and 
decelerated the economic development in Malaysia (Salleh 2009). 
 
2.5 Economic development 
Malaysia experienced a period of rapid growth and urbanization beginning in 
the 1980s. Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has moved from an agriculturally-
based economy to a more diversified and export-oriented economy that includes 
consumer products, electrical and electronic goods and agricultural products (Yusoff 
2010). Since 1987, manufacturing has emerged as the leading economic sector 
followed by agriculture and mining. Leading export-oriented manufactured products 
are electrical and electronic products, textiles and clothing as well as rubber-based 
products. Malaysia is the world's largest exporter of palm oil, natural rubber, tropical 
timber, and a leading world exporter of cocoa beans and pepper. Malaysia is 
considered the mini dragon of Asia next to Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Lu 
2013).  
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The New Development Policy (NDP) was announced in 1990 to overcome 
the shortcomings of the NEP. While NEP concentrated on redistribution of wealth, 
the NDP’s aim was to achieve a more united and just society through more balanced 
development. For that, the NDP emphasised higher levels of economic growth. One 
of its objectives was for the industrial sector to play a more dynamic role compared 
to services (Zain 1999). Responding to the government’s call, the predominantly 
mining and agricultural-based economy began a transition towards a more multi-
sector economy and finally transformed into an industrial-led economy. In fact, the 
industry sector is the highest contributor to the country’s GDP with 40.6% in 2013 
(Economic Planning Unit 2013). It appears that the government efforts to further 
develop the country through the introduction of the NDP has been rewarded. 
Privatisation of many government owned companies has also boosted the economy. 
These companies that operated with the use of government resources and capital 
eventually became relatively large companies in terms of market capitalisation 
(Amran & Devi 2008). They are known as government-linked companies (GLCs) 
and listed on the Malaysian stock exchange (Bursa Malaysia).  
In 1991, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad announced 
a new national strategy. Vision 2020 aimed to make Malaysia an advanced 
industrialised nation by the year 2020, not only in economic terms but encompassing 
political stability, social justice and other aspirations. Since then Malaysia has 
pursued socio-economic development on a number of fronts, such as construction of 
expressway networks and other infrastructure projects, and development of the 
Multimedia Super Corridor Project which envisions construction of a new city in an 
area southwest of Kuala Lumpur, featuring an advanced information network based 
on fibre-optics. Nevertheless, Malaysia was hard hit economically by the Asian 
currency and economic crisis that began in the summer of 1997. During that time, the 
economic growth contracted tremendously and foreign direct investment fell at an 
alarming rate. The Malaysian Ringgit depreciated substantially, and there were sharp 
declines of the Malaysian stock market and the property market. In response, the 
Malaysian government imposed capital controls and pegged the Malaysian Ringgit at 
US$1:RM3.80. The government was forced to cut spending. Malaysia emerged from 
the crisis successfully and managed to recover earlier than neighbouring countries 
(Bozyk 2006). Malaysia continued to post solid growth rates, averaging 5.5 percent 
per year over 2000-2008 (The World Bank 2010). The success of Malaysia’s 
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economic development has been influenced by several factors such as prudent 
monetary and fiscal policy management, supportive legal and regulatory 
environment and a supportive physical infrastructure and economic deregulation 
(Yusoff 2010). Malaysia also managed to recover rapidly when hit by the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2009. Malaysia is one of the most successful non-western 
countries to have achieved a relatively smooth transition to modern economic growth 
during the last century (Yusoff 2010). 
Malaysia has been working continuously to address the challenges of 
transforming into a developed economy as outlined in “Vision 2020”. Malaysia 
launched the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010, which aimed for the country to 
reach high income status by 2020 while ensuring that growth is also sustainable and 
inclusive. The NEM includes a number of reforms to achieve economic growth that 
is primarily driven by the private sector and moves the Malaysian economy into 
higher value-added activities in both industry and service (The World Bank 2016). A 
Government Transformation Programme and an Economic Transformation 
Programme have also been introduced in an attempt to accelerate the process. For 
many years, the Malaysian economy has been relaying on foreign direct investment, 
international trade and foreign capital to grow, conceivably due to strong regulatory 
oversight that has underpinned investor confidence. The Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) Confidence Index assesses the impact of political, economic and regulatory 
changes on FDI intentions and preferences of the leaders of top companies around 
the world. Malaysia was ranked 15th in the 2014 Foreign Direct Investment 
Confidence Index, 9th in 2012, 16th in 2007 and 21st in 2010 (MIDA 
2015).Consequently, foreign direct investment has been a key part of an outward-
oriented development strategy. In 2013, foreign direct investment mainly came from 
by the United States (30.1 percent) and Japan (20.2 percent) (Economic Planning 
Unit 2013). The Malaysia's economy is in 14th spot of the most competitive 
economies in the world in 2015 (Capital Markets Malaysia 2016). 
 
2.5.1 The role of Government 
Government’s involvement especially in allocating public resources, 
ownership of public sector and control of business enterprises has been significant 
since the NDP was initiated. Public enterprises were generally established to increase 
participation of Bumiputera in commerce and industry. These enterprises were given 
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a greater role in the economy as an effort to fulfil the NDP objectives. There are 
three categories of public enterprises. Firstly, departmental enterprises that are 
responsible for providing public services such as water, telecommunications, civil 
aviation and refuse collection. Secondly, statutory bodies such as the Malaysian 
Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas), the 
Tourist Development Corporation (TDC) and various state economic development 
corporations (SEDCs), etc. Thirdly, the government-owned private or public 
companies established under the Companies Act of 1965. The equity of the latter 
group is either fully or partly held by the government. 
While the federal government promotes private enterprise and ownership in 
the economy, the economic direction of the country is also heavily influenced by the 
government through five year development plans. The plans, called the Malaysian 
Plan started in 1950 during the British colonial rule. The plans were largely centred 
on accelerating the growth of the economy by investing in selective sectors of the 
economy and building infrastructure to support them. The Eleventh Malaysian Plan 
which covers the period 2016 until 2020 is considered the final leg in the journey 
towards realising Vision 2020. It emphasises strengthening infrastructure to support 
economic expansion, re-engineering economic growth for greater prosperity and 
improving the wellbeing of the people (Economic Planning Unit 2013). 
The economy is also influenced by the government through agencies such as 
the Economic Planning Unit and government-linked wealth funds such as Khazanah 
Nasional Berhad, Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB). These investment vehicles invest in and sometimes own major companies in 
sectors of the Malaysian economy with the aim of advancing Bumiputera share of 
corporate equity. Those companies, known as Government Linked Companies 
(GLC) have the government as the main controlling stake (Yusoff 2010). In terms  of  
revenue  and  asset  base,  GLCs  account  for  a  substantial  component  of  the  
Malaysian  economy. GLCs dominate several sectors of the economy and account for 
34% of the market  capitalisation  of  the  Bursa  Malaysia,  formerly  the  Kuala  
Lumpur  Stock  Exchange (Silver Book 2007). Indeed, the activities and economic 
contribution of GLCs form a major part of the nation’s economy. 
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2.5.2 Capital market 
The public trading of shares in Malaysia commenced in 1960 when the 
Malayan Stock Exchange was established. However, when Singapore separated from 
Malaysia in 1965, it was known as the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore. 
Finally on 14 December 1976 the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was 
incorporated as a company limited by guarantee. In an effort to become more 
competitive and to respond to global trends in the exchange sector, the KLSE has 
been renamed as Bursa Malaysia in 2004, with total market capitalisation of RM688 
billion. Currently as part of the demutualisation exercise, the KLSE transformed 
themselves to be more market driven and customer oriented. As of 31 March 2016, 
Bursa Malaysia had 904 listed firms with a market capitalisation of RM1313 billion 
(Bursa Malaysia). The main index for Bursa Malaysia is the Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index (KLCI). A new index series, a joint index by FTSE and Bursa 
Malaysia was introduced in June 2006. At the beginning of its establishment, Bursa 
Malaysia consisted of the Main Board and Second Board. The Main Board is meant 
for larger companies while medium sized companies were listed under the Second 
Board. Companies are also classified into sectors based on their core businesses. 
These boards are regulated by the Securities Commission. Established on 1st March 
1993, Securities Commission’s main roles were to act as a single regulatory body to 
promote the development of the capital market and to take responsibility for 
streamlining regulation of the securities market and for speeding up the processing 
and approval of corporate transactions. Meanwhile, the Malaysia Exchange of 
Securities Dealing and Automated Quotations Berhad (MESDAQ) was initially 
approved as a separate stock exchange in October 1997 to promote high growth and 
technology companies. However, due to its ability to list only three companies by the 
end of 2000, MESDAQ decided to join KLSE in 2002 and re-launched as MESDAQ 
market.  
In August 2009, Bursa Malaysia decided to merge the Main and Second 
Boards and renamed them the Main Market. Bursa Malaysia has a range of 
progressive products and services which covers equities, derivatives, offshore listings 
and services, bonds and Islamic offerings. Ever since its establishment, Bursa 
Malaysia has been committed to improving its product and service offerings, 
increasing the liquidity and velocity of its markets, improving the efficiency of its 
businesses and achieving economies of scale in its operations.  
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2.6. Ownership structures 
As in other East Asian economies, many Malaysian companies are closely 
owned or privately held with the principal shareholders typically playing an active 
role in management (Hashim & Ibrahim 2013). A study by Yunos, Smith and Ismail 
(2010) of Malaysian companies during 2001 to 2007 revealed that approximately 
97% of companies were closely held. The corporate ownership concentration and 
structure in Malaysia has very much shaped the announcement of the New Economic 
Model (NEM) in 2010.The NEM aimed to improve foreign direct investment and 
also to reduce the fiscal disparity between the wealthy and the result in an increase in 
Bumiputera ownership which has occurred (Lim 2012). Interestingly, despite the 
rapid growth of Malaysia’s economy, the ownership structure of Malaysian 
companies remains concentrated (Tam & Tan 2007). Government-controlled 
institutions also hold significant shares in Malaysian listed companies. Generally, 
large shareholders’ ownership provides an incentive to use their influence to 
maximize value, to exert control, and to protect their interests in the company. The 
large shareholders may use their positions to extract private benefits including paying 
themselves special dividends (Claessens & Fan 2002), committing the company to a 
disadvantaged business relationship with other companies over which they have 
control (Singham 2003), and appointing directors who have similar outlooks to 
protect their interests (Tam & Tan 2007). In return, minority shareholders are faced 
with significant downside risks (Claessens et al. 2000). An attempt to reduce the risk 
appears to be complicated as governmental activism in the corporate sector 
diminishes incentives for institutional investors to actively monitor returns on their 
investments. Consequently, this has lead to greater information asymmetry and free 
rider problems (Salleh 2009). Clearly, when ownership is concentrated, it can 
contribute to poor corporate governance such as weak legal systems, corruption, lack 
of uniform accounting standards, and poor disclosure of information (Yusoff 2010). 
 
2.6.1 Family ownership 
In examining the ownership structure of Malaysian companies, Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) showed that 31% of companies were controlled by a single 
shareholder. Tam and Tan (2007) revealed companies with single shareholders were 
at 43% while Yunos et al. (2010) found that single-shareholder companies dominates 
53% of the total companies studied. This increasing trend overtime proves that the 
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rate of family ownership of listed companies in Malaysia is among the highest in the 
world (Claessens & Fan 2002; Claessens et al. 2000).This type of ownership is 
characterised by fewer number of shareholders and higher proportion of board 
members who are family related and shareholders as well. Among the various ethnic 
groups in Malaysia, the Chinese have dominated the economy, controlling more than 
50 per cent of corporate assets (Goh 2008). This is made possible due to the practise 
of cross-shareholdings and adopting pyramid company structure. Through creation of 
conglomerates, the Chinese are able to secure ownership of a large number of 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia. This allows Chinese family members to 
hold several interlocking directorships and enable them to control the companies but 
with funds provided by minority shareholders (Goh 2008). The pyramid structure 
creates significant divergence between the control and cash flow rights of the 
shareholders through the three tier pyramid model (Goh 2008). In short, family 
members are able to enhance their control rights and maintain ultimate control as 
well as to facilitate the expropriations of minority shareholders’ funds (Claessens et 
al. 2000). 
With their large initial endowment, the majority shareholders feel the need to 
concentrate shareholding in order to maintain a dominating voice in company 
policies and decisions. By acquiring full controlling power, they have a better chance 
of passing the businesses down to coming generations. Family-owned companies are 
normally a one-man show with decisions and authority highly centralised. Internal 
control system are usually relatively weak in these companies. This lessens the 
ability of independent directors to monitor management effectively since they are 
normally considered as “rubber stamp” and are selected for reasons other than 
monitoring (Salleh 2009). 
 
2.6.2 Government ownership 
The launching of the NEP and subsequently the NDP to assist the country’s 
development brought large scale intervention by government. This has heavily 
influenced the unique political economy of Malaysia. Government is commonly one 
of the largest direct shareholders in a company. This means that government has 
control over the appointment of board members and senior management, and of 
major decisions. Malaysia is the second country in the world, after Singapore, to 
have the highest number of government-controlled listed companies (GLCs) 
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(Claessens & Djankov 1999). Basically, Malaysian GLCs can be categorised into 
three types. The first is where the government exercises direct control. Examples are 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad, the National Pension Fund and Bank Negara Malaysia. 
The second is when companies are controlled by the government indirectly through 
other federal government-linked agencies such as Permodalan National Berhad, the 
Employees Provident Fund, and Tabung Haji. The third consists of companies that 
are controlled by the government through state agencies.  
Unlike other companies that focus on maximising profit, government or state-
owned companies also give consideration to other factors like public good (Ingley & 
Van der Walt 2003). In addition, being government owned companies, it is expected 
to lead others in good accountability, transparency and disclosure (Esa & Zahari 
2016). Nevertheless, it is contended that the involvement of government leaves a 
significant agency problem since government can use ownership to favour certain 
parties and expropriate rents from minority shareholders.  
 
2.6.3 Institutional ownership 
Domestic institutional investors are another group of important players in the 
capital market. There are five largest institutional investors namely Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB); Employee Provident Fund (EPF); Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera (LTAT); Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH) and National Social 
Security Organization of Malaysia (SOCSO). However, among these five 
institutions, EPF is the largest of all (Abdul Jalil & Abdul Rahman 2010). It was 
established in 1951 to manage Malaysia’s mandatory national pension system. It is 
also the world’s oldest provident fund (Abdul Jalil & Abdul Rahman 2010). 
Collectively, the five represent about 70% of total institutional shareholdings in 
Malaysian Main Board listed companies (Wahab et al. 2007) which was about 13% 
of total market capitalisation of Bursa Malaysia in 2003. The existence of 
institutional investors is mainly driven by the need to reduce equity ownership 
imbalance between the various ethnic groups and increase Bumiputera equity 
ownership. As domestic institutional investors report directly to the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), they provide a vehicle for the government to implement some of its 
economic policies such as providing employment, subsidies and other benefits (Lim 
2012). These major institutional investors have quite significant patterns of 
investment in Malaysian companies. Hence, they are expected to be more proactive 
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in monitoring their investee companies on behalf of minority shareholders (Abdul 
Jalil & Abdul Rahman 2010). In so doing, the government has established the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in 2000 which serves as an avenue 
for institutional investors to monitor governance procedures in order to mitigate 
actions that may be detrimental to the rights and interest of minority shareholders 
(Abdul Jalil & Abdul Rahman 2010). A further discussion on MSWG is provided in 
Section 2.7.2. 
 
2.7 Corporate governance 
The economic meltdown caused by the financial crisis in 1997 was 
remarkable in several ways. First, the crisis hit the most rapidly growing economies 
in the world. Second, it prompted the largest financial bailouts in history. Third, it 
was the sharpest financial crisis to hit the developing world since the 1982 debt 
crisis. Finally, it was the least anticipated financial crisis in years (Furuoka et al. 
2012). In Malaysia, the impact of the crisis was indeed devastating. Investors and 
foreign currency managers’ confidence starting to dissipate as stock market 
capitalisation collapsed. In early 1998, the value of the ringgit took a nose-dive and 
its lowest point at 4.88 ringgit to one US dollar, compare to its pre-crisis value of 
2.57 ringgit in July 1997 (Tinggi et al. 2015). In the same period, the Bank Negara of 
Malaysia found that it has lost US$10 billion in its effort to shore up the value of 
Malaysian currency. Indeed, two thirds of the value of the Malaysian stock market 
was wiped out in six months. 
It is believed that the primary contributing factor to the 1997’s economic 
problems in Malaysia stemmed from poor corporate governance, specifically in the 
private sector (Salleh 2009; Furuoka et al. 2012). The absence of independent 
directors, lack of impartial audit committees and independent auditors in overseeing 
and disciplining corporate misbehaviour (Liew 2007), lack of transparency, financial 
disclosure and accountability (Mitton 2002), poor legal protection of minority 
investors against expropriation by corporate insiders (Claessens & Djankov 1999) 
and allegations of cronyism (Johnson & Mitton 2003) are amongst the much talked 
about factors that contributed to the fragility of corporate governance practises. In 
addition, significant dominance and participation of major shareholders in company 
management in Malaysia have provided them with the opportunities to act in their 
own interests, leading to corporate misbehaviour (Khoo 2003). These flaws 
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eventually led to the fall of several large companies in Malaysia. Examples include 
Renong, Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad and Lion Group. Khatri et al. 
(2002) revealed underlying vulnerability in Malaysian companies before the crisis, 
exacerbated by weak corporate governance characterised by a highly concentrated 
ownership structure with complex cross holdings and poor debt management. These 
features increase the probability that companies will be operating away from the best 
practice frontier and therefore be susceptible to crisis (Liew 2007). 
Despite the devastation caused, the calamity serves as an eye opener to many 
on the importance of adopting good corporate governance. Subsequently the 
government has worked closely with various authorities such as the Central Bank of 
Malaysia (BNM), the Securities Commission (SC) and Bursa Malaysia, to strengthen 
corporate governance by bringing together a number of reforms. Issues such as board 
composition and fiduciary responsibilities, directors’ remuneration, shareholder 
participation and protection and transparency and disclosure have been given much 
attention. To initiate the adoption of best practices in the industry, government took a 
major step by establishing the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) 
in 1998. The FCCG focused on three major areas. First, was the creation and 
development of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG), which 
identifies a framework for best practices in corporate governance. To assist in 
MCCG development, the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) was 
established in 1998. The inception of MICG was to raise awareness of good 
corporate governance practices. Further, it also provides an independent platform for 
various stakeholders to interact and debate corporate governance issues to promote 
continuous improvement. In fulfilling its mission, MICG runs activities such as: 
 conducting regular seminars and talks on corporate governance issues 
jointly with various professional bodies and industry groups; 
 conducting education public seminars, especially for investors; 
 providing assistance for various regulatory agencies in developing training 
programmes for directors of PLCs; 
 networking with international organisations such as the Organisation for 
 Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the 
 Asian Development Bank and other corporate governance institutions; and 
 developing a multi-disciplinary institute for service, research and education 
 in corporate governance. 
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Second is the reformation of laws and regulations and rules with the aim of 
enhancing the regulatory framework for all public listed companies. The final area 
emphasised by FCCG is the training and education of directors and future directors. 
Table 2.1 provides a chronological account of corporate governance initiatives over 
the past 25 years. 
 
Table 2.1 Corporate Governance Initiatives and Reforms 
Year Initiatives 
1987 Establishment of the Federation of Public Listed Companies Bhd.(FPLC) 
Recognized as the official spokesperson for PLCs in Malaysia 
Amendments to Companies Act 1965. Section 132E, Section 132F and Section 
132G pertaining to substantial transaction involving directors 
1989 FPLC introduced a Code of Ethics for PLCs 
1993 Establishment of the Securities Commission 
1994 Audit Committees mandated by KLSE Listing Requirements 
1996 Establishment of the Companies Commission of Malaysia which introduced 
Code of Ethics for Directors 
1997 Establishment of the Financial Reporting Act 1997 
Establishment of the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) 
1998 Establishment of the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) 
Establishment of High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance to 
conduct a detailed study on corporate governance and to make recommendation 
for improvements 
Establishment of Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance 
Amendments to Companies Act 1965 to mandate the compliance with Approved 
Accounting Standards Section 166A – Directors required to make a statutory 
declaration regarding compliance with approved accounting standards. Section 
169(15) 
1999 Issue of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
2000 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance amended 
Setting up Task Force by KLSE to formulate guidelines for Statement of 
Internal Control by Directors of PLCs 
Issue of Guidelines for Statement of Internal Control by Directors of PLCs 
2001 Revamped Listing Requirement by KLSE issued. Chapter 15 addresses issues of 
Corporate Governance  
Practice Note 5/2001 mandates Training for Directors 
The Malaysian Capital Market master plan was launched to further streamline 
and regulate the capital market and to chart the course for the capital market for 
the next ten years 
The Financial Sector master plan was launched to chart the future direction of 
the financial system over the next ten years. It outlined the strategies to achieve 
a diversified, effective, efficient and resilient financial system 
Securities Commission establishes industry taskforce to formulate guidelines on 
Internal Audit Function 
Exposure Draft: Guidelines on Internal Audit Function issued by the Institute of 
Internal Auditors 
Establish Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG): 
Aimed at creating awareness among minority shareholders of their rights and at 
the same time acts on behalf of the minority shareholders to monitor and deter 
any abuses by the majority shareholders who control the decision making 
process of PLCs 
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The mandatory disclosure of corporate governance code compliance was 
introduced 
2002 The internal audit guidelines for PLCs were introduced 
2003 Director’s Continuing Education Programme commences 
2004 Amendments to the security laws and takeover codes for better investors’ 
protection were made 
Launched National Integrity Plan (NIP) 
Launched Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) Transformation Program 
2005 A review in respect of accounting for minority interests in companies’ financial 
statements and guidelines on compliance functions for fund managers to further 
strengthen investors’ protection were introduced 
2006 Launched the Green Book on Board effectiveness 
2007 
 
Launched Malaysia’s Corporate Governance: Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes 
Amendment to Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 [Act 1299] to include 
Corporate Governance framework 
Amendments to audit committee guidelines were made 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was revised 
2009 Launched Corporate Governance Guide: Towards Boardroom Excellence 
2012 Revision of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance  
2013 Launched 2nd edition of Corporate Governance Guide: Towards Boardroom 
Excellence 
Source: Salleh (2009) and Lu (2013) with all initiatives until 2009; initiatives for 2012 
onwards were added by the author 
Essentially, efforts to improve corporate governance practices of public listed 
companies started as early as 1993 when audit committees became mandatory under 
the KLSE listing requirements. Further, the introduction of the Code of Ethics for 
Directors in 1996 by the Companies Commission of Malaysia acknowledged board 
of directors as the most effective supervision body. Unfortunately, such initiatives 
failed to constrain the negative effects of the financial crisis, which either suggests 
that they were largely rhetorical, superficial reforms, or that they were implemented 
too late or that corporate governance reforms can do little to prevent runs on a 
nation’s currency or major capital outflows (Liew 2007). In the aftermath of the 
crisis, a collaborative effort between the government and regulatory bodies has 
further led to the creation of the MCCG and the Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG). The motives for these changes were to reassure investors both 
domestic and international (Salleh 2009). 
Since then, the development of Malaysian corporate governance has 
progressed steadily and on an ongoing basis including the launching of both National 
Integrity Plan (NIP) and the GLCs Transformation Program in 2004. NIP is an 
attempt towards creating an ethical Malaysian society with zero tolerance for 
corruption. The Government is also pushing to reform state-owned companies by 
initiating the GLC Transformation Program in May 2004, to be tracked and 
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monitored by the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance (PCG). Since then 
the PCG has launched ten initiatives, two of which include the Green Book and the 
Silver Book. These two initiatives aim to transform GLCs into high performing 
entities. The Green Book outlines ways to improve a board of directors’ 
effectiveness, and the Silver Book outlines ways to contribute to society while still 
creating value for shareholders (Lu 2013). Another type of governance established to 
oversee public listed companies is the KLSE Listing Requirements. It specifically 
addresses key issues including substantial and related party transactions, board 
composition, the role and function of audit committees, directors’ rights, training, 
and disclosures, in relation to the state of controls and compliance with the MCCG 
(Yusoff 2010). In January 2001, the Listing Requirements underwent a 
comprehensive revamp which provide a greater obligation for publicly listed 
companies to enhance their corporate governance (Salleh 2009). Among the 
initiatives after the economic downturn, the introduction of the MCCG in 2000 is 
seen as the most important.  
 
2.7.1 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
MICG was given the responsibility to review the corporate framework and 
make recommendations to improve the level of corporate governance in the country. 
The review uncovered several corporate governance weaknesses particularly in the 
areas of transparency and disclosure requirement, corporate monitoring 
responsibilities and accountability of company directors (Das 2001). The MCCG is 
considered the landmark in Malaysian corporate governance reform. The Code draws 
from the United Kingdom’s (UK) experience set out in the Hampel Report (1998) 
and Cadbury Report (1993). 
 
2.7.1.1 MCCG framework 
The Malaysian corporate governance framework is premised on a broad-
based approach (Figure 2.1), which takes into account the fundamental 
considerations that are needed for effective governance. The framework is driven 
mainly by concern for shareholders' interest (Haniffa 1999) and was influenced by 
the Anglo-American systems. These include: professional and ethical management; 
planning; standards and best practices; amendments to laws and guidelines; 
development of a code of conduct; implementing awareness programmes; and 
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enforcement. At the foundation is the professional and ethical management of 
companies. This is the first line of defence against corporate misconduct (Yusoff 
2010). In addition, there are also rules and regulations enforced by relevant 
regulatory bodies to ensure a high standard of corporate governance and effective 
execution of the practise. Four regulatory bodies that have been entrusted with the 
responsibilities are the Securities Commission (SC), Bursa Malaysia (formerly 
known as the KLSE), the Company Commission of Malaysia (CCM) and the Central 
Bank of Malaysia (BNM) (Yusoff 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Holistic approach of corporate governance framework 
                                              
Source: Yusoff (2010) 
The code is premised on the hybrid approach and prescriptive in nature (Goh 
2008). Through a hybrid approach, companies are allowed to apply the code flexibly 
and with common sense to their varying circumstances. A company is still required 
to disclose the extent to which its custom-made corporate governance complies with 
the MCCG principles. It enables investors to assess company performance and 
governance practices and then respond to them in an informed way. However, 
compliance to best practices remains voluntary (MICG 2000). 
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2.7.1.2 MCCG principles 
The MCCG essentially aims to encourage transparency management of a 
company besides providing relevant information to investors. This code can also 
serve as guidelines to the board of directors on how to manage the company based on 
their roles and responsibilities. Fundamentally, the MCCG is divided into two parts. 
Part 1 provides 13 broad principles for good corporate governance in listed 
companies. These principles relate to good board practices, the need for independent 
directors, transparent procedure for the appointment of directors, re-elections of 
directors, directors’ remunerations, shareholders’ rights, accountability and audit (see 
Figure 2.2). Good board practices are dependent on honest and well intentioned 
directors and CEOs. There are 33 best practices in Part 2 of the Code. Wide ranging, 
they relate to all aspects of the company’s structure including the board, the audit 
responsibilities and the relationship between the board and shareholders. 
 
Figure 2.2 The 13 principles of the MCCG 
 
Source: Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 
 
In order to enhance transparency and corporate governance of PLCs, improve capital 
market efficiency, increase investor protection and strengthen confidence of 
investors, Bursa Malaysia has incorporated most of the recommendations of the 
A. Directors
1. To lead and control the company
2. A balance d of executive and non-
executive directors
3. Quality and timely supply of 
information
4. A formal and transparent procedure for 
director's appointment
5. Submit for re-election every 3 yeras
B. Directors' Remuneration
6. Remunerations should be sufficient  
to attract and retain the directors 
needed to run the company successfully
7. A formal and transparent procedure 
for fixing the directors' remunaeration
8. Annual report to contain details of 
remunerations
C. Shareholders
9. Dialogue between company and 
investors on mutual understanding of 
objectives
10. Company should use the AGM to 
communicate with the investors and 
encourage their participations
D. Accountability and Audit
11. A balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company position 
and prospects
12. A system of internal control to 
safeguard shareholders' investment 
and the company's assets
13. A formal and transparent 
relationship with the company's 
auditors 
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Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance into its Listing Requirements. From June 
2001 onwards companies were required to include in their annual report - the 
statement of corporate governance, a statement of internal control, composition of 
the board of directors, composition of audit committee, quorum of audit committee 
and any additional statements by the board of directors (Bursa Malaysia). 
Further efforts to strengthen and enhance the corporate governance 
framework can be seen with the revision of the MCCG and amendments to the 
Companies Act 1965 in 2007 (Salleh 2009).Hence, the key amendments to the code 
mainly strived at strengthening the board of directors and audit committees and 
ensuring that they discharged their roles and responsibilities effectively (Abdullah 
2004). In this revision, the eligibility criteria for appointment of directors, the role of 
nominating committees, audit committee member, committee composition, the 
frequency of meetings and the need for continuous training were spelt out (Salleh 
2009). A second revision of the MCCG was made in 2012. The revised MCCG sets 
out 8 broad principles followed by 26 corresponding recommendations. Among 
others, the principles and recommendations focus on: 
 Laying a strong foundation for the Board and its committees to carry out their 
roles effectively besides reinforcing independence; 
 Promoting timely and balanced disclosure; 
 Safeguarding the integrity of financial reporting; 
 Emphasising the importance of risk management and internal controls; and 
 Encouraging shareholder participation in general meetings. 
 
Bursa Malaysia requires all directors to undergo continuous training (i.e. 
Mandatory Accreditation Programme and Continuing Education Programme) to 
enhance their capabilities in performing their responsibilities as directors as well as 
to influence corporate thinking on issues relating to corporate governance (Zulkafli, 
Abdul Samad & Ismail 1999). The programme is a prerequisite to continued listing. 
From 2005 onwards companies were required to disclose the directors training in 
their annual report (Wan Hussin & Ibrahim 2003). In 2009, Bursa Malaysia launched 
another guide intended for directors to gain a clear and constructive direction on 
corporate governance best practices called the “Corporate Governance Guide: 
Towards Boardroom Excellence”. This guide focuses on bringing clarity to the roles 
Chapter 2: Institutional background of Malaysia 
 
41 
 
and requirements needed to enhance corporate governance practices among boards 
and committees (Lu 2013). 
 
2.7.2 The Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group 
The domination of family-owned businesses means that minority 
shareholders are exposed to the threat of wealth expropriation by major shareholders. 
To protect minority shareholders a monitoring body on corporate governance was set 
up by the EPF in 2001. The Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) acts 
as a voice and provides an avenue for minority shareholders to institute proceedings 
against listed issuers who fail to comply with the principles and practices of good 
corporate governance. The MSWG was set up to create awareness among minority 
shareholders of their three basic rights: to seek information, voice opinion and seek 
redress (Ameer & Rahman 2009). The MSWG monitors companies to deter abuse 
from majority shareholders, provide advice on best practice, and to offer other 
services like proxy voting (Liew 2007). Part of its activities is to establishing direct 
dialogues with PLCs management to express legitimate concerns to them (Abdul 
Jalil & Abdul Rahman 2010). MSWG encourages independent and proactive 
shareholder participation in listed companies. It initiates shareholders’ activism to 
ensure shareholders’ equality and value maximisation. MSWG is another initiative to 
strengthen the Malaysian corporate governance system. The committee members of 
these group were from the government fund institutions such as EPF, LTAT, LTH, 
SOCSO and PNB (Salleh 2009).  
 
2.7.3 Interplay between government and politics 
A unique characteristic of Malaysia is the existence of a large number of 
politically connected companies. The Bumiputera policy has ingrained Malaysian 
government intervention in the corporate sector resulting to business and politics to 
become intertwined (Tam & Tan 2007). By the mid-1990s numerous Malaysian 
companies owned by Bumiputera were found to be linked to at least one powerful 
politician and exhibited strong political loyalty (Lim 2012). They develop ties with 
powerful political agents who in turn provide easy access to business and finance 
(Lim 2012). Hence, they do not have to worry about funding nor to attract potential 
investors since they can easily obtain it from local banks at lower cost. They are also 
given priority in obtaining various Government project work despite other companies 
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being more eligible. Many projects run by Bumiputera companies failed to be 
properly executed or worse are abandoned. These politically favoured companies are 
also at advantage when they are given leeway in legal compliance. This is possible 
mainly due to the ability of the politicians to exert influence on the regulatory 
institutions (Goh 2008). This implies that regulatory institutions may be used as tools 
by powerful politicians with vested interests. The policy and company behaviour 
pose a threat to the execution of good corporate governance in Malaysia.   
 
2.7.4 Issues in corporate governance 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis moved Asian governments generally and the 
Malaysian government especially to tighten company laws, competition law and 
corporate governance requirements of listed companies. Although corporate 
governance was not the primary cause leading to the economic meltdown, the 
economic crisis had taught companies that good corporate governance or rather the 
lack of it, could extract a heavy toll from the markets (Liew 2007). While there were 
many carefully-thought out governance initiatives like MCCG commenced, several 
shortcomings currently remain.  
Concentration of ownership in Malaysia is seen as the biggest impediment to 
better corporate governance practices. Shareholders with voting rights that far exceed 
their cash flow rights tend to extract private benefits from such control, which may 
include the expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders. Despite the existence 
of MSWG intended to protect minority shareholders’ rights, this initiative seems to 
be ineffective. There appears to be weak enforcement of the laws and they are 
frequently violated. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (2000) contend 
that Malaysia has a relatively low level of investor protection, which suggests that 
minority shareholders would be less protected in the event of corporate wrongdoings. 
One reason provided by Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006) is that large 
institutional shareholders are often subject to political pressure. Since institutional 
shareholders in GLCs are subject to political interference, their effectiveness to assist 
minority shareholders in gaining their rights is relatively questionable (Ameer & 
Rahman 2009). Furthermore, the board of directors of the MSWG who are from the 
founding members, may not take action against the company that appointed them to 
the MSWG. Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006) further highlight the reluctance 
of minority shareholders to take action against any wrongdoings is likely associated 
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with respect for status as well as power differential. Khoo (2003) states the Eastern 
social culture norm of no open confrontation is not conducive to openness. Hence it 
is a norm in society to allow powerful individuals to have rights to certain privileges 
because of their status (Satkunasingam & Shanmugam 2006). Khoo (2003) also 
suggested a few factors contributing to weak shareholders activism such as 
prevalence of large controlling shareholders, minority shareholders free-riding on the 
controlling shareholder if the company is consistently generating good returns. 
Private individual investors prefer to move their investment out rather than confront 
management on issues that they disagree with. The high cost of instituting legal 
action and obtaining compensation from companies deters minority shareholders 
from exercising their rights. Finally, private individual investors lack the required 
knowledge to fully comprehend the disclosures and the impacts of any dubious 
transactions. Shareholder activism is weak with minority shareholders not able to 
ensuring good corporate governance practices by their boards (Goh 2008). Many are 
sceptical that the MSWG can mitigate the principal-agent problem, information 
asymmetry and other conflicts of interests. Thus, protection of shareholders rights, 
particularly those of the minority shareholders remains a key negative in corporate 
governance. 
The majority of companies evolved into family-controlled companies with 
corporate governance therefore largely a family matter (Goh 2008). These companies 
are reluctant to adopt the best-practise culture. To them, the push for good corporate 
governance is a threat to their entrepreneurial drive and spirit (Yusoff 2010). The 
prevalence of ownership concentration has also cast doubt on the composition of the 
board of directors. While independent directors are present in all companies, their 
independence is largely questionable. Observably, companies with political 
connections are able to reap significant preferential benefits. Therefore, a major 
proportion of the financial assets and productive capacity of the corporate economy 
are concentrated in a few large companies (Liew 2007). The practise of good 
corporate governance remains mainly a theoretical concept. The market 
characteristics that can enhance corporate governance are not found in Malaysia 
(Ameer & Rahman 2009). Therefore, those shareholders who do not work towards 
the maximisation of shareholder value can easily engage in wrongdoings without 
punishment. It can be argued that Malaysian companies are still lagging behind in 
complying with the recommendation of best practices. It is also likely that they are 
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still at an early stage in appreciating the benefits of corporate governance (Yusoff 
2010). In that view, more needs to be done to improve compliance with corporate 
governance. Having a sound legislative framework is one thing but unless it is 
accompanied by timely and effective enforcement then it is set for a failure.  
 
2.7.5 Board of directors 
Under law, company directors are primarily responsible for the governance of 
their companies, and the shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint directors and 
external auditors in order to satisfy themselves, among other things, that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place. 
 
2.7.5.1 Appointment of directors 
Every incorporated company is required to appoint a minimum of two 
directors who must reside within the country. This requirement is made mandatory 
through Section 122(1) of the Companies Act 1965. The appointment of a director is 
through a show of hands vote during a general meeting, as outlined by Section 126 of 
the Companies Act. The appointment of directors for Malaysian PLCs is also subject 
to the Bursa Malaysia that relies on the MCCG guidelines. The selection of non-
executive directors, should be formally made through a nomination committee to 
ensure transparency. Further, the nomination committee should also consists of a 
majority of non-executive directors to be transparent as recommended by the 
Cadbury Report (1993).  
 
2.7.5.2 Board composition 
2.7.5.2.1 Independent directors 
The MCCG views the composition of the board of a listed company as one of 
the most crucial channels through which effective corporate governance is ensured. 
To this end, the Principles Provision A I in Part 1 of the MCCG (2007) suggests that 
every listed company should be headed by an effective board which should lead and 
control the organisation. The Code places a great emphasis on independence of 
directors. According to the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, an independent 
director is a director who is independent of the management and free from any 
business or other relationship that could interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment or the ability to act in the best interests of the company. In order for the 
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board to perform effectively and efficiently, the Principles Provision A II in Part 1 of 
the MCCG (2007) proposes the following:- 
“The Board should include a balance of executive directors and non-executive 
directors (including independent non-executives directors) such that no individual or 
small group of individuals can dominate the Board’s decision making”. 
To provide a clearer view of what “balance” means ideally, the MCCG further 
recommends, as best practise, at least two directors or one third of the board, 
whichever is higher, must be independent. This, it is believed, will enable the 
independent directors to fulfill their responsibilities adequately by bringing their 
independent judgment to the board (Siladi 2006). Basically, the scope of 
responsibilities of an independent director in Malaysia covers six roles which are to: 
i.  act as chairman of the respective committees; 
ii. evaluate and monitor the decision-making process; 
iii. provide an objective and positive contribution; 
iv. provide an assertive and influencing presence for the company’s interest; 
v.  to provide independent views and judgements relating to conflict issues;  
     and 
vi. carry out functions specifically required by the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
     Requirements. 
(Yusoff 2010, p. 126) 
Nevertheless, being independent alone is insufficient to ensure the 
effectiveness of independent directors in executing their responsibilities. It is also 
required from them to have the appropriate skill sets and experience to make better 
assessments. This would mean an independent director needs to have a clear 
understanding of formal governance structures and policies with a strong knowledge 
of the business which he/she is responsible for directing and guiding and also be 
aware of any changes in the accounting, regulatory and business environment that the 
companies operate in. In addition, the MCCG requires every director to attend 
appropriate training that can assist in the discharging of his/her duty. In accordance 
with the requirement, under Paragraph 15.08 of the Main Market Listing 
Requirements, it is mandatory for every director to attend appropriate training 
programmes as prescribed by Bursa Malaysia from time to time. Bursa Malaysia 
recently enforced new amendment on 3rd January 2012 which was directors’ 
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qualities. Paragraph 2.20A highlights the importance of directors to possess certain 
qualities as follows:- 
“Every listed corporation must ensure that each of its directors, CEOs or CFOs has 
the character, experience, integrity, competence and time to effectively discharge 
his/her role as a director, CEO or CFO as the case may be, of the listed corporation”. 
Tenure of independent directors is also one of the crucial factors that 
companies should monitor. Holding a position for too long may cause the director to 
become affiliated with the major shareholder or management; hence impairing their 
independence. Ideally, the maximum period to sit on the board must neither be too 
short nor too long and must take into consideration the learning curve of any person 
(Lee 2013). The corporate governance codes in the United Kingdom bar independent 
directors from sitting longer than nine years while the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) allows a maximum tenure of six years (Lee 2013). Taking a 
similar measure, Bursa Malaysia through its 2012 revision, has announced a 
limitation to an independent director’s tenure to nine years. However, he/she is 
allowed to continue serving the board upon reaching the maximum tenure but as a 
non-independent director.  
While great efforts have been taken by the regulators to ensure effective 
execution of directors’ responsibilities, the extent to which these directors are truly 
independent remains an issue. In reality they are still accountable to specific 
shareholders (Yusoff 2010). In Malaysia where ownership concentration is high, the 
controlling shareholders have the ultimate power to appoint the independent 
directors. In addition, the nomination committee is allowed to consider candidates for 
directorships proposed by the Chief Executive Officer and, within the bounds of 
practicability, by any other senior executive or any director or shareholder (MCCG 
2000). This practice obviously contributes to the possibility of appointing a less 
independent individual as independent director.  The majority of independent 
directors of Malaysian PLCs were appointed because of personal contacts and to the 
satisfaction of majority shareholders (Yusoff 2010).As a result, many independent 
directors lack the necessary qualities expected to serve on the board. This practise 
also leads to a board with a lack of diversity (Yusoff 2010). 
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2.7.5.2.2 Board diversity 
With a population of 30 million, women constitute 48% of the Malaysian 
population and 52.4% of the total workforce (MWFCD, 2014). The participation of 
women in the workforce has increased significantly, from 37% in 1970 to 45.7% in 
2005 (Economic Planning Unit 2007). This can be attributed to the changes in the 
Malaysian economy where the nation’s focus shifted from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services and because women’s participation in the labour force 
became progressively acceptable to Malaysian society. While women seem to 
outnumber men in the workforce, they are severely under-represented on corporate 
boards. The majority of women are clustered in the lower and middle-income 
category jobs such as clerical, service and production workers, and operators (Yusoff 
2010). 
Driven by the need to encourage more women to contribute to national 
development, the government has announced a policy requiring decision making 
positions in the public sector to be occupied by women at a minimum rate of 30%. 
The policy has led to an increase of almost 14% of women in the top positions of 
public sector companies from 2004 to 2014 (MWFCD 2014). Following its success, 
the same policy was applied to the private sector effective from 2011; expecting to 
reach its goal by 2016. Further, the 2012 revision of MCCG included direction for 
public listed companies to have a boardroom diversity policy formally established, 
disclosed in the annual report and demonstrate how the goals were to be 
accomplished. While these moves exhibit government’s desire to increase the 
involvement of women in the private sector, the outcome is still a long way from 
reaching the 30% level (MWFCD 2014). There are a few factors that have 
contributed to the slow pace. The community still holds the mindset that women 
should stay home and take care of the family. This view has been the main deterrent 
women seeking directorship or leading companies. Female directors are also 
perceived as possessing an unattractive leadership style that makes male directors 
feel uncomfortable (Koshal et al. 1998). As a result, the number of women joining 
top management remains low. 
The government has undertaken various initiatives. One is the provision of 
more child care centres either at the workplace or in the nearby vicinity. Another 
initiative was the introduction of the “Women Directors’ Programme” in 2012. The 
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programme is designed to equip women with the appropriate skills and knowledge to 
become leaders. 
 
2.7.5.3 Board structure and process 
2.7.5.3.1 CEO duality 
Malaysian companies are governed by a unified board performing both 
management and supervisory functions. In this type of board structure, the CEO is 
responsible for the running of the board as well as the running of the company’s 
operation. Hence, it is presumed that members of the board cannot be completely 
objective and independent in monitoring and assessing the performance of the 
management team, since they may also be a part of the management team (Yusoff 
2010). There is also an overwhelming presence of family dominance in the corporate 
sector. Given those scenarios, the practise of CEO duality is incontestable. The 
increasing trend of CEO duality is evident in the study by Abdul Rahman and 
Haniffa (2005). There was a sharp increase from 8.8% in 1996 to 17.9% in 1999. 
Despite the absence of a mandatory rule for the separation of roles between both 
chairman and CEO, the MCCG strongly recommends this as best practice. This is to 
make certain that power and authority is balanced to avoid the existence of individual 
directors having unrestrained power in the decision-making process (Ponnu 2008). 
Plausibly when both monitoring and implementing roles are vested in a single 
person, the monitoring roles of a board will be severely impaired, and this could 
affect board incentives to ensure that management is pursuing value-increasing 
activities (Yusoff 2010). The segregation of these positions is seen as a key 
characteristic of an effective and an independent board. Nevertheless, should duality 
become inevitable, the MCCG (2007) recommends that a strong independent element 
must exist. It is crucial to have a clear acceptance of division between the 
chairperson and CEO and such information be disclosed to the public. However, 
compliance with the MCCG recommendation remains an issue as family owned 
companies are prevalent. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2004) revealed that 72% 
of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are family controlled. It is common for 
companies with this type of ownership structure to practise CEO duality (Ho & 
Wong 2001). Thus, MCCG’s recommendations of separation of roles of the 
chairperson and CEO are significant for all PLCs (Yusoff 2010). A recent study by 
Sundarasen et al. (2016) shows that CEO duality affects company CSR initiatives 
Chapter 2: Institutional background of Malaysia 
 
49 
 
negatively. This warrants further examination on the practice of CEO duality in 
Malaysia.  
 
2.7.5.3.2 Board meetings 
Board monitoring is crucial to good corporate governance. MCCG explicitly 
recommends that boards should meet frequently, with due notice of issues to be 
discussed and should record its conclusions. The recommendation was refined in the 
revised MCCG 2007 where it requires boards to properly record not only decisions 
but also all the issues discussed in arriving at the decision. This serves to provide a 
historical record and insight into those decisions (MCCG 2007). As the Code 
emphasizes flexibility, therefore, the frequency of board meetings depends very 
much on a company’s interpretation and requirement. Nevertheless, the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements however stipulate that every board should conduct at 
least four meetings per year. Further, the Code also requires a company to disclose 
the number of board meetings attended by each individual director. These are viewed 
as evidence of the directors’ accountability towards shareholders. Similarly, the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) justify this requirement to enable 
shareholders to evaluate their performance. If directors of PLCs have more than 50% 
absence from board meetings in a year, then there should be an automatic 
disqualification according to the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. 
 
2.8 CSR in Malaysia 
Evidence of CSR in Malaysia can be traced back as early as in the 1970s 
(Teoh & Thong 1984). Arguably, religion is the cornerstone for the early awareness 
of CSR. Irrespective of whether the religion is Islam, Confucianism or Hinduism, 
religions emphasise the concept of mutual prosperity by helping fellow human 
beings. Hence, CSR began in the form of small contributions which were 
traditionally driven by religion and racial motivations. This culture of giving 
continues which now makes philanthropy the most common form of CSR practice 
(Abdulrazak & Ahmad 2014). For Muslims, the concept of CSR is something close 
to their hearts where it is considered “religious duty rather than choice” (Lu 2013). 
Similar to other religions, Islam provides guidelines based on comprehensive rules 
that form a basis for conducting business in a responsible and socially beneficial 
manner. There are similarities between Islamic teaching and the modern view of 
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CSR, specifically in three broad categories: Human rights, Labour and Environment 
(Lu 2013). Angelidis and Ibrahim (2004) suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between religion and socially-responsible behaviour. Further, Abdul Rashid and 
Ibrahim (2002) has shown that family upbringing, traditional beliefs and customs have 
had much influence in the improvement of the level of CSR awareness among the 
Malaysian executives and managers. 
The impetus for CSR awareness has also come from the degradation of 
environmental quality. Environmental pollution problems have a long history. The 
rapid development of tin mining polluted rivers through mine wastewater and sludge 
while waste water from natural rubber and palm oil production has further 
exacerbated the problem. From the late 1960s, Malaysia pursued rapid 
industrialisation supported by foreign investment. While it provides employment 
opportunities and wealth generation, it has caused raft of pollution problems. 
Another recent problem is haze (smoke and fog caused by particulate matter), which 
has occurred on a large scale for several months annually and causes respiratory 
complaints and other health problems. The collapse of a condominium in the Kuala 
Lumpur in 1993 with a death toll of 49 and a big fireworks factory fire in 1992 are 
among the disasters that caused the emergence of safety and labour issues to national 
prominence (Zain 1999). 
Several precautionary measures, such as the inclusion of environmental 
policies in the Malaysia Plan, have resulted. The Third Malaysia Plan (1976 to 
1980), was the first to incorporate an environmental policy aimed at integrating 
environmental concerns into development planning. Since then, government has 
made its environmental policies more substantial in every subsequent Malaysia Plan 
in order to reconcile the interests of development and the environment. Following the 
strong urge to deal with various pollution problems, the government announced the 
Environmental Quality Act (EQA) 1974. This marked the beginning of 
environmental legislation and it has been subsequently strengthened with more 
stringent and stiffer penalties for non-compliance in 1998 and again in 2001 to 
include the prohibition of open burning (EQA 1974). These developments attest to 
increasing governmental concern about the environmental impacts of business 
operations in Malaysia. 
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2.8.1 Awareness 
At the initial stage of CSR introduction, one of the core challenges that the 
government faced was to understand the concept of CSR, comprehend the 
understanding of CSR by the public, the types of CSR activities practiced and the 
types of assistance the government can offer to motivate the adoption CSR (Abdul 
Rashid & Ibrahim 2002). Starting with the introduction of EQA in 1974, CSR 
awareness among Malaysians appears to be increasing, especially on environment 
quality awareness. The emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGO) such 
as Malaysia Trade Unions Congress (MTUC), the Federation of Malaysia Consumers 
Association, Consumer Association of Penang, Malaysian Nature Society and World 
Wildlife Federation (WWF) Malaysia proves the growing awareness of CSR in 
recent years. These NGOs and numerous CSR initiatives contribute extensively 
towards a growing publicity about CSR and raise social responsibility and 
environmental awareness (Zain 1999). It came to no surprise when there was a strong 
display of opposition against the manmade structures such as the Sarawak Bakun 
Hydraulic Dam in 1990 and the proposed Sabah Coal Power Plant in 2011 due to 
their immediate and long term environmental impacts. This public’s level of interest 
on matters relating to the environment is on the rise and companies are taking cues 
from it. However, to ensure continuous awareness in existing companies and to 
create awareness in new companies, CSR education will be continually needed (Lu 
2013).  
 
2.8.2 CSR drivers 
The principles of CSR are embedded in three out of nine challenges of Vision 
2020 that are to become (1) a moral and ethical community, (2) a fully caring culture, 
and (3) an economically just society. Due to the importance of realising these ideals, 
Zain (1999) highlighted Vision 2020 as one of the significant drivers of CSR 
development in Malaysia. To compete with multinational companies and their 
established brands, companies’ business strategy must reflect the current and 
growing trends in marketing and customer behaviour. One such key trend is CSR. 
CSR has become prominent in sourcing for funds internationally with the 
introduction of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). Similar emphasis has also 
been reflected in the Silver Book, which has positioned CSR as a means for GLCs to 
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gain competitive advantage, whilst contributing to social and environmental issues 
(Silver Book 2007). In general, the Silver Book outlines three guiding principles:  
Principle 1: The GLCs primary objective should be to enhance shareholder 
returns and meet the needs of other key stakeholders, 
Principle 2: GLCs should proactively contribute to society in ways that create 
value for their shareholders and other key stakeholders, 
Principle 3: GLCs should actively manage their contributions to society in the 
most efficient and effective manner, in line with industry norms and best 
practices as well as the relevant regulatory framework. 
It is worth mentioning that “contribution” in Principle 3  is more than philanthropy; it 
is about “creating benefits to society as an integral part of an organisation’s business 
and operations, with the opportunity to derive a competitive or commercial 
advantage for the organisation itself” (Lu 2013). Concerned about the need to 
maintain well-balanced development, the government has further intensified the 
incorporation of environmental considerations into corporate life. 
Companies practicing CSR does not happen by itself and not overnight. A 
study by ACCA (2002) reveals various drivers for CSR adoption in Malaysia. 
Primarily, the MCCG increased demand for corporate governance and accountability 
as a result of privatisation, business and marketing strategies, improved corporate 
image, the introduction of NACRA Environmental Reporting award, strengthening 
of stakeholder relationships, improve access to capital investment and advancements 
in information and communication technology. Nik Ahmad and Sulaiman (2004) 
claimed three primary drivers: to meet legal obligation, compliance with ISO 14000 
requirement and to provide true and fair view to shareholder or investor. Teoh and 
Thong (1984) believe any commitment to social action appears to stem from top 
management initiatives. It is argued that behaviour at work is a continuation of 
behaviour learned earlier, either from the family environment or school (Ramasamy 
et al. 2007). Therefore, culture and values play a large role in nurturing the attitudes 
of future executives and managers towards CSR. 
The financial crisis of 1997-1998 changed the political perceptions of 
corporate governance and perhaps nurtured the rise of a new CSR discourse. Ever 
since then, the government had adopted a more concerted approach towards 
corporate governance reform, with the aim to recover investors’ confidence. At the 
same time, companies were made aware of the importance of safeguarding the 
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welfare of all stakeholders, not only shareholders. Through the Securities 
Commission improved corporate governance was to include the CSR agenda. Interest 
and concern for CSR has continued with the recent 2012 revision of the MCCG 
emphasising sustainability factors. Enhancement of global competitiveness of 
Malaysian companies to ensure long term business success and to attract foreign 
investment into the country. Multinational companies are awarded tax exemptions 
and many other government incentives. Those appealing benefits together with 
political and social stability has helped to increase the number of foreign-owned 
companies in this country. Besides supporting economic growth, these companies 
has also enhanced the development of CSR by incorporating their CSR culture in the 
country.  
Over the past few years, Malaysia has made great strides in CSR 
development, through adoption to company’s policies, strategies, programmes and 
commitments towards society and environment. The Securities Commission is 
always keen to see more companies incorporate CSR into their corporate governance 
agenda to increase their profile, so that they can gain recognition from the 
perspective of international and domestic institutional investors. 
 
2.8.3 Initiatives and regulations 
In recent years, CSR has attracted much attention from the government, PLCs 
and private companies in Malaysia. This can be seen from various governmental and 
non-governmental efforts in initiatives. In November 2006, to further encourage its 
practise, CSR Malaysia was established. It is a network of corporate and academic 
organisations dedicated to improving responsible business practices. It has the 
objective of raising the level of CSR consciousness among domestic companies and 
to increase their capability to tackle social issues which aim to promote responsible 
business (Ahmad & Saad 2013). Further, the Institute of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Malaysia (ICRM), a not-for-profit network of corporations, was also 
created. Prior to that, government has established the Malaysia Institute of Integrity 
(IIM) in 2004 to promote the practice of ethical principles, good values and integrity 
in both the public and private sectors. There are also regulatory institutions such as 
the Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia Berhad and Khazanah Nasional Berhad 
with a commitment to promote the development of socially responsible business 
practices (Ahmad & Saad 2013). 
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The introduction of different CSR-related awards may also act as a catalyst 
for companies to start taking appropriate action to further CSR implementation. 
These awards act as a “push factor” for CSR diffusion by encouraging companies to 
assimilate CSR values in their business strategies and goals (Selvanathan 2012). 
Awards are given to recognise and honour companies that demonstrate outstanding 
CSR practises as well as reporting. While several awards have ceased to exist, many 
of the awards are still granted as a way of encouraging CSR practices. Table 2.2 
summarises some of the awards. 
 
Table 2.2 Various CSR-related awards in Malaysia 
Year Name of award Issuer 
 
Main Issues 
 
1990 Quality Management Excellence 
Awards 
(QMEA) 
Malaysia Productivity 
Corporation (MPC) 
Top Management Leadership and 
Management of Quality, Use of 
Quality Data and Information, Human 
Resource Management, Customer 
Focus, Quality Assurance of External 
Suppliers, Process Management, 
Quality and Operational/Business 
Results 
1990 Prime Minister’s Quality Award National Productivity 
Corporation (NPC), 
recently known as MPC 
Same as above (applicable to large 
companies) 
1996 Prime Minister’s Hibiscus Award 
(PMHA) 
Business Council for 
Sustainable 
Development 
(BCSDM) 
Environment 
2000 National Annual Corporate 
Reward Awards (NACRA) 
Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA) 
Malaysian Institute of 
Certified Public 
Accountants (MICPA) 
Bursa Malaysia 
3 categories: Employees, 
Communities, Environment 
2002 ACCA Malaysia Environmental 
Reporting Awards (ACCA 
MERA) 
Association of 
Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) 
Corporate transparency 
2002 Malaysian Business Corporate 
Governance Award 
Malaysian Business Corporate Governance 
2004 ACCA Malaysia Environmental 
and Social Reporting Awards 
(ACCA MESRA) 
Association of 
Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) 
2 categories: Environment, Social 
2005 Malaysian Business Ethics 
Excellence Awards 
Business Ethics 
Institute of Malaysia 
(BEIM) 
Business ethic, Code of Ethics 
2007 Prime Minister’s CSR Awards Ministry of Women, 
Family and Community 
Development 
7 categories: Education, Environment, 
Culture & Heritage, Community & 
Social Welfare, Small company CSR, 
Workplace, Media Reporting 
2008 StarBiz-ICR Malaysia Corporate 
Responsibility Awards 
Star Biz & ICR 
Malaysia 
4 categories: Marketplace, Workplace, 
Environment, Community 
2009 Malaysian Sustainability 
Reporting Awards (MaSRA) 
Association of 
Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) 
3 categories: Environment, Economic, 
Social 
Source: Lu (2013)  
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There are also tax incentives for companies to implement CSR programmes. 
Automatic tax exemptions are given for donations made to registered organisations 
such as trusts, foundations and associations through the Lembaga Hasil Dalam 
Negeri (LHDN). Special requests for tax exemptions are also available for certain 
charitable and community projects, for example the conservation or preservation of 
the environment. There is a 7% ceiling on tax rebates (Lu 2013) given for businesses 
incurring expenses on charitable or community projects (relating to education, 
health, housing, infrastructure as and information, and communication technology). 
It is reported that a significant amount of environmental expenditure at RM2,106 
million has been spent on overall environmental compliance by companies in 2010 
and the amount increased to RM2,236.7 million by 2013 (Department of Statistics 
2015). 
 
2.8.4 The environment of CSR reporting in Malaysia 
Reporting on CSR information is now compulsory for all companies. In the 
past, issues related to CSR received little attention from companies, let alone to be 
reported. Most of the earlier companies reporting on social aspects were generally 
large public-based companies with major foreign ownership (Zain 1999). The 
reluctance of companies to report CSR information can be attributed to many factors. 
Among others: costliness, fear of disclosing information that is commercially 
sensitive, fear that increase disclosure will encourage society to demand greater 
social responsibility and management not being accustomed to reporting non-
financial information (Zain 1999). It is also likely that companies prefer to keep their 
corporate affairs internally (Zain 1999; Thompson & Zakaria 2004; Haniffa & Cooke 
2005; Aaijaz & Ibrahim 2012). Companies in Malaysia are commonly less keen to 
report due to a lack of pressure from stakeholders, as well as weak legislation 
enforcement pertaining to CSR practices. Furthermore, most companies in 
developing countries have their focus more on accumulating profits to accelerate 
growth (Zain 1999). In view of this constraint, CSR reporting is not their primary 
concern. Nevertheless, if a company chooses to report on CSR information, they 
prefer to make it in the simplest form.  
To assist companies in reporting on CSR activities, there are several 
authoritative guidelines that explicitly make reference to environmental and later, 
CSR reporting. These include the publications of FRS 101 and FRS 137 (formerly 
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known as MASB 1 and MASB 20) by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) in 1999 and 2001, respectively; the MCCG in 2000; the ACCA’s 
Environmental Reporting Guidelines in 2003; and later the Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines in 2005. For instance, through the MASB Financial Reporting Standard 
(FRS) 101, companies are promoted to disclose any information that can guide users 
to make better decisions. FRS 137 shows the disclosure requirements for the 
recognition of contingent liabilities which include environmental liabilities and 
assets. In September 2006, Bursa Malaysia launched its CSR framework for 
publically listed companies. This is a set of voluntary and flexible guidelines that 
outline key focal areas and initiatives covering the environment, community, 
workplace and marketplace. As part of the GLCs Transformation Programme, the 
Silver Book was also launched by Khazanah Malaysia Berhad in the same year. It 
addresses matters related to responsibility and ethics. GLCs were encouraged to 
include CSR in their business objectives and corporate philosophy (Zainal et al. 
2013b). This was in line with the primary commercial objective of GLCs to serve the 
nation. These efforts are clearly geared towards improving the reporting of CSR. 
With enhanced information, stakeholders and investors can make better decisions. 
Reporting on CSR information was initially a voluntary practice. During that 
time, companies were inspired to disclose their CSR activities to improve their 
relationship with stakeholders and to demonstrate a good corporate image (Zainal et 
al. 2013b). Owing to the absence of mandatory CSR reporting standards, there were 
lack of uniformity and scarcity of information (Zainal, Zulkifli & Saleh 2013b). 
Recognizing the importance of guidelines that highlight the issues of transparency 
and accountability, Bursa Malaysia, acting as a complement to MCCG, has 
integrated the Code recommendations in the Listing Requirements to impose such 
requirements for their companies which listed on it. Similar to stock exchange in 
many countries like Spain, Denmark and Sweden, Bursa Malaysia has taken the lead 
in holding companies to higher standards of governance, operational accountability 
and disclosure or transparency of corporate data including CSR information (Zainal 
et al. 2013b). From 2007 Malaysian PLCs were the first in Asia to be mandated to 
report CSR activities. Apart from CSR awards and tax benefits (as discussed in 
Section 2.8.3), there are other initiatives shown in Table 2.3 that demonstrate the 
desire of government and also several other parties in increase CSR reporting. 
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Table 2.3 CSR Regulations, Guidelines and Initiatives 
Year 
 
Initiatives Function 
1974 Environmental Quality Act 
(Regulation) 
This act provides for prevention, abatement and control of 
pollution through licensing, and mandates the conducting of an 
Environmental Assessment Report for proposed private and 
public sector projects to determine and prevent, or prepare for, 
the environmental consequences of the project 
2006 CSR Framework 
(Guideline) 
Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange issued a set of guidelines for 
Malaysian public listed companies that wish to practice CSR. 
It aims to guide PLCs in defining their CSR priorities, 
implementation and reporting. The Bursa Malaysia CSR 
Framework looks at four main focal areas for CSR practice – 
the Environment, the Workplace, the Community and the 
Marketplace 
2007 CSR in Annual Report 
(Regulation) 
Bursa Malaysia (Stock Exchange of Malaysia) has worked 
closely with regulatory authorities and legislators. Malaysian 
public listed companies are required to include a description of 
the CSR activities or practices undertaken by the listed issuer 
and its subsidiaries or, if there are none, a statement to that 
effect.  This requirement has been incorporated into the Listing 
Requirements of Bursa Malaysia (Appendix 9C, Part A, 
paragraph 29) 
2010 Business Sustainability 
Program 
(Initiative) 
Bursa Malaysia launched its Business Sustainability Program 
to encourage Malaysian public listed companies to include 
sustainability in their business strategies. The program includes 
the publication of a sustainability guide for company directors 
and the introduction of a Sustainability Knowledge Portal on 
Bursa Malaysia’s website 
2015 Sustainability Framework 
(Guideline) 
Introduced by Bursa Malaysia with the aim of improving listed 
issuers' sustainability disclosures, with specific focus being 
given to managing and reporting material sustainability risks 
and opportunities 
2016 Sustainability Engagement 
Series 
(Initiative) 
These programmes are customised for mainly 2 groups of 
participants: listed issuers' directors, CEOs/CFOs, and Chief 
Sustainability Officers/practitioners. The series is intended to 
enhance participants' understanding of the significance of 
embedding sustainability into corporate strategy and 
implementing sustainability throughout the organisation 
(including preparing them in their sustainability disclosures 
pursuant to the amended Listing Requirements) 
Source: Author’s initiative 
Despite mandatory CSR reporting for all listed companies, there is lack of 
specific requirements on the content and extent of the reporting. This provides an 
opportunity for wide variability of CSR reporting. CSR reporting symbolises 
reputation through impressive reports (Sharma 2013) rather than fulfilling 
transparency and accountability functions (Zainal et al. 2013b). On the contrary, 
companies that pose threats to the environment are normally passive in CSR 
reporting (Ahmad and Mohamad 2014). There was also a lack of understanding 
around key CSR concepts of supply chain management, product responsibility and 
stakeholder engagement as revealed in a survey by CSR Asia in 2008. Earlier studies 
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(e.g. Hasnah, Sofri, Sharon & Ishak 2006; Janggu, Joseph & Madi 2007; Nik Ahmad 
& Sulaiman 2004; Saleh, Zulkifli & Muhamad 2010; Thompson & Zakaria 2004) 
showed that workplace initiatives have been the preferred theme reported, followed 
by marketplace and community while environment was the theme least disclosed. 
The environmental theme seems to be acknowledged most by companies that have 
huge impacts on the environment (Amran & Devi 2008), such as manufacturing, 
plantation and industrial products sectors (Saleh et al. 2010). Although there is a 
gradual increase in CSR reporting, the government and other related agencies are 
constantly striving to improve the quality of the reporting. In a recent effort to assist 
companies in producing better CSR reports, Bursa Malaysia has announced a new 
guideline called the Sustainability Framework in 2015 which emphasises reporting 
material sustainability risks and opportunities. This initiative should change the 
nature and level of CSR reporting by companies in the future.  
 
2.9 Conclusions 
This study aims to determine whether corporate governance has any impact 
on company CSR reporting behaviour. Differences in CSR practices among countries 
are observed. Prior to that, some background of Malaysia has also been explained. 
Initially the chapter outlined the historical development and the legal system 
governing Malaysia. Regarding the economy, this chapter highlighted early 
economic development and how it survived the severe Asian Financial Crisis. 
Culture and structure of company ownership were also examined. This chapter has 
finally discussed the development of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
In discussing corporate governance, two important elements were featured; 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the Minority Shareholders 
Watchdog Group. Further, the unique interplay between government and politics in 
Malaysia which has led to several issues in corporate governance was also discussed. 
Being at the apex of Malaysian corporate governance, the role of board of directors 
was highlighted, examining board composition, board structure and processes. 
Finally, the evolvement of CSR in Malaysia was discussed.  
Since the economic downturn in 1997, the government has taken steps to 
strengthen corporate governance and reporting quality by implementing and 
enforcing new rules and regulations. Following that, better transparency has been 
exhibited through improved levels of reporting of both financial and non-financial 
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items. Explicitly, it appears that better corporate governance can contribute to 
reporting enhancement. Nevertheless, an in depth examination into the relationship 
between corporate governance and CSR reporting is likely to provide clarity on this 
issue. To this end, the next chapter provides a review of the theoretical literature that 
forms a framework to examine the link between corporate governance and CSR 
reporting.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Experience without theory is blind, but theory without experience is merely intellectual play  
 Immanuel Kant 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical background within which 
the relationship between corporate governance and CSR reporting is examined. 
Subsequent to the introduction section, this chapter has two main sections. Section 
3.2 discusses theories applied in this study. The theories are then explained 
specifically in four sub-sections. A conclusion of this chapter is provided in Section 
3.3. 
 
3.2 Theories in CSR reporting 
A theory is an explanation of the relationship between two or more 
observable attributes of individuals or groups. The theory attempts to establish a link 
between what the researcher observes and the conceptual understanding of why 
certain phenomena are related to each other in a particular way (Frankfort-Nachmias 
& Leon-Guerrero 2010). In short, a theory is a set of interrelated concepts, 
definitions and propositions that explains or predicts events or situations by 
specifying relations among variables. Theories vary in the extent to which they have 
been conceptually developed and empirically tested; however, testability is an 
important feature of a theory (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero 2010). There 
are several well-developed theoretical perspectives that are available to researchers 
to aid them in exploring the issues of corporate governance and CSR. Studies 
examining the link between both issues have been generally informed by a number of 
theories such as legitimacy and stakeholder theories (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; 
Anas et al. 2015), agency and resource dependence theories (Deegan 2002), political 
economy theory (Amran & Devi 2008), neo-institutional sociology theory (Amran 
2007; Amran & Haniffa 2011) and of late, shared value theory (Abdulrazak & 
Ahmad 2014). This is to suggest that societal, political and economic issues cannot 
be isolated from one another (Gray, Owen & Adams 1996). Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 
(1995) propose three broad groups of theories in CSR research: decision-usefulness 
studies, economic theory studies, and social and political theory studies. In the 
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decision-usefulness theory, it is assumed that companies disclose CSR information 
because of a belief in the users' usefulness of this information. For studies using 
economic theory, like agency theory for instance assumes that voluntary disclosure 
by company is used as a means of reducing agency costs that could arise in the form 
of legislation and regulation (Joseph 2010). Meanwhile, the social and political 
theory group consists of stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and political economy 
theory (Gray et al. 1995). These theories are claimed to be neither separate nor 
competing (Amran 2011). Deegan (2006) sees many similarities between stakeholder 
and legitimacy theory. Further, institutional theory, has similarities with legitimacy 
theory in understanding how organisations recognise and respond to changing social 
and institutional pressures and expectations (Deegan 2006). Both theories are looking 
at the same issue which is about gaining legitimacy and homogenisation towards 
conformance with social values and norms (Joseph 2010). These aspects are 
considered essential for social acceptance by society.  
Despite the various theories adopted in explaining CSR practices, there is no 
dominant theory that is capable of fully explaining the CSR phenomenon (Amran & 
Siti-Nabiha 2009; Reverte 2009). A theory can only provide a partial explanation and 
it depends on the scope and the variables that the researcher intends to investigate 
(Amran 2007; Dalton & Dalton 2005). Gray et al. (1995) claim CSR reporting is a 
very complex activity unable to be explained adequately by any single theoretical 
point of view. Thus, in order to obtain a fuller and superior explanation of CSR 
reporting, it is suggested that scholars develop multi-theoretic approaches (Dalton & 
Dalton 2005; Deegan 2002). In view of that, studying CSR with multiple theories is 
logical, as the concept is multidimensional and is expected to impact stakeholders in 
different ways. Gray et al. (1995) claim that social and political theories provide 
more insightful theoretical perspectives to CSR disclosure. Nevertheless, through 
their literature review of peer reviewed journal articles from 2000 to 2015, Jain and 
Jamali (2016) discover that there are four main theoretical frameworks that guide 
empirical research at the intersection of corporate governance and CSR. They are: 
agency theory, institutional theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency 
theory. In an attempt to explain the influence of corporate governance on company 
CSR reporting behaviour, this thesis adopts these four theories and these are 
explained in the following sub-sections. 
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3.2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory has been the most influential in explaining corporate 
governance (Jain & Jamali 2016). Agency theory explains how to best organise an 
agency relationship, where Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the 
relationship as “a contract under which the principal(s) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent”. Agency theory assumes that principals 
(shareholders) and agents (managers and board members) have divergent interests, 
risk tolerances, capacities and information (Jain & Jamali 2016). Due to different risk 
preferences, they always seek to maximise own benefits and personal utility 
(Chambers, Harvey, Mannion, Bond & Marshall 2013) through wealth expropriation 
from other shareholders and stakeholders (Fama & Jensen 1983b). Thus, moral 
responsibility to act in someone else’s interest runs second to self-interest. Agency 
loss is the difference between the best possible outcome for the principal and the 
consequences of the acts of the agent. The more the agent’s interest deviate from the 
interest of the principal, the higher the agency loss. In a contract, both parties will 
need to monitor and find ways to ensure that their interests are aligned. Otherwise, 
companies are likely to face agency problems and incur agency loss. The principal is 
forced to implement certain incentive systems and monitoring mechanisms to curb 
agent opportunism. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest two mechanisms to achieve 
this: transparency and monitoring. The transparency mechanism requires 
management to disclose relevant information to help investors to evaluate whether 
the company’s resources have been managed in their best interest or not.  A higher 
disclosure policy helps to reduce information asymmetry and ensures investors pay 
higher prices for shares (Sartawi, Hindawi, Bsoul & Ali 2014). The second 
mechanism is to effectively monitor the behaviour and actions of management. 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001) board monitoring ensures that management 
behaves in shareholders’ interests and discloses credible information. This is vital 
since management is less inclined to provide investors with full and fair information 
if disclosure is left to their discretion (Sartawi et al. 2014). These explanation implies 
that agency theory regards board of directors as an instrument of control which 
reduces agency costs while maximizing shareholder wealth (Zhang 2012).   
Agency theory generally concerns the principal-agent relationships between 
managers and capital providers who can either be shareholders or debt holders 
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(Jensen & Meckling 1976). This relationships is especially important in developed 
countries where ownership of shares is dispersed leaving shareholders with little 
power and hence little incentive to monitor management. Consequently, agency 
conflicts are pronounced in this type of agency setting. On the contrary, developed 
countries are known for their concentrated ownership patterns. This provides direct 
controls of shareholders upon management. As such, shareholders are able to steer 
managers’ to act in their best interests. While this situation seems to suggest a 
weaker agency effect in developing countries (Mustapha & Che Ahmad 2011), it is 
actually the main source of principal–principal conflicts, which represent a key 
corporate governance challenge in these nations (Young et al. 2008). It is an 
environment where a dominant shareholder controls senior managers at the expense 
of minor shareholders’ interests (Dharwadkar, George & Brandes 2000; Young et al. 
2008) and poor institutional protection of minority shareholders exists concurrently 
(Young et al. 2008). Gaining effective control of a company enables the controlling 
owner to determine not just how the company is run, but also how profits are being 
shared among shareholders. Although minority shareholders are entitled to the cash 
flow rights corresponding to their share of equity ownership, they face the 
uncertainty that an entrenched controlling owner may opportunistically deprive them 
of their rights. These conflicts are unique in the sense that they occur ‘between two 
classes of principals, namely, controlling shareholders (often a family or the state) 
and minority shareholders. Therefore they are different in nature than agency 
conflicts described by the conventional principal–agent theory.  
Regardless of which type of agency conflict, the role of the board of directors 
is imperative in mitigating the problem. Generally, companies in developing 
countries are characterised by heavy debt financing. Borrowing creates a direct 
obligation for repayment. Although creditors are not given the power to influence the 
companies on CSR matters, they can indirectly sway directors since the cost attached 
to CSR activities might jeopardise the company’s ability to pay their debts. From the 
company’s perspective, there is a need to maintain a good re-payment pattern since 
the company may require additional capital from creditors. In light of these 
problems, independent directors especially, are instrumental in aligning the conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders. The principal-principal agency 
problem can also emerge when the role of CEO and Chairperson is entrusted to the 
same individual. This unified role brings about centralisation of power that provides 
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the CEO with full authority to make all decisions; most likely in favour of the CEO’s 
wants. Hence, CSR practices are often ignored. To counter this action, separating the 
role of CEO and Chairperson is highly recommended.  
 
3.2.2 Neo-institutional sociology 
Neo-institutional sociology is one of the main theoretical perspectives used to 
understand organisational behaviour. Institutional approaches emphasise the role of 
rules in shaping organisational forms and processes. Institutional rules are shared 
norms and expectations held by members of a society and they function as tradition 
to which organisations adapt in exchange for legitimacy. Legitimacy is the 
generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions. The sociology approach to institutional theory suggests that 
individuals, groups and companies seek social approval for the right to exist (social 
legitimacy) (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013). Hence, compliance with certain rules and 
procedures, as well as, adoption of certain organisational practices so as to attain 
legitimacy is crucial. These are done through isomorphism; a process that forces one 
unit to conform to other units in the population that deal with similar situations (Di 
Maggio & Powell 1983). Accordingly, organisations will become progressively more 
alike within certain areas and comply with the expectations of the wider institutional 
environment (Joseph 2010). Organisations that adopt recognised formal structures 
and conform to external assessment criteria as seen as legitimate thus enhancing their 
survival chances. In view of that, legitimacy and isomorphism are believed to 
complement each other in ensuring the success of an organisation. 
Isomorphism could be achieved through three different mechanisms, 
specifically, coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive isomorphism is the most 
cited type of institutional force (Joseph 2010). This type of isomorphism is a result of 
pressures exerted by organisations that the company depends upon on. It can 
originate from political influence, regulation, law and the public at large (Amran & 
Siti-Nabiha 2009). The higher the inter-organisational dependence, the greater the 
level of coercive isomorphism. In the case of CSR, it is argued that regulations and 
regulatory enforcements have been the main stimulus of the practices that caused all 
companies in industry to implement similar practices (Joseph 2010). Larrinaga 
(2007) provides example on this isomorphism mentioning the existence of regulation 
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to make environmental disclosures compulsory in European financial statements. 
The same rule applies in Malaysia especially for public listed companies. Meanwhile 
mimetic isomorphism is fostered due to uncertainty between means and ends and 
ambiguity of goals. A company will tend to model itself on other successful 
companies when proper reference or guidelines are absent (Di Maggio & Powell 
1983). It will imitate or benchmark those companies that are viewed to be more 
legitimate and successful than others. Normative pressure stems from professional 
networks. The more reliance on academic credentials in choosing personnel and 
participation in trade and professional organisations, the greater the extent to which 
the organisation becomes similar to other organisations in the field (Di Maggio & 
Powell 1983). This is achieved via formal and informal communication, for example, 
seminars, meeting and websites (Joseph 2010). In short, this theory implies that 
companies are pressured to become similar due to environmental constraints and also 
network ties with other similar organisations. 
Institutional theory has been used to examine CSR issues and practices since 
the decision to report on CSR activities results from both external pressure and 
internal forces. Neo-institutional sociology explains how companies adopt policies 
and procedures that are considered socially legitimate by external stakeholders. 
Compliance with good CSR practices in the form of increased CSR reporting can 
facilitate congruence of corporate goals and norms with those of the larger society, 
thereby improve company legitimacy. As CSR reporting is increasingly becoming a 
common practise, undoubtedly, an institutionalisation process is evident. Figure 1 
summarises the model illustrating the institutionalisation of CSR. 
 
Figure 3.1: Institutionalisation process of CSR reporting phenomenon
 
 
 Source: Amran (2007) 
 
Business organisations operating in different nations are embedded in distinct 
institutional environments and experience different degrees of coercive pressures to 
Sources of institutional 
factors
Mechanism of 
institutionalisation:
* Cohesive
* Mimetic
* Normative
Adoption of CSR
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engage in CSR. For CSR in developing countries, government has an important role 
in motivating socially responsible behaviour in companies. Based on coercive 
isomorphism, neo-institutional sociology suggests that regulative institutional 
pressures can force economic units to conform to expected social behaviour and 
international standards as it can enhance legitimacy and social acceptance (Arya & 
Zhang 2009). In the past decade, many developing countries have passed legislation 
on CSR related issues. Although CSR is understood as doing more than what is 
required by law, it is contended that government regulation plays a considerable part 
in formulating the element of social initiatives, and providing guidance for its 
implementation. In neo-institutional sociology, managers have incentives to increase 
CSR information to comply with regulatory requirements and social norms in order 
to justify their actions and to deflect criticisms regarding their activities. Arya and 
Zhang (2009) argue that during the early stages of institutional reforms, political, 
legal and societal changes in institutions create significant volatility and uncertainty. 
Accordingly, diverse organisational responses to social reform policies can be 
expected. Nevertheless, as the new institutional regime eventually becomes the main 
driver of social change, normative and mimetic institutional pressures are likely to 
promote greater isomorphism in corporate social strategies to achieve legitimacy 
(Arya & Zhang 2009). 
Mimetic isomorphism, on the other hand, describes what seems to be 
institutionalised conceptually correct (Di Maggio & Powell 1983). Hence, companies 
tend to copy or model procedures used in other organisations. Normally, large 
companies benchmark against their peers while smaller companies benchmark 
against industry leaders. With regard to CSR practices, similar businesses competing 
in the same industry are more likely to benchmark and imitate those companies 
considered to be superior. This is done with the intention of being at par with other 
companies besides yearning for increased reputation (Othman, Darus & Arshad 
2011).  
Normative isomorphism takes place when companies internalise the norms 
that derive from the professionalisation of a field (de Villiers & Alexander 2014; Di 
Maggio & Powell 1983). Companies seek professional CSR reporting guidance in 
the form of consultants and guidelines, e.g. the GRI guidelines. Companies 
increasingly follow the GRI guidelines (KPMG 2013) because they believe it will 
assist in producing a good CSR report. In addition, training and professional 
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membership socialise individuals into common beliefs regarding what constitutes 
accepted norms (de Villiers & Alexander 2014). For example, MBA programmes 
teach similar norms; accounting bodies, such as chartered accounting and certified 
public accounting bodies encourage similar norms; and the same goes for other 
degree programmes and professions. Table 3.1 explains in more detail the general 
transition of a field from a formative phase (mimetic and coercive isomorphism) to a 
more mature phase (normative isomorphism). 
 
Table 3.1: Application of institutional theory 
 
 
 
Mimetic Isomorphism Coercive Isomorphism 
Normative 
Isomorphism 
Phase Formative phase Formative phase Field matures 
Characteristics Environmental 
uncertainty 
Public influence and the 
problem of legitimacy 
Professionalisation and 
standardization 
Forces Uncertain how to 
respond 
External pressure from 
institutions the 
organization is 
dependent on internal 
pressure to conform to 
societal expectations 
Professionals receives 
similar training and 
interact with other 
professionals, 
socialising them into 
similar views 
Response Copy superior 
performer 
Conformance to 
demands 
Conformance to 
expectations 
Processes Benchmarking 
Identify to best 
practices 
Informal or formal 
influences 
Persuasion 
Internalization of 
established norms and 
values through social 
or peer network 
Applied to CSR 
reporting 
Public listed 
companies follow 
more profitable 
companies or 
companies which have 
received recognition in 
CSR practices 
CSR reporting in 
response to real or 
anticipated pressure in 
the environment, such 
as following legislation 
or pre-empting 
legislation i.e. 
following corporate 
governance guidelines, 
Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirement 
Management’s MBA 
and chartered 
accountant training 
combined with 
consultants’ shared 
experiences with GRI 
and Bursa Malaysia 
CSR Framework, 
leading to these 
guidelines 
implementation and 
institutionalisation 
Adaptation from de Villiers and Alexander (2014) 
 
In conclusion, the common idea of institutional theory is to encourage 
homogenisation and achieve legitimacy. While the type of pressure exerted within 
fields by institutions differs as well as the variation of cultures and environment, 
companies will typically copy the practices of their peers when new activities reach a 
degree of acceptability or are seen to deliver important business benefits. Companies 
would also increase their reporting if they saw their competitors doing it more. Thus, 
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there is some evidence of isomorphic pressure (Di Maggio & Powell 1983) in 
relation to reporting amongst companies. 
 
3.2.3 Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory derives from the economics and sociology 
disciplines and is concerned with the distribution of power in the company. It was 
developed by Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). According to 
resource dependence theory, the company is a combination of various tangible and 
intangible assets as well as capabilities. Yet, a company cannot be completely self-
sufficient in terms of all its resource needs. A company is dependent on its 
surroundings to guarantee the flow of critical resources. Thus, to survive and thrive, 
it should seek to collaborate with them to acquire higher performance in the long run 
(Ramanathan, Poomkaew & Nath 2014). It has been found that interactions with 
important external groups help to improve a company’s environmental performance. 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) found that companies with greater dependence on their 
local community exhibit better environmental performance in that community, while 
Ramanathan et al. (2014) linked improvements in environmental performance to 
stakeholder pressures, economic pressures as well as environmental regulation. 
For the purpose of managing the external relationships to leverage influence 
and resources, resource dependency theory suggests mandating the role to the board 
of directors. They are viewed as strategic resources who are valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable (Chambers et al. 2013). The resource dependence perspective 
views the board as one of the instruments that management may use to facilitate 
access to resources critical to the company’s success. Hence, it is not surprising that 
board members are selected for their background, contacts and skills in ‘boundary-
spanning’ (Aguilera, Desender and Kabbach-Castro2012). Specifically, board of 
directors provide four benefits to the organisation: (1) advice, (2) access to 
information, (3) safeguard and preferential access to resources and (4) legitimacy 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). The board provides security in the form of ensuring 
proper disclosure of information. Connections from the directors’ business contacts 
are a benefit to the company. Boards consisting of directors with ties to strategically 
related organisations are believed to be able to provide better advice and counsel 
(Aguilera et al. 2012). The connections they provide promise a better information 
flow, more open communication, and/or potential influence with government 
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(Aguilera et al. 2012). It is also beneficial if a company has a representation of 
financial institutions on their boards as this will provide easy access to financial 
resources. The types of financial institutions represented on aboard affect the finance 
the companies obtain (Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009). The heavy reliance on 
board reflects its potential in fostering long-term relationships with key external 
constituencies. This, in turn, minimises uncertainty caused by external environmental 
factors and dependence on outside organisations (Chambers et al. 2013). There are 
several studies that highlight the role of the board of directors in ensuring the flow of 
critical resources (knowledge, personal ties or legitimacy) to the company as 
portrayed by resource dependence theory (e.g. Hafsi & Turgut 2013; de Villiers, 
Naiker & van Staden 2011; Mallin, Michelon & Raggi 2013). Hafsi and Turgut 
(2013) found the diversity of the board has a positive effect on the company’s social 
performance. de Villiers et al. (2011) found that environmental performance is higher 
in companies that have larger boards, larger representation of active CEOs on the 
board, and more legal experts on the board.  
Taken together, this theory argues that corporate boards are one of the 
mechanisms for managing external dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), 
reducing environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer 1972), which in turn lessens the 
transaction costs associated with environmental interdependency. Inevitably, board 
members are a rich source of knowledge and guidance (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) and 
can provide critical linkages to resources and leverage social capital through their 
social networks (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). Directors with backgrounds in finance or 
law facilitates the company in obtaining financial resources or when dealing with 
authorities, especially concerning CSR issues. In return, these benefits enable 
managers to adopt specific pro-social practices that could be value-enhancing for the 
company (Jain & Jamali 2016) and ultimately aid in the survival of the company 
(Aguilera et al. 2012). In the same way, humanitarian activities, environmental 
protection and employee welfare is often associated with women than men; 
suggesting that female directors maybe able to lead the company to adopt better CSR 
practices. These explanations provide strong foundation for the usage of resource 
dependence theory in relation to the role of board of directors. Hillman et al. (2009) 
assert that resource dependence theory is a more successful lens for understanding 
boards than agency theory despite its rare application. 
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3.2.4 Stakeholder-agency theory 
Hill and Jones (1992) developed stakeholder-agency theory through their 
views of the shortcomings of agency theory. Generally, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
view agency contract as involving primarily the agents (managers) and the principal 
(shareholders) only. The domain of agency theory are relationships that mirror the 
basic agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative 
behaviour, but have differing goals and attitudes toward risk (Shankman 1999). 
Agency theory only recognises the economic responsibilities between principals and 
agents. The interests of the principal are viewed as having primary importance. 
Nevertheless, it is silent on other responsibilities that may be implied in the agency 
perspective (Culpan & Trussel 2005). Hill and Jones (1992) take the initiative to 
expand the accountability of the agents to include other stakeholders. These 
stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, customers and communities are assumed to 
have a legitimate claim on the company (Hill & Jones 1992). Although stakeholders 
are generally instrumental to the company’s survival, their importance varies 
according to the size of their stake in the company. The stakeholder-agency theory 
highlights the role of the managers who have direct control over decision making in 
the company. It demonstrates that managers are also agents for other stakeholders. It 
is increasingly acknowledged that managing for stakeholders involves attention to 
more than simply maximising shareholder wealth. Attention to the interests and well-
being of those who can assist or hinder the achievement of the company's objectives 
is imperative (Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997). Stakeholder theory addresses morals 
and values explicitly as a central feature of managing companies (Culpan & Trussel 
2005). Hence the weakness of agency theory is addressed through the adoption of 
stakeholder theory simultaneously. 
The cornerstone of stakeholder-agency theory lies in the assumption of an 
inefficient market mechanism which brings about power differentials between parties 
to a contract. Hill and Jones (1992) introduce the concept of friction that leads to 
market inefficiency. Among others, friction can take the form of barriers to entry and 
exit and also organisation inertia. Unlike agency theory that assumes efficient 
markets, stakeholder-agency theory predicts that markets require time to make 
adjustments to friction before reaching equilibrium. Stakeholder-agency theory also 
puts forward the idea that apart from shareholders, other stakeholders are eligible for 
a claim on the company (Hill & Jones 1992). Consequently, this reduces the 
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availability of funds that can be utilised for company growth. Divergence of interest 
between managers and stakeholders further limits the claim available for 
stakeholders due to utility loss besides lowering the ability to maximise shareholders 
interests. To align these interests, various accountability mechanisms are employed. 
Managerial ownership is another measure usually employed to capture 
agency problems between managers and shareholders (Shuto & Takada 2010). 
Earlier studies acknowledge two types of managerial ownership effects. The 
incentive alignment effect predicts that managers with larger shareholdings have 
stronger incentives to act in line with shareholders’ interests, thus reducing 
opportunistic managerial behaviour (Shuto & Takada 2010). However, when 
managerial ownership is at the lower level, it poses higher agency costs. Meanwhile, 
the management entrenchment effect suggests that larger shareholdings by managers 
enable them to have greater control over companies. As such, they are in better 
position to pursue their own private interests since they are less likely to be 
disciplined (Shuto & Takada 2010) and are also a way of stabilising their position in 
the company. Despite this claim, scholars believe that the entrenchment effect is 
ineffective if a manager has a sufficiently large number of shares. Nevertheless, 
when the shareholding is extremely low, managers have no control of the company. 
In short, arguments by Shuto and Takada (2010) suggest that the entrenchment effect 
is dominant within intermediate levels of ownership patterns. With regard to family 
owned companies, shareholdings by managers are likely to have an entrenchment 
effect instead of helping to congruent the interests of conflicting parties. Since 
managers are usually appointed from family members, managers’ ownership 
provides additional power to them to prioritise their interests. Holding the view that 
CSR practices are costly and do not provide immediate returns, managers who own 
company shares have the power to opt for low reporting of CSR information.  
Financial institutions as major capital providers enable them to exert 
influence over management. The ease of exit from the market to some extent 
determines the governance role of institutional investors like banks (Hill & Jones 
1992). Exit can be costly as the option may lead to massive losses to specific 
investors. Additionally, some institutional investors, particularly the more activist, 
favour both financial and social performance criteria in assessing company 
performance. Hence, institutional investors are considered suitable to control agency 
problems through their monitoring function. Their ability to exert influence on the 
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management helps to assist the enhancement of CSR reporting. The integration of 
stakeholder and agency theory by Hill and Jones (1992) provides multiple insights in 
describing managers’ roles conventionally and socially, besides the controlling role 
of stakeholders. Given these explanations, stakeholder-agency theory can provide a 
useful foundation in explaining the relationship between ownership by managers and 
the levels of institutional and CSR reporting.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the theories that will be applied in explaining the 
relationship between corporate governance attributes and CSR reporting. Since most 
theories on CSR reporting offer a single analytical perspective, they may have 
limitations in explaining CSR issues. In view of that deficiency, this study relies on 
multiple theories to examine companies’ behaviour towards CSR practices. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Design is the process of expending considerable time, thought and energy into making 
something that looks and feels effortless  
Christopher Anton 
4.1 Introduction 
This study aims to determine the pattern of CSR reporting as well as to 
investigate whether the revealed reporting form is shaped by corporate governance 
mechanisms. In fulfilling the objectives of the research, the study was focused on 
nine research questions. To answer these questions, this chapter specifically 
addresses the methodology used in this study. 
This chapter begins with explaining the research design in Section 4.2. In 
Section 4.3, the sample used in the study is outlined. Description and measurement 
of independent, dependent and control variables is done in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 
presents the econometric models used for estimation. Section 4.6 discusses how data 
are analysed. Finally this chapter is summarised in section 4.7. 
4.2 Research design 
The research design is the plan that enables a researcher to seek clarifications 
to the problems investigated and assists him or her in the various stages of the 
research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero 2010). A research design refers to 
the overall strategy to integrate the different components of the study coherently and 
in a logical way. In other words, it is a detailed outline of how an investigation will 
take place (De Vaus 2001). Fundamentally, research design links research questions 
to the data to be collected and then the results of a research from which conclusions 
are drawn. A proper research design helps minimise bias but maximises the 
reliability of data. Subsequently, it assists in producing quality information and 
reduces experimental errors.  
Research design revolves around two types of approach, namely quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (Zikmund 2003).The quantitative paradigm is based on 
positivism (Sale, Lohfeld & Brazil 2002) and adopts a deductive process (Hyde 
2000)underpinned by systematically collecting and analysing numerical data 
(Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar & Newton 2002). This helps to make generalisation 
across groups of people or explain a particular phenomenon. It uses deductive 
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reasoning requiring the researcher to form a hypothesis and then collects data and 
uses them in an investigation of the problem. After analysis is done, conclusions are 
made which then prove whether the hypotheses are true or false. Quantitative 
research focus on the confirmation of extant theory rather than the discovery and 
development of new theory (Guba & Lincoln 1994). Normally, this type of research 
is aimed at determining the relationship between an independent variable and a 
dependent or outcome variable in a population. 
 Quantitative research designs are either descriptive (subjects usually 
measured once) or experimental (subjects measured before and after a treatment). A 
descriptive study establishes only associations between variables. In other words, it 
attempts to determine the extent of a relationship between two or more variables 
using statistical data.  In this type of design, relationships between and among a 
number of facts are sought and interpreted (BCPS 2010). The outcome of this type of 
research is usually recognition of trends and patterns in data. However, but it does 
not go so far in its analysis to prove causes for these observed patterns. Variables are 
only identified and are studied as they occur in a natural setting. When analyses and 
conclusions are made, determining causes must be done carefully, as other variables, 
both known and unknown, could still affect the outcome (BCPS 2010).  
Arguably, every research designs have their own drawbacks that renders 
limited conclusion to be drawn (Scandura & Williams 2000). Further, Crotty (1998) 
claims that there are no set method tied to any particular methodology and theoretical 
perspective, however, certain methods fit more comfortably with certain 
methodologies and theoretical perspectives. Commonly, selection of the chosen 
approach depends primarily on what is intended to be accomplished by the 
researcher (Cavana, Delahaye & Sekaran 2001). This study employs a positivist 
paradigm, focusing on the quantitative approach. The basis of this study stems from 
the need to make generalisations on company CSR reporting patterns. 
Fundamentally, it is believed that there is an underlying and measurable reality that 
governs company behaviour. The idea was to determine the pattern of CSR reporting 
by companies and to find possible influence of corporate governance mechanisms in 
explaining the pattern. In doing so, various publicly available information were 
gathered using company annual reports; representing objective and replicable data 
sources. Data were then transformed using various accounting formula to obtain CSR 
index and corporate governance attributes measures. To this end, the method chosen 
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for this study relate to quantitative method; specifying on descriptive research. 
Neuman (2000) argues that descriptive research has dominated much social research 
since it is suitable in presenting a picture of the specific details of a situation, social 
setting or relationship. Further, descriptive research has the ability to describe a 
phenomenon more clearly by offering a profile of the factors (Zikmund 2003). 
Hence, this justifies the usage of a descriptive quantitative research method in this 
study. 
One of the basic procedures of a quantitative research is data collection. Prior 
to that, a sample of the study will need to be determined. The next section explains 
how the sample is specified and data are collected.  
4.3 Sampling 
Generally, there are four ways to obtain a sample that are selecting largest 
companies, selecting large, medium and unlisted companies, selecting companies 
from The Times 100 and also selecting “interesting” or “best practice” (Gray et al. 
1995). This study draws on the largest non-financial companies listed on the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia from 2008 until 2013. This sample was chosen based on 
several grounds. Public companies are normally well established with healthy 
financial positions and also strong business prospects. These companies are 
perceived to embrace good corporate governance. Prior to being listed on the Main 
Market, a company is required to have an uninterrupted profit after tax (PAT) for 3 
to 5 years with the accumulation amounting to a minimum of RM (Ringgit Malaysia) 
20 million. Also, its recent full year PAT should be worth at least RM6 million. 
Upon listing, the company should have a recorded market capitalisation of RM500 
million. These criteria reflect the large and stable the companies that are listed on the 
Main Market. Hence, these companies are believed to have more resources to 
embark on social and environmental initiatives (Cormier & Magnan 2003; 
Ramasamy & Ting 2004). With good corporate governance in place as well as 
readily available CSR reports following the mandatory disclosure requirement passed 
in 2007, these companies are presumed to be suitable sample for this study. 
Nevertheless, this study focus on listed companies in Malaysia only. Since corporate 
governance practices differ among countries and generally not internationally 
comparable, selecting a single country helps to control for differences in corporate 
governance systems.  
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This study takes the form of a longitudinal study that offers a number of 
advantages. Primarily, it enables detection of development of changes in the 
characteristics of the target population at both the group and the individual level. In 
other words, it has the ability to show clear patterns of a variable overtime. As a 
result, sequences of events can be established. Longitudinal study is unique as it 
provides useful data about individual changes. Hence, it is perfect for doing research 
on development trends. In addition, it ensures high accuracy when it comes to 
observation of changes since the focus is on the same object, overtime. While the 
usage of longitudinal study seems appealing, there are several hiccups that requires 
equal attention. Longitudinal study is commonly associated with panel attrition. This 
can reduce the number of useable data. Subsequently, longitudinal study requires a 
large sample size. However, despite its drawbacks, Sartawi et al. (2014) contends 
that this type of study may reveal more dependable trends of companies CSR 
reporting as practices tend to change over time. The large sample size enhances the 
reliability of the results (Jitaree 2015; Farook, Kabir Hassan & Lanis 2011; Burritt, 
Schaltegger, Ferreira, Moulang & Hendro 2010; Cheung, Tan, Ahn & Zhang 2010). 
Earlier studies conducted in the Malaysian context mostly relied on small sample 
sizes: Haji (2013) (85 PLCs), Said, Hariri, Haron & Zainuddin (2011) (150 PLCs), 
Abdullah (2014) (100 PLCs), Said, Omar and Nailah Abdullah (2013) (120 PLCs) 
and Amran and Devi (2008) (133 PLCs). In this study, 450 companies are examined.  
The time span covering 2008 to 2013 were selected for several reasons. First, 
this period is the recovery period from the financial crisis that hit Asian countries 
hard. Second, reporting on CSR information during this period was desirable to gain 
shareholders confidence after the financial downturn. Finally, the time span is 
inclusive of major fundamental reforms of MCCG which took place in 2007 and 
2012. Haji (2013) confirmed that changes in regulation and occurrence of specific 
events bring about changes in company reporting. Considering the reasons already 
noted, the selection for 6 year period is justified as it should provide a clearer picture 
of the trend in CSR reporting. The next section explains how the sample frame. 
 
4.3.1 Data selection and sources 
This study was based on panel data which is data collected for individual 
units observed over a period of time (Korathotage 2012). Panel data is deemed the 
most appropriate type of data for the present study because it uses both cross-
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sectional and time-series data. A number of researchers have applied this class of 
data to investigate issues that could not be studied independently using either time 
series or cross-sectional settings (Greene 2007). Panel data offers several benefits. It 
helps to correct problems of endogeniety (Martínez‐Ferrero, Garcia‐Sanchez & 
Cuadrado‐Ballesteros 2015), results in less collinearity among the variables (Amran 
2011) and provides a better measurement than pure cross section or pure time series 
data (Gujarati 2003; Baltagi 2008). Further, the panel data approach makes it 
possible to control for unobservable heterogeneity presented in the different 
companies in the sample (Martínez‐Ferrero et al. 2015; Himmelberg et al. 2004). 
Further, the availability of a large data set enhances the efficiency of the statistical 
estimates (Hsiao 2007). Panel data analysis has been applied in several previous CSR 
studies (e.g. Mahoney & Roberts 2007; Saleh et al. 2008; Martínez‐Ferrero et al. 
2015; Amran 2011; Korathotage 2012). The data in this study was verified with the 
necessary tests to ascertain that the multiple regression assumptions are not violated. 
In order for a company to be included in the sample, the following 
requirements had to be met for all the six-year period (2008-2013). Firstly, 
companies were continuously listed on Bursa Malaysia. Secondly, companies have 
annual reports available for download. There were 813 companies listed on the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia as at 31st December 2013. However, only 613 companies 
had completely uploaded their annual reports over the six year period. Companies 
were then group into nine sectors according to Bursa Malaysia classifications. 
Generally, all companies are subject to the same regulatory and disclosure 
requirements except for finance companies which also experience material 
differences in their types of operation. Consequently, many prior studies have 
excluded them (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Mohd 
Ghazali 2007; Said et al. 2009). Following this line of research, 136 finance 
companies were excluded from the target population, limiting the population to 477 
companies. The annual reports for each company were downloaded from the Bursa 
Malaysia website at www.bursamalaysia.com.my. Given incomplete information 
contained in annual reports, other data sources were also sought. These are explained 
in Section 4.3.2. After a thorough process of data extraction, 27 companies with 
incomplete data were omitted from the sample. Finally, the total sample comprised 
450 companies, representing 55.35% of the total Bursa Malaysia population as at 31st 
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December 2013. The sample size is larger than previous study in this field. Table 4.1 
explains how the sampled companies were derived.  
 
Table 4.1: Sampling frame 
 
 No of 
companies 
Total 
companies 
No of 
observations 
Total 
observations 
Total companies listed on 31st 
December 2013 
 
813 813 4,878 4,878 
 
Less: companies with incomplete 
annual reports from 2008 - 2013 
 
(200) 613 (1,200) 3,678 
Less: finance companies 
 
(136) 477 (816) 2,862 
Less: companies with missing data 
 
(27) 450 (162) 2,700 
Total companies  
 
 450  2,700 
Total sampled companies in % 55.35 
 
The distribution of the sampled companies categorised by Bursa Malaysia criteria is 
given in Table 4.2.   
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of companies according to Bursa Malaysia criteria 
 
No Sector Number of companies % 
1 Industrial 162 36.00 
2 Trading 104 23.11 
3 Consumer 93 20.67 
4 Construction 33 7.33 
5 Plantation 32 7.11 
6 Technology 18 4.00 
7 Infrastructure 4 0.89 
8 Hotels 4 0.89 
 Total 450 100.00 
 
The companies have been re-classified based on the international two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code as shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Sample company characteristics 
 
SIC 
Code Sector 
Number of 
companies  
Observed 
company 
Observation 
in 
Sector 
in 
    
in the 
sample years % % 
  
Category A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
(AFF)         
01 Agricultural Production - Crops 25 150 5.56 6.89 
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02 Agricultural Production - Livestock 5 30 1.11 
09 Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 1 6 0.22 
            
  Category B: Mining (MIN)         
10 Metal Mining 3 18 0.67 
1.56 13 Oil and Gas Extraction 4 24 0.89 
            
  Category C: Manufacturing (MAN)         
20 Food and Kindered Products 32 192 7.11 
58.67 
21 Tobacco Products 1 6 0.22 
22 Textile Mill Products 2 12 0.44 
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 8 48 1.78 
24 Lumber and Wood Products 25 150 5.56 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 13 78 2.89 
26 Paper and Allied Products 19 114 4.22 
27 Printing and Publishing 7 42 1.56 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 11 66 2.44 
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 4 24 0.89 
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 18 108 4.00 
31 Leather and Leather Products 1 6 0.22 
32 Stone, Clay and Glass Products 21 126 4.67 
33 Primary Metal Industries 23 138 5.11 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 6 36 1.33 
35 Industrial, Machinery and Equipment 15 90 3.33 
36 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 24 144 5.33 
37 Transportation Equipment 11 66 2.44 
39 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 23 138 5.11 
            
  
Category D: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
(EGW)         
49 Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 5 30 1.11 1.11 
            
  Category E: Construction (CON)         
15 General Building Contractors 21 126 4.67 
7.78 
16 Heavy Construction, Ex. Building 14 84 3.11 
            
  Category F: Wholesale Trade (WST)         
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 11 66 2.44 
4.44 
51 Wholesale Trade- Non-Durable Goods 9 54 2.00 
            
  Category G: Retail Trade (RTT)         
53 General Merchandise Stores 4 24 0.89 
2.22 
54 Food Stores 1 6 0.22 
55 Automotive Dealers and Service Stations 3 18 0.67 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 2 12 0.44 
            
  
Category H: Accommodation, Cafes and 
Restaurants (ACR)         
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58 Eating and Drinking Places 1 6 0.22 
2.00 
70 Hotels and Other Lodging Places 8 48 1.78 
            
  Category I: Transport and Storage (TAS)         
42 Trucking and Warehousing 4 24 0.89 
4.89 
44 Water Transportation 11 66 2.44 
45 Transportation By Air 1 6 0.22 
47 Transportation Services 6 36 1.33 
            
  Category J: Communication Services (COM)         
48 Communications 7 42 1.56 1.56 
            
  
Category K: Property and Business Services 
(PBS)         
65 Real Estate 11 66 2.44 
6.44 
73 Business Services 18 108 4.00 
            
  Category L: Education (EDU)         
82 Educational Services 1 6 0.22 0.22 
            
  
Category M: Health and Community Services 
(HCS)         
80 Health Services 8 48 1.78 1.78 
            
  
Category N: Cultural and Recreational 
Services (CUL)         
79 Amusement and Recreational Services 2 12 0.44 0.44 
            
  Total 450 2700 100.00 100.00 
 
The sample is dominated by the manufacturing sector with 58.67% of 
companies. Then follows the Electricity, Gas and Water sector at 11.1% and the 
Construction sector at 7.78%. Meanwhile Education and Cultural and Recreational 
services sectors were among the lowest contributors to the sample with less than 1% 
of companies. Although there seemed to be a huge disparity among the sectors, the 
sample was assumed to be adequate to represent all PLCs during 2008-2013. Figure 
4.1 shows graphically the distribution of companies based on the SIC code. 
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  Figure 4.1: Distribution of sampled companies based on SIC code 
 
 
 
4.4 Description of variables 
In developing a model for hypotheses testing, it is essential to ascertain that 
all important variables are included and irrelevant variables have been omitted. 
Redundant or irrelevant variables can mask the true effects of variables through 
multicollinearity and over-fitting the model (Zikmund 2003). The constructed model 
comprises three categories of variables and an error factor. They are the dependent 
variable (CSR reporting), the independent variables (the selected corporate 
governance mechanisms) and control variables. Meanwhile, the error represents 
changes in the dependent variable that cannot be explained by the independent 
variables and the control variables (Smith 2009). The next section defines and 
measures all variables. 
 
4.4.1 Dependent variable – CSR reporting 
CSR reports give information about economic, environmental, social and 
governance performance.  
 
4.4.1.1 Content analysis 
Those investigating CSR have employed a variety of methodological 
approaches to conduct their research: from case studies (e.g. Adams 2004) and 
interviews (e.g. O'Dwyer 2002), to surveys using questionnaires (e.g. Deegan 
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&Rankin 1997), longitudinal studies (e.g. Guthrie & Parker 1989; O’Dwyer & Gray 
1998) and experiments (e.g. O'Donovan 2002). Still, it appears that the research 
method that is most commonly used to assess companies’ social and environmental 
disclosures is content analysis (Milne & Adler 1999). An observation of empirical 
research done within 2008-2013 by Sapkauskiene and Leitoniene (2014) revealed 
that content analysis is the preferred method in analysing CSR reporting. Berelson 
(1952, p. 18) has defined content analysis as “a technique for objective, systematic, 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” whilst 
Krippendorff (1989) considers it as a research technique that enables replicable and 
valid conclusions to be made from data to their context. This method determines the 
presence of certain words and concepts in the text (Sapkauskiene & Leitoniene 2014) 
and codifies them based on selected criteria (Weber 1990). In the words of 
Djajadikerta and Trireksani (2012), content analysis combines both the qualitative 
and quantitative methods, transforming information into scores.  
Content analysis can be done using either the index approach or volume-
amount approach (Vourvachis 2007). The index approach generally checks for the 
presence or absence of specific items of information, whereas the volume-amount 
approach check for the overall volume of disclosure, most frequently by counting 
words, sentences or proportions of an A4 page. At its simplest, CSR scores can be 
based on a binary coding system; also known as unweighted index to measure the 
extent of CSR reporting. Alternatively, the CSR index can also assess the quality of 
disclosure where it will be based on an ordinal scale; also called weighted index 
which can range from poor to excellent (Guthrie & Abeysekera 2006). Opponents to 
the binary coding system contend that some disclosure items are more important than 
others. Hence it is undesirable to treat all items as being of equal value (Guthrie & 
Abeysekera 2006). Further, Abbott and Monsen (1979) argue that the usage of a 
binary coding system only reflects various CSR activities but fails to measure the 
depth of each activity. In comparison to the volumetric approach, this method can 
cause confusion as it treats disclosure of one item as equal to a company that makes 
50 disclosures. The volumetric approach has flaws as merely counting words without 
examining the sentences will not reflect the exact meaning of the context (Jitaree 
2015). Guthrie et al. (2004) and Guthrie and Abeysekera (2006) also view word 
counting as very subjective. Further, evaluating CSR reporting through the number 
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of words raises reliability concerns as the quality of the reported items may not be 
assessed clearly (Jitaree 2015).  
Nevertheless, the usage of binary coding is believed to be more reliable 
(Milne & Adler 1999) as it provides lesser choice in the coding decision, hence 
lessening disagreements (Vourvachis 2007). Milne and Adler (1999, p. 242) state 
that reliability “is gained at the expense of potential refinements to the understanding 
of social and environmental disclosure”. Likewise, Cooke (1989) supports the binary 
coding system since the overall effect of subjective evaluation by various groups of 
respondents is minimal. Further, the implied assumption is that each disclosure item 
is equally significant for all user groups. Additionally, this approach allows a variety 
of information to be gathered regardless of how the sentence is constructed. Hence, it 
may be appropriate for an international comparison (Jitaree 2015). Yet, regardless of 
method similar research conclusions are likely to be derived (Mohamed Adnan 
2012). Evidently, both index and volumetric approaches have their own strengths and 
weaknesses. Consequently, the basis of choosing the most appropriate approach is 
the posed research question (Vourvachis 2007). Based on the arguments above, this 
study opted for the unweighted index approach or the binary coding to access, 
compare and explain differences. This is in line with prior studies (e.g. Haniffa & 
Cooke 2005; Abdullah, Mohamad & Mokhtar 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 2011; Chan, 
Watson & Woodliff 2014; Amran & Devi 2008; Haji 2013). 
 
4.4.1.2 CSR checklist 
Prior to assessing the CSR reporting, a checklist of items was constructed.  
Milne and Adler (1999) emphasise the importance of constructing a checklist with 
categories in a content analysis research. This involves the selection and 
development of categories into which content units can be classified (Tilt 2001). In 
other words, identifying the themes for the checklist becomes a priori in constructing 
a checklist. The CSR framework focuses on four themes: Environment, Community, 
Marketplace and Workplace. Reference to the framework is also consistent with the 
procedures undertaken by earlier local studies (e.g. Abdullah et al. 2011; Haji 2013; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2005). To construct a more comprehensive checklist, previous 
international CSR disclosure checklists were also referenced (e.g. Hackston & Milne 
1996; Barako & Brown 2008). Gray et al. (1995) note that there are four major CSR 
themes employed in the literature namely marketplace (consumers, creditors), 
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workplace (employees), community, and environment. In addition to these themes, 
they further suggest a development of an “Other” theme. This is to accommodate 
those items that cannot be classified under any of the four themes. Finally, a 
“General” theme was also included based on the work of Chan et al. (2014). This 
theme basically reflects company policy towards CSR. Thus, this study adopted six 
themes: General, Community, Environment, Workplace, Marketplace and Other. 
To facilitate the process of classifying CSR information to the corresponding 
theme, a checklist requires definitions as what comprises each theme. These 
definitions allow comparability with other researcher. Checklists from various 
international and local studies were again referenced (e.g. Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Barako & Brown 2008; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Mohd Ghazali 2007; Haji 2013). 
Based on their suitability, checklists developed by Mohamed Adnan (2012), 
Abdullah et al. (2011) and Chan et al. (2014) have been chosen as the main 
references. The first checklist by Abdullah et al. (2011) was an adoption of the work 
of Mohd Ghazali (2007) with some changes according to the checklists by Hackston 
and Milne (1996) and Ng (1985). The second checklist by Mohamed Adnan (2012) 
adapted the internationally recognised Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) indicators. 
Finally, Chan et al. (2014) developed their checklist based on the Ernst and Ernst 
(1979) six themes with the addition of a “General” theme. Given that the checklist 
was formed based on various sources, it presumably reflects a comprehensive form 
of CSR reporting. The merged checklists results to a total of 151 items. To avoid 
redundancy in classification, items with similar meaning were excluded. To ensure 
compatibility with the Malaysian context, the checklist was pre-tested using 30 
annual reports randomly selected across industries. This is consistent with the work 
of Abdullah et al. (2011). Accordingly, a few items have been removed from the 
checklist. Like any research study, validity of the research instrument is important 
and this study followed the work of Said et al. (2011) to further validate the 
checklist. Experts in the area of CSR were also called upon to review the checklist. 
Said et al. (2011) used auditors and academia. Opting for a similar method, the 
checklist was reviewed by a CSR expert who was also an academician. After going 
through several series of revisions and refinements, the final checklist containing 51 
items was produced with General containing 7 items, Community 9 items, 
Environment 14 items, Workplace 14 items, Marketplace 5 items and Other 
containing 2 items. Table 4.4 presents the full checklist. 
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Table 4.4: CSR checklist  
CSR Reporting Items 
A General (maximum 7 scores) 
1 Acknowledgement or management of corporate social responsibility 
2 Disclosure of corporate objectives or policies with regard to corporate social responsibility 
3 Company’s strategy for addressing sustainability 
4 Mission/ values/ codes of conduct relevant to CSR topics 
5 Commitments to external initiatives (e.g. membership) 
6 Awards received relating to social, environmental and best practices 
7 Discussion on stakeholder engagement 
B Community (maximum 9 scores) 
8 
Charitable donations and activities (such as donations of cash, products or employee services to 
support established community activities, events, organizations, education and the arts) 
9 
Supporting government/ non-governmental organization campaign (such as supporting national 
pride/government-sponsored campaigns) 
10 
Support for public health/ volunteerism (such as blood donation, sponsoring public health or 
recreational projects) 
11 Aid medical research 
12 
Sponsoring educational programs/ scholarship (such as sponsoring educational conferences, seminars 
or art exhibits, funding scholarship programs or activities) 
13 Discussion on public policy involvement 
14 Graduate employment 
15 Sponsoring sports project 
16 Acquisition from local suppliers 
C Environment (maximum 14 scores) 
17 Statements indicating that pollution from operations have been or will be reduced 
18 Discussion on recycling efforts (such as recycled inputs/ recycled waste) 
19 Preventing waste 
20 Disclosure on significant spills/ environmental accidents 
21 Hazardous waste disclosure 
22 Fines/ sanction for non-compliance 
23 
Design facilities that are harmonious with the environment/ landscaping (such as contributions in 
terms of cash or art/sculptures to beautify the environment, restoring historical buildings and 
structures) 
24 Impacts on biodiversity 
25 
Strategies/ plans for managing impacts on biodiversity (such as wildlife conservation, protection of 
the environment, e.g., pest controls) 
26 
Environmental review and audit (such as reference to environmental review, scoping, audit, and 
assessment including independent attestation) 
27 
Conservation of energy in the conduct of business operations (using energy more efficiently during 
the manufacturing process) 
28 Utilizing waste materials for energy production 
29 Disclosure of carbon/ green gas emissions 
30 Initiatives to reduce carbon/ green gas emissions 
D Workplace (maximum 14 scores) 
31 
Employee profiles (such as number of employees in the company and/or at each branch/ subsidiary,  
information on the qualifications and experience of employees recruited) 
32 Employee appreciation (such as information on purchase scheme/ pension program) 
33 
Discussion of significant benefit program provided (such as remuneration, providing staff 
accommodation or ownership schemes ) 
34 Employee training (such as  through in-house training, establishing training centers) 
35 
Support to employee education (such as giving financial assistance to employees in educational 
institutions; continuing education courses) 
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36 
Information on management-employee relationship/ efforts to improve job satisfaction (such as 
providing information about communication with employees on management styles and management 
programs which may directly affect the employees) 
37 
Employee diversity (such as disclosing the percentage or number of minority and/or women 
employees in the workforce and/or in the various managerial levels) 
38 Employee receiving regular reviews 
39 Recreational activities/ facilities 
40 Establishment of a safety department/ committee/ policy 
41 Provision of health care for employee 
42 Compliance to health and safety standards and regulations 
43 Award for health and safety 
44 Rates of work-related injury/ illness/ deaths (such as disclosing accident statistics) 
E Marketplace (maximum 5 scores) 
45 
Information on any research project set up by the company to improve its products in any way (such 
as the amount/percentage figures of research and development expenditure and/or its benefits) 
46 Verifiable information that the quality of the firm’s products has increased (such as ISO9000) 
47 
Disclosure of products meeting applicable safety standards (such as information on the safety of the 
firm’s product) 
48 Product sustainability/ use of child labour 
49 Customer service improvements/ awards/ ratings 
F Other (maximum 2 scores) 
50 Value added statements 
51 Value added ratios 
Note: Adaptation from Abdullah et al. (2011), Mohamed Adnan (2012) and Chan et al. (2014) 
 
4.4.1.2.1 Measurement 
In order to assess company CSR reporting, a disclosure index was used. A 
disclosure index “is a research instrument comprising a series of pre-selected items 
which, when scored, provide a measure that indicates a level of disclosure in the 
specific context for which the index was devised” (Guthrie & Abeysekera 2006, p. 
11). This measurement has been used extensively in earlier studies (e.g. Haniffa & 
Cooke 2005; Mohd Ghazali 2007; Rashid & Lodh 2008; Haji 2013; Abdullah et al. 
2011; Muttakin & Subramaniam 2015). This study employs the binary coding system 
in order to score the CSR items, where a value “1” will be awarded to a particular 
item if it is disclosed and “0” if it is not disclosed. In many instances of index usage, 
researchers have employed the sentence as the unit of analysis (e.g. Hackston & 
Milne 1996; Hooks & van Staden 2011). However, any unit of measurement that 
does not take account of graphs, charts, or photographs can be questionable as they 
can be potentially powerful and highly effective methods of communication (Beattie 
& Jones 1997). This study followed the work of Lock and Seele (2015) where 
attention was paid to all text included in the reports as well as pictures and graphical 
tools like text boxes. The scores were then transformed into a CSR reporting index 
by dividing the aggregate disclosure score of each company based on the six CSR 
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themes to the maximum possible score (i.e. 1 x 51= 51). This CSR measurement is 
also referred to as the relative index (Owusu-Ansah 1998). Generally, the formula 
used to calculate the CSR index (CSRI) is shown below: 
 
                                    CSRI  =  
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1  
 
CSRI = CSR reporting index; nj = number of items expected for jth company; Xij = 1 
if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed. 
 
4.4.2 Independent variables – Corporate governance attributes 
Neuman and Kreuger (2003, p. 149) defined independent variables as “the 
cause variable, or the one that identifies forces or conditions that act on something 
else” and the independent variable is independent of prior cause that act on it”.  
 
4.4.2.1 Ownership structure 
Ownership is defined as the legal right over the use of a company’s factors of 
production. The ownership structure of any company portrays the different owners 
and their percentage of voting rights in terms of the proportion of shares owned. In 
general, corporate ownership in Malaysia is highly concentrated (Mohd Ghazali 
2007). This means that there are several large shareholders whose rights and control 
are significant. In Malaysia, company ownership is basically dominated by family 
and government. Prior studies show that degree of engagement in CSR will differ 
amongst companies with different ownership structure (e.g. Eng & Mak 2003; Liu & 
Anbumozhi 2009; Elsayed & Hoque 2010). Based on those findings, this study 
specifically looked at ownership by directors and institution.  
 
4.4.2.1.1 Directors’ ownership 
The primary objective of providing opportunity to directors to hold shares is 
premised on its ability to align the interests of the directors with those of the owners. 
By owning significant volume of shares, they are more likely to make decisions 
maximising shareholders’ value (Oh, Chang & Martynov 2011). Yet, the absence of 
institutional pressures on directors to make socially responsible decisions may lead to 
differing outcomes.  In such cases, directors may be more likely to pursue short-term 
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strategies that boost the company’s profits and positively affect their compensation 
(Oh et al. 2011). As a result, directors’ ownership makes them less accountable to the 
public (Khan et al. 2013). Subsequently, they are more inclined to opt for lower CSR 
disclosure to avoid unnecessary costs that may affect the company’s return. This 
study measures directors’ ownership (DIROWN) by the percentage of directors’ 
shareholding in a company. This is in line with Khan et al. (2013), Fauzi and 
Musallam (2015), Sartawi et al. (2014) and Chou, Chung and Yin (2013). 
Information on directors’ ownership were extracted from annual reports under 
“Shareholdings by directors”.  
 
4.4.2.1.2 Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors are more prone to taking long-term decisions. Hence, 
they are often associated with promotion of CSR activities in a company (Ullah & 
Jamali 2010). Consequently, these companies are expected to have better CSR 
reports. Malaysian corporations that are owned by institutional investors disclosed a 
high quality of CSR information (Mohamed Adnan 2012). Institutional ownership 
(INSTITUT) was measured by taking the percentage of institutional shareholdings in 
the annual report but that it is limited to only the top thirty shareholders. 
Accordingly, the data on institutional ownership was augmented by the Bursa 
Malaysia Historical Data Package.  
 
4.4.2.2 Board of directors 
This study looks at several board attributes that may influence company CSR 
reporting. They are explained below: 
 
4.4.2.2.1 Board independence 
Independent directors are commonly associated with better monitoring where 
board independence refers to independent directors who have no affiliation with the 
company except for their directorship. As such, they have important impact on 
monitoring activities (Fama & Jensen 1983a). Consequently, their presence will 
check the possibility of shareholders’ wealth expropriation by management. 
Although independent directors have been criticized for having shallow information 
about the company that may compromise their ability to make good decisions (e.g. 
Markarian & Parbonetti 2007; Haniffa & Cooke 2005), the inadequacy is addressed 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
89 
 
with their experience, knowledge as well as external connections. Board 
independence (BIND) was the number of independent directors on the board relative 
to the total number of directors. This is consistent with the work of Arora and 
Dharwadkar (2011), Harjoto and Jo (2011) and Das et al. (2015). Information 
pertaining to independent directors were found under various headings such as 
“Director’s profile”, “Profile of directors” or “Corporate information” in the annual 
report. 
 
4.4.2.2.2 Board meetings 
Board meetings are commonly held at definite intervals to consider policy 
issues and major problems. Laksmana (2008) claims that attendance at board 
meetings can be used as a proxy for board diligence. It is a decisive dimension to 
improve the effectiveness of a board and the level of monitoring activity (Laksmana 
2008; Giannarakis 2014). Frequent board meetings are also associated with better 
CSR reporting. This study measured board meeting (BMEETING) by taking the 
number of board meetings held during the financial year which is consistent with 
Haji (2013) and Van Staden and Chen (2010). The information on board meetings 
could be found under “Statement of corporate governance” in the annual report.  
 
4.4.2.2.3 Board diversity 
4.4.2.2.3.1 Gender diversity 
Diversity of board members is assumed to bring broad and heterogeneous 
perspectives to the decision making process. Diversity has an infinite number of 
dimensions ranging from age to nationality, from religious background to functional 
background, from task skills to relational skills and from political preference to 
sexual preference (Rao & Tilt 2015). It can be visible/ observable (race/ethnic 
background, nationality, gender, age, etc.) or less visible (educational, functional and 
occupational background, industry experience and organisational membership). A 
majority of studies indicate that diversity on boards has the potential to outperform 
homogeneity. Of many diversity aspects, gender diversity has raised most attention. 
There have been claims that the presence of female directors could enhance a 
company’s governance (Adams & Ferreira 2009; Abbott, Parker & Presley 2012). 
Further, womanly instincts can bring female directors closer to community activities 
compared to male directors (Betz, O’Connell & Shepard 2013). Studies have 
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exhibited that better CSR reporting outcomes result from the presence of woman 
(e.g. Liao, Luo & Tang 2015; Frias‐Aceituno, Rodriguez‐Ariza & Garcia‐Sanchez 
2013). Gender diversity (FEMALE) was measured by taking the percentage of 
female directors to the total number of directors. This is consistent with Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), Bear, Rahman and Post (2010), Post, Rahman and Rubow (2011), 
Said et al. (2013), Rao and Tilt (2015), Sundarasen, Je-Yen and Rajangam (2016), 
Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu and Nwakoby (2012) and Hafsi and Turgut (2013). Based on the 
list of directors shown under “Director’s profile”, “Profile of directors” or 
“Corporate information” in the annual report, the information on female directors 
were obtained by counting. 
 
4.4.2.2.3.2 Board educational background 
One of the ingredients to board effectiveness is having a good mixture of 
experiences and competencies (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). Bantel (1993) 
asserts that diverse educational background leads to better decision making. 
Similarly, Carter and Lorsch (2013) and Charan (1998) indicate the importance of 
directors possessing both the functional and firm-specific knowledge and skills. In 
line with the study by Said et al. (2013), the variables were measured as follows: 
 
i. Board with management background (BMGT) was measured by taking the 
percentage number of directors with a management background (such as 
finance, accounting and business administration) to the total number of 
directors.  
ii. Board with law background (BLAW) was measured by taking the percentage 
number of directors with a law background to the total number of directors. 
 
Information on board educational background was obtained from the annual report 
under the heading “Director’s profile” or “Profile of directors”. 
 
4.4.2.2.4 CEO duality 
CEO duality occurs when the role of CEO and Chairperson is the same 
individual. Many believe that by having the same person occupying the operational 
and monitoring position jeopardises the independence of directors (Dalton & Dalton 
2005; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014). The practise of duality is likely to 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
91 
 
hamper efficient monitoring by directors which eventually leads to lower 
transparency (Allegrini & Greco 2013). The presence of CEO duality (CEOD) is 
measured by a dummy variable coded “1” if the CEO is also the Chairperson of the 
board and “0” otherwise. This is consistent with Allegrini and Greco (2013), Rashid 
(2013) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). The information on CEO duality was sourced 
from “Director Profile” or “Profile of Directors” in the annual report.  
 
4.4.3 Control variables 
Control variables are not linked to the hypotheses and theories being tested. 
They can either contaminate the measurement of the variables of interest or affect the 
underlying constructs. As such, inclusion of control variables is hoped to refine the 
relationships among the variables of interest.  
Numerous studies have shown support that CSR reporting is significantly 
influenced by various companies’ characteristics (e.g. Michelon & Parbonetti 2012; 
Lu & Abeysekera 2014; Khan 2010; Naser, Al-Hussaini, Al-Kwari & Nuseibeh 
2006; Ho& Taylor 2007; Al-Shubiri, Al-Abedallat & Orabi 2012). Hence, to 
eliminate their impact on the level of reporting, this study considered board size, 
CEO founder and CEO tenure, company size, profitability, leverage, company 
growth, market capitalisation, liquidity and company age as control variables. These 
variables are discussed next. 
 
4.4.3.1 Board size 
Board size refers to the number of directors that make up the board (Said, 
Zainuddin & Haron 2009; Siregar & Bachtiar 2010; Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Jizi, 
Salama, Dixon & Stratling 2014; Amran, Zain, Sulaiman, Sarker & Ooi 2013). 
Although there is no universal “best” size, García Sánchez, Rodríguez Domínguez 
and Gallego Álvarez (2011) claimed that an ideal board should compose of a 
considerable number of experienced and knowledgeable directors. They should be 
adequate enough to allow for full deliberation and diversity of thinking on 
governance and other organisational matters. Smaller boards are expected to benefit 
from more efficient communication, coordination and accountability of individual 
board members (Jizi et al. 2014). However, they suffer from a limited monitoring 
ability due to high workloads and a less diversified range of expertise. Similarly, 
larger boards are inefficient because they result in weaker control of management 
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and increases agency costs but can offer more knowledge and expertise, as well as 
more capacity for monitoring and sharing of workloads (Larmou & Vafeas 2010). 
Other studies that reported positive associations between board size and CSR 
reporting are Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), Shamil et al. (2014) and Akhtaruddin, 
Hossain, Hossain & Yao (2009). Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the natural 
logarithm of total number of directors as used by Rashid (2013), Reddy and Bather 
(2013) and Chou et al. (2013).The information on board size were found under 
“Statement of corporate governance” in annual reports. 
 
4.4.3.2 CEO Founder 
CEO founder is associated with greater power by virtue of his role in the 
company’s history and his influence on the board. Following Daily and Dalton 
(1993), CEOFOUNDER takes the binary code of 1 if CEO is also the founder and 0 
if otherwise. The information on CEO founder were extracted from “Directors 
Profile” or “Profile of directors” in annual reports. 
 
4.4.3.3 CEO Tenure 
CEO tenure refers to the length of time a CEO has held that position (Bathala 
& Rao 1995). Mohd–Saleh, Mohd–Sanusi, Abd–Rahman and Bukit (2012) revealed 
that long-tenured CEOs are associated with low levels of reporting. CEO TENURE 
is represented by the natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO held the post. 
CEO tenure information were extracted from annual reports through “Directors 
Profile” or “Profile of directors” section. 
 
4.4.3.4 Firm size 
It has been persistently argued that large companies are more motivated to 
provide higher financial and non-financial disclosures due to several reasons 
(Michelon & Parbonetti 2012). Large companies are likely to have a broad-based 
ownership, which would require more comprehensive and detailed disclosure to meet 
the information needs of diverse groups of investors (Boesso & Kumar 2007). Large 
companies are more likely to disclose information to enhance their corporate 
reputation as visibility to the public increases (Branco & Rodrigues 2008).  
Perrini, Russo and Tencati (2007) found that size explains the differences in 
company willingness to engage in specific CSR strategies. A positive social image is 
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normally a major concern of large companies (Korathotage 2012). There is a 
consensus on the existence of a relationship between company size and the extent of 
CSR disclosures (Cormier, Ledoux & Magnan 2011; Lu & Abeysekera 2014). 
Availability of funds, power and expertise in large companies enable them to engage 
in more activities (including CSR activities), produce more information on these 
activities and their implications, and bear the cost of such processes (Andrew, Gul, 
Guthrie & Teoh 1989; Nelling & Webb 2009).  
Company size has been measured with different bases such as the number of 
employees, total revenues, sales volumes, total assets, number of shareholders and 
also market capitalisation. This study employed the natural logarithm of total assets 
as the proxy for company size (SIZE). This is consistent with Das et al. (2015), 
Sartawi et al. (2014), Rashid (2014), Jitaree (2015), Reddy and Bather (2013) and 
Fauzi and Musallam (2015). Information on total assets of the company was 
extracted from annual reports, under the heading “Financial Statements”.  
 
4.4.3.5 Profitability 
Profitability has been proven to have effect on sustainability activities and 
reporting levels. Since CSR activities are not cost-free, profitability allows 
management the freedom and flexibility to undertake more extensive responsibility 
programs (Yaftian 2011). Studies by Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Said et al. (2009) 
and Khan (2010) confirm the importance of profitability when reporting levels of 
CSR reporting.  
Earlier studies measured company profitability using various bases such as 
return on assets, return on equity, return on sales and stock price. Aupperle, Carroll 
and Hatfield (1985) argue that Return on Assets (ROA) is the most reliable 
profitability measurement. It has been widely used by other researchers (e.g. Bliss & 
Balachandran 2003; Nasir & Abdullah 2004; Rashid 2014; Sartawi et al. 2014; 
Barako, Hancock & Izan 2006; Haniffa & Cooke 2005). This study employed Return 
on Assets (ROA) to measure profitability. Return on assets (ROA) was obtained by 
dividing Profit/ Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) with Total Assets.   
 
             Return on assets (ROA)  =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
∑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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The information for both EBIT and Total Assets were taken from “Financial 
Statements” in annual reports. 
 
4.4.3.6 Leverage 
Companies require financial resources for their continuing operations and 
creditors are an important source of such resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). 
Important stakeholders like significant creditors are likely to be interested in a 
company’s social responsibility activities (Abdullah et al. 2011). Therefore, the more 
a company relies on external funding the more its management would be expected to 
respond to creditor expectations concerning the company’s CSR activities (Chan et 
al. 2014). This would mean higher CSR disclosure as financial leverage increases. At 
the same time, further debt level would cause a company to have unstable incomes 
due to extra interest expense.  
Naser et al. (2006) and Chan et al. (2014) found that leverage is positively 
related to CSR reporting although companies tend to report less especially if they 
have closer relationships with their creditors. These companies may use other means 
to communicate their social responsibility activities (Purushothaman, Tower, 
Hancock & Taplin 2000; Yaftian 2011). A study by Barnea and Rubin (2010) 
suggests a negative relationship between leverage and CSR disclosure. Nevertheless, 
Reverte (2009), Elijido-Ten (2004) and Rahman et al. (2011) found a neutral 
association between debt ratio and CSR reporting. Several researchers measure 
financial leverage based on the gearing ratio which is calculated as the ratio of long 
term debt to equity (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Purushothaman et al. 2000; Yaftian 
2011). Alternatively, this study measured leverage using total liabilities over total 
assets; as used by Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010), Reddy and Bather (2013) and 
Chou et al. (2013).  
 
                                     Leverage =  
∑𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
∑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
To obtain both total liabilities and total assets information, annual reports were 
referenced under “Financial Statements”. 
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4.4.3.7 Growth 
Growth is a result of an interaction between a company’s productive 
resources and its market opportunities. When a company is growing rapidly, it tends 
to pay less dividends and seek financing from outside, thus forcing more disclosure 
(Naser et al. 2006). Rapid growth companies are also believed to have greater 
information asymmetry and agency costs (Eng & Mak 2003). To reduce those 
problems, companies are expected to disclose more information. Following Rashid 
(2013), Braun and Sharma (2007), Bathala and Rao (1995) and Chou et al. (2013), 
company growth (GROWTH) is expressed as percentage of annual change in sales. 
Information on annual sales was obtained from “Financial Statements” section in 
annual reports. 
 
4.4.3.8 Market capitalisation 
While some view market capitalisation as representing company size, the 
investing public considers it as an external measure of a company’s importance 
(Wallace & Naser 1996).  Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that highly capitalised 
companies have greater exposure to various political attacks. Society may demand 
more exercise of social responsibility or for greater regulation such as price controls 
and higher rate of tax. Such potential action can be minimised by disclosing more 
comprehensively. Conversely, companies with low market capitalisation are more 
likely to feel that greater disclosure would be detrimental to its competitiveness. 
Market capitalisation (CAP) is expressed in its natural logarithm. Information on 
market capitalisation were extracted from “Financial summary” section in annual 
reports. Nevertheless, if the information was not directly available from the specified 
section, market capitalisation was derived by multiplying the current year’s closing 
share price by the number of shares. Alternatively, market capitalisation data were 
also extracted from DataStream database. 
 
4.4.3.9 Liquidity 
Liquidity is an important company characteristic that can potentially affect a 
company’s reporting behaviour. When companies have high degrees of liquidity, this 
means that the company is missing the potential investment opportunities by 
retaining cash and not investing. Subsequently, financial providers may envisage that 
this company is lacking financial management efficiency. In an effort to allay the 
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apprehension of future investors, companies may feel extra motivated to provide 
sufficient information pertaining to their operational efficiency. Following this, there 
is an expectation that companies with high liquidity will disclose more information 
on their CSR activities. Ho and Taylor (2007) confirmed a positive relationship 
between liquidity and company reporting. There are a number of financial ratios that 
can be used to evaluate companies’ liquidity position. Among others are the current 
ratio, the quick ratio or acid test ratio and net working capital. This study followed 
Rashid (2013, 2014) and Ho and Taylor (2007) by measuring liquidity as the current 
ratio. The information for current assets and current liabilities were obtained from 
annual reports under “Financial Statements”. 
 
4.4.3.10  Firm age 
The level of CSR reporting is said to differ with company age. As suggested 
by Peloza (2006), younger companies are not as inclined to carry out CSR activities 
as well as report them. This phenomena is driven by several factors (Owusu-Ansah 
1998). Since young companies are basically in the process of strengthening their 
business positions, it is feared that disclosing too much information will expose them 
to competition which may undermine their survival. Hence, their main focus is to 
maintain financial performance (Peloza 2006). Furthermore, lacking an attractive 
track record may demotivate young companies from producing comprehensive CSR 
reports. Conversely, mature companies have sufficient capital and well-known brand 
names to ensure that disclosing more information is essential in protecting their 
reputation (Khan et al. 2013). Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Al-Shubiri, Al-abedallat and 
Orabi (2012) confirm a positive relationship between company age and level of 
disclosure. However, several studies revealed insignificant results (Hossain & Reaz 
2007; Menassa 2010). This study determined company age (AGE) by the number of 
years it has been listed on Bursa Malaysia, expressed in natural logarithm as 
employed by Rashid (2009), Fauzi and Musallam (2015) and Das et al. (2015). The 
company’s initial listed date on Bursa Malaysia was extracted from DataStream 
database. 
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4.4.4 Dummy variables 
4.4.4.1 Type of industry 
Many researchers have asserted that industry affiliation affects CSR reporting 
because of the unique characteristics of each industry (Wallace, Naser & Mora 1994; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2005). Reverte (2009) noted that industries with a negative impact 
on environment such as the oil, chemical and mining industries provide more 
disclosures than other industries. Companies in industries that are more politically 
vulnerable tend to use voluntary disclosure to minimise political costs such as 
increased regulation (Bowrin 2013). Clarke and Gibson‐Sweet (1999) stated that 
industries with high visibility to consumers are more likely to engage in their 
disclosures related to community involvement. However, some researchers have 
found that industry type is insignificant for CSR reporting (e.g. Eng & Mak 2003; 
Arcay & Vazquez 2005). 
Hafsi and Turgut (2013) state the rationale for different company behaviour 
towards reporting is the result of different industries facing different stakeholders. 
Logically, these stakeholders have diverse agendas and interests. Thus, the needs of 
different stakeholders’ interest results in CSR reporting varying in terms of depth and 
issues. In order to control for the effects of 43 industries, type of industry was 
represented by INDUSTRY; following Rashid (2014) and Anas et al. (2015). These 
industries were classified based on SIC code as presented in Table 4.3. Table 4.5 
provides the summary of all the variables used in this study. 
 
Table 4.5: Summary of variables 
Variable name Variable 
acronym 
Variable  
type 
Measurement 
The extent of 
sustainability 
reporting  
CSRI Dependent A binary coding of the extent of 
sustainability reporting with score of 
“0” if item is not disclosed and “1” if 
item is disclosed 
Directors’ 
ownership 
DIROWN Independent Percentage of shares owned by 
directors to total number of shares 
issued 
Institutional 
ownership 
 
INSTITUT Independent Percentage of shares owned by 
institutional owners to total number 
of shares issued 
Board composition BIND Independent Percentage of independent directors 
to total directors 
Board education 
background 
BMGT Independent Percentage of directors with 
management background to total 
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BLAW Independent Percentage of directors with law 
background to total directors 
Board diversity BFEMALE Independent Percentage of female directors to 
total directors 
CEO duality CEOD Independent A binary coding where “1” means 
combine role of CEO/Chairperson 
and “0” if the role of 
CEO/Chairperson is separated 
Board meeting BFREQUENCY Independent Number of board meetings held for 
the financial year 
Board size BSIZE Control Natural logarithm of total number of 
directors 
CEO tenure CEO TENURE Control Natural logarithm of CEO service 
length 
CEO founder CEOFOUNDER Control A binary coding where “1” if CEO is 
also the founder and “0” if otherwise 
Company age AGE Control Natural logarithm of company listed 
years on Bursa Malaysia 
Company size SIZE Control Natural logarithm of total assets 
Profitability ROA Control Earnings before interest and tax over 
Total Assets 
Growth GROWTH Control Percentage of annual change in sales 
Liquidity LIQ Control Current Assets over Current 
Liabilities 
Market 
capitalisation 
CAP Control Natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation 
Leverage DR Control Total liabilities over total assets 
 
4.5 Econometric Models 
In order to analyse the relationships between corporate governance attributes 
and CSR reporting, several econometric models have been developed. They are as 
follows: 
 
4.5.1 Ownership structure and CSR reporting 
 Equation 1 examined the relationship between ownership structure and CSR 
reporting. Equation 1a is with industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1DIROWNi,t  + 2INSTITUTi,t  +  3BSIZEi,t  + 4DRi,t +5LIQi,t  + 
6AGEi,t +7SIZEi,t  + 8ROAi,t +  9GROWTHi,t+ 10CAPi,t + 
i,t …………..………………………………………..….......…Equation 1a 
 
Equation 1b is without industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1DIROWNi,t  + 2INSTITUTi,t  +  3BSIZEi,t  + 4DRi,t +5LIQi,t  + 
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6AGEi,t +7SIZEi,t  + 8ROAi,t +  9GROWTHi,t+ 10CAPi,t  
                  +  yINDUSTRY+i,t …………..……………....………………..Equation 1b 
 
4.5.2 Board independence and CSR reporting 
Equation 2 examined the relationship between board independence and CSR 
reporting. Equation 2a is with industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BINDi,t + 2BSIZEi,t + 3DIROWNi,t + 4INSTITUTi,t  + 5DRi,t + 
6LIQi,t  + 7AGEi,t  + 8SIZEi,t  + 9ROAi,t  + 10GROWTHi, +
 11CAPi,t  +  i,t……………………………....……………….Equation 2a 
 
Equation 2b is without industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BINDi,t + 2BSIZEi,t + 3DIROWNi,t + 4INSTITUTi,t  + 5DRi,t + 
6LIQi,t  + 7AGEi,t  + 8SIZEi,t  + 9ROAi,t  + 10GROWTHi, +
 11CAPi,t +  yINDUSTRY  +  i,t………………………….….Equation 2b 
 
4.5.3 Board meeting frequency and CSR reporting 
Equation 3 examined the relationship between board meeting and CSR 
reporting. Equation 3a is with industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BFREQUENCYi,t  + 2BINDi,t  + 3BSIZEi,t  + 4DIROWNi,t  +  
5DRi,t+6LIQi,t  +7AGEi,t   +8SIZEi,t  +9ROAi,t  + 10GROWTHi,t+ 
 11CAPi,t+ i,t……………………………..…………..……..Equation 3a 
 
Equation 3b is without industry and year effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BFREQUENCYi,t  + 2BINDi,t  + 3BSIZEi,t  + 4DIROWNi,t  + 
5DRi,t+6LIQi,t  +7AGEi,t   +8SIZEi,t  +9ROAi,t  + 10GROWTHi,t
+11CAPi,t+  ΩYEAR+yINDUSTRY+i,t.…………………......Equation 3b 
 
4.5.4 Board diversity and CSR reporting 
Equation 4 examined the relationship between board diversity and CSR 
reporting. Equation 4a is with industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BFEMALEi,t  + 2BMGTi,t  + 3BLAWi,t   +  4BSIZEi,t   
                + 5DIROWNi,t +6DRi,t +7LIQi,t  +8AGEi,t   +9SIZEi,t  + 
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10ROAi,t  + 11GROWTHi,t+ 12CAPi,t  +i,t……..….…Equation 4a 
 
Equation 4b is without industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BFEMALEi,t  + 2BMGTi,t  + 3BLAWi,t   +  4BSIZEi,t + 
                5DIROWNi,t + 6DRi,t +7LIQi,t  +8AGEi,t   +9SIZEi,t  +10ROAi,t  + 
                 11GROWTHi,t+ 12CAPi,t+  yINDUSTR  +  i,t……......…Equation 4b 
 
4.5.5 CEO duality and CSR reporting 
Equation 5 examined the relationship between CEO duality and CSR 
reporting. Equation 5a is with industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1CEODi,t + 2BINDi,t + 3BSIZEi,t + 4DIROWNi,t  + 
5CEOFOUNDERi,t  + 6CEOTENUREi,t + 7DRi,t + 8LIQi,t  
                         + 9AGEi,t + 10SIZEi,t + 11ROAi,t + 12GROWTHi,t+  13CAPi,t  
                + i,t ............................................................................................Equation 5a 
 
Equation 5b is without industry effect: 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1CEODi,t + 2BINDi,t + 3BSIZEi,t + 4DIROWNi,t + 
                5CEOFOUNDERi,t+ 6CEOTENUREi,t + 7DRi,t + 8LIQi,t +  
                9AGEi,t + 10SIZEi,t + 11ROAi,t + 12GROWTHi,t+  13CAPi,t + 
                  yINDUSTRY + i,t ......................................................................Equation 5b 
 
Where CSRIi,t is CSR index for ith company at time t.DIROWNi,t is 
percentage of director ownership for ith company at time t. INSTITUTi,t  is 
percentage of institutional ownership for ith company at time t. BINDi,t is number of 
independence director to total number of directors for ith company at time t. 
BFREQUENCYi,t is the natural logarithm of number of board meetings throughout 
the financial year for ith company at time t. CEODi,t  takes the value of 1 if the role 
of CEO and Chairperson is combined; otherwise it takes 0 for ith company at time t. 
BFEMALEi,t  is the proportion of female directors to total number of directors for ith 
company at time t. BMGTi,t  is the proportion of directors with financial background 
to total number of directors for ith company at time t. BLAWi,t is the proportion of 
directors with law background to total number of directors for ith company at time t. 
BSIZEi,t is the total number of directors for ith company at time t. 
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CEOFOUNDERi,t is coded as 1 if CEO is also the founder of the company; 0 if 
otherwise for ith company at time t. CEO TENUREi,t is natural logarithm of CEO 
service length for ith company at time t. DRi,t  is debt ratio for ith company at time t. 
LIQi,t  is liquidity ratio for ith company at time t. AGEi,t  is number of listed years on 
Bursa Malaysia for ith company at time t. SIZEi,t is natural logarithm of total assets 
for ith company at time t. ROAi,t is profitability for ith company at time t. 
GROWTHi,t is the company growth in sales for ith company at time t. CAPi,t is the 
market capitalisation for ith company at time t. INDUSTRY is the type of industry. 
α is the intercept, is the regression coefficient and is the error term. 
 
4.6 Data analysis 
Answering research questions requires testing the relationship between a number 
of predictors that are expected to affect the outcome (in this case the identified 
corporate governance characteristics and the control variables) and CSR reporting 
(the dependent variable). Subsequently, this study performed statistical analyses 
using various programs such as SPSS, EViews and also Stata. In general, analyses 
comprise descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and also regression analysis 
which are discussed below. 
 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are a set of brief descriptive coefficients that 
summarises a given data set, which can either be a representation of the entire 
population or a sample. The measures used to describe the data set are measures of 
central tendency (mean, median and mode) and measures of variability or dispersion 
(standard deviation (or variance) and also the minimum and maximum values). Table 
4.6 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. 
 
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Independent Variables 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
DIROWN 0.0438 0.0030 0.0000 0.5680 0.0879 
INSTITUT 0.2627 0.2040 0.0000 0.9590 0.2208 
BIND 0.4519 0.4300 0.1700 1.0000 0.1281 
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CEOD 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3500 
BFEMALE 0.0820 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.1069 
BMGT 0.5200 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2061 
BLAW 0.0743 0.0000 0.0000 0.6700 0.0970 
BFREQUENCY 5.1018 4.9530 2.0138 27.1126 1.3442 
Panel B: Control Variables 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
BSIZE 7.2362 6.6859 3.0042 18.1741 1.2960 
CEO TENURE 6.7255 8.0045 1.0000 46.0625 2.5659 
CEOFOUNDER 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3450 
DR 0.4024 0.3775 0.0030 10.3190 0.3623 
LIQ 3.0531 0.1785 0.0070 96.1110 5.1989 
AGE 13.9782 15.0293 6.0000 52.9845 1.6403 
SIZE (LogTA) 12.8784 12.6500 9.3690 18.4110 1.4467 
ROA 0.0619 0.0580 -2.8980 5.5470 0.1782 
GROWTH 0.0533 0.0265 -4.9410 8.5780 0.4777 
CAP (LogCAP) 18.7976 18.5030 12.3710 24.8100 1.8112 
Panel C: Dependent Variable 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
CSRI 0.2167 0.1961 0.0392 0.7255 0.1198 
 
Panel A of Table 4.6 illustrates that on average directors only own 4.4% of 
company shares; with the highest ownership of 56.8%. This result is lower than that 
reported in Jordan (53%) (Sartawi et al. 2014). In the same way, large ownership by 
directors is evident only in certain companies. This result implies that companies 
prefer to keep directors ownership low on the grounds that it may encourage 
misappropriation of shareholders’ wealth. While this result reflects the practice of 
more independent boards, it was rather surprising as CEO duality is commonly 
practised in owner managed companies (Mohd Ghazali 2007). On the contrary, there 
is an extreme difference between the minimum (0%) and maximum (95.9%) 
shareholdings by institutions. Institutional investor ownership accounts for 26.3% of 
the total company shareholding. This is considerably lower than the rate reported in 
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Pakistan (70.52%) (Majeed, Aziz & Saleem 2015) and also Jordan (45%) (Sartawi et 
al. 2014). 
In board independence, on average the board comprises 45.2% independent 
directors. With average independent directors ranging from 17% to 100%, it 
generally implies that most PLCs responded well to the regulators’ call to include 
independent directors as a way of enhancing board monitoring effectiveness.  
CEO duality shows a slightly different scenario. The result portrays that on 
average there are only 14% of companies that have the same individual acting as 
CEO and Chairperson. Comparing the result with several local studies, the rate 
seems slightly higher than Sundarasen et al. (2016) (12.44%) and Yusoff (2010) 
(10%) but relatively lower than Abdullah (2001) (21.4%). However, studies in other 
countries have revealed a much higher rate of CEO duality such as Egypt (61%) 
(Samaha et al. 2012a), Italy (41.24%) (Allegrini & Greco 2013) and Bangladesh 
(46.7%) (Rashid 2013). Nevertheless, this result matches Lu et al. (2015) in China 
and also Sartawi et al. (2014) in Jordan. Although there seems to be variations in the 
percentage of Malaysian companies with duality roles, there appears to be a marked 
fall as compared to the start of the millennium. Apparently, CEO duality in Malaysia 
is now not a common practise.  
Board of directors reflects a male-dominated culture where only 8.2% were 
female but an increase from 6.3% as reported by Abdullah (2014). In comparison the 
result is higher than in Nigeria (4.6%) (Ujunwa et al. 2012) and Jordan (5%) (Sartawi 
et al. 2014) but is lower than in Germany (13.52%) (Dienes & Velte 2016), New 
Zealand (17%) (Fauzi & Locke 2012), South Africa (10%) (Ntim & Soobaroyen 
2013) and the USA (10.4%) (Gupta, Lam, Sami & Zhou 2014). Abdullah (2014) 
believes that religion contributes to the formation of Malaysian perceptions of gender 
issues. The Malays and Chinese, who follow Islam and Confucianism respectively, 
generally discourage women from being leaders. While directors with financial 
background make up 52% of the total directors, there are only 7.43% directors who 
hada law background. This result is anticipated since accountancy has the highest 
enrolment rate in both public and private universities in Malaysia (MWFCD, 2014).  
The mean of board meeting frequency reveals that companies conduct 
approximately five meetings per year up to a maximum of 27 meetings. The result is 
much lower compared to studies by Jallow and Al-Najjar (2012) (7 meetings), Brick 
and Chidambaran (2010) and Saiful et al. (2007) (8 meetings) and Boyle and Ji 
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(2013) (11 times). Nevertheless, this finding is in line with proponents of board 
meeting who suggested meetings should occur frequently. More board meetings 
usually reflect better monitoring by directors.  
Control variables were listed under Panel B. On average, Malaysian PLCs 
have seven directors on the board. This result is confirmed elsewhere (MCG Index, 
2011) and comparable to the study of Amran et al. (2010). This demonstrate that 
most companies opt for a more moderate board size despite companies listed on the 
Main Board being among the largest companies in Malaysia. Overall, companies in 
this study have been listed, on average for 14 years and a maximum of 53 years. As 
for CEO tenure, on average a CEO holds the post for six years. However, since 
Malaysian companies are mostly family-run businesses, it is not odd to find CEOs 
managing companies for an extended period of up to 46 years in this study. 
Panel C shows that on average the level of CSR reporting of PLCs is 21.67%. 
This result is lower than in Bangladesh (22.23%) (Khan et al. 2013) and also in the 
US and Europe (49.18%) (Michelon & Parbonetti 2012). A huge variation between 
the highest and the lowest level of reporting is observed. Gray (1988) suggests that 
managers in Asia are more inclined to be secretive. As a result, they are not 
motivated to disclose more information (Aaijaz & Ibrahim 2012).  
In short, descriptive statistics of the variables in this study exhibit diverse 
results of which some were anticipated while others seemed to be rather surprising.  
 
4.6.2 Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis quantifies the direction and strength of the linear 
association between two variables in a sample (Coakes 2010). Normally, the 
correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to +1. The sign indicates the direction of the 
association which can either be positive or negative. Positive association generally 
means, higher scores on one variable tend to be paired with higher scores on the 
other and that lower scores on one variable tend to be paired with lower scores on the 
other. Alternatively, negative association indicates higher levels of one variable are 
associated with lower levels of the other. There is also a possibility of getting zero 
coefficient that denotes no correlation between variables. The correlation analysis 
was performed using SPSS and EViews. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Table 4.7. 
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4.6.2.1 Correlation matrix 
To analyse the association between two variables, Pearson two tailed 
correlations were run for all variables in the regression model and the results are 
displayed in Table 4.7. The Pearson correlations between each pair of variables 
varied from -0.009 to 0.839; indicating a combination of strong and weak 
associations. The highest correlation was detected between market capitalisation 
(CAP) and company size (SIZE). Meanwhile, the correlation coefficient between 
board independence (BIND) and profitability (ROA) was lowest at -0.009. Although 
the correlation coefficients of most variables were relatively low, the coefficient 
between CAP and SIZE raises some concerns. The presence of a high correlation 
between variables can result to multicollinearity. This problem can, in turn, threaten 
the reliability of results (Smith 2009). As such, it is important to identify its presence 
and rectify the problem prior to the regression. 
 
4.6.3 Multiple regression analysis 
In order to test the relationships between corporate governance attributes and 
CSR reporting, regression analysis was utilised. This technique allows predictions to 
be made of the dependent variable (i.e. CSR reporting) based on several predictor 
variables (independent variables and control variables) (Field 2009).  
A regression model is considered to provide better robust results because it 
examines the combined influence of all variables to explain their relations to CSR 
reporting, and how each variable influences reporting (Coakes 2010). Besides 
objectively assessing the predictive power of explanatory variable, multi-regression 
models also improves the prediction of the dependent variable (Hair, Black, Babin 
&Anderson 2010). Based on its capabilities, this study employed the ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression model. While multiple regression has various uses, its 
reliability is premised on a number of assumptions that must be met and are now 
briefly discussed. 
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Table 4.7 Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
 BIND BFREQUENCY BFEMALE BMGT BLAW CEOD INSTITUT DIROWN BSIZE DR LIQ AGE SIZE ROA GROWTH CAP CEO 
TENURE 
CEO 
FOUNDER 
VIF 
BIND 1.000                  1.335 
BFREQUENCY 0.098** 1.000                 1.163 
BFEMALE -0.074** 0.022 1.000                1.040 
BMGT 0.106** 0.052** 0.028 1.000               1.171 
BLAW 0.156** 0.103** -0.031 -0.132** 1.000              1.121 
CEOD -0.010 -0.062** 0.076** -0.030 -0.012 1.000             1.046 
INSTITUT -0.077** 0.084** 0.030 -0.031 -0.042* 0.061** 1.000            1.1111 
DIROWN 0.057** -0.018 -0.061** -0.018 -0.069** -0.041* -0.256** 1.000           1.146 
BSIZE -0.414** 0.098** 0.046* -0.176** -0.079** -0.084** 0.071** -0.089** 1.000          1.485 
DR 0.085** 0.120** -0.072** -0.038* -0.013 -0.037 -0.013 -0.035 0.007 1.000         1.149 
LIQ 0.094** -0.041* -0.041* 0.090** 0.067** 0.037 0.002 -0.008 -0.045* -0.274** 1.000        1.149 
AGE 0.151** 0.047* -0.048* 0.123** 0.108** -0.062** 0.017 -0.177** -0.011 0.005 0.063** 1.000       1.258 
SIZE -0.053** 0.236** 0.022 0.031 0.068** -0.016 0.061** -0.181** 0.339** 0.055** -0.067** 0.337** 1.000      4.017 
ROA -0.009 -0.047* 0.032 -0.021 0.018 -0.008 0.062** -0.073** 0.084** -0.129** 0.049* 0.051** 0.111** 1.000     1.062 
GROWTH -0.029 -0.037 0.031 -0.030 0.042* 0.005 0.049* -0.009 0.025 0.018 -.059** 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.000    1.021 
CAP -0.063** 0.174** 0.024 0.062** 0.101** -0.010 0.071** -0.156** 0.321** -0.069** 0.035 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.000   3.764 
CEO TENURE -0.090** -0.167** 0.057** -0.172** -0.062** 0.081** 0.052** 0.016 0.027 -0.046* 0.083** 0.024 -0.024 0.042* -0.006 -0.047* 1.000  1.153 
CEOFOUNDER -0.076** -0.087** 0.096** -0.183** -0.078** 0.125** -0.013 0.053** 0.034 0.009 -0.055** -0.162** -0.032 0.043* -0.009 -0.055** 0.236** 1.000 1.145 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed
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4.6.4 Assumptions of multiple regression analysis 
Prior running the regression, it is important to ascertain that the data satisfy 
several assumptions such as normality, multicollinearity, linearity, independence, 
homoscedasticity and endogeniety (Tabachnick, Fidell & Osterlind 1985). Failure 
to fulfil these statistical assumptions may generate invalid statistical results. 
Conversely, when the appropriate assumptions are satisfied, OLS regression is 
considered the best unbiased estimator. The assumptions to be satisfied are briefly 
explained below. 
 
4.6.4.1 Normality assumption 
Assumption of normality asserts that the distribution of the means across 
samples is normal. Normality can be measured in a number of ways both graphically 
and non-graphically (Stevens 1992). In terms of graphic, this can best be checked 
with a histogram and a fitted normal curve or a Q-Q-Plot. A plotted normally 
distributed data will exhibit a bell-curve shape. Alternatively, normality can be 
checked with a goodness of fit test, for instance the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. 
Stevens (1992) states that non-graphical measures are more convincing in terms of 
interpreting data normality. Data normality can also be tested by observing the 
skewness or by conducting a kurtosis test. Whenever the data is found to be not 
normally distributed, a non-linear transformation, for instance, log-transformation 
might fix this issue. While normality is essential in ensuring the validity of statistical 
results, Berry and Feldman (1985) claims that this assumption is critical only with 
small samples. The normality assumption is relatively insignificant when more than 
30 data points are used (Pallant 2007). The normality assumption for this study was 
not an issue as there are 450 data points involved. However, despite this anomaly, the 
data was nevertheless tested using a Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test and the 
result confirmed normality of the data. 
 
4.6.4.2 Multicollinearity assumption 
When multiple regression is used to test hypotheses, meeting the 
multicollinearity assumption is imperative. Multicollinearity is a phenomenon where 
the independent variables are not independent from each other (Osborne & Waters 
2002). In its simplest form, there exists two or more variables that are highly 
correlated. Thus it makes it difficult to establish how much of the effect on the 
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dependent variable should be attributed to each of the independent variables. As a 
result, it may affect the accuracy of the regression test result. Conversely, when 
multicollinearity is absent, results of the regression analysis can be interpreted with a 
greater degree of confidence. In this study, multicollinearity is checked against two 
criteria: the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient matrix and the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Table 4.7 shows the correlation coefficients between 
independent variables vary from -0.009 to 0.839. Gujarati (2003) recommends that 
multicollinearity is a problem when the correlation value exceeds 0.80. Company 
size and market capitalisation at 0.839 suggests the possibility of multicollinearity. 
However, Hair et al. (2010) advocate a higher cut off point where a value not 
exceeding 0.90 between the independent variables should not be considered harmful. 
Further, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable was 
measured to reconfirm whether the assumption is violated or not. A VIF value 
exceeding 10 shows multicollinearity is present (Gujarati 2003; Osborne & Waters 
2002). Nevertheless, VIF values fall within acceptable levels ranging from 1.040 to 
4.017. Accordingly, the results indicate that multicollinearity was not a cause for 
concern in this study. 
 
4.6.4.3 Linearity assumption 
Multiple linear regression requires the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables to be linear. This assumption can be tested by observing the 
scatter plot of residuals versus predicted values (Hair et al. 2010). Preferably, the 
points should be symmetrically distributed along the horizontal line. The linearity 
test of this study showed a relationship between dependent and independent 
variables; hence meeting the assumption. 
 
4.6.4.4 Independence assumption/Auto-correlation assumption 
The independence assumption is when there is no correlation between two 
error terms (Gujarati 2014). In other words, the standard mean error of the dependent 
variable is independent from the independent variables. Alternatively, when the error 
terms are dependent with each other, autocorrelation occurs. Detection of 
autocorrelation can be made using the Durbin-Watson test. The test statistic assumes 
values between 0 and 4; with 2 indicating no autocorrelation. Meanwhile, if the 
statistic is substantially less than 2, there is evidence of positive serial correlation and 
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a statistic of more than 2 indicates negative correlation (Osborne & Waters 2002). 
While serial correlation does not affect the consistency of the estimated regression 
coefficient, it might affect the ability to conduct valid statistical tests. Nevertheless, 
the study sample showed that companies are not related in any way. Therefore this 
assumption is not violated. 
 
4.6.4.5 Homoscedasticity assumption 
Homoscedasticity is where the variance of errors is the same across all levels 
of the independent variables (Osborne & Waters 2002). If otherwise, the traditional 
formula used to calculate the standard error of coefficient estimates produces a 
biased value of the true standard deviation of the OLS estimates. Berry and Feldman 
(1985) and Tabachnick et al. (2001) comment that heteroscedasticity has little effect 
on significance tests. However, when heteroscedasticity is marked it can lead to 
serious distortion of results obtained. A scatter plot is a good way to check for 
homoscedasticity. Ideally, the error terms along the regression line should be equal. 
However, when the residuals are not evenly scattered around the line, 
heteroscedasticity is present. Testing of the homoscedasticity assumption in this 
study was made by examining the scatter plot of the residuals (ZRESID) against the 
predicted value (ZPRED) of the model. It turned out to be the classic cone-shape 
pattern of heteroscedasticity. As this warranted concern, the Breush-Pagan test was 
then conducted. Likewise, the chi-square and p value of that test proved that there is 
a difference between the variances in the sample; indicating that heteroscedasticity is 
a problem. To correct it, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors using White’s 
(1980) method was applied. 
 
4.6.4.6 Endogeniety test 
A potential problem that may occur in any economic model is endogeneity.  
A variable is said to be endogenous if it is correlated with some error term (Kaur & 
Arora 2015). In this case, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is not capable of 
delivering consistent parameter estimates. This causes the regression coefficient in 
OLS regression to be biased. Endogeniety problem is normally diagnosed through 
adoption of a control variable approach. By adding a control variable to the 
regression model, the regressors and the unobservable will be independent (Kaur & 
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Arora 2015). Following Rashid (2014), this study performed an endogeniety test (F 
test) using the Instrumental Variables approach.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has began by describing the research design. Following that is the 
explanation on how sample was selected and data are collected. All the variables 
employed in this study are subsequently explained and measured. For hypotheses 
testing, econometric models were then developed. Finally, an explanation of the 
various data analysis techniques was done highlighting multiple regression as the 
predominant method used in the study. The proceeding chapters, Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 and 10 will present the empirical results of the study based on the two research 
objectives utilizing the methodology outlined here. 
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CHAPTER 5: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) 
REPORTING 
 
Abstract 
This chapter assesses the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting of 
public companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. CSR reporting is increasingly utilised by 
investors globally to make decisions. Therefore, to penetrate into international 
markets, companies need to report on their CSR activities. Malaysia has carried out 
many initiatives to inculcate a culture of undertaking reporting CSR activities with 
mandating PLCs reporting effective from 2008 being the most prominent. Based on 
content analysis, CSR reporting among PLCs is observed to be increasing steadily. It 
is postulated that this increase is industry/sector specific. This chapter provides an 
insight to current CSR practices in Malaysia. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is neither new nor recent (Friedman 
1970); rather it has varied and extended history. The pressure to consider the social 
and environmental impact of business operations have been growing steadily over 
the past four decades (Castelo Branco & Delgado 2011). Despite diverse views on 
the concept and practice of CSR, there is increasing consensus that companies are 
social enterprises and therefore, have enormous responsibilities to society (Rowe 
2006). The impact of globalisation, wider stakeholder activism, and the free flow of 
information demand that companies do their business in a socially responsible and 
transparent manner. Hence, companies are expected to behave ethically and to act as 
good corporate citizens; by dealing fairly with employees, suppliers and customers, 
as well as focusing on corporate philanthropy and promoting environmental 
sustainability. The acknowledgement of CSR implies the need to recognize the 
importance of disclosure of information on companies’ activities related to such 
responsibilities (Castelo Branco & Delgado 2011). This points to the theme of this 
chapter: CSR communication.  CSR reporting, as given by Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines, describes the report made by the company on its economic, 
environmental, and social impacts (Global Reporting Index 2006). 
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The beginnings of CSR reporting in developed countries can be traced back 
to shareholder pressure, environment legislation and lobbying groups such as those 
concerned with shareholders activism, socially responsible investment and gender 
equity (Thompson 2008). In Malaysia and Asia generally, however, concern about 
employee health and occupational safety, environment and community support 
activities have been identified as the main drivers of CSR reporting (Othman & 
Ameer 2009). Despite the numerous benefits associated with CSR reporting, 
companies are still reluctant to disclose information voluntarily. The production of 
these reports has been portrayed as too complex, too costly, require too much human 
resources but with dubious return-on-investment (KPMG 2013).  Perry and Tse 
Sheng (1999) relate low CSR disclosure levels with the perception of the business 
community that their organizations do not have an environmental impact. Unlike 
shareholders in developing countries, those from developed countries associate their 
spending on CSR with the market value of the company. Given the ability of CSR to 
increase a company’s reputation (Othman et al. 2011), the perceived liability will 
eventually turn into an asset as the company’s share price increases. Lack of 
regulation was one of the most common problems that authorities in developing 
countries faced in their efforts to encourage corporations to increase their CSR 
reporting. Furthermore, the shortage of qualified accountants in developing countries 
is part of the problem because introducing social and environmental issues into the 
reporting system requires a combination of expertise in various fields including law, 
engineering and sociology (Ismail & Ibrahim 2012).  
Unlike developed countries where the impetus for development of CSR were 
greatly driven by the human rights and consumer movements, most developing 
countries have had different experiences. Stakeholder activism is relatively weak as 
compared to those in developed countries. A study by Elijido-Ten (2009) revealed 
that there is generally no demand from shareholders and creditors in Malaysia, for 
disclosure relating to environmental issues. Amran (2007) associates this 
phenomenon to the low level of CSR awareness among the local people. Even if 
stakeholders’ pressure exists, local managers perceived it as being of no consequence 
(Nik Ahmad & Sulaiman 2004). Hence this explains why developing economies 
such as Malaysia lag behind in terms of CSR reporting. 
CSR was initiated and institutionalised in developed countries. Various 
studies have addressing a plethora of subjects within the still-evolving field of CSR 
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and its communication realm. However, only a handful of studies have been 
conducted into CSR reporting in Malaysia (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Mohd 
Ghazali 2007; Haji 2013).  Since the public now appears to be more concerned with 
the adverse impact of business on society, the Malaysian government has increased 
efforts to encourage CSR reporting. Yet, the level of reporting remains low 
compared to developed countries (Said et al. 2011).  This study aims to determine the 
extent of CSR reporting in Malaysia especially after a series of important regulatory 
regime and governance changes since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The 
evolutionary process of strengthening the governance landscape presents an 
opportunity for an in-depth study of the extent of information communicated to 
external users.   
This study examines the nature and extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian 
public listed companies (PLCs) from 2008 until 2013, as well as determining the 
reporting trends over the examination period. The period under investigation was 
chosen based on several grounds. First, the country’s growing economy and 
openness to foreign investment.  Second, the period during and after the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Haji (2013) showed that companies’ reporting levels tend to vary 
with the occurrence of certain events. Third, the Malaysia stock exchange has 
mandated listed companies to disclose CSR information in their annual reports from 
the 2007 financial year (Bursa Malaysia 2006). Abdul Fatima, Abdullah and 
Sulaiman (2015) indicate that mandatory regulation has had some impact on the level 
of reporting. Fourth, a number of CSR awards such as the Malaysian Prime 
Minister’s CSR award were subsequently launched to encourage community 
development initiatives. A recent study by Anas et al. (2015) indicates the positive 
effect of awards on the extent and quality of CSR disclosures. 
This study seeks to contribute to the extant literature by extending and 
attempting to overcome the limitation of existing studies in a number of ways. First, 
it will extend the literature on the extent of CSR reporting in Malaysia. Second, it 
aims to provide new evidence on how external forces such as legislation, influence 
CSR reporting practices. Regulation is alleged to have the ability to increase a 
company’s reporting level given that several countries like Australia, Belgium, 
China, Denmark, Sweden, UK and the US have also taken the same measure (Hung, 
Shi & Wang 2013). The positive impact of mandatory reporting pertaining to social 
and environmental aspects is evident in more developed countries (Criado-Jiménez, 
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Fernández-Chulián, Larrinaga-González& Husillos-Carqués 2008). Hence it is 
beneficial to know whether such a command-and-control system may improve CSR 
behaviour in Malaysia. 
The rest of the chapter is organised along the following lines. The second 
section is concerned with the CSR reporting environment in Malaysia. The third 
section reviews the literature about CSR reporting. The fourth section discusses 
theory development. The fifth section describes the research method. The results are 
discussed in the sixth section. Finally, concluding remarks are reported in the seventh 
section. 
 
5.2 The environment of CSR reporting in Malaysia 
Malaysia is a unique emerging market in South-East Asia with a diverse 
racial ethnic and religious environment. Malaysia has shown tremendous economic 
resilience from the economic and global financial turmoil commencing in 2007. In 
the previous 50 years, Malaysia has experienced a shift in its type of industries; from 
agriculture to manufacturing, automotive and information technology based 
industries. Vision 2020 was initiated to inspire Malaysia in becoming a developed 
country by the year 2020. The principles of CSR are embedded in three out of nine 
challenges of the Vision that are to become: (1) a moral and ethical community, (2) a 
fully caring culture, and (3) an economically just society. A study by Zain (1999) 
highlighted Vision 2020 as one of the significant drivers of CSR development in 
Malaysia. Concerned about the need to maintain well-balanced development, the 
government has further intensified the incorporation of environmental considerations 
subsequently. Current increasing concerns over the environment on the part of 
pressure groups have led to an increased importance for companies to disclose their 
CSR activities.  
Prior to compulsion, there was a lack of incentive for companies to make 
CSR reporting standard practice in their annual reports. Reporting on CSR requires 
companies to be transparent which contradicts many Southeast Asian cultures 
(Thompson & Zakaria 2004). In developed countries, CSR is a set of robust 
command-and-control regulations. There exist comprehensive environmental 
regulations, strong labour laws and unions and a wealth of consumer advocate 
organizations. These generate pressure that drives companies to adopt voluntary CSR 
practices. Contrary to that, there is weak enforcement of legislation in relation to 
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CSR practices as well as a lack of monitoring and also consultation in most 
developing countries. This phenomenon may explain why only few companies take 
CSR reporting seriously (Thompson & Zakaria 2004). Another key point in relation 
to the low level of reporting in developing countries like Malaysia rests in ownership 
patterns. Companies with concentrated ownership generally find CSR practices 
unattractive. Therefore, disclosure is usually at the minimum level possible. 
Directors from dispersed ownership companies view this issue differently. While 
they adopt CSR practices with the aim of building and maintaining their companies’ 
good reputations, it is also believed that their personal reputation will also be 
enhanced. 
The earlier absence of CSR reporting guidelines in Malaysia exacerbated the 
low reporting scenario. The only source of environmental reporting guidelines during 
the 1990’s was provided by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board. Financial 
Reporting Standard (FRS) 101 explicitly referred to environmental reports. It 
encouraged companies to present additional information if management believes it 
will assist users in making economic decisions. FRS 137 set out the disclosure 
requirements for the recognition of contingent liabilities and assets. Although it does 
not provide specific details of the types of liability, it is foreseeable that 
environmental liabilities could potentially be included within a company’s financial 
statement. Bursa Malaysia launched its CSR framework in September 2006.  This 
was a set of voluntary guidelines for PLCs to address matters related to responsibility 
and ethics in the course of their normal economic activities. The framework looked 
at four main focal areas – the Environment, the Workplace, the Community and the 
Marketplace, in no order of priority. Its goal is to go beyond compliance, towards 
making CSR integral to normal business operations. Similarly, the Silver Book was 
introduced in March 2006 to assist government-owned companies in their CSR 
reporting. This was expected to increase managers’ awareness to make detailed 
disclosure of CSR activities in their companies’ annual reports. CSR reporting in 
Malaysia remained largely optional until 2007. However, this changed when all 
PLCs were directed to adopt CSR reporting for the 2007 financial year. This 
requirement has been incorporated into the Listing Requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia. PLCs are required to include a description of their CSR activities or 
practices undertaken by the listed issuer and its subsidiaries or, if there are none, a 
statement to that effect.  
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To encourage environmental reporting, various CSR awards were introduced. 
The Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA) Malaysia, with the 
endorsement of the Department of Environment, launched the Malaysia 
Environmental and Social Reporting Awards (MESRA) to give recognition to those 
corporations that have reported environmental and social information to raise 
awareness about the environment (Othman & Ameer 2010).  Other awards were the 
“Prime Minister’s CSR Award” and “Most Outstanding Annual Report Award”, to 
name a few. Also, the Federal Government’s 2008 and 2009 budget incorporated 
incentives such as tax deductions for companies who provide public facilities or 
undertake environmental activities such as biomass energy or carbon credits.  
Consequently, there is a significant increase over time in CSR disclosure (Esa & 
Mohd Ghazali 2012) with a reporting level of 98% recorded in the survey conducted 
by KPMG in 2013. Given these points, government initiatives in promoting CSR 
appear to be bearing fruit.   
On top of the government’s role in encouraging companies to embark on 
CSR practices, there are various other drivers which have increased the practices in 
Malaysia such as: increased demand for corporate governance and accountability as a 
result of privatization; business and marketing strategies; improved corporate image; 
NACRA Environmental Reporting award; strengthening of stakeholder relationships 
and improve access to capital investment (ACCA 2002). Also, CSR activities were 
carried out to fulfil legal obligations and to provide information to shareholders (Nik 
Ahmad & Sulaiman 2004). Ethnicity and religion are also influencing factors for 
CSR activities in Malaysian companies (Zulkifli & Amran 2006). The corporate 
culture of the Malaysian companies is influenced by the three largest ethnic groups, 
namely Malay, Chinese and Indian. Each group possesses unique characteristics, yet 
generally prioritizes on similar aspects such as mutual cooperation and adherence to 
their religious percepts (Said et al. 2011). As such, these characteristics provide 
managers of Malaysian companies with the moral support to engage in CSR and 
disclose information about their activities to important interest groups.   
The announcement of the CSR framework by Bursa Malaysia in 2006 was 
accepted with mixed reactions by PLCs. Bursa Malaysia recognises that 'one size 
does not fit all'. Although the framework guides companies in determining the main 
areas that should be reported, the details content is left to management’s discretion; 
very much depending on (1) nature of business (2) resources (3) company 
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inclinations (4) stakeholders expectations. Accordingly, a wide variation of content 
across companies is observable.  In 2008, Bursa Malaysia commissioned CSR Asia 
to survey CSR reporting in 2006-2007.  The natural resources sectors as well as the 
so-called “sin” industries namely gambling, tobacco and alcohol were the highest 
reporters. Associated with negative social and environmental impact, these industries 
are in the global spotlight. Hence, producing impressive CSR reporting, in some 
ways provide them with the “license to operate” (Sharma 2013). In contrast, the 
construction industry is seen to be rather passive in CSR reporting. Despite being 
labelled as one of the sensitive industries that pose a threat to the environment, the 
construction industry exhibited little or no engagement on CSR issues. Of the four 
dimensions of the CSR framework, workplace ranked highest with environment at 
the bottom and marketplace and community taking the second and third position 
respectively. Of late, numerous efforts have been done by the Malaysian government 
to assure the growth of CSR awareness. It is expected that there could be further 
changes in the nature and level of CSR reporting by companies in Malaysia. Hence, 
it is the intention of this present study to examine the trend and level of company’s 
CSR reporting following the recent regulatory changes. 
 
5.3 Literature review 
A number of studies on CSR reporting have documented an increase in public 
awareness and concern about the detrimental effects of business on the natural 
environment. Despite its importance, CSR reporting studies in Asia remain 
comparatively scarce in comparison to North America and Europe. This is mainly 
because, conventionally, CSR has been viewed as a predominantly Western trend 
(Chapple & Moon 2005). There are few empirical studies on CSR reporting reported 
from an Asian perspective; suggesting that differences in institutional attributes 
influence the levels of development, resources and awareness of CSR issues 
(Welford 2004). However, attitude towards CSR changed with the emergence of 
NGO and consumer interest groups.  This movement is also influenced by Western 
multinational companies increasing their operations in Asia and thereby encouraging 
Asian companies to also take a proactive approach to CSR issues (Chapple & Moon 
2005).  As a result, the number of studies on CSR reporting has grown substantially 
after the turn of the millennium, which could be attributed to an increasing public 
attention for CSR (Kolk, Hong & Van Dolen 2010; Saleh et al. 2010). 
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Substantial research on the determinants of voluntary disclosure has been 
done in developed countries (e.g. Siregar & Bachtiar 2010; Gamerschlag, Möller & 
Verbeeten 2011; Reverte 2009). A few studies have been done in developing 
countries (e.g. Khan, 2010; Rashid and Lodh, 2008). One of the primary studies on 
the development of CSR in Malaysia was carried out by Teoh and Thong (1984). 
That study examined various aspects of corporate social performance including 
social reporting. The authors surmised that companies were mainly involved in areas 
of human resources, product services, community work and the physical 
environment. Human resource related activities topped the list of social involvement 
by the companies surveyed. The authors concluded that Malaysian companies were 
conservative in their attitude towards CSR. 
A study has been conducted by Jamil, Alwi and Mohamed (2002) into the 
CSR practices of Malaysian companies for the five year period from 1995 to 1999. It 
was discovered that less than 30% of companies, made social and environmental 
disclosures.  Most of the disclosures pertained to human resources. At this point of 
time, levels of CSR practices of Malaysian companies were portrayed as very low. 
The phenomenon can be attributed to, among others, the absence of legislation on 
that matter (Teoh & Thong 1984; Nik Ahmad & Sulaiman 2004) and the low level of 
awareness of the business community of their companies’ potential environmental 
impact (Perry & Tse Sheng 1999). 
However, at the start of the millennium, the situation started to improve 
(Thompson & Zakaria 2004). A survey by the ACCA in 2002, intended to examine 
the extent of environmental related disclosures by public listed companies on the 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. Covering a three-year period from 1999 to 2001, the 
survey documented an increase in the number of companies disclosing 
environmental information. There was an upward trend of reporting with the highest 
engagement by the industrial sector, followed by the plantation sector, consumer 
products, trading/services, construction, infrastructure and properties and lastly 
finance. Despite the positive sign emerging from the above mentioned sectors, 
companies in the mining, technology and hotel sectors were not disclosing any 
environmental information.  
Hasnah et al. (2006) compared social disclosures pre-recession (1996), during 
recession (1998) and post-recession (2000). The study outlined that the highest 
disclosures were made during the recession period. It seems that companies tried to 
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legitimize their actions to boost public confidence in their performance. Additionally, 
companies reacted positively to the calls by the government, in line with the 
development of corporate governance, to be more transparent. 
Janggu et al. (2007) examined the level and trend of CSR disclosure pattern 
of 169 industrial companies in Malaysia from 1998 to 2003. The study revealed an 
improved CSR level by industrial companies, particularly in terms of the amount of 
disclosure and the number of participating companies.  Human resources emerged as 
the most popular theme reported, followed by environment, product and community. 
The observations implied that companies highly appreciate their employees and at 
the same time are concerned about the environment. 
While there are numerous studies that have examined the trend in CSR 
reporting, not many have looked at the reporting trend when new regulatory efforts 
are introduced. In China, Liu et al. (2010) documented an increase in environmental 
disclosure of companies in Jiangsu province following the introduction of a 
government-oriented disclosure programme. A comparable result was obtained in the 
study by Criado-Jiménez et al. (2008) on Spanish companies after the 
implementation of mandatory CSR reporting in 2002. These results suggest that 
progressive and improved regulation could increase the volume and quality of CSR 
reporting in annual reports. Recently, Hung, Shi and Wang (2013) demonstrated that 
mandatory CSR reporting companies in China experience a reduction in information 
asymmetry subsequent to the mandate. Their result casts away the criticism that 
mandatory CSR reporting lacks credibility and relevance in developing countries. 
Haji (2013) investigated the CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs in 2006 and 
2009. The study documented a significant overall increase in both the extent and 
quality of CSR reporting; mainly attributable to regulatory changes and the 
introduction of various CSR awareness programs. Likewise, a study on 
environmental disclosure by Abdul Fatima et al. (2015) captured an improved quality 
of the disclosure in the period between 2005 and 2009. They contend the increase in 
the level of environmental disclosure is due to the impact of the stock exchange 
listing requirement. Additionally, the study by Said et al. (2013) revealed an increase 
in the level of CSR reporting by PLCs in Malaysia; although it was still a voluntary 
initiative during 2009. The study identified industry type as being the most 
influencing factor in disclosing CSR information. 
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Given the increase in awareness and legal enforcement (Othman & Ameer 
2010), CSR issues have gained increased attention (Abdullah et al. 2011; Haji 2013).  
Other empirical studies on CSR practices in Malaysia include (Said et al. 2013; Saleh 
et al. 2010; Abdullah et al. 2011; Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012). These studies have 
shown that increasing interest was given to CSR reporting over time. This upward 
increment moved from a mere 26% in the 1980s (Teoh & Thong 1984) to more than 
90% recently (Said et al. 2009; KPMG 2013).   
While there are increasing numbers of studies that delve into the importance 
of CSR, this chapter is different from those previously done, in several aspects. First, 
it relies on a large number of samples. Most prior studies have depended on small 
number of PLCs, for example, 85 (Haji 2013), 99 (Nik Ahmad & Sulaiman 2004) 
and 100 (Jamil et al. 2002). With the intention of increasing the rate of 
generalisability, 450 companies across a wide range of industries in Malaysia were 
sampled. Another distinguishing factor is the longer time frame used here. The six 
year time period should illustrate clearer CSR reporting trends. Finally, the CSR 
checklist to be used in this study is an adaptation of CSR checklists from a number of 
recent studies (e.g. Chan et al. 2014; Mohamed Adnan 2012; Abdullah et al. 2011). 
Apart from the study by Chan et al. (2014), both studies are locally based. Thus, 
adapting their checklists enable currently reported CSR items to be captured. 
 
5.4 Theoretical framework 
This study adopts an institutional theory perspective in explaining the CSR 
practices of the Malaysian companies. Neo-institutional sociology suggests that a 
major way of achieving legitimacy is to incorporate accepted institutional norms, 
rules, conventions, and practices into corporate operations (Di Maggio & Powell 
1983). This theory provides the reasoning for the homogeneity of organisational 
forms and practices in one particular environment; achieved through three different 
mechanisms specifically coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Coercive 
isomorphism is a result of pressures exerted by organisation that the company is 
dependent on; originating from political influence, regulation, law and the public at 
large (Amran & Siti-Nabiha 2009). Mimetic isomorphism results to organisation 
imitating or benchmarking those firms that are viewed to be more legitimate and 
successful than others. Normative pressure stems from professionalisation factored 
Chapter 5: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting 
 
121 
 
by education and professional networks. In relation to CSR in developing countries, 
coercive isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism are evident.  
“Institutionalise” in the context of this chapter means how the environmental 
factors influence Malaysian companies to feel that CSR is something important that 
needs to be carried out. However, keeping the practice as voluntary might inhibit its 
growth. Hence, government has an important role to play in motivating socially 
responsible behaviour in companies especially when CSR practices are just 
beginning to gain a foothold (Abdul Fatima et al. 2015). Neo-institutional sociology 
suggests that regulative institutional pressures can force companies to better fulfil 
their social obligations. A decision to disclose more extensive CSR information in 
annual reports by managers can, therefore, be understood as being determined by 
institutional forces due to the effect of coercive isomorphism.  
As a further testament to its commitment towards CSR practices, the 
Malaysian government has included CSR issue in the recent MCCG revision. The 
revised MCCG 2012 guidelines emphasises the importance of the board in ensuring 
the company’s strategies promote sustainability especially in the area of 
environmental, social and governance. Balancing sustainability aspects with the 
interests of various stakeholders is professed to be essential in enhancing investor 
perception and public trust. Companies are also required to disclose these policies 
and their implementation in the annual report and the corporate website. In view of 
this, it is anticipated that companies will react positively to the restructuring of the 
corporate governance by increasing their CSR reporting. Given this major issue, 
adopting an institutional theory perspective in this study is assumed to be 
appropriate.   
 
5.5 Method 
5.5.1 Research design 
5.5.1.1 Sample selection 
This study utilised a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia from 2008 until 2013. The study period enabled an 
examination of the trends in the CSR reporting practices of public listed companies 
in Malaysia, inclusive of the impacts of two major MCCG revisions in 2007 and 
2012. In order for a company to be included in the sample, the following 
requirements had to be met for each year in the six-year period (2008-2013): 
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i. Companies were continuously listed on Bursa Malaysia 
ii. Companies produced an annual report which was publically available  
 
5.5.1.2 Data selection 
Initially, there were 813 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa 
Malaysia as at 31st December 2013. However, only 613 companies have completely 
lodged their annual reports over the six year period. Bursa Malaysia classified 
companies under nine sectors: plantation, mining, property, consumer products, 
industrial products, construction, trading/services, technology and finance. In 
general, finance companies are subject to different regulatory and disclosure 
requirements and also material differences in their types of operation. Consequently, 
prior studies have not considered them (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Mohd Ghazali 
2007; Said et al. 2009). Following this line of research, 136 finance companies were 
excluded from the sample, reducing the potential population to 477 companies. 27 
companies with incomplete data were also omitted from the sample; leaving 450 
companies. In order to get generalisation of the state of CSR reporting in Malaysia, 
all 450 companies were included in the study.   
The study utilised the six annual reports for each company as the main source 
of information. Relying on this sole source of CSR information is based on several 
justifications. First, the selection of annual reports is consistent with other prior 
studies (e.g. Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 2011; Chan et al. 2014; Haji 
2013). Second, with reference to Hasnah et al. (2006), annual reports are considered 
to be the major means through which company’s information is communicated 
(Jenkins & Yakovleva 2006) including social and environmental reporting (Chan et 
al. 2014). Third, Gray, Javad, Power and Sinclair (2001) support the usage of the 
annual report because it is the central corporate document that outlines the 
organisation as a whole. Further, much of the interest in CSR reporting lies in the 
construction of accounts of the organisation’s social and environmental activities. 
Finally, annual reports have been a preferred place for disclosure because of their 
perceived credibility and accessibility (Othman & Ameer 2010).   
 
5.5.2 Content analysis 
In measuring the extent of CSR reporting, content analysis was applied in this 
study. It is the prevailing technique used to investigate CSR disclosures in corporate 
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annual reports (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 
2011; Chan et al. 2014; Haji 2013). Content analysis is technique used by researchers 
to replicate and make valid inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff 
1989). It includes qualitative and quantitative methods and converts information in 
annual reports into scores (Djajadikerta & Trireksani 2012). 
To assess the content of CSR reporting, a checklist of items was constructed 
by examining previous CSR disclosure checklists (e.g. Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Barako & Brown 2008). Additionally, specifically Malaysian checklists were also 
referenced (e.g. Abdullah et al. 2011; Haji 2013). To ensure conformation of the 
checklist items to the listing requirement and their relevance to the current Malaysian 
context, the framework launched by Bursa Malaysia in 2006 was also used as a 
reference. It comprises guidelines for PLCs in defining their CSR priorities, 
implementation and reporting.  The framework focuses on four dimensions namely: 
Environment, Community, Marketplace and Workplace. For the purpose of this 
study, a checklist of 22 items of CSR developed by Abdullah et al. (2011) has been 
made as the benchmark. The referred checklist was used to capture CSR reporting of 
companies in a similar institutional setting as the present study; hence confirming its 
suitability. Their checklist was an adoption of the work of Mohd Ghazali (2007) with 
some changes according to the checklists by Hackston and Milne (1996) and Ng 
(1985).  In addition, the checklists by Mohamed Adnan (2012) and Chan et al. (2014) 
were also referred to. To ensure validity of the checklist, this study also followed the 
work of Kolk (2010). After going through several series of revisions and 
refinements, the final checklist containing 51 items was produced (see Table 4.4).  
Measuring the items reported would address the presence or absence of CSR 
information (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Mohd Ghazali 2007). CSR scores were derived 
based on an unweighted method, where information was equally valued regardless of 
their importance or relevance to any particular user group (Chau & Gray 2002).  A 
value “1” was awarded to a particular item if it is disclosed and “0” if it is not 
disclosed.  This method has been extensively employed previously. The scores were 
then transformed into a CSR reporting index by dividing the disclosure score of each 
company to the maximum possible score (i.e 1 x 51= 51). 
                                                           CSRIi = 
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1  
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CSRI = CSR reporting index,  nj = number of items expected for jth company 
Xij = 1 if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed 
This measurement technique has been used previously by other researchers (e.g. Haji 
2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Rashid & Lodh 2008). 
 
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Incidence of CSR reporting 
Table 4.3 outlined the breakdown of the number and percentage of the 
companies in the sample, across various industries. Companies are classified under 
particular industry based on a two-digit SIC code. Companies classified under 
Education and Cultural and Recreational Services were omitted due to the small 
number in the sample; Education (6 observations) and Cultural and Recreational 
Services (12 observations). Cohen (2013) suggests that in order to detect differences 
statistically, there should be at least 30 participants per cell. Following this rule of 
thumb both industries were excluded.   
Table 5.1 contains the average CSR reporting for all industries in this study.  
The result demonstrates that there has been a steady increase in CSR disclosure over 
time. The finding is similar and consistent with a previous study of Malaysian 
companies by Mustaffa and Tamoi (2006). 
 
Table 5.1 CSR reporting by industry over time 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 % % % % % % 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  22.45 22.96 22.71 24.54 24.98 25.75 
Mining 15.69 16.53 16.25 16.53 17.93 20.45 
Manufacturing 19.63 20.55 20.89 21.37 21.73 22.36 
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 37.65 40 41.57 42.35 42.74 48.63 
Construction 21.4 20.67 21.74 21.01 22.8 24.03 
Wholesale Trade 18.04 18.53 19.41 18.24 19.02 20.79 
Retail Trade 16.86 20 20.2 20 22.16 22.55 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 28.98 31.59 32.68 31.59 31.59 33.11 
Transport and Storage 19.61 17.65 19.07 20.41 22.28 21.21 
Communication Services 34.17 30.53 35.01 29.69 34.45 36.69 
Property and Business Services 17.24 18.53 18.46 18.73 18.53 19.07 
Health and Community Services 21.81 21.82 24.27 23.53 22.79 26.23 
Overall 20.29 20.91 21.43 21.70 22.34 23.16 
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The increase in CSR reporting suggests that PLCs in Malaysia attach some 
importance to CSR activities. The increase can be attributed to recent changes 
occurring in the Malaysian business environment such as the Bursa Malaysia stock 
listing requirement and also the introduction of many CSR awards.  The highest 
annual increase was reported from 2012 to 2013. In 2012, Malaysia had its second 
revision of MCCG focusing on sustainability aspects. Companies might have 
responded positively to this governance revision; resulting in increased reporting. 
This finding is consistent with the recent study by Haji (2013) of 85 listed companies 
in Malaysia that confirms an increase in CSR disclosures following the introduction 
of the new regulations. The second highest annual increase was between 2008 and 
2009. This was a post- recession period where companies tend to increase their level 
of reporting; legitimizing their activities to gain stakeholders’ confidence. At the end 
of 2007, Bursa Malaysia announced mandatory CSR reporting for all PLCs. In 
China, Liu et al. (2010) reported an increase in environmental disclosure following a 
government-oriented disclosure programme. The reporting of environmental 
information of companies in Spain followed the same pattern when mandatory 
environmental reporting was introduced in 2002 (Criado-Jiménez et al. 2008). 
 
Figure 5.1 General reporting by industry and year 
 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the reporting trend by various industries in Malaysia.  It 
can be seen that by far the highest level of reporting was in the electricity, gas and 
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water supply industry. It indicates that this industry seemed to be practicing CSR 
well compared to other industries. Mohamed Adnan (2012) provides similar result 
when observing the reporting trend of companies operating in utilities industry 
particularly in Malaysia, UK, India and China. A study by Lu and Castka (2009) on 
CSR practices of Malaysian companies has identified one of the leading companies 
in this industry to have practiced CSR as early as 1974. The company asserts that its 
CSR efforts include rural education, health care and involving every employee in the 
organization in its CSR activities. Interestingly, this finding supports the study by 
Hilson (2012) that showed that mining and the oil and gas industry spearhead CSR 
reporting in developing countries. Other studies that share the same result are Kolk 
(2003) and Gray et al. (1995). 
Surprisingly, manufacturing and construction were found to be reporting CSR 
moderately; showing a similar pattern to other industries in the study. Despite the 
sturdy increase in CSR reporting across various industries, the reporting level is still 
considered low compared to disclosures made in developed countries (Said et al. 
2011).  This echoes the findings of past studies in Malaysia (Elijido-Ten 2009; Saleh 
et al. 2010; Haji 2013; Nik Ahmad & Salat Ahmed Haraf 2013). High reporting of 
CSR information was also seen from industries like communication services and also 
accommodation, cafes and restaurants. These appear to be interesting results. 
Apparently, not much discussion has been made in relation to these industries since 
they have received less attention from researchers. One example is the study by Rizk, 
Dixon and Woodhead (2008) who found that Egyptian companies operating in the 
telecommunication and construction industries exhibit excellent CSR practices. A 
study by Hamid and Atan (2011) revealed that many telecommunication operators 
have won major CSR awards in Malaysia. For example, DiGi is the first company to 
win Prime Minister’s CSR Awards and Telekom Malaysia won the ACCA Malaysia 
Environmental and Social Reporting Awards in 2004 and 2005 respectively.  
 
5.6.2 Content-category themes of CSR reporting 
In explaining the company’s reporting on content-category themes, Tables 
5.2 and Table 5.3are to be read concurrently. Table 5.2 shows the CSR reporting in 
six content-category themes over time. Overall, it can be seen that most companies 
disclose CSR information in the General area where it involves their 
acknowledgement of CSR as well as sharing the company’s CSR mission. 
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The workplace theme comes second in the theme ranking. This might be due 
to most companies regarding their employees as the most valuable assets and would 
secure their health and safety, provide training and development programs in order to 
stimulate the sense of being appreciated and to engender loyalty amongst employees.  
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) (1994)'s aim, among others, is to 
make further provision for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work. 
These CSR practices not only acts to improve job satisfaction but also helps to 
reduce recruitment and training costs (Paek et al. 2013). By detailing these health and 
safety actions in the annual reports, it is contended that companies seek a form of 
influence legitimacy because the disclosures convey the message that companies are 
responding to their employee’s broader interests. Evidence of companies attaching 
great importance to fulfilling the employees’ needs have been observed in several 
studies such as Teoh and Thong (1984), Hasnah et al. (2006), Mohamed Adnan 
(2012), Jitaree (2015), Said et al. (2011) and Yaftian (2011). 
Environmental disclosure ranks third in the reporting of the CSR themes. 
Despite the extent of CSR reporting may appears to be encouraging, factors such as 
lack of public pressure, fear of readers’ reaction and perception on their organisation 
are said to contribute to low level of reporting  (Rahman et al. 2011).  In the same 
vein, Jaffar, Iskandar and Muhamad (2002) pointed out that the reluctance to disclose 
on the environmental theme occurs if companies feel that such disclosure will have 
negative implications on their social and financial performance. This hypothesis is 
proven by looking at the disclosure of environmental accidents, hazardous waste 
disclosure and also fines/sanction for non-compliance which was not reported by any 
company across all industries. Studies by Yusoff, Lehman and Mohd Nasir (2006), 
Elijido-Ten (2009) and Ahmad and Mohamad (2014) exhibited similar result of 
companies withholding so called “bad news” from the stakeholders. The finding 
emphasises that CSR reporting is probably perceived attempts at improving the 
companies’ image rather than to fulfill stakeholders’ information needs. 
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Table 5.2: Disclosure of CSR themes over time 
Theme 
Expected  Actual  
% 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
total  total  
disclosure disclosure Total 
% 
Total 
% 
Total 
% 
Total 
% 
Total 
% 
Total 
% 
    disclosure disclosure disclosure disclosure disclosure disclosure 
General 18774 9965 33.50 1653 35.40 1659 34.53 1666 34.06 1660 33.41 1659 32.49 1668 31.47 
Community 24138 5395 18.14 850 15.76 862 17.94 893 18.26 916 18.44 927 18.16 947 17.86 
Environment  37548 6197 20.84 934 17.15 998 20.77 1010 20.65 1022 20.57 1098 21.50 1135 21.41 
Workplace 37548 7553 25.40 1135 20.84 1188 24.73 1217 24.88 1265 25.46 1317 25.79 1431 26.99 
Marketplace 13410 536 1.80 82 1.41 83 1.73 91 1.86 87 1.75 93 1.82 100 1.89 
Other 5364 94 0.32 16 0.29 14 0.29 14 0.29 18 0.36 12 0.24 20 0.38 
Total 257472 29740 11.55 4670 100 4804 100 4891 100 4968 100 5106 100 5301 100 
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The findings along with other average disclosure of CSR items are presented 
in Table 5.3. The disclosures are mostly vague statements of commitment and 
concerns about the external environment. This lack of engagement with 
environmental issues is not uncommon in emerging economies and has been reported 
in previous studies, for example, in Singapore (Tsang 1998), Malaysia (Haniffa & 
Cooke 2005), Thailand (Ratanajongkol, Davey & Low 2006) and Bangladesh (Islam 
& Deegan 2008).   
Next highest disclosed theme was Community. Under this sub-theme, 
charitable donations and activities as well as granting scholarships to the needy, 
report a high result. Abdulrazak and Ahmad (2014) highlight the fact that 
philanthropic activities has been regarded as the most common CSR practice in 
Malaysia specifically, and in Asian countries generally (Sharma 2013). While it is 
argued that participating in good deeds are merely to boost company’s image, it 
benefits the community especially those in the immediate vicinity of the operations 
(Sharma 2013).  Though the view seems to support the notion that Malaysian society 
has common concern for morality which is driven by spiritual values (Lu & Castka  
2009), Mustaffa and Tamoi (2006) point to the reporting on this community theme to 
the introduction of “Caring society policy” and “Vision 2020” by the government in 
the early 1990s.  Disclosing companies might want their readers to know that they 
are noble corporate citizens, adhering to government policy and that they see 
themselves as accountable to the wider public (Zain 1999).  In other words, the 
companies are conforming to the needs of the stakeholders (Rahman et al. 2011).  
Low levels of information were reported under the Marketplace theme which 
consists of information on product research, safety, quality as well as customer 
awards. This finding is consistent with the study by Mustaffa and Tamoi (2006) who 
found that research culture is rather novel in Malaysia, therefore less emphasis is 
placed on this area. Similarly, under sub-theme Other, value added statement and 
value added ratio received the least attention from the companies; with a number of 
them not disclosing the items. 
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Table 5.3 Number of companies disclosing CSR items over time 
CSR Theme/ Items 
  Number of companies disclosing CSR  
No. of  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
companies 
General               
Acknowledgement/ management of CSR 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
Disclosure of CSR policies 450 320 323 322 324 324 326 
Address sustainability 450 212 215 216 217 216 213 
Mission/ values/code of conduct 450 209 207 205 203 201 202 
Commitment to external initiatives  450 8 8 9 9 10 12 
Awards related to social, environmental/best practices 450 15 17 25 19 19 25 
Discussion on stakeholder engagement 450 442 442 442 441 442 443 
Community               
Charitable donations and activities 450 345 345 351 358 356 371 
Supporting government social campaign 450 49 49 45 48 47 51 
Support for public health/ volunteerism 450 144 160 162 164 175 179 
Aid medical research 450 2 1 1 3 1 1 
Sponsoring educational programs/ scholarship 450 195 196 213 210 219 212 
Discussion on public policy involvement 450 6 7 6 7 9 8 
Graduate employment 450 25 24 29 28 29 33 
Sponsoring sports project 450 71 66 71 80 71 71 
Acquisition from local suppliers 450 13 14 15 18 20 21 
Environment               
Statement to reduce pollution  450 257 274 277 272 286 284 
Recycling/ using recycle materials 450 170 176 174 171 187 184 
Preventing/ Managing waste 450 149 154 159 162 176 171 
Disclosure on significant spills/ environmental accidents 450 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hazardous waste disclosure 450 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Fines/sanction for non-compliance 450 0 0 1 1 2 2 
Design facilities harmonious with the environment/ Landscaping 450 55 56 61 66 70 70 
Impacts on biodiversity 450 34 34 30 32 33 39 
Strategies/ plans for managing impacts on biodiversity 450 53 53 60 59 59 66 
Environmental review and audit 450 9 12 12 13 17 20 
Conservation of energy in the conduct of business operations 450 98 117 113 120 133 135 
Utilizing waste material for energy production 450 30 35 33 33 39 44 
Disclosure of carbon/ green gas emissions 450 10 10 11 12 13 22 
Initiatives to reduce carbon/ green gas emissions 450 66 74 77 79 81 96 
Workplace               
Employee profiles 450 49 43 45 47 43 56 
Information on share purchase scheme/ pension program 450 14 10 15 16 16 16 
Employee training through in-house programs 450 235 259 256 278 293 297 
Support to employee education 450 21 19 21 25 28 35 
Information on management-employee relationship/ efforts to 
improve job satisfaction 450 34 40 40 38 48 53 
Employee diversity 450 37 33 36 37 49 56 
Employee receiving regular reviews 450 15 12 15 17 19 19 
Recreational activities/ facilities 450 164 172 176 175 176 198 
Discussion of significant benefit program provided  450 113 123 126 130 136 161 
Establishment of a safety department/committee/policy 450 97 103 111 113 109 119 
Provision of health care for employee 450 73 83 84 94 93 92 
Compliance to health & safety standards and regulations 450 248 253 260 261 269 281 
Award for health and safety 450 19 15 13 17 17 23 
Rates of work-related injury/ illness/deaths 450 16 23 19 17 21 25 
Marketplace               
Information on research project to improve products 450 35 40 43 42 45 48 
Verifiable information that product quality has increased  450 7 7 6 6 7 7 
Disclosure of product meeting safety standards 450 25 22 25 25 27 26 
Product sustainability/ use of child labour 450 6 5 6 6 5 8 
Customer service awards/ ratings 450 9 9 11 8 9 11 
Other               
Value added statement 450 8 7 7 9 6 10 
Value added ratio 450 8 7 7 9 6 10 
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Figure 5.2 displays the CSR themes emphasised by companies when 
reporting CSR information.   
 
Figure 5.2: Breakdown of themes in CSR reporting 
            
Evidently, most companies indicate their involvement in CSR practices 
through the General theme, accounting for 33.50% of disclosures. The second 
highest reported theme is Workplace accounting for 25.40% of the total reporting. 
Environment theme comprises 20.84% of the total disclosures revealing the 
increased awareness of CSR among companies. Meanwhile, Community theme made 
up 18.14% of the total reporting where most companies focused on charity activities. 
Marketplace and Other theme made to the two last spots in terms of themes reported, 
disclosing 1.80% and 0.32% respectively. This finding shows that out of all the CSR 
themes, companies are less keen to share their information on product matters. It is 
also interesting to know the trend of CSR reporting based on the themes. Table 5.4 
summarises the results. 
Table 5.4: Trend of CSR reporting over time 
CSR Theme/Items 
Percentage number of companies disclosing CSR  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Increment  
% % % % % % % 
General 52.80 53.00 53.20 53.10 53.00 53.30 0.95 
Community 27.20 27.50 28.50 29.30 29.60 30.30 11.40 
Environment 29.80 31.90 32.30 32.70 35.10 36.30 21.81 
Workplace 36.30 38.00 38.90 40.40 42.10 45.70 25.90 
Marketplace 2.60 2.70 2.90 2.80 3.00 3.20 23.08 
Other 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.60 20.00 
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Through general observation, there seems to be an increment in the CSR 
reporting over the six year period. Workplace has become the prioritised reported 
theme with the increment of 25.90%. As employees are among the crucial elements 
for a company’s success, providing them with the basic necessities and also fringe 
benefits is as important as disclosing them in the annual report. Interestingly, more 
companies are starting to report on Other with the increment of 20%. As this theme 
reports on value added statement as well as value added ratio, it exhibits companies’ 
inclination towards providing additional information to show their commitment to 
CSR activities. Marketplace also shows promising increment of 23.08% over time. 
While little has been reported under this theme and disclosed by approximately 3% 
of companies as compared to 61.2% Iranian companies (Yaftian 2011), the increment 
proves that companies are starting to consider producing better quality products and 
services. Meanwhile, Environment theme has also received considerable attention by 
companies with an increase of 21.81%. Generally, the percentage of companies 
disclosing this theme seems to be higher compared to the study by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005) in Malaysia, Purushothaman et al. (2000) in Singapore, Yaftian (2011) 
in Iran and Hackston and Milne (1996) in New Zealand but lower than reported by 
Gray et al. (1995) in the UK. This result is likely to be driven by the difference in 
companies’ size (Deegan & Rankin 1997) and also country researched (Yaftian 
2011). Meanwhile, Community and General theme exhibit a fairly lower increment 
of 11.40% and 0.95% respectively.  
In terms of CSR reporting by type of industry, Table 5.5 summarises the 
findings. Companies involved in producing tobacco products rank the highest, 
disclosing 66.34% of CSR information. A possible reason could be that it is seen as 
having more negative impact on the people, and therefore need to legitimise the 
companies’ activities (Gray et al. 1995). Apparel and other textile products industry 
ranks bottom of the list.  
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Table 5.5 CSR reporting ranking by industry over time 
SIC Code Industry type 
Mean CSR 
Disclosure Index 
Rank 
21 Tobacco Products 0.6634 1 
49 Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 0.4216 2 
45 Transportation By Air 0.4183 3 
70 Hotels and Other Lodging Places 0.3394 4 
48 Communications 0.3343 5 
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 0.3056 6 
20 Food and Kindered Products 0.2714 7 
37 Transportation Equipment 0.2591 8 
1 Agricultural Production - Crops 0.2552 9 
31 Leather and Leather Products 0.2516 10 
54 Food Stores 0.2484 11 
80 Health Services 0.2341 12 
53 General Merchandise Stores 0.2271 13 
10 Metal Mining 0.2255 14 
24 Lumber and Wood Products 0.2245 15 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 0.2222 16 
27 Printing and Publishing 0.2213 17 
15 General Building Contractors 0.2194 18 
16 Heavy Construction, Ex. Building 0.2194 19 
44 Water Transportation 0.2163 20 
33 Primary Metal Industries 0.2123 21 
36 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 0.2096 22 
26 Paper and Allied Products 0.2055 23 
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 0.2029 24 
39 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 0.2023 25 
35 Industrial, Machinery and Equipment 0.2011 26 
73 Business Services 0.1973 27 
9 Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 0.1961 28 
22 Textile Mill Products 0.1945 29 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 0.1895 30 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 0.1825 31 
32 Stone, Clay and Glass Products 0.1776 32 
51 Wholesale Trade- Non-Durable Goods 0.1743 33 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 0.1705 34 
2 Agricultural Production - Livestock 0.1667 35 
47 Transportation Services 0.1639 36 
65 Real Estate 0.1628 37 
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 0.1581 38 
42 Trucking and Warehousing 0.1569 39 
55 Automotive Dealers and Service Stations 0.1427 40 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 0.1364 41 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 0.1275 42 
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 0.1135 43 
 
5.7 Conclusions, limitations and recommendations for future research 
The main objective of this chapter was to examine the extent of CSR 
reporting practices of selected PLCs in Malaysia over the period 2008 to 2013. 
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Drawing on institutional theory, the results, based on a self-constructed disclosure 
checklist, indicate that the extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs increased 
substantially over the six-year period under examination. This supports the findings 
of Esa and Mohd Ghazali (2012) and also Haji (2013). Following the corporate 
governance restructuring in 2012, companies have been seen starting to increase the 
provision of CSR information in their annual reports. This finding lends support to 
the study by Ratanajongkol et al. (2006) that spelling out corporate governance 
pronouncements has an impact on a company’s decision to provide more CSR 
information. The increase in CSR reporting might also be attributed to other specific 
events that took place during the study period namely the Bursa Malaysia mandatory 
CSR reporting, the introduction of CSR awards as well as the increasing cognizance 
of CSR issues in the Malaysian business environment.  
Turning to the content-category theme reporting, there appears to be some 
concern among companies to portray a socially responsible image. The human 
resource disclosure increased sharply over time, embedding the perspective of the 
employee as one of the key stakeholders. Other type of content-category themes of 
CSR reporting, such as Environment and Community, have similarly shown some 
promising changes through steady increases over the six year period.  
On the whole, there have been increases in the extent of CSR reporting of 
public listed companies in Malaysia. Although reporting companies here did not 
explicitly identify that the Bursa Malaysia’s CSR reporting requirement directly 
drove the change in their reporting practices, the evidence and analysis show that the 
change is consistent with regulation compliance. Further to that, the revised 
corporate governance code has wielded some influence in raising awareness of the 
concerns of non-economic stakeholders, thereby resulting in changes in social 
reporting. Theoretically, the rise in CSR reporting over time provides support to 
institutional theory through coercive isomorphism in a developing country context.   
The findings of this chapter lead to some potential policy recommendations. 
First, policy-makers could launch educational programs to increase CSR awareness 
of company management-stakeholders’ and the general public. Second, policy 
makers should also consider that the most common form of CSR involvement in 
Malaysia currently appears to be donations and sponsorships. There is a plethora of 
other core issues on the CSR agenda, which could be highlighted, promoted and 
reported. While mandatory CSR reporting has been identified as one of the main 
Chapter 5: CSR reporting in Malaysia: A research note 
 
135 
 
drivers of improved level of reporting among companies, Sulaiman, Abdullah and 
Fatima (2014) point to the deficiencies of the CSR framework. In light of this, the 
government should consider making CSR reporting mandatory, not only in terms of 
the current reporting format but also regarding the required content and type of 
information disclosed. This is essential to ensure uniformity and consistency of CSR 
reporting across companies, and also a way to discharge a company’s accountability 
to all stakeholders. Unless this is put into practice, CSR reporting will remain 
fragmented in various forms and incorporate subjective elements, instead of 
disseminating important information with regard to a company’s impacts. Although 
to some, uniformity in CSR reporting may not necessarily reflect company’s 
accountability to stakeholders, but merely in order to conform to the reporting 
requirements, companies might indirectly find themselves performing CSR activities 
previously not undertaken. This might put some stakeholders at an advantage. In 
addition, to further foster companies to provide a more comprehensive report and 
satisfy the objective of the Bursa Malaysia, which is to go beyond compliance, the 
government could provide more attractive incentives such as granting greater tax 
benefits. It may also worthwhile to survey stakeholders in order to understand their 
CSR information needs. The outcome of this survey will help companies make more 
informed decisions about what would be considered meaningful and credible CSR 
information to be reported. This would be a fruitful area for further work. 
Collectively, although government’s efforts have been efficacious and consistent 
with institutional theory, there is still considerable room for improvement. 
The findings of this chapter should nevertheless be interpreted with a degree 
of caution.  First, this study relies on published annual reports and on the assumption 
that CSR reporting contained within the annual report reflects the main corporate 
narrative. Companies have at their disposal a wider array of media to convey their 
message. For instance, most companies usually have separate supplemental 
information in communicating their CSR, which this study has not considered.  
Hence, it is worthwhile for a future study to include this type of information. Second, 
given the diversity of presentation in the annual reports, a certain level of subjectivity 
in coding the different CSR items is unavoidable. However, such subjectivity exists 
in all annual report content analytic studies and this drawback has been noted in prior 
studies (Nik Ahmad & Sulaiman 2004). 
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CHAPTER 6: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) REPORTING 
 
Abstract 
This chapter studies the relationship between ownership structure and CSR reporting. 
This chapter tests the hypotheses that shareholdings by directors demotivate 
companies from reporting more CSR information. When directors are also large 
shareholders, they are able to lead the company towards satisfying their needs rather 
than those of other stakeholders. This effect is detrimental to a company’s reporting 
behaviour. Interestingly, the presence of institutional investors fails to improve CSR 
reporting. They are most likely focusing on short term returns and view CSR 
practices unfavourably since they have the potential to reduce company earnings.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Ownership structure is one of the important features that affect the 
governance system of a company. It shapes what owners seek from the company and 
what their responsibilities toward society (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera 2016).  
Ownership as a construct can be easily compared across countries unlike other 
governance constructs such as board independence (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera 
2016). Two significant types of ownership structure have been recognised; one being 
dispersed ownership and the other is more concentrated in nature. The first type of 
ownership exists more frequently in the US and the UK while the latter is more 
prevalent in Continental Europe and Asia (La Porta et al. 2000). Ownership structure 
determines the nature of conflict between shareholders; between owner and 
managers in dispersed types of ownership and between dominant and minority 
shareholders in concentrated ownership structures. It is imperative to differentiate 
between different types of controlling shareholders when ownership structure is 
concerned. Different types of owners prefer different strategic objectives with 
divergent preferences regarding corporate decisions and investments (Ghazali & 
Weetman 2006). Consequently, their demands from boards will vary. Zahra (1996) 
demonstrated that executive ownership and long-term institutional ownership are 
positively associated with corporate entrepreneurship, whereas short-term 
institutional ownership has a negative effect on it. Based on the agency view of this 
principal-agent problem, when ownership is widely dispersed, there is the risk that 
Chapter 6: Ownership structure and CSR reporting 
 
137 
 
managers run companies to fulfil their own interests at the expense of the owners’ 
interests. The design of corporate governance mechanisms is largely focused on 
mitigating or solving the managers-shareholders conflict in the context of widely 
held companies. Shareholdings in PLCs in Malaysia are found to be highly 
concentrated (Ghazali & Weetman 2006). This structure portrays the nature of the 
agency problem as principal–principal (Young et al. 2008). This means dominant 
shareholders possess both the incentive and the power to discipline management. 
While this ability can confirm that the management’s act will not divert from the 
shareholders’ wants, the dominant shareholders are more inclined to expropriate the 
wealth of the minority shareholders through promoting strategies they feel will be 
beneficial. This action is driven by the conflicting interest of controlling and minority 
shareholders. At this point of time, effective corporate governance mechanisms are 
needed to prevent actions of tunnelling at the expense of the overall company’s 
interests, including its minority shareholders towards the majority shareholders’ 
interests. 
In the case of information disclosure, likewise, concentrated ownership 
structures allow controlling owners to utilize their effective control over companies 
to influence disclosure policy (Garcia-Sanchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, & Frias-
Aceituno 2016). Basically, the disclosure pattern of the company must satisfy the 
demands of shareholders. As a result, companies’ reporting will differ in terms of its 
level and quality. Companies operating with a concentrated ownership structure 
normally tend to report less information especially pertaining to CSR activities. 
Dominant shareholders prefer to invest in activities that can increase their wealth 
rather than matters that are less beneficial for them. Further, shareholders’ activism 
are weak in concentrated ownership countries. This further discourage companies 
from reporting more CSR information (Ghazali & Weetman 2006). Fan and Wong 
(2002) mentioned two approaches to reporting practices in concentrated ownership 
companies. Initially, company reports information mainly reflecting the interests of 
the dominant shareholders. This is known as “entrenchment”. However, upon 
reaching a certain level of ownership concentration, it starts to demonstrate an 
alignment effect between the interests of the main shareholder and those of minority 
shareholders. At this stage, though more information is disclosed, it is administered 
in order to limit the transfer of specific information to possible competitors. On the 
contrary, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) argued that ownership concentration 
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could have the opposite effect due to dominant shareholders’ interest in the long-
term survival of the company and in maintaining their own reputations. Hence, these 
shareholders are prone to take decisions that optimize the company's economic, 
social and environmental behaviour. In other words, corporate social activities are 
becoming part of normal company considerations (Fauzi, Mahoney & Abdul 
Rahman 2007). These explanations outline the importance of ownership structure in 
relation to company reporting. 
Prior research in developed countries suggests that the structure of ownership 
is associated with the level of information disclosure due to different objectives and 
decision making horizons of different owners (Soliman, El Din & Sakr 2013). 
Examining the effect of ownership on company reporting behaviour in developing 
countries may provide a different perspective mainly because of the concentrated 
ownership as oppose to diverse type of ownership. It is widely acknowledged that 
companies operating in a concentrated ownership environment suffer greater conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders. The objective of this study is to 
investigate the relationship between ownership structure and CSR reporting in 
Malaysia; focusing on institutional ownership and directors’ ownership. Institutional 
investors are traditionally large and may hold a substantial amount of a company’s 
shares while managers are individuals who have in-depth knowledge about the 
company. Given their power, they have significant influence on corporate 
governance decisions. In addition, with the dominance of family run companies, 
ownership by directors is almost a common practise (Sundarasen et al. 2016). While 
most evidence on the effect of ownership structure on CSR reporting is available in 
developed countries, it is interesting to know whether the same result hold for 
developing countries. Hence, the prevalence of institutional investments, the 
existence of large ownership by directors and the paucity of earlier studies in the 
context of developing countries, collectively act as the foundation for undertaking 
this study. The results of this study will provide information to business communities 
to assess corporate governance practices in Malaysia and also to regulatory agencies 
to develop better corporate governance framework. 
The rest of this chapter is as follows. This introduction section highlighted the 
research problem and motivation. Next, discussions pertaining to the ownership 
structure and CSR reporting are deliberated in the literature review section. Then the 
theoretical background is discussed followed by development of hypotheses. The 
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research methodology is explained next. Then the research findings and discussion 
are presented. Finally, the research findings are summarised followed by outlining of 
the limitations of the study and recommendations for future study. 
 
6.2 Literature review 
6.2.1 Directors’ ownership 
The separation between ownership and control has mostly leads to an array of 
agency problems which are premised on the belief that managers are economically 
self-interested (Samaha, Dahawy, Abdel-Meguid & Abdallah 2012b). Allegedly, 
holding a substantial portion of shares of a company by board members is a way to 
curtail agency problems. This basically means shifting of conflicts of interest from 
management-shareholders to management-minority shareholders (Akhtaruddin & 
Haron 2010). The widely held view that higher managerial ownership is valuable for 
shareholders because it aligns the interests of managers better with those of 
shareholders. Within the corporate governance field, directors’ ownership is 
perceived as a major influential factor associated with management efficiency (Paek 
et al. 2013; Fauzi & Musallam 2015).Through holding a certain percentage of the 
company shares, it encourages manager-owners to start focus on maximizing 
company gain which also means increasing the value of the company (Amran & 
Ahmad 2010). Inspired by the agency literature, many researchers (e.g. Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 1988) show support for greater director ownership 
because it increases directors’ incentives to enhance company value, hence 
benefiting shareholders. The thought of converging directors’ equity holdings and 
directors’ actions to shareholder interests has been supported in many studies (Paek 
et al. 2013). Latif, Kamardin, Mohd and Adam (2013) demonstrate that director 
shareholdings help in aligning the directors’ interests with the interests of other 
shareholders through better meeting attendance. Indeed, a number of studies have 
proposed that directors’ ownership level is an indication of the company’s value; 
high ownership reflects the high value of the company (Paek et al. 2013). Hence, it is 
not surprising when there are companies that often require directors to own a certain 
amount of company stock, and several others restricting the selling of shares held by 
top management in favour of other shareholders’ interests (Paek et al. 2013). Mak 
and Li (2001) further provide evidence that managers who take company ownership 
resort to lower board monitoring over management activities. Also, Dhaliwal, 
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Salamon and Smith (1982) found that directors’ ownership is associated with lower 
earnings manipulation. Yet, instead of agreeing with the idea, Mat Nor and Sulong 
(2007) argue that when directors own a smaller portion of the company’s share, they 
still have greater incentive to pursue personal benefits and less motivated to 
maximise company value. Also, directors who have a small ownership percentage 
tend to use higher internal cash flow than the level that maximizes shareholders’ 
wealth (Paek et al. 2013). Thus, to reduce the agency costs, Mat Nor and Sulong 
(2007) propose to increase the shares held by the directors. In this manner, directors 
will become more efficient in controlling the company assets.  
Nevertheless, many believe that the effects of directors’ ownership on 
corporate governance are non-linear (e.g. Samaha et al. 2012b; Akhtaruddin & Haron 
2010; Fahlenbrach & Stulz 2009). When directors’ ownership becomes too large, it 
enables directors to entrench themselves (Fahlenbrach & Stulz 2009). A high level of 
directors’ ownership provides power which induces directors to indulge preferences 
for non-value-maximizing behaviour (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010). Upon reaching  
this stage, directors’ benefits may outweigh the loss they suffer from a reduced value 
of the company (Amran & Ahmad 2013). In accordance to that, operating 
performance will be reduced as directors’ ownership increases beyond a certain point 
(Fama & Jensen 1983a); forcing company value to fall. Meanwhile, Stulz (1988) 
proves that higher directors’ ownership act as a shield from external takeovers. 
Directors’ ability to block takeover bids can lower company value. Likewise, 
Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) also find company value to increase with 
low levels of directors’ ownership and decreases as the ownership level gets higher. 
This vagueness seems to raise the issue about whether companies should encourage 
stock ownership by managers and board of director members (Pergola & Joseph 
2011). Zhou (2001) describes the issue as evidence of a complex role of insider 
ownership: while it aligns the interests of directors and shareholders and thus 
enhances performance, it also facilitates entrenchment and affects performance 
adversely. Perhaps there is an optimal level of ownership that can actually align the 
directors’ interest to that of shareholders, which is undoubtedly unique to each 
company.   
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6.2.2 Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors have a notable presence and a growing influence in 
capital markets (Muniandy, Tanewski & Johl 2016). Given considerable amounts of 
investment, they are able to influence trading activities in the capital market 
(Muniandy et al. 2016). Of late, institutional investors emerge to provide corporate 
governance (Jones et al. 1997). This new role motivates them to support a means of 
monitoring management and protecting shareholder interests (Jones et al. 1997; 
Muniandy et al. 2016; Mizuno 2010). In other words, institutional investors have the 
opportunity, resources and ability to monitor, discipline and influence a manager’s 
decision in the company (Monks & Minow 2004). In fact, institutional investors have 
a much stronger incentive to monitor companies that they own than do individual 
investors because of their larger stakes in those companies, especially if exit is costly 
(Chung & Zhang 2011). Thus, institutional investors have greater responsibility in 
ensuring company adopt their recommendations (Mizuno 2010). At the same time, 
they also have the power in constraining choices of strategies (Chaganti & 
Damanpour 1991). The more involved the owners, and the more concentrated their 
ownership, the greater the power they should have in influencing the companies 
(Mintzberg 1983). Chung and Wang (2014) mention that companies with large 
institutional shareholdings play an active role in monitoring managerial opportunism 
in managing the reported earnings. This is because institutional investors are more 
concerned about the underlying profitability of the companies especially when it 
involves long-term investment. Besides monitoring, institutional investors also have 
the ability to change existing power distributions within companies (Muniandy et al. 
2016).  
While many claimed that institutional investors act as enhancement of 
governance mechanism (e.g. Jones et al. 1997; Muniandy et al. 2016; Mizuno 2010), 
their roles are contingent to their investment strategy and their incentives and ability 
to involve themselves in the company's governance and the process of business 
decision making (Manzaneque, Merino & Priego 2016). With respect to that, 
scholars have commonly distinguished them into groups of pressure resistance (e.g. 
insurance companies, pension funds and investment trusts) and pressure sensitive 
(e.g. financial institutions). The former group is less subject to influence from 
management because they are investors without a commercial relationship with the 
company, while the latter is sensitive to management because they may obtain 
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benefits from the business activities of the company in which they are owners. 
Muniandy et al. (2016) highlight three types of monitoring situations provided by 
institutional investors. Their presence can be associated with active monitoring of 
management, conflict with management or aligned interest with other shareholders. 
In addition to investment strategy, these monitoring incentives are also subject to the 
investment size; institutional investors with large stakes in the company are more 
inclined to monitor management as a way of securing their ownership interests 
(Muniandy et al. 2016). Mallin (2007) points out that there has been a general 
increase in the level of engagement of institutional investors with their investee 
companies. Recently, institutional investors have been observed to show increasing 
concerns regarding social and environmental matters. Mahoney and Roberts (2007) 
prove that institutional investors pay attention to the way companies manage their 
social issues before making investment decision.  
There are various ways that institutional investors can enhance company’s 
engagement in CSR. One way is through better involvement in the decision-making 
processes. Their large stake in a company provide them with the force to request, and 
if necessary instruct, the top management to include social and environmental 
guidelines in their business objectives (Ullah & Jamali 2010). Another way is by 
being selective in making investment whereby they will only invest in companies 
that embrace social responsibility. In fact, institutional investors have publicly stated 
their preference for companies that appear strong on CSR activities (Harjoto et al. 
2015). This is termed Socially Responsible Investment. Institutional investors who 
consider ethical investment criteria in their investment decisions have a choice of 
selling the shares if companies were found to neglect CSR (Ullah & Jamali 2010). 
Mahoney and Roberts (2007) provide evidence that companies’ CSR is capable of 
attracting more institutional investors to own stocks in the companies. Dhaliwal, Li, 
Tsang & Yang (2011) further reinforce the finding by showing that dedicated 
institutions hold shares of companies that initiate CSR disclosure and exhibit better 
CSR performance. On the same note, Harjoto et al. (2015) confirm an increase in 
company’s CSR engagement with the existence of institutional investors, which in 
return boosts the performance of the company. While institutional investors has been 
widely associated with better CSR practices, it is presumed that this act is common to 
institutional investors with long-term horizon only. Due to their interest in the 
company’s long-term profitability, they have the incentive to get engaged in 
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company strategic management including its social behaviour (Ullah & Jamali 2010). 
Institutional investors with long-term horizon emphasize on economically optimal 
value rather than social value of CSR activities. This is consistent with the finding of 
Cox et al. (2004) that CSR is positively related to long-term institutional investment. 
Contrary to that, short-term institutional investors focus on short-term costs of CSR 
activities which obviously makes it look less appealing to them. That probably 
explains the negative association revealed by Chava (2014) between institutional 
ownership and a company's environmental concerns. Apparently the diverse 
perspective of institutional investors towards CSR is likely to affect company CSR 
practices. 
Collectively, institutional investors are commonly assumed to be a key 
component of corporate governance, hence, they are more likely to prefer stocks of 
better-governed companies when investing. To them, better governed companies are 
likely to require less monitoring, have higher stock market liquidity, and more easily 
meet fiduciary responsibilities (Chung & Zhang 2011). In conjunction with that, 
institutional investors seek for more accountability and transparency in business 
operations. They regard companies demonstrating these qualities as well governed. 
Therefore, in terms of fundraising, companies have to seriously consider the value of 
transparent and accountable management (Mizuno 2010). This would mean, 
disclosing information that may affect investment decision of institutional investors 
is essential.  
 
6.3 Ownership in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, most listed companies are commonly concentrated by family 
ownership and these companies mostly are inherited by the founder’s descendants. 
Malaysia has the third highest concentration of family founder control and their 
descendants after Thailand and Indonesia (Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus & Musallam 2013). 
Amran and Ahmad (2013) further confirm this by revealing that 72.8% companies 
listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia are family-owned. Clearly, family 
ownership is the most prevalent of ownership structure in Malaysia. At present, listed 
companies are obligated to meet the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement that calls 
for at least 25% of outstanding shares of a company to be issued to the public. While 
this rule is complied with by many companies, family founder companies or other 
connected parties could still hold at least three quarter of shares. If this is the case, 
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they would still be the major shareholders and would control the decision-making 
process (Sundarasen et al. 2016). A family-controlled company normally practices 
“top-down” approach in managing a business, with owners being the major decision-
makers (Sundarasen et al. 2016). Given the highly concentrated ownership and 
control of companies in Malaysia, it is feared that it may impair the effectiveness of 
existing regulatory mechanisms in the corporate sector. It suggests that protection of 
minority shareholders may be problematic (Thillainathan 1999). It is common to find 
majority shareholders either individuals/families or institutions to involve directly in 
the management (Amran & Ahmad 2013). Hence through their dominant voting 
right, they are free to pursue their own interests that may not coincide with the 
interests of other shareholders in the company. Accordingly, minority interests are 
expropriated. As a measure to address the issue, Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) has been established. Nevertheless, to this day, MSWG seemingly 
fails to function effectively. 
 
6.4 Theoretical background 
Traditionally, insights into the relationship between management and 
company are normally provided by agency theory. Meanwhile stakeholder theory 
focuses on the importance of managing stakeholders’ interests in an attempt to 
maximise company’s return (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Nevertheless, Hill and Jones 
(1992) believe that to better understand organisational phenomena, both theories 
should be combined. This means, fundamentally managers are accountable to 
maximise profits for the shareholders but such duties must also comply with law and 
ethical norms (Culpan & Trussel 2005). With that view, stakeholder-agency theory 
was introduced. This theory generally extent the responsibilities of managers to 
include all stakeholders instead of shareholders. Stakeholders are assumed to have 
the right to claim on company’s profit since they are the controllers of key resources 
(Hill & Jones 1992). Their satisfaction is central in ensuring the long-term survival 
and success of the company. Yet, shareholder wealth maximisation and stakeholders’ 
interest fulfilment are frequently distorted by hazards arising from the separation of 
risk bearing and decision-making. The concern is that with the absence of moral and 
values aspects, managers are most likely to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
company and also shareholders.  
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Stakeholder agency theory suggests that shareholdings owned by managers 
help by aligning their interests with those of the shareholders (Hill & Jones 1992). 
Considering they have equal share to the company’s profit, managers have a stronger 
incentive to improve company’s performance. However, given the family dominance 
in a company, shareholdings by managers are likely to cause an entrenchment effect. 
Often, top management in family owned companies has family ties. This gives them 
the power to act according to their needs. Through the granting of shareholding, it 
forms a solid ground to increase their power.  
Scholars refer to management entrenchment as situations in which executives 
try to ensure self-preservation by neutralising internal control mechanisms. 
Generally, this highlights the ability of managers to extract private benefits from 
owners. In the word of Weisbach (1988), managerial entrenchment occurs when 
managers gain so much power that they are able to use the company to further their 
own interests rather than the shareholders interests. Through costly entrenchment 
strategies, managers are able to keep their positions even when they are not 
sufficiently competent or qualified to manage a company (Shleifer & Vishny 1989). 
Entrenched managers are not only costly to replace but they can further extract 
shareholders wealth through higher remuneration or greater discretionary behaviour. 
There are six entrenchment devices which according to Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009) are among the most impactful: poison pills, staggered boards, executive 
golden parachutes, supermajority voting requirements for the approval of mergers 
and limitations on shareholders’ ability to amend corporate bylaws and charters. 
Both of academics and market participants collectively view entrenchment as 
reducing accountability to shareholders and amplifies agency costs, thus decreasing 
shareholder wealth. Although there exist various corporate mechanisms such as 
takeover and board of directors, they are assumed less effective in holding 
management accountable to shareholder interests (Shleifer & Vishny 1989). In fact, 
it is the interest of the managers that they transform the mechanisms to be in their 
favour.  
Share-option schemes have a similar effect to the entrenchment device. It has 
been observed to create an adverse opportunity that contributes to management 
expropriation (Ismail, Arshad & Othman 2014). When managers hold a substantial 
amount of company’s shares, they are assumed to have less incentive in sharing more 
information to the public (Ismail et al. 2014). This includes reporting on CSR 
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information. Managers’ reluctance will help to pave way for the attainment of their 
personal goals. Given their power, they are likely to face any obstacle in creating a 
conducive condition to management entrenchment (Ismail et al. 2014). Putting it 
differently, managers use their ownership stake to assert their interests thus 
compromising the interests of the remaining shareholders (Siebels & Zu 
Knyphausen‐Aufseß 2012). With regard to CSR reporting, entrenchment effect of 
managerial ownership is associated with low CSR reporting. Seemingly, increased 
managerial ownership decreases the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms 
(Siebels & zu Knyphausen‐Aufseß 2012).  
Institutional investors have strong incentive to monitor company management 
as they will benefit from enhanced company value (Chung & Wang 2014). Large 
ownership positions provide the opportunity for institutional investors to directly 
engage with and influence management on various issues including greater corporate 
disclosure. With CSR becoming more prominent, institutional investors have 
attempted to influence companies’ CSR practices. Many of them have even 
incorporated environmental, social, and governance issues into their investment 
analysis (Chung & Wang 2014). As a result, a sizeable group of institutions require 
both social and financial measures of performance. In sum, the application of 
stakeholder agency theory in explaining the effect of ownership structure on CSR 
reporting seems justified.  
 
6.5 Hypotheses development 
6.5.1 Directors ownership 
There has been continuous debate that company’s ownership structure affects 
its reporting strategy (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Janggu et al. 2007; Mohd Ghazali 
2007). On the positive note, directors’ ownership provides direct incentives for them 
to act in line with shareholders’ interests as the wealth of the directors is tied to the 
performance of the company (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In line with that, directors 
tend to be more motivated to disclose more information to the shareholders. This 
notion is supported by Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) after examining Nigerian 
listed companies. He discovered that a higher level of managerial ownership in a 
company induce their willingness to be more environmental friendly with the 
stakeholders; hence report more on CSR information. In China, Li and Qi (2008) use 
an entropy theory assessment method on 100 listed companies in Shanghai and 
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Shenzhen stock exchange. The result shows that companies with high managerial 
ownership have high levels of corporate voluntary disclosure. Another study that 
reports similar results are Samaha et al. (2012b) in Egypt. 
On the negative side, when directors hold the majority shares of a company, 
there is a possibility that demand for disclosure and consequently, the incentive to 
disclose, will be affected (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010).This potential problem is 
further aggravated when owner-managed companies prefer to limit their social 
activities due to the presumption that it may not be beneficial for the company. 
Indirectly, reporting on these activities will not be impressive. Fan and Wong (2002) 
further argue that entrenchment effect of ownership concentration to the board 
potentially affects corporate transparency. In Malaysia, Guan Yeik (2006) provides 
evidence that ownership by directors impacts negatively on CSR disclosure of PLCs. 
Abdullah et al. (2011) also find that owner-managed companies are negatively 
associated with the extent and quality of CSR disclosure. Mohd Ghazali (2007) 
reports that companies which have higher portion of executive directors shares 
disclose less CSR information. Likewise, Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) 
demonstrate a negative relationship between directors ownership and disclosure 
level. The negative effect is, however, weaker for companies with higher proportion 
of independent directors on the audit committee suggesting that the presence of 
independent directors moderate board ownership and corporate voluntary disclosure 
relationship. A more recent study has been conducted by Razak and Mustapha 
(2013). Employing multiple regression analysis on data of 200 PLCs, they revealed a 
negative and significant relationship between directors ownership and CSR 
disclosure. Similar result was exhibited by Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore where 
they found that lower managerial ownership is associated with increased voluntary 
disclosure. Rouf and Al Harun (2011) revealed that the opportunity of management 
owning company shares has an adverse impact on voluntary disclosure of listed 
companies in Bangladesh. Samaha and Dahawy (2010) examine the factors 
influencing corporate disclosure transparency as measured by the level of corporate 
voluntary disclosure in the annual report of the active share trading firms in Egyptian 
Stock Exchange. The study indicates that lower managerial ownership was 
associated with increased in corporate voluntary disclosure. Khan et al. (2013) argue 
that managers especially in family-dominated companies are less keen to spend on 
CSR activities which they assumed as not beneficial. Hence, managerial ownership is 
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negatively related to CSR reporting. Expressing similar view, Rouf (2011) proves 
that management ownership results to lower voluntary disclosure.  
Juhmani (2013) believes that managers with greater shareholdings can derive 
greater share-market benefits from better disclosure. As their wealth is linked to the 
company’s wealth, they are more inclined to increase disclosure. Nevertheless, the 
insignificant result emerged from his study suggests that managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour is likely to be reduced due to the small amount of shareholdings. Other 
studies that revealed similar results are Darus, Isa, Yusoff and Arshad (2015) and 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008). Collectively, although the studies provide diverse 
results, the majority of them exhibit a negative impact of directors’ ownership on 
company disclosure. This gives the initial impression that the attempt to align 
managers' interest with that of shareholders is apparently ineffective. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is formed: 
H1: Directors’ ownership negatively affects CSR reporting  
 
6.5.2 Institutional ownership 
Special interest has arisen from the literature about the role of institutional 
investors in management control. Institutional investors have been commonly 
associated with good corporate governance practices. For instance, institutional 
investors in Japan have become vocal and keen to exercise their voting rights to 
protect the interests of all stakeholders. Along with the increasing interest for social 
aspects, institutional investors now regard their investments as an expansion of their 
values and social beliefs in their business environment (Saleh et al. 2010). In light of 
the view, companies are suggested to consider declaring their CSR activities in 
annual reports as a way of attracting institutional investment. However, a question 
arises as to whether institutional investors, really deliver on reporting on non-
financial information.  
Empirically, the evidence on the institutional ownership-CSR reporting 
relationship is mixed and inconclusive. Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus and Musallam (2013) 
believe that institutional investors could play an effective monitoring role as their 
wealth is tied up to the company’s performance. Consequently, they can help to 
reduce the agency problems between majority and minority shareholders in 
Malaysia. Mahoney and Roberts (2007) also report a significant positive relationship 
between companies’ CSR disclosure and the number of institutions investing in its 
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shares. Nik, Rahimi and Gholami (2015b) found positive relationship between 
institutional ownership in the cement, petrochemical and automotive industry and 
voluntary disclosure of PLCs in Tehran. They assert that due to high monitoring by 
institutional investors, the quality and quantity of voluntary disclosure can be 
enhanced. Chakroun and Matoussi (2012) analyse the interactions between the 
external and internal mechanisms of corporate governance and corporate voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports in the Tunisian market. They find that there is an 
impact of the institutional ownership on the extent of the voluntary disclosure. Rouf 
and Al Harun (2011) demonstrate similar finding upon examining companies listed 
on Dhaka Stock Exchange.  
On the contrary, institutional ownership concentration appears to negatively 
influence the level of disclosure (Htay, Rashid, Adnan & Meera,2012). Premised on 
agency theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, Ntim and Soobaroyen 
(2013) contend that the presence of institutional investors motivates managers to 
report more CSR information. However, their analyses proved otherwise, where by 
institutional investors are inclined to make significantly less CSR disclosures. 
Habbash (2015) and Barnea and Rubin (2010) did not find significant empirical 
evidence to relate the power of institutional investors with CSR practices. Clearly, 
the evidence on the role of institutional investors in enhancing company’s CSR 
reporting behaviour are varied. While some scholars view the investment horizon of 
institutional investors as the root cause (e.g. Cox, Brammer & Millington 2004; 
Ullah & Jamali 2010), others view the role of shareholder activism that is likely to 
vary in each country as the prime motivating factor. This study hypothesized that: 
H2: Institutional ownership positively affects CSR reporting 
 
6.6 Methods 
6.6.1 Data 
There are 813 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia at 31st 
December 2013. Only 613 companies have completely lodged their annual reports 
over the six year period. 136 finance companies were dropped from the sample due 
to different regulatory and disclosure constraints similar to Mohd Ghazali (2007), 
Said et al. (2009), Haniffa and Cooke (2005). Additionally, 27 companies were 
further excluded due to insufficient data. Finally, the sample comprises 450 
companies as exhibited in Table 4.3.  
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CSR data for this study are mainly collected manually from the annual 
reports. The reasons the annual report was used to serve the main objective of this 
study are first, many researchers have relied primarily on annual report to obtain 
CSR information (e.g. Chan et al. 2014; Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 
2011; Haji 2013). Second, annual report has been the preferred medium to 
disseminate corporate information including information pertaining to CSR (Hasnah 
et al. 2006; Chan et al. 2014). Third, annual report is perceived as the main 
company’s document as it outlines the organization as a whole (Gray et al. 2001). 
Finally, annual reports are not only easy to access but they are also reliable which 
make them the favourable option to disclose corporate information (Othman & 
Ameer 2010). As for financial data, apart from the annual report, the information was 
also obtained from DataStream database, if it was not readily available from the 
annual report. Nevertheless, information on institutional ownership was acquired 
from Bursa Malaysia Historical Data Package. 
 
6.6.2 Variables 
6.6.2.1 Dependent variable 
Content analysis as a research method is well established for CSR reporting 
(Lu, Abeysekara & Cortese 2015) as evident in Abdullah et al. (2011), Chan et al. 
(2014) and Haji (2013). Similarly, this study employs content analysis. In doing so, a 
checklist of items was constructed. This was done by referring to (1) previous CSR 
reporting checklists (e.g. Hackston & Milne 1996; Barako & Brown 2008), (2) 
Malaysian checklists (e.g. Abdullah et al. 2011; Haji 2013) and (3) Bursa Malaysia 
framework. Highlighting four CSR dimensions namely Environment, Community, 
Marketplace and Workplace, this framework guides companies in implementing and 
reporting CSR activities. Although the detailed content of CSR reporting is highly 
dependent on the management, reference to this framework is deemed essential to 
ensure adherence to the listing requirement and to be current to the Malaysian 
context. This study benchmarked a checklist by Abdullah et al. (2011) that 
encapsulates the work of Mohd Ghazali (2007), Hackston and Milne (1996) and Ng 
(1985). In an attempt to make the checklist more comprehensive, the checklists by 
Mohamed Adnan (2012) and Chan et al. (2014) were also referred to. Further, Kolk 
(2010) uses CSR expertise to review the checklist. Accordingly, this study employs 
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the same validity method. The checklist was revised and refined several times before 
a final checklist was formed with 51 items (see Table 4.4).  
This study utilises dichotomous approach to obtained disclosure score; in 
accord with earlier studies (e.g. Haji 2013; Rashid & Lodh 2008). Each disclosure 
item is scored “1” if it is disclosed and “0” if otherwise. A CSR reporting index is 
calculated by dividing the disclosure score of each company to the maximum 
possible score (i.e. 1 x 51= 51) as indicated by the formula below: 
  
                                                 CSRI  =
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1  
 
CSRI = CSR reporting index; nj = number of items expected for jth company; Xij = 1 
if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed. 
 
6.6.2.2 Independent and control variables 
This study employs a number of independent variables and also control 
variables. These variables together with their definition and sources from previous 
studies are listed in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Independent and control variables 
Independent 
variables 
Acronyms Description Sources 
Directors’ ownership 
 
 
DIROWN 
 
 
 
Percentage of directors’ 
shareholdings 
 
 
Rashid (2015a), Khan et al. 
(2013), Fauzi and Musallam 
(2015), Sartawi et al. 
(2014), Chou et al. (2013) 
Institutional 
ownership 
INSTITUT Percentage of institutional 
shareholding 
Rao, Tilt and Lester (2012), 
Chung and Zhang (2011) 
Control variables 
 
   
Board size BSIZE Natural logarithm of total 
numbers of directors on the 
board 
Rashid (2013), Reddy and 
Bather (2013), Chou et al. 
(2013), Lam and Lee (2008) 
Leverage DR Ratio of Total liabilities to 
Total assets 
Akhtaruddin and Haron 
(2010), Reddy and Bather 
(2013), Chou et al. (2013), 
Rahman et al. (2011) 
Liquidity LIQ Current ratio Rashid (2013), Rashid 
(2014), Ho and Taylor 
(2007) 
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Company age AGE Natural logarithm of 
number of years listed on 
Bursa Malaysia 
Rashid (2009), Taufil-Mohd 
et al. (2013), Fauzi and 
Musallam (2015), Das et al. 
(2015) 
Company size SIZE Natural logarithm of Total 
assets 
Das et al. (2015), Sartawi et 
al. (2014), Rashid (2014), 
Jitaree (2015), Reddy and 
Bather (2013), Fauzi and 
Musallam (2015) 
Profitability ROA Ration of Earnings before 
interest and interest (EBIT) 
to Total assets 
Bliss and Balachandran 
(2003), Nasir and Abdullah 
(2004), Rashid (2014), 
Sartawi et al. (2014), 
Barako et al. (2006), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) 
Company growth GROWTH Percentage of annual change 
in sales 
Rashid (2013), Braun and 
Sharma (2007), Bathala and 
Rao (1995), Chou et 
al.(2013) 
Market capitalisation CAP Natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation 
Lam and Lee (2008) 
 
 
6.6.3 The Model 
In order to examine the relationship between ownership structure and CSR 
reporting, a model has been formed as follows: 
 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1DIROWNi,t  + 2INSTITUTi,t  +  3BSIZEi,t  + 4DRi,t +5LIQi,t  + 
6AGEi,t +7SIZEi,t  + 8ROAi,t +  9GROWTHi,t+ 10CAPi,t +i,t 
 
Where CSRIi,t is CSR index for ith company at time t. DIROWNi,t is 
percentage of director ownership for ith company at time t. INSTITUTi,tis 
percentage of institutional ownership for ith company at time t. BSIZEi,t is the total 
number of directors for ith company at time t. DRi,t is debt ratio for ith company at 
time t.  LIQi,t is liquidity ratio for ith company at time t.  AGEi,t is number of listed 
years on Bursa Malaysia for ith company at time t. SIZEi,t is natural logarithm of 
total assets for ith company at time t. ROAi,t is profitability for ith company at time t. 
GROWTHi,t is the company growth in sales for ith company at time t. CAPi,t is the 
market capitalisation for ith company at time t.α is the intercept, is the regression 
coefficient and  is the error term. 
Before regressing the variables, data was screened for multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeniety problems in addition to meeting the normality 
assumption. Based on Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test, data was found to be 
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normally distributed. In testing for multicollinearity problem, a Pearson correlation 
matrix has been formed (see Table 6.2). If the correlations among the independent 
variables are beyond 0.8, it indicates problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati 2003). 
Based on this view, the correlation value of 0.839 between company size and market 
capitalisation poses a concern. To confirm the existence of multicollinearity problem, 
a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable was measured. 
Gujarati (2003) confirms the presence of multicollinearity when the value of VIF is 
greater than 10. However, this was not the case when the VIF values were within 
acceptable levels. 
In examining the fulfilment of homoscedasticity assumption where there is 
constant error term across all values of the independent variables, this study looks at 
the scatter plot of the residuals (ZRESID) against the predicted value (ZPRED) of the 
model. It demonstrates a pattern of a classic cone-shape; indicating 
heteroscedasticity.  Further, the Breusch-Pagan test was conducted where the 
heteroscedasticity problem was ascertained based on the Chi square and 
corresponding p values. Nevertheless, the problem was rectified using 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of the White (1980)'s method. Finally, 
data should be free from endogeniety problem. In other words, the independent 
variables should not be correlated with the error terms; otherwise the regression 
coefficient in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression would be biased. One way 
of correcting it is to use Instrumental Variable regression. Consistent with Rashid 
(2014), when the CSR index was used as a proxy for CSR reporting, F = 0.32 with p 
= 0.5737. In light of the insignificant F-test for the predicted value of ownership 
structure, the results implied that: (1) endogeniety is not a problem; (2) OLS and 
Instrumental Variable regression results are consistent.  
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       Table 6.2 Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 VIF 
1 DIROWN 1.000          1.123 
2 INSTITUT -0.256** 1.000         1.080 
3 BSIZE -0.089** 0.071** 1.000        1.171 
4 DR -0.035 -0.013 0.007 1.000       1.117 
5 LIQ -0.008 0.002 -0.045* -0.274** 1.000      1.105 
6 AGE -0.177** 0.017 -0.011 0.005 0.063** 1.000     1.184 
7 SIZE -0.181** 0.061** 0.339** 0.055** -0.067** 0.337** 1.000    3.886 
8 ROA -0.073** 0.062** 0.084** -0.129** 0.049* 0.051** 0.111** 1.000   1.052 
9 GROWTH -0.009 0.049* 0.025 0.018 -0.059** 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.000  1.013 
10 CAP -0.156** 0.071** 0.321** -0.069** 0.035 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.000 3.680 
 
                                **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).           *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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6.7 Results and discussion 
Table 6.3 shows the results of the descriptive tests of all variables. 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
DIROWN 0.0438 0.0030 0.0000 0.5680 0.0879 
INSTITUT 0.2627 0.2040 0.0000 0.9590 0.2208 
BSIZE 7.2362 6.6859 3.004 18.1741 1.2960 
DR 0.4024 0.3775 0.0030 10.3190 0.3623 
LIQ 3.0531 1.7845 0.0070 96.1110 5.1989 
AGE 13.9782 15.0293 6.0000 52.9845 1.6403 
SIZE (log TA) 12.8784 12.6500 9.3690 18.4110 1.4467 
ROA 0.0619 0.0580 -2.8980 5.5470 0.1782 
GROWTH 0.0533 0.0265 -4.9410 8.5780 0.4777 
CAP (log Cap) 18.7976 18.5030 12.3710 24.8100 1.8112 
CSRI 0.2167 0.1961 0.0392 0.7255 0.1198 
 
The level of CSR reporting was recorded at 21.67% as compared to 76% in 
Bahrain (Juhmani 2013) and 37.45% in Egypt (Soliman et al. 2013). Apparently, this 
is a reasonably low result in spite of the initiatives conducted by many parties in 
raising consciousness regarding the importance of CSR as well reporting the related 
activities (Lu & Castka 2009). Notwithstanding, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) affirm 
that culture has its role in instigating companies to be less prone to share corporate 
information with the public. Interestingly, directors who own company shares 
comprise only 4.38%. While businesses in Malaysia are mostly run by families, this 
is an unforeseen result. Companies in other developing countries which generally 
share the same environment, have a higher rate of directors ownership as 
demonstrated by Juhmani (2013) in Bahrain at 16.57%, Rashid (2015a) in 
Bangladesh at 40.2% and Soliman et al. (2013) in Egypt at 24.81%. Ownership by 
institution represents only 26.27% of the total shareholdings in a company despite 
the claims that this type of investor is becoming one of the major capital providers in 
the market.  This rate is comparably lower than in Egypt at 52.43% (Soliman et 
al.2013) and in Pakistan at 71.41% (Majeed et al. 2015). Meanwhile, on average, 
companies have approximately 7 directors on board; suggesting that they are 
complacent with moderate sized board.  
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In an attempt to determine whether ownership structure influences company 
CSR reporting, directors’ and institutional ownership along with other control 
variables were regressed against CSR index. The results are summarised in Table 
6.4. 
 
 Table 6.4 Relationship between ownership structure and CSR reporting 
 Dependent variable 
 Panel A Panel B  
 (before controlling for 
industry) 
(after controlling for 
industry) 
                    CSRI    CSRI 
Intercept     -0.532 -0.581 
                   (-20.787)***             (-17.955)*** 
   
DIROWN -0.630 -0.042 
 (-2.555)* (-1.774)* 
   
INSTITUT -0.035 -0.043 
 (-3.713)***       (-4.727)*** 
   
BSIZE 0.035 0.028 
 (4.237)*** (3.394)*** 
   
DR 0.002 0.006 
 (0.351) (1.146) 
   
LIQ -0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.432) (-0.905) 
   
AGE 0.023 0.027 
 (4.867)*** (5.803)*** 
   
SIZE 0.028 0.037 
 (10.110)*** (13.636)*** 
   
ROA 0.061 0.047 
 (5.583)*** (4.499)*** 
   
GROWTH -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.130) (-0.194) 
   
CAP 0.014 0.008 
 (6.640)*** (3.835)*** 
   
F statistic 136.516 36.604 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.465 
   
The t tests are presented in the parentheses  * p< 0.10;  ** p< 0.010;  *** p< 0.001 
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At 37.6% explanatory power denotes by adjusted R2, the independent 
variables can explain the variation in the dependent variable at almost a satisfactory 
level. In line with the expectation, this study found that directors’ ownership 
influences company CSR reporting. The coefficient of DIROWN is negative (β = -
0.630) and statistically significant for the dependent variable CSRI at p< 0.10. This 
supports H1of this study. This result confirms the studies by Sartawi et al. (2014), 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Janggu et al. (2014), Khan et al. (2013), Razak and 
Mustapha (2013), Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) and Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010). 
It posits that provision of shares to directors may pose an obstacle to an effective 
governance structure, a source of agency costs and also reduce transparency.  
The result for INSTITUT shows that it has a negative coefficient (β = -0.035) 
and significant at p < 0.001. Nevertheless, the result contrasts the expected 
relationship between institutional ownership and CSR reporting. Hence, H2 is not 
supported. This result gives the impression that institutional investors have failed to 
execute their expected monitoring role in trying to influence the management of the 
company to disseminate more CSR information to the public. The control variables 
are reported as follows: BSIZE, AGE, SIZE, ROA and CAP were significant in 
relation to CSR reporting while DR, LIQ and GROWTH showed insignificant 
results.  
The result on directors’ ownership indicates that directors’ equity can form 
the basis of power establishment which in turn triggers the abuse of power 
(Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010). This viewpoint holds true for directors in Malaysia 
despite their low level of ownership. In fact this result confirm the point highlighted 
by Mat Nor and Sulong (2007) and Paek et al. (2013). They claim that a low rate of 
ownership does not prevent directors from prioritising their personal needs over 
increasing shareholders’ wealth. Given this advantage, directors are more likely to 
expend company resources in ways that serve their own interest at the expense of 
other shareholders (Htay et al. 2012). To conceal their misdeeds, directors tend to 
reduce the level of disclosure. It appears that directors’ ownership induces directors 
to undertake value-destroying behaviour as oppose to value-maximising actions. As a 
result, directors’ ownership not only leads to greater agency problem but also creates 
information asymmetry. 
Directors’ ownership provides directors with direct access to the information 
in the company. Hence, this reduces the needs for additional disclosure. This 
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supports the contention that the presence of large shareholders encourages 
information retention, since they can rely on internal sources for obtaining 
information (Sartawi et al. 2014). Besides, CSR practices including reporting are 
often associated with high cost. This further influences directors to report lesser 
information. The dominance of family managed companies in Malaysia is also likely 
to drive directors to opt for lesser disclosure as they prefer to be more secretive 
regarding their activities (Ghazali & Weetman 2006). The result of this study lends 
support to stakeholder agency theory particularly relating to entrenchment effect. 
Inevitably, directors’ ownership will increase managerial discretion in decision-
making. Nevertheless, entrenchment generally initiates socially irresponsible 
behaviours (Jain & Jamali 2016) as proven by this study where there appear to be 
low level of CSR reporting when directors own company shares. 
Often, the investments of institutional investors are massive. Inevitably, the 
company is obliged to satisfy the demands from these shareholders in ensuring a 
continued supply of resources. Due to their bigger stake, institutional investors also 
have the ability to influence management including on issues pertaining to CSR 
practices (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Institutional ownership appears to be an 
important player to have higher disclosure since their voting power can be used as a 
tool to monitor the agents (Htay et al. 2012). Accordingly, companies with 
institutional investors are more likely to be surrounded by a much richer information 
environment (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008). However, these investors can also 
influence the company in a contradictory way. Muniandy et al. (2016) assert that 
institutional investors differ in their monitoring incentives, which are determined by 
various factors such as their risk preferences, objectives, and ownership control. For 
instance, financial institutions which are regarded as pressure-sensitive investors 
(Muniandy et al. 2016) prefer not to press the investing company to change as an 
attempt to maintain their existing business relationship with the investee company. 
As such, the effectiveness of their monitoring ability is greatly reduced.  
There is also a possibility that institutional investors may take advantage of 
their positions to pursue their own interests rather than encourage the firm to commit 
to better disclosure practice. This is especially so for those investors with short-term 
horizon. Institutional investors of this type normally aim to reap as much profit 
possible out of their investment. CSR requires an understanding of the social norms 
and practices; mastering the knowledge of laws and conformity (Nulla 2015). 
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Without a doubt, it is a costly act. While long term institutional investors perceive 
ethical practices as a strategy to reduce business transactions’ costs as well as 
building investors’ confidence, short-term institutional investors may view business 
ethics as a constraint on their wealth maximization (Nulla 2015). Further, CSR is 
also uncertain in nature. Thus, institutional investors whose focus are on gaining 
immediate profit are more sensitive to short-term changes in earnings (Harjoto, Jo & 
Kim 2015) and are likely to find CSR costs unjustified (Jain & Jamali 2016). Hence, 
ignorance towards CSR practices is expected from them. Furthermore, despite the 
various type of institutional investors in Malaysia, for instance nominee 
shareholdings as well as non-financial and finance companies, institutions 
channelling Bumiputera funds such as the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and 
unit trust schemes such as Amanah Saham MARA, Lembaga Tabung Haji and 
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, it is understood that the majority of nominee 
shareholdings and institutions (non-financial and finance companies) are owned by 
families (Ghazali & Weetman 2006). It is likely that they are more concern with 
short term profit. As such, through their voting power, they are able to exert their 
influence on management to minimise the reporting of CSR information. After all, 
these information can be internally accessed by them.  
The reasoning above justifies why this result differs from some published 
studies (e.g. Nik et al. 2015a; Majeed et al. 2015; Barako et al. 2006; Nasir & 
Abdullah 2004). Nevertheless it is consistent with Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) and also Chava (2014) who found negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and CSR concerns and disclosure. 
Theoretically, this result fails to support stakeholder agency theory owing to the fact 
that the existence of more institutional investors in the company will only reduce the 
level of CSR information reported to the public. To them, comprehensive CSR 
reporting would only raise a lot pressures especially from competitors, political 
aspects and also customers (Htay et al. 2012). Avoiding them would ensure better 
returns specifically for those investors aiming for short-term profit. Explicitly, this 
view is not in conformity with the beliefs of stakeholder theorists that institutional 
investors are good monitors of the company through their power to influence 
management.  
There has been a consensus that industry influences the CSR reporting 
behaviour of companies. Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Reverte (2009) and Bowrin 
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(2013) provide evidence on the influence of different types of industry on CSR 
reporting. Considering this effect, modification of the model was done through the 
inclusion of INDUSTRY dummies. Industries have been classified based on a two-
digit industrial classification (SIC) code. The modified regression model is presented 
below: 
 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1DIROWNi,t  + 2INSTITUTi,t  +  3BSIZEi,t  + 4DRi,t + 5LIQi,t   
                + 6AGEi,t +7SIZEi,t  + 8ROAi,t +  9GROWTHi,t+ 10CAPi,t  
                 + yINDUSTRY + i,t 
 
The results exhibited in Table 6.4 (Panel B) proved indifferent despite the inclusion 
of industry. These results imply that the presence of institutional investors and 
provision of shares to directors have the same effects on CSR reporting regardless of 
industry type. 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
The unique ownership structure of Malaysian businesses environment 
provides the motivation for examining its possible effect on CSR reporting. This 
chapter found evidence that the provision of company shares to directors impacts 
negatively on company reporting behaviour. Apparently the result is in accord with 
the argument that directors’ ownership motivates them to prioritise their wants 
instead of shareholders; contradicting the claim of many researchers who believe this 
practice has the ability to bring congruence of directors and shareholders’ interests. 
They favour lower reporting to avoid reducing the wealth of both company and 
themselves. It is likely that the dominance of family owned companies may also 
influence the result. Due to an unfettered power in decision making, the owner of the 
company is able to affect the management’s decisions despite the low rate of 
directors’ ownership.  
The result also reveals that while institutional ownership affects significantly 
CSR reporting, it has a negative impact. Owing to their power, institutional investors 
have more incentive to monitor managerial behaviours and ascertain that managerial 
actions are congruent with wealth maximisation. As a result, institutional investors 
are normally related to better CSR performance including CSR reporting. 
Nevertheless, this study fails to support the claim. The result posits the possibility 
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that institutional investors prefer short term over long term investment which is able 
to provide them with fast return at minimum risk. Investment in CSR on the contrary, 
takes a longer time to mature besides full of uncertainties. Consequently, institutional 
investors are less keen in this type of investment. On the whole, this study suggests 
that large ownership or ownership concentration may contribute to deficiencies in 
good corporate governance practices. 
Practically, there is a need to prevent unethical conduct from further 
distorting the business environment. In doing so, regulatory bodies such as Securities 
Commission, Bursa Malaysia and Committee of Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance may want to introduce regulation pertaining to shareholding by directors 
as well as ethical guidelines for institutional investors. These initiatives are likely to 
give better protection to minority shareholders. It is also highly recommended that 
companies develop and enforce a code of ethics. The top management’s commitment 
to business ethics is central in developing an organizational culture preventing 
unethical practices. Apart from that, directors should be encouraged to have more 
engagement in the stakeholder management. Heightened the awareness on CSR is 
the fundamental step to open the minds of directors and institutional investors on the 
importance of CSR reporting. Therefore, CSR-leading agencies such as public 
sectors, including global, governmental, or non-governmental organisations, should 
pay further attention in order to educate companies on CSR issues.  
One potential limitation of this chapter is that the sample was drawn from the 
population of non-financial companies. Additionally, the result of this study is 
applicable to Malaysia only. This study focuses on annual reports only to obtain 
information. Future research may consider other CSR disclosure mediums such as 
stand-alone reporting. As identified in this chapter, there are generally two categories 
of institutional investors: short- and long-term ones. They have a different orientation 
towards companies’ involvement in CSR activities (Saleh et al. 2010). These 
differences provide opportunity for future research to examine the impact of different 
type of institutional investors on company reporting behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 7: BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) REPORTING 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the influence of board independence on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting by listed companies of Bursa Malaysia. An 
independent board is imperative to ensure shareholders’ interest takes precedence. 
Directors who are independent have the capability to execute their responsibilities 
through better monitoring and decision making, thus contribute to the enhancement 
of CSR reporting. However, this expectation only holds for companies in certain 
industries, as shown by the Ordinary Least Square regression results in this chapter. 
This outcome implies that the function of independent directors is less effective in 
family dominated companies. These family members dominate decision-making 
even in the presence of independent directors. This chapter illustrates that the 
principal-principal agency theory is partially justified thus provides important 
feedback to regulators on the effectiveness of existing corporate governance 
practices. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 Consistent with the increased importance of CSR, boards’ roles and 
responsibilities have been extended from the traditional shareholder-centric view to 
encompass various stakeholders. Board of directors influences CSR in various ways 
from establishing stakeholder friendly corporate policies to create committees 
dealing with CSR-related matters. They are also expected to monitor company 
performance financially and socially (Janggu et al. 2014) and are accountable for any 
decisions made by the management to serve for the best interest of the shareholders. 
Apparently, board of directors played a pivotal role in a company’s CSR activities. 
Nevertheless, decision to demonstrate social and environmental responsibility to 
relevant stakeholders through CSR reporting, often depends on management’s 
personal wealth considerations (Watts & Zimmerman 1990). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) postulate that separation of ownership and control of a company provides 
managers with the incentive to serve their personal interests at the expense of the 
shareholders’ interests. In the context of the company, a major issue is the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. This phenomenon can 
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cause the public to question the integrity and effectiveness of monitoring 
mechanisms in organizations. An alleged lack of independence is seen as the root 
cause of a board’s failure to effectively monitor the actions of management. 
Therefore it is claimed that greater emphasis should be made on the internal context, 
which include boards, particularly to increase shareholder insight and influence 
corporate behaviour in organizations (Buniamin, Alrazi, Johari & Rahman 2011). 
Proponents of corporate board reform have long supported increasing 
independent director representation as a means of increasing the objectivity and 
effectiveness of boards. Fama and Jensen (1983a) claim the effectiveness of board 
monitoring is enhanced by including independent directors because they have 
incentives to perform their monitoring function effectively and not collude with 
managers. This is partly driven by the fact that their reputation and their human 
capital value depend on their judgement as decision control specialists. Accordingly, 
their presence is commonly associated with lower information asymmetry and better 
reporting (Htay et al. 2012). Having independent directors is also significant when 
dealing with corporate social activities, such as charitable giving (Post et al. 2011), 
and the ethical aspects of the company’s activities (Ibrahim, Howard & Angelidis 
2003), as well as reducing agency cost (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe 2006). These 
views have eventually led to the movement toward specific board guidelines, 
typically calling for greater independent directors representation.  
This chapter aims to examine board independence on company CSR 
reporting in Malaysia. Malaysia is characterised by high ownership concentration 
where family block-ownerships and “dominant” shareholders are commonly present 
in listed companies (Mustapha & Che Ahmad 2011). Unlike companies with 
dispersed shareholdings, these companies seemingly to have reduced agency 
problems and costs due to a better match of control and cash flow rights of 
shareholders (Mustapha & Che Ahmad 2011). Nonetheless, due to the highly 
concentrated ownership and control, Malaysian listed companies face a unique 
“principal-principal” agency problem instead of the traditional “principal-agent” 
agency problem (Rashid 2015a). The conflict between family and non-family 
principal emerges when family owners engage in strategies that advances personal, 
family or political agendas at the expense of minority owners. This agency conflict 
which include the pursuit of non-economic goals that purportedly diverge from the 
interest of minority investors, if not monitored properly, may lead to a severe 
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minority shareholders expropriation. Coupled with ineffective minority shareholders 
protection, this type of conflict presents a major challenge to corporate governance 
practices.  
Further, CSR practices are often in conflict between minority and controlling 
shareholders. Thus, board of directors, especially independent directors, play a major 
role in addressing this unique conflict. Besides, understanding board independence 
and its impact on CSR reporting provides evidence on the effectiveness of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) guidelines. This study also adds 
to the limited literature that addresses the principal-principal conflict besides 
extending prior work which mostly focused on the monitoring role of independent 
directors in a traditional agency problem setting. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two presents the 
literature review and research questions. Section three presents an overview of 
corporate governance and corporate board practices in Malaysia. Section four 
presents the theoretical framework. Section five outlines the methodology. Section 
six presents and discusses the results. The final section is the conclusion. 
 
7.2 Literature review 
Studies examining board independence and CSR reporting present varying 
outcomes. There are vast arrays of reasons that are likely to moderate the 
relationship; among others, differences in institutional context, corporate governance 
system, different time periods, the unique CSR challenges in each country, variation 
in methods applied as well as definitions used for the variables. Apart from this, 
independent directors at board room have been exercised as early as mid1980s in US 
and Europe (Tinggi, Md Isa & Jakpar 2015). However, a similar idea was brought 
into light by companies in Asia especially, only after the financial crisis that started 
from the late 1990s until the late 2000s. Its evolvement has since made the issue of 
independent directors prominent. The development that has taken place, apparently 
shows the differing views of the importance of board independence. The idea that the 
majority of directors of a listed public company should be independent is relatively 
new in many countries. This study is conducted when the issue of independent 
directors is central to effective corporate governance practice.  
Leung and Horwitz (2004) showed a positive relationship can exist between 
board independence and voluntary disclosure for companies listed in Hong Kong. 
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Cheng and Courtenay (2006) documented a positive relationship between board 
independence and voluntary disclosure for 104 Singapore companies. A study of 
European biotech companies by Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) show that the 
proportion of independent directors has positive effects on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Htay et al. (2012) and Rao et al. (2012) on examining corporate 
governance mechanisms on social and environmental disclosures of banking 
companies in Malaysia and Australian companies respectively, acknowledged the 
importance of independent directors in enhancing companies’ reporting. Likewise, 
Jizi et al. (2014) exhibited positive relationship between board independence and 
CSR reporting. Other studies that report comparable results are Rashid and Lodh 
(2008), Barako and Brown (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Chau and Gray 
(2010). Conversely, Eng and Mak (2003), examining the impact of board 
composition and ownership structure on voluntary disclosure of 158 Singapore 
companies show that board composition significantly and negatively affects 
voluntary disclosure. Similar findings were reported by Haniffa and Cooke (2005). 
Independent directors are hindered in their ability to influence majority board 
decisions (Abdullah et al. 2011). In the same vein, Gul and Leung (2004), along with 
other studies (e.g. Allegrini & Greco 2013; Rouf 2011) document a negative 
relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure. Meanwhile 
studies by Said et al. (2009), Haji (2013), Shamil et al. (2014) and Sartawi et al. 
(2014) found no evidence of significant association between board independence and 
CSR disclosures. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) argued that independent directors 
may be elected to focus mainly on a monitoring role only as a way of protecting 
investors against managerial misbehaviour. Thus, reporting aspects have been 
neglected. Nonetheless, they strongly believe that disclosure should be considered as 
an indirect monitoring mechanism. 
In general, the majority of the empirical evidence suggests that board 
independence has some impact on CSR reporting. However studies are scant in 
developing countries. Hence, the objective of this study is to examine the influence 
of board independence on CSR reporting of public listed companies in Malaysia. 
 
7.3 Corporate governance and corporate board practices in Malaysia 
The Companies Act 1965 provides the laws relating to directors’ roles and 
responsibilities while Articles of Association outlines the regulations for the internal 
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management of a company’s affairs. The law considers a company as a separate legal 
entity and adopts a “one-tier” Anglo-American model of corporate governance.  This 
“market or shareholder” model regards the board of directors as the uppermost 
governing body in the company. “One-tier” boards are directly involved in company 
decisions, initiatives and outcomes. To ensure directors acts as an effective vehicle of 
corporate governance in Malaysia, they are obliged to undergo a Mandatory 
Accreditation Programme (MAP) reinforced by an annual Continuing Education 
Programme (CEP). In addition, Bursa Malaysia through its Listing Requirement has 
also provided guideline on determining independent directors. Practise Note 13 states 
that an independent director isa director who is independent of management and free 
from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of 
independent judgement or the ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a 
listed issuer. In a one-tier board system, members of the board of directors are 
allowed to hold both executive and non-executive positions. Hence, the objectivity 
and independence of the directors in monitoring and assessing the performance of the 
management might be hampered, since they may also be a part of the management 
team. This weakens the independent directors’ ability to oversee the implementation 
of decisions. 
In addition, Malaysia’s corporate ownership is highly concentrated, with most 
companies either family or government owned (Claessens et al. 2000). The 
controlling shareholders normally hold powerful positions on both the top 
management team and the board of directors; enabling them to make important 
decisions such as profit-sharing policy. Consequently, this causes an inequitable 
treatment to minority shareholders. There is seldom a separation of management and 
ownership; hence the agency problem in Malaysia is present. It is also common to 
find that the chairperson of the board is also the chief executive officer. Considering 
this the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance recommends, as a best practice, 
that there needs to be a balance on the board of directors with at least one third of the 
members being independent. Their inclusion are based on: (i) their experience and 
knowledge, (ii) their contacts, and (iii) their independence from the CEO. Malaysian 
business practice is dominated by owner managed companies where the prime 
shareholder is also the primary founder. When a single body is entrusted with both 
managing and supervising the company's operations, it is more difficult to guarantee 
the independence of board members. Also it is common that ‘independent’ directors 
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are either family members or friends instead of genuinely independent. Accordingly, 
the degree of independence of many boards of directors is questionable. 
 
7.4 Theoretical framework 
Issues pertaining to corporate governance such as monitoring mechanisms are 
very much related to agency theory. This theory emerged in the 1970s as a powerful 
framework to address the conflicting relationship between owners and managers and 
to suggest possible resolutions. An agency relationship exists when there is a change 
of control previously held by owners (principals) to control by managers (agents). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the relationship as a "contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent". Agency theory argues that the separation of 
ownership and control in companies has resulted in a potential conflict of interests 
between the owners and their managers. It induces managers to exhibit different 
attitudes toward risk and conflicting goals with owners, such as investment in 
unprofitable projects, and excessive use of free cash flow (Fama & Jensen 1983a). 
While the principal-agent conflict is prevalent in most developed countries, countries 
with concentrated ownership patterns are confronted with a principal-principal 
agency conflict (Dharwadkar et al. 2000). Following the incongruence of interests 
between shareholder groups, controlling shareholders can exploit minority 
shareholders through managerial facilitation. 
Managers in developed countries are most likely to opt for CSR activities on 
the grounds of self-interest despite the corporate governance system focused on 
shareholder primacy. To them, CSR acts as a personal reputational building tool. 
This different perception of the purpose of CSR can result in conflict between 
managers and shareholders. In developing countries with potential principal-principal 
agency conflicts, managers in most cases are less independent from, and may even be 
strongly affiliated with, founding owners or major shareholders. They tend to 
expropriate value from other shareholders to increase the wealth of the controlling 
owners. As a result, managers in Malaysia, for instance might seek opportunities that 
immediately benefit themselves, as well as founding families, by disengaging from 
longer-term, outcome-uncertain and costly social investments (Chang, Oh, Park & 
Jang 2015). Accordingly, despite the increasing pressure on companies to engage in 
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CSR, many have resisted it. 
How organisations control the agency problem has been of great interest. 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, p. 294) regard the board's "most important role is to 
scrutinize the highest decision makers in the firm". Given the power to authorise and 
monitor important decisions enables the board to accomplish its monitoring role 
(Fama & Jensen 1983a). Independent directors are professional referees whose task 
is to stimulate and oversee the competition among the firm's management. Agency 
theory advocates that boards comprising higher proportion of independent directors 
are more diligent in pursuing their monitoring role, due to their independence from 
management.  
Divergence of interest between managers and shareholders may create 
information asymmetry; hence incurring agency costs to closely align those interests 
(Mustapha & Che Ahmad 2011). Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as 
the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the owners (e.g. the use of boards of 
directors), the bonding expenditures by the managers (e.g. the preparation of 
financial statements) and the residual loss. Two mechanisms that can possibly 
mitigate the agency and asymmetric information problems as well as alleviating 
agency costs are board monitoring and transparency through disclosure. Htay et al. 
(2012) suggests that disclosure of information, or transparency, is an integral part of 
corporate governance as higher disclosure could reduce information asymmetry 
which not only clarifies the conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
management but also makes management more accountable. Forker (1992) found 
that the presence of independent board members enhanced financial disclosure 
quality and reduced the benefits of withholding information. 
Boards of directors have an important role in alleviating agency costs (Fama 
& Jensen 1983a). Researchers with agency-centred views believe that independent 
directors have the responsibility to enhance company transparency in order to protect 
shareholders’ interests (Michelon & Parbonetti 2012). By disclosing more CSR 
information in annual reports this reduces asymmetric information as well as 
enhances or maintains the company’s reputation/protection. Therefore, an effective 
board promotes CSR due to its ability to align managers’ interests with the long-term 
goals of both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders. 
Increased numbers of independent directors on a board creates a higher 
demand for voluntary disclosure to shareholders via better monitoring (Donnelly and 
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Mulcahy, 2008). Therefore, based on agency theory, it is hypothesized that board 
independence positively influences company CSR reporting. 
 
7.5 Method 
7.5.1 Data 
This study utilised a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia from 2008 until 2013. The study period enabled an 
examination of the trends in the CSR reporting practices of PLC in Malaysia. To be 
included in the sample, the company must have produced an annual report each year. 
Although there are quite a number of companies that issue stand-alone CSR reports 
and most companies made disclosure on their web, the information on those channels 
normally replicates what is reported in the annual report (Rashid 2015b). Initially, 
there were 813 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia as at 31st 
December 2013. Only 613 companies lodged their annual reports each and every 
year. Companies in the finance sector are subject to different regulatory and 
disclosure requirements and also material differences in their types of operation and 
were thus excluded following prior studies (e.g. Mohd Ghazali 2007; Said et al. 
2009; Haniffa & Cooke 2005). The 136 finance companies have reduced the 
potential population to 477 companies. 27 companies were also omitted due to 
having partial data which left a sample of 450 companies (see Table 4.3). 
Using the six annual reports for each company as the main source of 
information is based on several justifications. This is in line with other prior studies 
(e.g. Chan et al. 2014; Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 2011; Haji 2013).  
Further, annual reports are normally used by companies to communicate information 
to the public (Hasnah et al. 2006; Othman & Ameer 2010; Gray et al. 2001) 
including social and environmental reporting (Chan et al. 2014).  
 
7.5.2 Variables 
7.5.2.1 Dependent variables 
Content analysis was used to investigate environmental disclosures in the 
annual reports (e.g. Chan et al. 2014; Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 2011; 
Haji 2013). This technique replicates and make valid inferences from data to their 
context (Krippendorff 1989) and involves both qualitative and quantitative methods 
that converts information in annual reports into scores (Djajadikerta & Trireksani 
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2012). 
To assess the content of CSR reporting, a checklist of items was constructed 
by examining previous CSR reporting checklists (e.g. Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Barako & Brown 2008). In addition, specifically Malaysian checklists were also 
referenced (e.g. Abdullah et al. 2011; Haji 2013). To ensure conformation of the 
checklist items to the listing requirements and their relevance to the current 
Malaysian context, the framework launched by Bursa Malaysia in 2006 was also 
used as a reference. It comprises guidelines for PLCs in defining their CSR priorities, 
implementation and reporting. The framework focuses on four dimensions namely: 
Environment, Community, Marketplace and Workplace.  A checklist of 22 items of 
CSR developed by Abdullah et al. (2011) was used as the benchmark. This checklist 
adapted the work of Mohd Ghazali (2007) as well as incorporating aspects of 
Hackston and Milne (1996) and Ng (1985). The referred checklist was used to 
capture CSR reporting of companies in a similar institutional setting as the present 
study; hence confirming its suitability. Checklists by Mohamed Adnan (2012) and 
Chan et al. (2014) were also referenced apart from the inclusion of several items 
from the Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines in an attempt to get a more 
comprehensive checklist. After going through several revisions and refinements, the 
final checklist with 51 items was produced (see Table 4.4).  
Each disclosure item was assigned a score of “1” if it is disclosed and “0” if it 
is not disclosed; similarly used by many researchers (e.g. Haji 2013; Haniffa & 
Cooke 2005; Rashid & Lodh 2008; Mohd Ghazali 2007). Transforming the scores 
into a CSR reporting index were made by dividing the disclosure score of each 
company to the maximum possible score (i.e. 1 x 51= 51).   
 
              CSRIi = 
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1 , 
CSRI = CSR reporting index;  
nj = number of items expected for jth company;  
Xij = 1 if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed 
 
 
7.5.2.2 Independent and control variables 
The independent variable of interest is board independence. Board 
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independence refers to independent directors who have no affiliation with the 
company except for their directorship (Bursa Malaysia 2006).  Board independence 
(BIND) is the number of independent directors on the board relative to the total 
number of directors Arora and Dharwadkar (2011), Harjoto and Jo (2011) and Das et 
al. (2015).   
Following previous studies, a number of governance attributes and 
company’s characteristics that might affect CSR reporting are investigated as control 
variables in this study: board size, directors’ ownership, institutional ownership, debt 
ratio, liquidity, company age, company size, profitability, company growth and 
market capitalisation. Board size is one of the governance attributes that has a major 
influence on company’s operation. Although there is no universal “best” size, García 
Sánchez et al. (2011) claimed that a board should be composed of a considerable 
number of experienced directors. They should ensure full deliberation and diversity 
of thinking on governance and other organisational matters. Smaller boards are 
expected to benefit from more efficient communication, coordination and 
accountability of individual board members (Jizi et al. 2014). However, they suffer 
from limited monitoring ability due to higher workloads and less diversified range of 
expertise. Similarly, larger boards are inefficient because they result in weaker 
control of management and increases the agency cost but can offer more knowledge 
and expertise, as well as more capacity for monitoring and sharing workload 
(Larmou & Vafeas 2010). Board size refers to the number of directors who make up 
the board (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Jizi et al. 2014). An ideal board size would be 
different across companies. Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the total number of directors, following Rashid (2013). 
Directors’ level of ownership is presumed to have an important effect on their 
willingness to monitor managers and enhance shareholders’ value (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997). With the prevalence of family owned companies, directors’ ownership 
is often associated with low monitoring and ineffective alignment of interests 
between shareholders and managers. Director ownership (DIROWN) is expressed as 
the ratio of total director shareholdings to total number of shares. Institutional 
investors are a special group of shareholders with a relatively concentrated bigger 
stake of shares. By holding substantial shares in a company, they can exert 
considerable influence upon management including disclosure of CSR information. 
Institutional ownership (INSTITUT) is the ratio of total institutional shareholdings to 
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total number of shares as defined by Nasir and Abdullah (2004) and Barako et al. 
(2006). Leverage (DR) was measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) believed that the need for managers of highly leveraged 
companies to generate and retain cash to service debts might reduce their ability to 
fund CSR activities. Conversely, companies with high debt levels are expected to 
incur high monitoring costs. An opposing view is that they disclose more information 
to reduce costs (Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012) and to meet the needs of their lenders 
(Abdullah et al. 2011).  
Profitability has been proven to have an effect on CSR practices. Since CSR 
activities are not cost-free, companies that are highly profitable are able to absorb the 
associated costs, hence disclosing more information to stakeholders. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005) and Khan (2010) showed that profitability was a vital factor in relation 
to disseminating social information by companies. Profitability was proxied by 
Return on Assets (ROA) following Rashid (2014) and Sartawi et al. (2014). Rashid 
(2013) defined company growth (GROWTH) as a percentage of annual change in 
sales. Growth is a result of an interaction between a company’s productive resources 
and its market opportunities. Allegedly, when companies experience rapid growth, 
they tend to source outside financing from the market, thus forcing more disclosure 
(Naser et al. 2006). Consequently, the cost of external financing is reduced and 
improves a company’s ability to potentially pursue profitable projects. Further, 
growth companies also show greater information asymmetry and higher agency costs 
(Eng & Mak 2003). Hence, they are expected to disclose more information. Market 
capitalisation can be used to represent company size (Wallace & Naser 1996). High 
market capitalisation companies often face with demands by the society for the 
exercise of social responsibility or for greater regulation such as price controls and 
higher corporate tax (Watts & Zimmerman 1990). To minimise the outcomes, 
companies should produce comprehensive reports. Meanwhile, companies with low 
market capitalisation view higher disclosure as detrimental to its competitiveness. 
Market capitalisation (CAP) is expressed in its natural logarithm. 
Ho and Taylor (2007) suggest that companies with high liquidity have 
stronger incentives to disseminate more information in their annual report as 
compared to companies with lower liquidity. Company liquidity (LIQ) is measured 
as the current ratio (Rashid 2013, 2014; Ho & Taylor 2007). Company age (AGE) 
was represented by the number of years it has been listed on Bursa Malaysia, 
Chapter 7: Board independence and CSR reporting 
 
173 
 
expressed in natural logarithm (Rashid 2009). Many believe that there exist a 
relationship between company size and the extent of disclosures made. Studies by 
Cormier et al. (2011) and Lu and Abeysekera (2014) confirmed the result that size is 
one of the major factors determining CSR reporting. Large companies engage in 
more activities due to resource availability, produce more information on these 
activities and are better able to bear the cost of such processes (Andrew et al. 1989).  
The natural logarithm of total assets as the proxy for company size (SIZE) was used, 
consistent with Das et al. (2015), Sartawi et al. (2014) and Rashid (2014). 
 
7.5.3 The Model 
The following model is estimated to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance attributes and the extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs: 
 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BINDi,t + 2BSIZEi,t + 3DIROWNi,t + 4INSTITUTi,t  + 5DRi,t 
    +6LIQi,t +7AGEi,t   +8SIZEi,t +9ROAi,t  + 10GROWTHi, + 
 11CAPi,t +i,t 
 
Where CSRIi,t is CSR index for ith company at time t.  BINDi,t is number of 
independence director to total number of directors for ith company at time t.  
BSIZEi,t  is the total number of directors for ith company at time t. DIROWNi,t is 
percentage of director ownership for ith company at time t. INSTITUTi,t is 
percentage of institutional ownership for ith company at time t. DRi,t is debt ratio for 
ith company at time t.  LIQi,t is liquidity ratio for ith company at time t.  AGEi,t is 
number of listed years on Bursa Malaysia for ith company at time t.  SIZEi,t   is 
natural logarithm of total assets for ith company at time t.  ROAi,t  is profitability for 
ith company at time t.  GROWTHi,t is the company growth in sales for ith company 
at time t.  CAPi,t is the market capitalisation for ith company at time t.α is the 
intercept, is the regression coefficient and   is the error term. 
First step is to ensure the data not only meets the normality assumption but 
also free from problems of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeniety. 
Assumption of normality asserts that the distribution of the means across samples is 
normal; exhibiting a bell-curve shape if plotted. However, this assumption of 
normality turns out to be relatively uncontroversial when large samples are used, for 
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instance more than 30 (Pallant 2007). The model was tested using Residual 
Test/Histogram-Normality Test and the result conformed to the assumption. The 
correlation matrix results presented in Table 7.1, show the correlation coefficients 
between the independent variables range from -0.009 to 0.839. Gujarati (2003) 
suggests that a multicollinearity problem may exist when the correlation exceeds 
0.80, which was evident from the correlation between company size and market 
capitalisation. To confirm whether the assumption is violated or not, the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent has also been considered. A value of VIF 
greater than 10 indicates multicollinearity is present (Gujarati 2003). However, none 
of the VIF values in the model exceed 10, indicating multicollinearity is not a serious 
problem when interpreting the regression results. 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is central to any regression model. 
Homoscedasticity describes a situation in which the error term is constant across all 
values of the independent variables. Standard estimation methods are inefficient 
when the size of the error term differs across values of an independent variable; also 
known as heteroscedasticity.  The scatter plot of the residuals (ZRESID) against the 
predicted value (ZPRED) of the model indicated heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-
Pagan test was thus employed. Likewise, both the Chi square and corresponding p 
values indicated heteroscedasticity. Correction was achieved by applying the 
standard errors of the White (1980) method. Another major assumption of regression 
is that independent variables are not correlated with the error terms. Based on the 
Hausman Test, when this assumption is violated, endogeniety occurs. This causes the 
regression coefficient in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to be biased.  
This can be addressed by using Instrumental Variable regression. The F-test for the 
predicted value of board independence in this model was considered not significant. 
Following Rashid (2014), when the CSR index was used as a proxy for CSR 
reporting, F = 2.28 with p = 0.1314. The results indicated that endogeniety is not a 
problem. Hence OLS and Instrumental Variable regression are consistent.  
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Table 7.1 Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)    *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1 BIND 1.00           
1.284 
2 BSIZE -0.414
** 1.00 
         
1.402 
3 DIROWN 0.057
** -0.089** 1.00 
        
1.126 
4 INSTITUT -0.077
** 0.071** -0.256** 1.00 
       
1.084 
5 DR 0.085
** 0.007 -0.035 -0.013 1.00 
      
1.136 
6 LIQ 0.094
** -0.045* -0.008 0.002 -0.274** 1.00 
     
1.119 
7 AGE 0.151
** -0.011 -0.177** 0.017 0.005 0.063** 1.00 
    
1.204 
8 SIZE -0.053
** 0.339** -0.181** 0.061** 0.055** -0.067** 0.337** 1.00 
   
3.891 
9 ROA -0.009 0.084
** -0.073** 0.062** -0.129** 0.049* 0.051** 0.111** 1.00 
  
1.054 
10 GROWTH -0.029 0.025 -0.009 0.049
* 0.018 -0.059** 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.00 
 
1.013 
11 CAP -0.063
** 0.321** -0.156** 0.071** -0.069** 0.035 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.00 3.680 
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7.6 Results 
7.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of CSR reporting and the independent variables are 
shown in Table 7.2.  
 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables   
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
CSRI 0.217 0.196 0.039 0.726 0.120 
BIND 0.452 0.430 0.170 1.000 0.128 
BSIZE 7.236 6.686 3.004 18.174 1.296 
DIROWN 0.044 0.003 0.000 0.568 0.088 
INSTITUT 0.263 0.204 0.000 0.959 0.221 
DR 0.402 0.378 0.003 10.319 0.362 
LIQ 3.053 1.785 0.007 96.111 5.199 
AGE 13.985 15.029 6.000 52.985 1.640 
SIZE (log TA) 12.878 12.650 9.369 18.411 1.447 
ROA 0.062 0.058 -2.898 5.547 0.178 
GROWTH 0.053 0.027 -4.941 8.578 0.478 
CAP (log Cap) 18.798 18.503 12.371 24.810 1.811 
 
The average CSR reporting level among PLC is 21.7%. This shows that 
despite the existence of regulation and awareness campaigns, the level of CSR 
reporting in Malaysia remains moderately low (Lu & Castka 2009; Ramasamy & 
Ting 2004). A huge variation between the highest and the lowest level of reporting is 
observed. The finding also implies that transparency and reporting are not a strong 
tradition in Malaysian PLCs (Aaijaz & Ibrahim 2012). On average, boards comprised 
45.2% of independent directors. With almost half of the board consists of 
independent directors, it is likely for the board to provide more independent 
judgement which are important in making better decisions for the shareholders. 
There is also a greater chance of enhancing board monitoring effectiveness. The 
result also reveals that PLCs in Malaysia are conforming to the MCCG 
recommendation of having at least one third independent directors.  In general, 
companies have an average board size of 7.2, postulating that a moderately large size 
of board is preferable. Director ownership illustrates that on average they only own 
4.4% of company shares; with the highest recording 56.8%. Notwithstanding its 
ability in aligning directors’ interests with shareholders, companies prefer to keep 
directors ownership levels low. On the contrary, there is an extreme difference 
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between the minimum (0%) and maximum (95.9%) shareholdings by institutions. 
Average institutional ownership accounts for 26.3% of total company shareholding. 
 
7.6.2 Regression analysis 
Panel A of Table 7.3 shows the adjusted R2 value which shows that the 
variation in the extent of CSR reporting that can be explained by the independent 
variables is 37.7%. It is argued that independent directors are more objective when 
making decisions, thereby rise the chance of protecting interests of stakeholders 
against the possible emergence of opportunist behaviour by management (Fama & 
Jensen 1983a). In return, levels of disclosure are increased. It was expected that a 
positive relationship between independent directors and the extent of CSR reporting 
exists.  Consistent with that found by Barako and Brown (2008) and Rashid and 
Lodh (2008), the result is significant which supports this hypothesis. Further it was 
predicted that board size is positively related to the extent of CSR reporting.  The 
result reveals a significant positive relationship between the two variables indicating 
that larger boards can benefit from diversity, resulting in better involvement in CSR 
activities and increased reporting (Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012). This outcome 
matches those observed in studies by Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and Akhtaruddin 
et al. (2009).    
Ownership by directors and institution, company age, size, ROA and market 
capitalisation are found to be significantly related to CSR reporting. Contradicting to 
the findings of Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah (2004), directors’ 
ownership was found to reduce CSR reporting. Despite the claim by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) that directors ownership helps to match the interests between the 
directors and the shareholders, this study proves otherwise. The finding also 
illustrates that institutional ownership significantly influence the extent of CSR 
reporting but in an opposite way; contrary to Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir 
and Abdullah (2004). Without doubt, through their power, institutional owners are 
able to influence management on CSR practices (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). However, 
it is inclined towards a lower reporting. As predicted, mature companies tend to 
disclose more CSR information to demonstrate and reinforce their high reputations. 
Likewise, larger companies report more CSR activities since the costs of disclosures 
are funded by profits (Brammer & Pavelin 2008). Furthermore, they are more visible 
to the public and tend to be subject to greater political and regulatory pressures from 
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external interest groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). To reduce these (potential) 
political costs, large companies disclose more information to demonstrate that their 
actions are legitimate and consistent with good corporate citizenship (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2008). Similarly, companies that are highly profitable are able to absorb the 
associated costs, hence disclosing more information to stakeholders. With regard to 
market capitalisation, consistent with expectation, companies with high market 
capitalisation are likely to produce high levels of CSR reporting. 
 
 Table 7.3 Relationship between board independence and CSR reporting 
 
  Dependent variable 
  Panel A Panel B 
  (before controlling for industry) 
(after controlling for 
industry) 
  CSRI CSRI 
Intercept -0.546 -0.594 
  (-19.575)*** (-17.016)*** 
BIND 0.033 0.017 
  (1.878)* -1.021 
BSIZE 0.042 0.031 
  (4.637)*** (3.519)** 
DIROWN -0.065 -0.044 
  (-2.657)** (-1.828)* 
INSTITUT -0.034 -0.044 
  (-3.597)*** (-4.648)*** 
DR 0.001 0.005 
  -0.104 -0.994 
LIQ -0.001 0 
  (-1.637) (-0.995) 
AGE 0.022 0.027 
  (4.591)*** (5.591)*** 
SIZE 0.027 0.037 
  (10.041)*** (13.619)*** 
ROA 0.06 0.046 
  (5.504)*** (4.427)*** 
GROWTH 0 -0.001 
  (-0.093) (-0.181) 
CAP 0.014 0.008 
  (6.640)*** (3.844)*** 
  
 
  
F statistic 124.567 35.97 
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.465 
 The t tests are presented in the parentheses * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.010; *** p< 0.001 
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It is argued that companies in certain type of industries may face different 
degrees of pressure to disclose information because of competitive reasons (Mohd 
Ghazali 2007). Previous studies have provided evidence of a significant systematic 
variation across industries pertaining to their propensity to make CSR reporting 
(Brammer & Pavelin 2008; Giannarakis 2014). Companies with high consumer 
visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated intense competition disclosed 
significantly more CSR information in their annual reports (Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Mohd Ghazali 2007). The sample in this study constitutes companies from multiple 
industries. To control for the effects of industry on reporting activities, modification 
to the model was made by adding INDUSTRY dummies. Companies were classified 
based on a two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. The new 
regression model was as follows: 
 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BINDi,t + 2BSIZEi,t + 3DIROWNi,t + 4INSTITUTi,t  + 5DRi,t 
    + 6LIQi,t + 7AGEi,t   + 8SIZEi,t + 9ROAi,t  +  10GROWTHi,  + 
     11CAPi,t + yINDUSTRY  +  i,t 
 
 The regression coefficients are shown in Panel B of Table 7.3. As observed, 
industry has no effect on the majority of independent variables, except for board 
independence. Its coefficient has changed from significant to non-significant. The 
result seems to infer that the effectiveness of independent directors in promoting 
CSR reporting is only relevant to certain industries. This suggests that while some 
independent directors are able to execute well their responsibilities in one industry, 
others may not have the capability to do so in other industries. As pointed out by Haji 
(2013) and Shamil et al. (2014), the effectiveness of independent directors in 
increasing the level of CSR reporting might be hampered, plausibly due to lack of 
knowledge and experience in relation to the type of industry. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether independent directors have any 
association with the extent of CSR reporting of PLCs in Malaysia. Although 
independent directors are perceived to represent stakeholders’ interests, their ability 
to enhance company’s CSR reporting is found to be industry specific. This finding is 
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likely to be related to the structure of the Malaysian board system. The practice of 
one-tier board system portrays governance by one body that undertakes both the 
management and monitoring functions. When all members of the board are entrusted 
with the same tasks and are obliged to perform the same duties, independent 
directors are most likely to fail to carry out their supervisory functions objectively. It 
thus remains a problem of the one-tier system to find ways to guarantee that a certain 
number of board members are independent. In addition, independent directors are 
elected based on the notion that they are not materially related to the company. Due 
to their commitments elsewhere, they usually invest too little time to really 
understand the business. This dependence on management means it is difficult to 
execute the supervisory function when independent directors have limited 
information on the company’s affairs.  Perhaps regular board meetings might better 
familiarise them with the company and in turn assist them in making better and more 
informed decisions. Independent directors may also have strong family or friendship 
ties with management, which influences their independence and weakens their 
monitoring role (Sartawi et al. 2014). Family-owned businesses are a significant 
element in the Malaysian economy, may also impede directors’ independence. In 
these companies, controlling shareholders are significantly influential which might 
help explain independent directors’ failure to execute the monitoring tasks entrusted 
to them.  
These clarifications demonstrate the unique principal-principal agency 
conflict that exists in companies with concentrated ownership. Cross directorship can 
also undermine board independence. According to the Higgs Report (2003, p. 37), a 
director’s judgement can be affected if he/she “holds cross-directorship or has 
significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies or 
bodies”. Cross directorship is legally practised in Malaysia. Bursa Malaysia Listing 
(2002) permits a maximum of 10 directorships in public companies and 15 
directorships in private companies. Cross directorship can result to conflict of 
interests especially when performance evaluation is concerned. Clearly, board 
independence is central in trying to overcome the conflict. Nevertheless, the efficacy 
of independent directors is justifiable only in certain industries only as evident in this 
chapter. Thus, theoretically, the findings partially support agency theory in 
explaining the impact of governance on CSR practices in Malaysia. 
The chapter concludes that having more independent directors does not 
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necessarily enhance board effectiveness, especially if they are unable to contribute 
effectively to the board. It is highly recommended that policy makers look for 
alternative methods of electing independent directors, for instance, appointment by a 
special committee. Importantly, PLCs need to continuously recognise the 
significance of corporate governance best practices especially when its effect on CSR 
practices is apparent. For instance, the regression analysis results provide evidence 
that size of board contributes to the enhancement of CSR reporting. Fundamentally, 
this conclusion asserts that better reporting can result from diverse and 
knowledgeable directors on large boards (Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012). Board size is 
also associated with the capacity to foster effective monitoring to mitigate agency 
problems. High number of directors permits the board to execute duties effectively, 
thus leading to more reporting on CSR (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008). 
 The findings of this chapter need to be carefully interpreted. Fundamentally, 
different countries are subject to different regulatory and corporate governance 
mechanisms. For that reason, the results cannot be generalised across countries. 
Further, this study focused on CSR reporting in annual reports only, despite knowing 
that company utilises other mass communication mechanisms.  In view of this, future 
work should consider other forms of reporting. It would also be interesting to assess 
the effect of other control variables that may play an important role in influencing 
CSR reporting. Ethnicity, competitiveness, politically connected companies and 
listing status are several control variables appropriate to the Malaysian context that 
could be incorporated into the model. Finally, due to the ability of independent 
directors to provide impartial perspective in decision making is industry specific, as 
suggested by this study, it provides an opportunity for future researchers to conduct 
an industry-based study on the effectiveness of independent directors in enhancing 
CSR reporting. 
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CHAPTER 8: BOARD MEETING FREQUENCY AND CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) REPORTING 
 
Abstract 
This chapter shows the influence of board meeting frequency on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) reporting by publically listed companies. Although there is no 
consensus on the appropriate number of meetings, higher frequency of board 
meetings often demonstrate the commitment of directors of their responsibilities. 
Despite its costliness, it is one of the prime mediums for directors to obtain 
information on the company as well as able to monitor the management’s actions. 
Utilising Ordinary Least Square regression, the analysis indicates an absence of a 
relationship between board meeting frequency and CSR reporting. It may be the 
result of pre-set agendas by the CEOs which seems to be the norm of family-owned 
companies. Nevertheless, these results suggest chapter that frequent board meetings, 
if properly conducted, can help to safeguard all stakeholders’ interests. 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The relevance and reliability of CSR information reported by companies are 
very much influenced by the company’s various internal governance mechanisms 
(Karamanou & Vafeas 2005); suggesting the convergence of disclosure and 
governance practices. Fundamentally, corporate governance encompasses the 
controls and procedures that exist to ensure that management acts in the interest of 
shareholders. Effective corporate governance is the main mechanism that bridges the 
trust between the stakeholders and the company (Amran et al. 2010). In addition to 
reducing the likelihood that management takes actions that deviate from maximising 
the value of the company, corporate governance mechanisms also affect the 
information disclosed by the company to its shareholders. These mechanisms make it 
less likely that management does not fully disclose relevant information to 
shareholders or discloses information that is less than credible. This brings the focus 
to boards as primary vehicles for improving the quality of information provided by 
companies. A sizable body of prior research indicates that boards by monitoring 
management enhance the quality and the frequency of information released by 
management (Karamanou & Vafeas 2005). These information releases include not 
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only actual reported earnings but also voluntary disclosures such as CSR 
information. 
The board of directors is an important entity in a company, creating a link 
between shareholders and managers; therefore playing an important role in the 
governance of a company (Amran et al. 2010). According to the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) a company should be led by an effective board that 
also bears the responsibility of steering the company into success. As a watchdog 
group in a company, the board of directors is presumed as an effective managerial 
oversight (Fama & Jensen 1983a), including in the provision of voluntary 
information (Chen & Jaggi 2001; Ho & Wong 2001). This important role is to make 
company’s reporting disclosures accurate and precise to inform shareholders. The 
board of directors has the legal authority to ratify and monitor managerial initiatives, 
evaluate, reward or penalise the performance of managers (Fama & Jensen 1983a). 
An essential way that a board exerts its influence on its company is through decisions 
and plans made in board meetings (Chou et al. 2013). It is argued that board 
meetings and attendance of the meetings are considered to be important channels 
through which directors obtain company specific information and are able to fulfil 
their monitoring and supervisory roles of the company or to make strategic decisions 
for it (Adams & Ferreira 2008). Concomitant to that, frequent board meetings are 
claimed to be an indicator of effective board performance (Yatim 2010). 
Despite board meeting being an essential monitoring mechanism in ensuring 
managers pursues the interests of shareholders, much of the empirical literature is 
concentrated in a few developed countries (Vafeas 1999; Kent & Stewart 2008; 
Carcello, Hermanson, Neal & Riley 2002). Arguably, there are differences in 
institutional contexts, legal and corporate governance practices in developing 
countries. Not only the effectiveness of board meeting may differ but also its impact 
on company reporting is expected to vary from those reported in developed 
countries. Directors in developed countries normally opt for better CSR practices as a 
way of promoting their undiversified human capital and also to increase share price, 
thus maximizing shareholders’ returns. Nevertheless, since considering stakeholders’ 
welfare and interests has become part of directors’ fiduciary responsibility, directors 
who fail to practise CSR is likely to face legal actions (Devinney, Schwalbach & 
Williams 2013). In contrast to developed countries, CSR practices are less common 
in developing countries since they can reduce shareholders’ returns. Nonetheless, 
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with various benefits of CSR, the practise is currently on the rise. Besides, better 
governed companies are often associated with better CSR practices (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen 2013). Hence, conducting this study will provide better understanding of 
the effectiveness of board meeting on enhancing company CSR reporting. 
Investigating the impact of board meeting frequency on CSR reporting in 
developing countries generally and Malaysia specifically is important. Malaysia 
provides a good setting to investigate the relationship between reporting and 
corporate governance attributes because its legal system is reasonably well 
developed but surrounded by limited information environment (Ball et al. 2003). 
Further, Malaysia is a semi-developed country that has a CSR Framework 
promulgated by Bursa Malaysia in 2007. It is a voluntary self–regulated model for 
existing PLCs. Past studies relating to CSR practices in Malaysia showed that CSR 
reporting especially among PLCs is currently on the rise (Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012; 
Haji 2013). Nonetheless, they vary considerably in terms of its detail. Most prior 
research done internationally have revealed that corporate governance has an 
influence on the level of reporting. Thus, based on a different governance landscape, 
it is expected that the variation in CSR reporting in Malaysia is likely to be attributed 
to corporate governance especially with its current revision of MCCG in 2012. The 
revised MCCG emphasises the importance of the board in ensuring the company’s 
strategies promote sustainability especially in the area of environmental, social and 
governance. It is also required of companies to disclose policies pertaining to 
sustainability and its implementation in the annual report and corporate website. 
Meanwhile, an earlier revision of MCCG in 2007 recommends frequent board 
meetings as one of the best practices. It keeps the board engaged in the company’s 
operations besides connecting with other directors. Based on the emphasis given by 
the regulator on board meeting, it clearly demonstrates the importance of board 
meeting in assisting companies achieve their objectives. This would include meeting 
their social responsibilities towards stakeholders. In light of these recommendations, 
this study aims to investigate the effect of board of directors meeting frequency on 
the extent of CSR reporting of PLCs in Malaysia.  
Against the backdrop of current efforts to regulate the structure and functions 
of corporate boards, results of this study are likely to be of interest to policy makers 
because they believe that certain board attributes are systematically associated with 
the quality of reporting. Secondly, these results extend academic research by 
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enhancing the understanding of the connection between CSR reporting and board of 
directors, and, more generally, by providing additional evidence on the role of 
corporate governance mechanism in aligning the interest of management and 
shareholders. Finally, the results can be potentially valuable to directors because their 
credibility in making good decisions during board meeting is indirectly being 
assessed. Generally, this study proposes a potential path for directors wishing to 
enhance the quality and credibility of their CSR reporting. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section 
discusses the literature and development of hypothesis. The third section briefly 
explores corporate governance and CSR reporting in Malaysia. This is followed by a 
discussion of the theoretical framework. The fifth section describes the methods. The 
results of this study are reported in the sixth section while in the final section 
conclusions are drawn and implications of the results are discussed. 
 
8.2 Literature review and development of hypothesis 
Arguably, the directors of the company should meet regularly as all decisions 
can be made after thorough discussion, fruitful debates and detailed analysis. When 
boards hold regular meetings, they are more likely to remain informed and 
knowledgeable about relevant performance of the company leading them to take or 
influence and direct the appropriate action to address the issue (Ponnu & 
Karthigeyan 2010). Vafeas (1999) suggested that the number of board meetings 
attended is actually a very good proxy for directors’ monitoring effort. Frequency of 
board meetings is also expected to be a remedy to the problem of limited director 
interaction. This applies especially to independent directors who have limited 
interaction time to perform their monitoring role. This opinion is reinforced by 
criticisms of directors who spread their time too thin by taking on too many outside 
directorships, confounding their ability to attend meetings regularly and, therefore, to 
monitor management well (Vafeas 1999). A clear implication of this is that directors 
in boards who meet more frequently are more likely to perform their duties in 
accordance with shareholders' interests. Boards of directors need to be active to meet 
their corporate governance commitments, particularly in ensuring high quality and 
transparent reporting in annual reports (Kent & Stewart 2008). The notion is that an 
active board should be a better monitor than an inactive board. Equally important is 
the need for a boardroom environment that encourages constructive debate. Hence, a 
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board meeting that involves disagreement among directors is presumably more 
effective as it encourages critical thinking. Additionally, frequent meetings as well as 
informal side line communications can create and strengthen cohesive bonds among 
directors (Lipton & Lorsch 1992). This contributes to effective collaboration among 
directors and better company performance. Taken together, boards that meet 
frequently are more likely to perform their duties diligently and effectively (Lipton & 
Lorsch 1992; Yatim 2010; Vafeas 1999). 
While many agree that diligent boards are likely to enhance the oversight 
level of company’s reporting, there seems to be no consensus on the effectiveness of 
frequency of meeting. Hahn and Lasfer (2015) suggest that the frequency of board 
meetings to be a function of company specific factors, namely, remuneration, 
company performance, complexity, financial distress, and corporate governance. 
Companies with greater scale, more diversified activities, and/or larger staff are 
likely to have more monitoring and advisory needs and require more board meetings. 
Similarly, during crisis times, board of directors tend to increase meeting frequency 
(Hahn & Lasfer 2015). Market performance and investor issues, are also expected to 
influence boards of directors to act, and such action may increase, or decrease, their 
meeting frequency (Vafeas 1999). For instance, weakening company dynamics may 
require immediate board consent or approval on key strategic issues, hence 
demanding increased board meetings. Vafeas (1999) and Adams (2005) argue that 
company’s performance is an important determinant of board meeting frequency, as 
poor prior performance increases the need for monitoring to turn around the 
company. Vafeas (1999) and Raheja (2005) propose that, as boards become more 
independent, their meeting frequency increases to reflect the need to access 
information via other channels and the increased efforts needed for information 
coordination. However, to date, the appropriate number of board meetings still 
remains a question. Codes of corporate governance such as the Cadbury Report 
(1993) and MCCG (2007) propose that companies self-determine their board 
meeting frequencies according to their monitoring and advising needs. As a result, 
the number of board meetings selected by a company appears to be quite random.  
Despite the collective agreement that active monitoring through board 
meeting enhances company’s performance including reporting, research on this issue 
contains contradicting arguments. Jensen (1993) considers board meetings not 
necessarily useful due to the limited time independent directors spend with the 
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company and consider such time could be better utilised for a more meaningful 
exchange of ideas with the management. Besides, routine tasks absorb much of the 
meetings, limiting opportunities for independent directors to exercise meaningful 
control over management. Companies are also likely to limit the board meeting 
frequency because it is a costly monitoring alternative (Vafeas 1999) involving 
managerial time and travel expenses, administrative support requirements and 
directors’ meeting fees. Johl (2006) in the U.K among the FTSE 100 companies 
found there was a negative relationship between frequency of board meetings and 
entrepreneurial activities. In support of less meetings, Jensen (1993) contends that 
establishing a system that can respond to specific challenges is likely to be more 
useful for boards in well-functioning companies. Since these types of companies 
normally exhibit little conflict, directors can increase the frequency of meetings 
during crisis or when shareholders’ interests are visibly in danger (Ntim & Osei 
2013). 
Prior studies reveal the association of board meeting frequency with various 
elements such as company’s earnings management (Xie, Davidson & DaDalt 2003); 
financial reporting (Kent & Stewart 2008); company fraud (Uzun, Szewczyk & 
Varma 2004) and also company performance (Chou et al.2013; Vafeas 1999). 
However, the literature is inconsistent. Vafeas (1999) found empirical evidence that 
boards meet more frequently after crises and that performance increases as a result. 
He suggests that board meeting frequency is a proxy for the time directors have to 
monitor management. However, it is not clear if the frequency of board meetings 
represents increased monitoring efforts or more a case of upskilling independent 
directors. Brick and Chidambaran (2010) confirmed that companies holding more 
board and committee meetings tend to have greater value. Francis, Hasan and Wu 
(2015) indicated that companies during crises with poor board attendance at meetings 
perform significantly worse than boards with high attendance. Ntim and Osei (2013) 
in South Africa also suggested similar findings between the frequency of board 
meetings and higher financial performance. Boards that meet more frequently have 
increased capacity to effectively advise, monitor and discipline management, and 
thereby improving corporate financial performance. Carcello et al. (2002) claimed 
that boards meeting more frequently pay higher audit fees and complements auditor 
oversight. Mangena and Tauringana (2008) report a positive relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and company performance for a sample of 157 
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Zimbabwean listed firms. Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Whalen (2007) relate frequent 
board meetings with fewer asymmetric information problems. Uzun et al. (2004) did 
not find a significant relationship between financial reporting fraud and the meeting 
frequency of board and audit committee.  
Board meeting frequency was found to mediate the negative relationship 
between earnings management and both board and audit committee independence 
(Ebrahim 2007). Allegrini and Greco (2013) found that both the boards and the audit 
committees’ diligence are positively associated with voluntary disclosure. Examining 
Australian companies’ attitudes on financial disclosure Kent and Stewart (2008) 
found that companies with more frequent board and audit committee meetings tend 
to have more disclosures. On the contrary, Haji (2013) failed to find any significant 
relationship between board meeting frequency and sustainability reporting of 
Malaysian PLCs. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) concluded that there is no relation 
between the activity of the board and the quality of financial information disclosed. 
In short, board meeting frequency is one of the mechanisms that directors 
utilise to collectively decide and determine the direction of the company. With CSR 
issues becoming increasingly important the frequency of board meetings is likely to 
be associated with more CSR duties, such as CSR reporting. Therefore, based on the 
reviewed literature, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: Frequency of board meeting is positively associated with company CSR 
reporting 
 
8.3 Corporate governance and CSR reporting in Malaysia 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) came about in 2000 
with the aim to achieve excellence in corporate governance. In 2007, the code was 
revised; specifically recommending that board should meet frequently, with due 
notice of issues to be discussed and should record its conclusions. However, the 
frequency of board meeting depends entirely on a company’s interpretation. 
Companies are also required to disclose the number of board meetings held in each 
year together with the attendance of each individual director. Following mandatory 
CSR reporting for PLCs in 2007, there has been consistent growth in CSR practices. 
However, there are still sharp differences in reporting outcomes across companies 
since they are allowed to report information they think is appropriate based on the 
themes outlined by the CSR framework. Effectiveness of directors may also 
Chapter 8: Board meeting frequency and CSR reporting 
 
189 
 
contribute to the variation of CSR reporting. This suggests the link between good 
practise of corporate governance and the level of CSR reporting. 
 
8.4 Theoretical framework 
Various theories have been used to explain the association between board 
meeting frequency and company disclosure practices. Resource dependence theory 
rests on the notion that board of directors is a key resource to a company (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) outlined the concept of board capital as 
the sum of individual directors’ human and social capital and use board capital as a 
proxy for a board’s ability to monitor and provide resources to the company. de 
Villiers et al. (2011) assert that directors who are resource rich, for instance through 
multiple directorship, being experts in their fields, or having long-term director 
experience, have more human and social capital. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) note 
that board capital is needed for effective resource monitoring and provision because 
it provides four benefits as outlined by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978): (1) advice and 
counsel, (2) legitimacy and reputation, (3) channels of communication and 
information between the company and external organizations, and (4) resources from 
important elements outside the company. Inevitably, board of directors plays an 
important advisory role in corporate strategic decisions. Through the provision of 
advice and social support to the CEO as well as counsel to the company, board of 
directors can enhance the strategic decision making process. Boards are anticipated 
to review and evaluate analyses and proposed changes in company strategies. By 
active involvement in the formulation and implementation steps, they contribute 
directly to better strategic decision making (Chen 2014). 
Through their experiences, competences and different viewpoints, board 
members are able to contribute to the boardroom debate. With a critical attitude and a 
willingness to ask the management penetrating questions allows board members to 
exert effective behavioural and strategic control (Huse 2005). Critical debate 
facilitates the exchange of diverse information which enhances decision quality. 
Consequently, this may lead the CEO to provide more detailed information and 
explanations on their conduct and decision-making as it may be perceived by the 
CEO as a signal of board power to better take into account shareholders’ interests 
(Chen 2014). Clearly, this contributes to better board monitoring performance. With 
frequent board meetings, competent directors are able to use their expertise in assist 
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management to make better decisions that are beneficial to both the company as well 
as shareholders.  
 
8.5 Method 
8.5.1 Data 
The sample of this study is taken from non-financial companies listed on the 
Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. This study spans from 2008 to 2013 which permits 
an investigation of CSR reporting trends in Malaysia. The company must have been 
continuously listed on Bursa Malaysia in each year of the six-year period as well as 
producing an annual report. There were 813 companies listed as at 31st December 
2013. However, only 613 companies met the criteria. Generally, companies in the 
finance sector are bound by different regulatory, disclosure requirements and 
material differences in their types of operation. Hence, they are not included (Mohd 
Ghazali 2007; Said et al. 2009; Haniffa & Cooke 2005). In this study, 136 finance 
companies were excluded from the sample along with 27 companies with incomplete 
data. 450 companies were finally included as demonstrated in Table 4.3. 
The study utilised the six annual reports for each company as the main source 
of information and is based on several justifications. First, the selection of annual 
reports follows prior studies (e.g. Chan et al. 2014; Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & 
Samad 2011; Haji 2013). Second, annual reports are alleged to be the main channel 
to communicate information to the public (Hasnah et al. 2006) including social and 
environmental reporting (Chan et al. 2014). Third, Gray et al. (2001) support the 
usage of the annual report because it is the central corporate document that outlines 
the organisation as a whole. Lastly, Othman and Ameer (2010) mention that 
disclosure is mainly made in annual reports due to its easy access apart from being 
credible. 
This study relies on panel data which provides multiple observations on each 
company in the sample. Panel data usually give the researcher a large number of data 
points, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity among 
explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2007). These advantages help to improve the efficiency 
of econometric estimates. Panel data according to Hsiao (2007), also allows to 
control for omitted (unobserved or mismeasured) variables. More importantly, panel 
data allows a researcher to analyse a number of important economic questions that 
cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or time-series data sets. Given these 
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advantages, this study uses panel data based on its ability to portray more reliable 
company CSR reporting trends (Sartawi et. al. 2014). 
 
8.5.2 Variable definitions 
8.5.2.1 Dependent variables 
In measuring the extent of CSR reporting, content analysis was applied in this 
study. Many earlier studies (e.g. Chan et al.2014; Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & 
Samad 2011; Haji 2013) opted this technique to investigate CSR reporting. Content 
analysis is a technique to measure objectively and systematically the content of 
communication (Naser et al. 2006). This technique changes information disclosed in 
annual report into scores using qualitative and quantitative methods (Djajadikerta & 
Trireksani 2012). 
A checklist of items was constructed by examining previous CSR reporting 
checklists (e.g. Hackston & Milne 1996; Barako & Brown 2008). Additionally, 
specific Malaysian checklists were also referenced (Abdullah et al. 2011; Haji 2013) 
and the framework introduced by Bursa Malaysia in 2006 was also referenced. The 
focus of the framework was fourfold: Environment, Community, Marketplace and 
Workplace. The content under each heading is left to management discretion. For the 
purpose of this study, a checklist of 22 items of CSR developed by Abdullah et al. 
(2011) has been made as the benchmark. This checklist was used to measure CSR 
reporting index of companies in Malaysia during 2007. Their checklist was an 
adoption of the work of Mohd Ghazali (2007) with some changes according to the 
checklists by Hackston and Milne (1996), Ng (1985). Additionally, the work of 
Mohamed Adnan (2012) and Chan et al. (2014) have also been considered. To ensure 
validity of the checklist, this study also followed the work of Kolk (2010). The final 
checklist containing 51 items is in Table 4.4.  
A dichotomous procedure is used to compute a disclosure score for each 
company.  Each disclosure item is assigned a score of “1” if it is disclosed and “0” if 
it is not disclosed.  This measurement would address the presence or absence of CSR 
information (Mohd Ghazali 2007) and has been widely used previously (e.g. Haji 
2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Rashid & Lodh 2008). The disclosure scores of each 
company were divided by the maximum possible score (i.e. 1 x 51= 51) to arrive at 
CSR index. This approach has been commonly applied by many scholars of this area. 
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                                                 CSRI  =  
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1  
CSRI = CSR reporting index; nj = number of items expected for jth company; Xij = 1 
if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed. 
 
8.5.2.2 Independent and control variables 
The independent variable in this study is the frequency of board meetings. 
Board meetings are often held at definite intervals to consider policy issues and 
major problems. Claimed to be a proxy for board diligence, it is a decisive dimension 
to improve the effectiveness of a board and the level of monitoring activity delivered 
(Laksmana 2008; Giannarakis 2014). Frequency of board meetings 
(BFREQUENCY) is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of board 
meetings held in a financial year. This follows Ntim and Osei (2013).  
Numerous studies have shown that CSR reporting is influenced by various 
governance attributes and company’s characteristics. Hence, to eliminate their impact 
on the level of reporting, this study considered board independence, board size, 
directors’ ownership, debt ratio, liquidity, company age, company size, profitability, 
company growth and market capitalisation as control variables. Board independence 
refers to independent directors who have no affiliation with the company except for 
their directorship (Bursa Malaysia 2006). As such, they have important impact on 
monitoring activities (Fama & Jensen 1983a). Board independence (BIND) is 
defined as the number of independent directors on the board relative to the total 
number of directors which is consistent with Arora and Dharwadkar (2011), Harjoto 
and Jo (2008) and Das et al. (2015). Board size refers to the number of directors to 
make up the board (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Jizi et al. 2014). Board size (BSIZE) 
is defined as the natural logarithm of total number of directors as used by Rashid 
(2013). Allegedly, directors’ ownership determines their willingness to monitor 
managers and enhance shareholders’ value (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). It motivates 
directors to do their monitoring job effectively. Directors’ ownership (DIROWN) is 
expressed as the ratio of total director shareholdings to total number of shares. This is 
consistent with Bathala and Rao (1995) and Rashid (2013). There are mixed results 
pertaining to leverage in relation to CSR reporting. On the one hand, Barnea and 
Rubin (2010) believed that companies with high debt levels are expected to incur 
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high monitoring costs and suggests a negative relationship between leverage and 
CSR disclosure. Alternatively, they disclose more information to reduce the costs 
(Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012) and to meet the needs of their lenders (Abdullah et al. 
2011). Following Rahman et al. (2011), leverage (DR) was measured by the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets.  
Liquidity has been proven to be positively related to both financial and non-
financial disclosure (Ho & Taylor 2007). They suggest companies that are highly 
liquid have stronger incentives to communicate more information to the public as 
compared to companies with lower liquidity. Company liquidity (LIQ) is measured 
as current ratio (Ho & Taylor 2007; Rashid 2013, 2014). Company age (AGE) was 
represented by the number of years it has been listed on Bursa Malaysia, expressed in 
natural logarithm (Rashid, 2009). The level of CSR reporting escalates as company 
age increases. Khan et al. (2013) point out that a more mature company is likely to 
report more on CSR activities due to its reputational apprehension. Meanwhile, many 
researchers are in agreement that both company size and the extent of disclosures 
made for information users are closely linked. Among others, studies by Cormier et 
al.(2011) and Lu and Abeysekera (2014) confirmed that size is one of the major 
factors determining CSR reporting. Availability of money and expertise in large 
companies enables them to engage in more activities (including CSR activities), 
produce more information on these activities and their implications, and bear the cost 
of such processes (Andrew et al. 1989). This study employed the natural logarithm of 
total assets as the proxy for company size (SIZE) consistent with Das et al. (2015), 
Sartawi et al. (2014) and Rashid (2014). 
CSR practices are also associated with profitability. Highly profitable 
companies have the ability to bear the CSR costs, hence disseminate more 
information to the stakeholders. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Khan (2010) confirm 
the importance of profitability when reporting social information is concerned. 
Profitability is proxied by Return on Assets (ROA) following Rashid (2014) and 
Sartawi et al. (2014). When companies grow rapidly they tend to seek outside 
financing. This creates an obligation to the companies to provide better disclosure to 
fulfil the financial provider’s demand (Naser et al. 2006). Alongside, growth 
companies are also believed to have greater information asymmetry and agency costs 
(Eng & Mak 2003). To reduce those problems, companies are expected to disclose 
more information. Following Rashid (2013), company growth (GROWTH) is 
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expressed as percentage of annual change in sales. Market capitalisation (CAP) is 
expressed in its natural logarithm. It generally represents companies’ importance 
(Wallace & Naser 1996). Given that view, companies that are highly capitalised 
usually opt for higher CSR disclosure in an attempt to minimise public pressure 
expecting them to be socially responsible and the possibility of facing greater 
regulation (Watts & Zimmerman 1990). 
 
8.5.3 The Model 
The model is estimated based on an Ordinary Least Square regression 
technique to examine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and 
the extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs: 
 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1BFREQUENCYi,t + 2BINDi,t + 3BSIZEi,t + 4DIROWNi,t +  
5DRi,t +6LIQi,t+7AGEi,t   +8SIZEi,t +9ROAi,t  + 10GROWTHi,t
+ 11CAPi,t+i,t 
 
Where CSRIi,t  is CSR index for ith company at time t. BFREQUENCYi,t is 
the natural logarithm of number of board meetings throughout the financial year for 
ith company at time t. BINDi,t  is number of independence director to total number of 
directors for ith company at time t.  BSIZEi,t is the total number of directors for ith 
company at time t. DIROWNi,t is percentage of director ownership for ith company 
at time t. DRi,t is debt ratio for ith company at time t. LIQi,t is liquidity ratio for ith 
company at time t. AGEi,t  is number of listed years on Bursa Malaysia for ith 
company at time t.  SIZEi,t is natural logarithm of total assets for ith company at time 
t.  ROAi,t  is profitability for ith company at time t. GROWTHi,t is the company 
growth in sales for ith company at time t.  CAPi,t is the market capitalisation for ith 
company at time t. α is the intercept, is the regression coefficient and   is the error 
term. 
Prior to analyses, various data testing were conducted such as tests of the 
normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeniety. To perform 
regression analyses, the means across samples must be normally distributed. 
Nevertheless, when sample is more than 30 (Pallant 2007), fulfilling this assumption 
is unnecessary. Nevertheless, based on Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test, 
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data conformed to the assumption. On the word of Gujarati (2003), when the 
correlation is greater than 0.80, multicollinearity exists. The correlation matrix 
presented in Table 8.1 demonstrates the highest correlation is 0.839 between 
company size and market capitalisation; suggestive of multicollinearity problem. To 
reconfirm the problem, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent 
variable was measured. A VIF value exceeding 10 indicates multicollinearity 
(Gujarati 2003). Nevertheless, the VIF values fall below 10, proving the absence of 
multicollinearity problem. 
Examination of homoscedasticity assumption in any regression model is 
imperative. A constant error across all values of the independent variables points to 
homoscedasticity. Alternatively, variation in size of the error term causes 
heteroscedasticity, resulting to the standard estimation methods to be inefficient. To 
check whether or not homoscedasticity assumption is violated, the scatter plot of the 
residuals (ZRESID) against the predicted value (ZPRED) of the model is examined. 
A classic cone-shape pattern indicates heteroscedasticity. Further, the Breusch-Pagan 
test was conducted and the chi-square and corresponding p values also demonstrated 
heteroscedasticity. To correct it, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of the 
White (1980)'s method were applied. When there is correlation between independent 
variables and the error terms, endogeniety occurs. This causes biasness in the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression coefficients. To overcome this problem, 
Instrumental Variable regression can be employed. The F-test for the predicted value 
of board meeting in this model turns out to be insignificant. Following Rashid 
(2014), when the CSR index was used as a proxy for CSR reporting, F = 10.75 with 
p = 0.0011. The results showed that: (1) endogeniety is not an issue; and (2) OLS and 
Instrumental Variable regression are consistent.  
 
8.6 Results 
The descriptive statistics of CSR reporting and the independent variables are 
displayed in Table 8.2. The average CSR reporting level among PLC is 21.7%.  This 
indicates that the CSR reporting level in Malaysia remains moderately low (Lu & 
Castka 2009; Ramasamy & Ting 2004) even though there are continuous efforts by 
regulators to promote CSR. There is a huge difference between the highest and the 
lowest level of reporting; suggesting that CSR practices in Malaysia are generally 
lacking. Culture is also an issue when explaining CSR reporting. By and large, 
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transparency and reporting are uncommon practices in Asia (Aaijaz & Ibrahim 
2012). 
 
Table 8.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
     
CSRI 0.2167 0.1961 0.0392 0.7255 0.1198 
BFREQUENCY 5.1018 4.9530 2.0138 27.1126 1.3442 
BIND 0.4519 0.4300 0.1700 1.0000 0.1281 
BSIZE 7.2360 6.6859 3.0042 18.1741 1.2960 
DIROWN 0.0438 0.0030 0.0000 0.5680 0.0879 
DR 0.3956 0.3775 0.0030 5.1030 0.2458 
LIQ 2.2001 1.7845 0.0070 10.3760 1.6831 
AGE 13.9782 15.0293 6.0000 52.9845 1.6403 
SIZE (log TA) 12.8784 12.6500 9.3690 18.4110 1.4467 
ROA 0.06192 0.0580 -2.8980 5.5470 0.1782 
GROWTH 0.0533 0.0265 -4.9410 8.5780 0.4777 
CAP (log CAP) 18.7976 18.5030 12.3710 24.8100 1.8112 
 
The mean of board meeting frequency reveals that companies conduct 
approximately 5 meetings per year and a maximum of 27 meetings. The mean result 
is much lower compared to studies by Jallow and Al-Najjar (2012) (7 meetings), 
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) and Saiful et al. (2007) (8 meetings) and Boyle and Ji 
(2013) (11 times). It is hypothesised that more board meetings reflect better 
monitoring by directors. As for board independence, on average, the board comprises 
45.2% of independent directors. Although Amran et al. (2010)'s study of Malaysian 
PLCs recorded an average of 63% independent directors, the result of this study still 
indicate that PLCs in Malaysia are consistent with the MCCG recommendation of 
having a board with at least one third independent directors. Companies have an 
average board size of 7 directors, assuming that a moderately large size of board is 
preferable. Again, this finding is comparable to the study of Amran et al. (2010). 
Ownership by directors is surprisingly low with an average of 4.4% of shares owned 
by directors and large ownership by directors is evident only in certain companies.  
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          Table 8.1 Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1 BFREQUENCY 1.000           1.105 
2 BIND 0.098** 1.000          1.280 
3 BSIZE 0.098** -0.414** 1.000         1.405 
4 DIROWN -0.018 0.057** -0.089** 1.000        1.056 
5 DR 0.170** 0.044* 0.029 -0.038* 1.000       1.511 
6 LIQ -0.063** 0.009 -0.025 -0.007 -0.508** 1.000      1.369 
7 AGE 0.047* 0.151** -0.011 -0.177** 0.014 -0.018 1.000     1.202 
8 SIZE 0.236** -0.053** 0.339** -0.181** 0.148** -0.101** 0.337** 1.000    4.414 
9 ROA -0.047* -0.009 0.084** -0.073** -0.207** 0.107** 0.051** 0.111** 1.000   1.084 
10 GROWTH -0.037 -0.029 0.025 -0.009 0.048* -0.029 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.000  1.013 
11 CAP 0.174** -0.063** 0.321** -0.156** -0.067** 0.066** 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.000 4.013 
  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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The adjusted R2 value as presented in Panel A of Table 8.3 indicates that the 
disparity in the extent of CSR reporting explainable by the independent variables is 
37.6%. It was expected that a positive relationship between frequency of board 
meeting and the extent of CSR reporting exists. Although the result in Panel A shows 
that frequency is positively related to the level of CSR, it is not significant. This 
result is consistent with Haji (2013) also in Malaysia. Opportunities for independent 
directors to exercise meaningful control over management are impaired when 
meeting agendas have been pre-set by CEOs (Jensen 1993). 
 
Table 8.3 Relationship between board meeting frequency and CSR reporting 
 
  
                 Dependent variables 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  (Before controlling for  (After controlling for  
  industry) industry) 
  CSRI CSRI 
Intercept -0.547 -0.559 
  (-19.234)*** (-17.277)*** 
BFREQUENCY -0.002 -0.007 
  (-0.296) (-1.073) 
BIND 0.033 0.021 
  (1.873)* -1.247 
BSIZE 0.042 0.029 
  (4.570)*** (3.269)*** 
DIROWN -0.044 -0.019 
  (-1.866)* (-0.820) 
DR 0.013 0.02 
  -1.311 (1.989)* 
LIQ -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.548) (-0.292) 
AGE 0.022 0.026 
  (4.636)*** (5.371)*** 
SIZE 0.026 0.035 
  (9.026)*** (12.113)*** 
ROA 0.061 0.048 
  (5.571)*** (4.574)*** 
GROWTH -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.281) (-0.289) 
CAP 0.015 0.001 
  (6.620)*** (4.014)*** 
  
 
  
F statistic 122.667 34.752 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.461 
The t tests are presented in the parentheses * p< 0.10; ** p< 0.010; *** p< 0.001 
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 The control variables: board independence, board size, ownership by 
directors, company liquidity, age, size, ROA and market capitalisation are found to 
be significantly related to CSR reporting. Independent directors have the ability to 
effectively monitor management due to its independence from the board. This 
reduces the opportunist behaviour of top management, thus increases the level of 
disclosure. The finding reinforces Barako and Brown (2008) and Rashid and Lodh 
(2008). Generally, companies with moderately large boards benefit from board 
diversity. This in turn results in better involvement in CSR activities and increased 
reporting supporting Esa and Mohd Ghazali (2012), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) 
and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009). While directors’ ownership significantly affect CSR 
reporting, it actually reduces the reporting level thus matches the argument of this 
study. This result however contradicts Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and 
Abdullah (2004) besides inconsistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976)'s claim that 
director ownership helps to harmonise the interests of directors and shareholders. As 
predicted, mature companies tend to disclose more CSR information to demonstrate 
their already high reputations. Larger companies have the ability to report more CSR 
activities since the costs of disclosures are funded by profits Brammer and Pavelin 
(2008). Profitable companies are able to absorb the associated costs of disclosing 
more information to stakeholders. Companies with high market capitalisation are 
likely to produce high levels of CSR reporting; conceivably as part of their image 
building exercise.  
Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994) mentioned that different industries may 
provide a different disclosure levels because of the unique characteristics of each 
industry. Earlier studies have confirmed a significant systematic disparity across 
industries concerning their inclination to make CSR reporting (Gamerschlag et al. 
2011; Brammer & Pavelin 2008; Giannarakis 2014). Companies with high consumer 
visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated intense competition disclose 
significantly more CSR information in their annual reports (Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Mohd Ghazali 2007). Following this, it is imperative to control for the effect of 
industry on reporting activities as the sample in this study constitutes of companies 
from multiple industries. Hence, the model was altered by adding INDUSTRY 
dummies. This study uses a two-digit industrial classification (SIC) codes to classify 
the companies. To further test the robustness of the results, the model has also been 
controlled for year effect through the addition of YEAR dummies.  
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The augmented regression model is: 
 
CSRIi,t  = α + 1FREQUENCYi,t  + 2BINDi,t + 3BSIZEi,t + 4DIROWNi,t 
                        + 5DRi,t + 6LIQi,t +7AGEi,t   +8SIZEi,t +9ROAi,t  +  10GROWTHi,  
                        +  11CAPi,t  +  ΩYEAR  + yINDUSTRY + i,t 
 
 There are some slight changes to the results when industry and year are 
controlled as shown in Panel B of Table 8.3. Independent directors have become 
insignificant; supporting Haji (2013) and Shamil et al. (2014). This result implies 
that the effectiveness of independent directors in increasing the level of CSR 
reporting might be hampered, plausibly due to lack of knowledge and experience in 
relation to the type of industry. Correspondingly directors’ ownership has become 
insignificant. Leverage has become significant with the inclusion of industry and 
year. This indicates that in certain industries, companies with high leverage tend to 
disclose more CSR information. Companies may gain their creditors’ confidence by 
attempting to provide more information (Abdullah et al. 2011). At the same time, Esa 
and Mohd Ghazali (2012) postulate that extensive information may help in reducing 
cost of capital. Nevertheless, board meeting remains to be negatively correlated to 
CSR reporting and insignificant. While board meeting remains insignificant, its 
coefficient has changed from positive to negative. This implies that too many board 
meetings can impair a company’s level of reporting. Companies might opt for more 
board meeting at the sacrifice of better levels of reporting. This finding is consistent 
to Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2013) and Vafeas (1999).  
 
8.7 Conclusions 
This chapter examined whether the frequency of board meetings is a primary 
determinant of company CSR reporting. 450 listed Malaysian companies were 
sampled. Inconsistent with expectations, the OLS model reveals that board meeting 
frequency does not influence firm CSR reporting. These results suggest that 
company’s level of CSR reporting remains indifferent to the number of board 
meetings held. The results seem to repudiate the common belief that resource-rich 
board of directors contributes to higher levels of reporting. 
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Although board meeting frequency is assumed to be the platform to protect 
shareholders’ interests, it has not been well demonstrated in the Malaysian context. 
Vafeas (1999) suggested that board meetings should be reactive, rather than 
proactive measures. Companies need to consider how board meetings are to be used. 
Higher frequency may indicate that the company requires many board meetings to 
resolve its problems. Frequency of board meetings is seen as only a rough estimation 
of board activity as it does not indicate the work accomplished during the meeting 
(Menon & Williams 1994). Board meeting frequency may also be associated 
insignificantly with the size of the board. Larger board size are correlated with longer 
meeting times (Vafeas 1999). Hence, more board meetings does not necessarily 
mean more decisions being taken. Further, Malaysia is known for its family-owned 
companies. It is very common to see the same individuals serving as managers and 
board of directors. This results in conflicts and inefficiencies in making strategic 
decision during board meeting.  
This chapter attempted to relate frequency of board meetings with resource 
dependence theory. In general, companies may not have all the skills and expertise 
needed to operate effectively and continuously in an ever-changing environment. To 
accommodate the shortfall, the focus shifted to the board of directors. Apart from 
bringing expertise from various fields, directors bring along business contacts and 
networks which may be relevant especially for start-ups and high-growth companies. 
Theoretically, board of directors should be a set of experienced, engaged and helpful 
advisors who can assist the management to focus strategically on the business. 
Ideally, board meetings should be a place and time for the directors to provide the 
most help and assistance they can. Yet, based on the grounds stated above, directors 
have failed to channel their expertise and network effectively through board 
meetings. Evidently, the finding of this study does not lend support to resource 
dependence theory. In closing, the result in this study suggest that frequent board 
meeting fails to provide stakeholders with better CSR information. 
Inevitably, embracing good corporate governance and upholding it is vital for 
a company’s survival. Broadly, higher board meeting frequency is synonymous with 
increasing board monitoring function. Yet, the results here suggest otherwise. 
Companies might want to revise their corporate conduct especially pertaining to 
board meeting frequency. If the impetus behind increased frequency were simply the 
need to comply with regulation and the fear of shareholders litigation, it is likely that 
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increases in frequency will impact negatively on a company’s value. Perhaps it is 
better for the company to keep the meeting frequency moderately low but not 
compromising board effectiveness. The result also signal the need for the authorities 
to be more stringent in monitoring company’s compliance with the corporate 
governance code. It is vital in strengthening the reliability and confidence of the 
shareholders towards the role of board of directors. 
The generalisability of the findings is subject to several limitations. Analysis 
of annual reports is not free from subjective influences. This might reduce the 
reliability of the results. Alternatively, future studies may attempt to adopt 
approaches such as surveys or interviews in order to reduce subjectivity of the annual 
report disclosure analysis. Besides, interviewing board members will provide further 
insights on the effects of board characteristics on CSR reporting. Relying on annual 
reports only might be insufficient although it is regarded as the primary source of 
information for stakeholders (Tilt 2001). Therefore, examining other corporate 
information channels is highly recommended. Future research may also consider 
investigating other board attributes such as foreign directors, influential community 
members, CEO duality and ownership structure in relation to CSR reporting. While 
these governance attributes may have significant impact on company reporting 
behaviour, they were not included in this study due to word restraint. It is also worth 
investigating the board meeting process in determining its quality. Board meeting 
that is run efficiently helps to enhance board effectiveness (Saiful et al. 2007). In 
return, companies are able to demonstrate better performance. In addition, with the 
increasing importance of CSR reporting, it is essential to ensure that CSR reports are 
sufficient enough to meet stakeholders’ information needs and subsequently help 
them hold companies to account. One way of doing it is by obtaining their 
perspectives on the issue. While this information may inform the future development 
of CSR reporting practices, O’Dwyer, Unerman and Hession (2005) mentioned that 
views of non-managerial stakeholders are largely absent. Hence, future studies may 
want to carry out surveys on various stakeholders to examine the adequacy of CSR 
reporting.  
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CHAPTER 9: CORPORATE BOARD DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) REPORTING 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the impact of board diversity on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) reporting by companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. Inevitably, 
the issue of board diversity has been under the spotlight in most countries. Many 
scholars agree that diversity contributes to board effectiveness. Besides widening 
external networks, a diverse board may reach better decisions with the help of 
directors having various backgrounds, skills and experience. Despite its increasing 
importance, gender diversity has not been proven to drive companies towards better 
CSR reporting. While the presence of small number of female directors attests to the 
inability to influence a male dominated board, the effectiveness of directors who are 
financial experts is found to be industry specific. These results are associated with 
the prevalence of family-owned companies in Malaysia. Collectively, this chapter 
requires regulators and policymakers to be more stringent in monitoring company’s 
conforming towards more diversified boards. 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Board diversity or corporate boards with increased female director 
representation is gaining attention around the world. There is a growing 
understanding that a demographically diverse board is capable of addressing the 
concerns of diverse stakeholders (Buchholtz & Carroll 2012). Board diversity is 
generally defined as the various attributes that may be represented among directors in 
relation to board decision-making (Ingley & Van der Walt 2003). These attributes 
include those that are directly observable (age, gender, ethnicity, and nationality) and 
those that are less visible (religion, education and occupation) (Mahadeo, 
Soobaroyen & Hanuman 2012). The aim of making the board less homogenous is to 
cultivate a broad spectrum of demographic attributes and characteristics, 
consequently breaking down a tendency towards “group think”. Diversity in board 
composition inevitably creates breadth of perspective among directors, subsequently 
drives towards board’s effectiveness through the likelihood of reaching a holistic 
solution, and hopefully assisting in better company performance. Board members 
with various experience, expertise and reputation are a source of competitive 
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advantage to the company. Alternatively, companies that have a homogenous board 
of directors may display low performance because they lack a broad portfolio of 
skills and expertise. For instance, in the absence of female directors, a male-
dominated board may have few connections with female stakeholders (Ali, Ng & 
Kulik 2014). Various laws have been enforced to promote boardroom diversity. 
Attempts to increase women representation in boardrooms are evident in Norway, 
France, and Spain and mandated to be at least 40%, Belgium 33%, and Malaysia 
30% (Ali et al. 2014). These initiatives are driven by the desire to achieve gender 
equality.  
Proponents of board diversity argue that it produces a greater range of 
perspectives and potential solutions to problems; although it may initially present 
more conflicts in the decision-making process. Healthy debate can lead to better 
decisions. This would mean “group think” is avoidable (Ferreira 2010). Diversity can 
also foster creativity by acquiring information through a more diverse set of sources. 
Directors with financial industry experience, for instance, can help companies gain 
access to specific investors. Greater board diversity leads to closer monitoring of 
management decision making pertaining to social performance. Through enhanced 
supervising process, it helps to ensure that multiple stakeholder interests are 
represented in corporate governance (Kang, Cheng & Gray 2007). Board 
demographic diversity may also improve strategic decision making involving social 
issues (Zhang 2012).Further to that, board with diverse backgrounds tend to ask 
questions that might not be asked by directors with homogeneous backgrounds. This 
differentiation increases board independence (Carter, Simkins & Simpson 2003). As 
a multiplying effect, company levels of disclosure can be improved (Rao et al. 2012). 
Finally, diversity may promote more effective global relationships. Cultural 
sensitivity is critical in an international environment and ethno-cultural diversity 
makes corporate leaders more sensitive to other cultures (Wang & Clift 2009). On 
the contrary, demographic dissimilarity may limit communication among subgroups, 
create conflict, and reduce interpersonal attraction and group cohesiveness. When 
executives perceive demographically dissimilar directors as sharing different values 
and adopting dissimilar views, they are reluctant to share information with them 
(Adams & Ferreira 2007). This could compromise board effectiveness. In addition, 
the various opinions and many critical evaluations resulted from diverse boards 
might consume much time. This flaw might lead to ineffectiveness, especially if the 
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company is operating in a highly competitive environment where the ability to react 
quickly to market shocks is very important (Ujunwa et al. 2012). 
While the importance of board diversity has been recognised, there is limited 
evidence on the influence of diversely-comprised boards on management decision 
making. Within the CSR disclosure framework, boards play a very important role. 
They decide the entrepreneurial strategy, including CSR policies and reporting 
(Kakabadse 2007). There is a considerable literature that shows the potential 
influence a diverse board has on a company’s financial performance though less is 
known if this influences non-financial aspects like CSR. The empirical research on 
board diversity has been mostly done in the context of developed countries, such as 
the U.S. (Hillman, Cannella & Harris 2002; Gul, Srinidhi & Ng 2011), the U.K. 
(Conyon & Mallin 1997; Brammer, Millington & Pavelin 2007) and Australia (Kang 
et al. 2007). It is also worth noting that the findings differ contextually. Evidently, 
developed and developing countries differ in their regulatory, cultural, economic 
environments, size of capital markets and effectiveness of governance mechanism 
(Kang et al. 2007; Zainal, Zulkifli & Saleh 2013a). While it is essential to conduct a 
debate on gender diversity, other aspects of diversity such as skills, experience and 
ideas should also be considered as they are equally important (Adams 2015). 
Furthermore, the revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) (2007) 
proposes that the nominating committee must consider skills, knowledge, expertise 
and experience of a board candidature for appointment. The Corporate Governance 
Blueprint 2011 emphasises the need for the board to ensure it has the right mix of 
members with appropriate skills and experience to cope with business complexities, 
competition and changes. In response to the aforementioned reasons, this study aims 
to examine the association between board diversity, specifically gender and 
educational background, and CSR reporting, of Malaysian public listed companies 
(PLCs). 
This chapter will contribute to the limited literature on board diversity in 
developing countries generally and in Malaysia, particularly. In addition, this study 
also includes board education specifically financial and law expertise following 
Adams (2015). With sparse evidence on these specific variables, the findings may 
assist government and regulators in refining existing rules. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 reviews 
earlier studies. Section 9.3 explains board diversity in Malaysia. Section 9.4 outlines 
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the theoretical framework and hypotheses to be studied. Section 9.5 describes the 
research methods. Section 9.6 presents the results and discussions. Section 9.7 
concludes the paper. 
 
9.2 Literature Review 
9.2.1 Gender diversity 
Boardroom diversity debate generally exhibits gender as the central issue 
(Adams 2015). The advantages of having female directors have been regularly 
demonstrated. Adams and Ferreira (2009) using a sample of U.S. companies, 
associated companies with female directors to be bigger in size, have larger boards, 
have more business segment and lower stock return volatility. Nielsen and Huse 
(2010) identify that women board members can reduce the level of conflict and 
ensure high quality board development activities. Both studies report better company 
performance in terms of return on assets (ROA).  
Gender is the main demographic variable used to explain CSR attitudes. The 
literature has shown that women usually have a higher perception of risks and have 
been socialized to care for the needs of others, representing these qualities that 
encompass CSR (Ciocirlan & Pettersson 2012). Women are more risk averse and 
more ethical than men (Liu, Wei & Xie 2014). Studies have also found that women 
are more comfortable with community activities, while men are more comfortable 
with profitable activities (Betz et al. 2013). Thus, the presence of women on board 
increases welfare activity, and more likely to report their activities to the public. 
Theoretically, women have different knowledge and values when it comes to 
contextual issues. Ciocirlan and Pettersson (2012) discovered the presence of women 
impact positively on company’s climate change commitment. Similarly, utilising a 
sample of Fortune 500 companies, Bernardi and Threadgill (2011) found evidence 
that companies with a higher proportion of women board members are more socially 
responsible. Dienes and Velte (2016) indicate a positive relationship between female 
directors and CSR reporting in German companies. Also, Liao, Luo and Tang 
(2015), Frias‐Aceituno et al. (2013), Fernandez‐Feijoo, Romero and Ruiz‐Blanco 
(2014) and Rao et al. (2012) found increased female board representation has a 
positive influence on the quality of CSR reporting. Furthermore, Zhang, Zhu and 
Ding (2013) estimated that female directors are linked to better CSR performance. 
Harjoto, Laksmana and Lee (2015) report gender diversity is positively associated 
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with CSR activities, increasing CSR strengths and reducing CSR concerns. Gupta et 
al. (2014) believe that boards with higher gender and racial diversity adopt 
stakeholder views instead of purely shareholders opinions. For this reason, they 
perform better on social, environmental and governance dimensions but not on 
financial dimensions. Positive association between female directors and CSR has 
also been reported recently by Sundarasen et al. (2016). Gender diversity has also 
been associated with critical mass of three concept. When women are outnumbered 
by men, they are not likely to bring any benefits to the company due to their limited 
power (Konrad, Kramer & Erkut 2008). Bear et al. (2010) associate higher CSR 
strength ratings with more women on board. Likewise, Fernandez‐Feijoo et al. 
(2014) on their 22 cross country study demonstrate that more and better CSR reports 
are produced by companies with high numbers of women on the board. 
 
9.2.2 Financial expertise 
Education, to a certain degree, may shape a person’s values, cognitive 
preferences, knowledge and skill base. Yusoff (2010) showed that relevant 
knowledge and educational qualifications are integral components of the 
effectiveness of Malaysian PLC boards. There is a significant relationship between 
level of education and expressed environmental attitudes and concern. Education aids 
in increasing environmental concern and awareness because it can increase an 
individual’s ability to appreciate complex and integrative large scale problems. 
Cooke and Wallace (1990, p. 84) posit that “an increase in the level of education in a 
country may increase political awareness and demand for corporate accountability”. 
Therefore, if a board of directors consists of individuals having an academic 
background in accounting and business, they may choose to disclose more 
information to demonstrate accountability, improve the company’s image as well as 
add credibility to the management team (Haniffa & Cooke 2002). Dienes and Velte 
(2016) further argue that it is impossible for board members without sufficient 
financial expertise to give advice to other board members. Both studies demonstrated 
that board members with financial expertise were indifferent to CSR reporting; 
confirmed by Jizi et al. (2014). These findings imply that having financial expertise 
alone is insufficient to have an effect on CSR reporting. Meanwhile, Yusoff and 
Armstrong (2012) examined Malaysian board competencies and company 
performance and revealed that financial expertise was the most highly valued 
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competency for Malaysian companies. Further, they found that accounting expertise 
impacts positively on company performance.  
 
9.2.3 Legal expertise 
Primarily, lawyers are trained to protect their clients’ interests and socialised 
to behave conservatively and minimise risk. Therefore, it is not surprising to find 
individuals with a legal education exhibit decision making patterns that are distinct to 
those without legal educations (Lewis et al. 2014). Investors prioritise excellent 
corporate governance. Despite their obsessiveness towards risk, directors possessing 
legal education are presumed to be more accountable to protect shareholders’ 
interests (Yusoff & Armstrong 2012). Lawyers are believed to be capable of 
assessing environmental opportunities through their reasoning skills besides being 
well-informed of stakeholder impacts of environmental actions (de Villiers et al. 
2011). As such, their advice is a source for promoting sound environmental policy 
(Kassinis & Vafeas 2002). de Villiers et al. (2011) demonstrate a higher 
environmental performance when there are legal experts among the board members. 
In their quest to determine whether human capital affects environmental reporting, 
Said et al. (2013) studied a sample of 120 Malaysian listed companies in 2009. They 
revealed that CEOs with law backgrounds are more prone to disclose environmental 
information. Conversely, a study of CEOs of U.S. companies during 2002 to 2005 by 
Lewis et al. (2014) showed that CEO with a legal degree prefer not to disclose the 
company’s environmental performance. Informing others about company’s 
performance on the environment might pose a threat to the company.  
To summarise, studies on board diversity have shown inconclusive results. 
On the one hand, having a diverse board can improve board effectiveness through 
increased decision-making capacity; hence better reported CSR information. On the 
other hand, diversity can create conflicting ideas which in turn might affect board 
performance negatively. Thus, its overall effect on CSR reporting remains a 
debatable issue. It is also notable that the impact of board diversity varies across 
countries. Unfortunately, board diversity studies in developing countries especially in 
relation to CSR reporting have received comparatively less attention. As such, a 
research gap clearly exists. 
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9.3 Board diversity in Malaysia 
Malaysia has a population of 30 million (MWFCD 2014). Women constitute 
48% of the Malaysian population and 52% of the total workforce (MWFCD 2014). 
However, they are severely under-represented on corporate boards. Achieving gender 
equality is crucial as it is one of the agendas in Vision 2020. As noted by the Prime 
Minister’s Department:  
“At the crux of the matter, Malaysia will not be able to achieve its ambitions to 
emerge as a developed nation by 2020 if we are not able to fully unlock the potential 
of half our population – that is, our talent pool of women. Whether we succeed in 
optimising on our women talent will, in large, depend on Corporate Malaysia.” 
In view of the problem, in 2004, the Government of Malaysia announced its 
policy to have at least 30% participation of women at decision making positions in 
the public sector. There has been a sharp increase of the number of women as 
decision makers in public sectors from 18.8% initially to 32.5% in 2014 (MWFCD 
2014). The government has decided to extend the policy to the private sector, 
specifically public listed companies and government linked companies. Malaysia has 
lagged behind its Asian counterparts in terms of female board directors. In The Korn 
Ferry International 2010 Asian Diversity Study, Malaysia was in fourth place (7.8%) 
after Australia (11.2%), Hong Kong (8.6%) and China (8.1%). In June 2011, the 
Malaysian government established a goal of 30% female board membership by 2016. 
The determination to see more women as decision makers has in some way driven 
MCCG to include in its 2012 revision a requirement that a board needs to have a 
formal policy on boardroom diversity. This is to confirm that women candidates are 
sought as part of its recruitment exercise. Further, public listed companies are also 
obliged to disclose in their annual report its policies on gender diversity and means to 
realize those goals. Despite these initiatives by 2014 there was a slight increase to 
10.2%. In 2015, Talent Corp and PwC estimated it at 13%. Although the progress 
seems promising, it is still far from reaching the 30% target by 2016. Amran (2011) 
attributes the slow pace to women’s commitment to their families and their 
preference not to work long hours. Meanwhile, being a multiracial country, 
divergence in cultural values (Haniffa & Cooke 2005) might hinder the effort. 
Religions such as Islam and Confucius have shaped the Malaysian attitude towards 
gender diversity (Abdullah 2014). Nevertheless, despite those challenges, various 
initiatives have been undertaken to increase the number of women. One of them 
Chapter 9: Corporate board diversity and CSR reporting 
 
210 
 
called “Women Directors’ Programme” which was launched in 2012. Up to May 
2014, 128 women have been successfully placed on various PLCs boards (MWFCD 
2014).  
 
9.4 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
9.4.1 Resource dependence theory 
Earlier studies have utilised resource dependence theory when discussing 
board diversity (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Ali et al. 2014; Gupta et al. 2014). 
Introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) the theory states that a company’s 
performance is linked to the opportunities that are available to it to access resources. 
External pressures, such as competition, regulation and social forces, cause 
companies to seek out environmental linkages to acquire access to or control over 
resources (Boyd 1990). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) claim that a board of directors 
serves as an environmental linkage that helps link the company with its external 
resources. The board develops connections with external stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, 
consumers), helps engage talent from the labour market and makes strategic 
decisions. In view of the important functions the board serves, it is essential for the 
company to have a diverse board. Board diversity may benefit the board’s decision 
making process. A board needs to draw upon a range of experiences in understanding 
opportunities, anticipating challenges and assessing risks. When facing with 
constituencies that are globalizing, the accelerating effects of technology and risk 
presents itself in new ways, it is essential to have multiple views on the possible 
outcomes of an action (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 2000). Conceivably, male and 
female directors vary in aspects like skills, knowledge and perspectives. Hence, 
integration of these aspects results to broader range of information thus higher 
quality decisions (Ali et al. 2014) including the intensity of company’s reporting.  
Board diversity assists in establishing connections with important external 
stakeholders, such as suppliers and consumers. Companies may reduce uncertainties 
and dependencies if they capitalize on the full range of connections delivered by a 
diverse board (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Companies with diverse boards have the 
advantage of accessing critical resources from various suppliers and in turn, develop 
products valued by diverse consumer groups (Ali et al. 2014). A diverse board also 
helps to attract and retain diverse talents (Stephenson 2004). These talents may 
contribute to better organizational performance and help the organization to achieve 
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a sustained competitive advantage. Clearly, diversity may be a source of competitive 
advantage due to its ability to enrich the board’s knowledge base, creativity and 
innovation (Sartawi et al. 2014), which in turn contributes to a company’s success. 
Generally, women and men appear to differ in values when it comes to social 
responsibility.  Many studies provide support for the claim that women are more 
likely than men to identify situations requiring ethical judgment and to behave 
ethically (Albaum & Peterson 2006) as well as to support the enforcement of 
environmental accountability standards (Shafer, Fukukawa & Lee 2007). Barako and 
Brown (2008), Bear et al. (2010) and Zhang (2012) found a positive link between 
boards with female directors and CSR disclosures. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) 
found no relationship between gender diversity and CSR disclosures. Similarly, Post 
et al.(2011) showed that having three or more women board members is insignificant 
to social and environmental disclosures. Based on the above arguments and empirical 
findings, the first hypothesis is that: 
 
H1: Gender diversity affects company CSR reporting 
 
Education levels of board members can be an effective mechanism in 
establishing a link with external companies and individuals. Pfeffer (1972) asserts 
that directors with a financial background as well as law background have the ability 
to create connections with the external environment. The presence of directors who 
have financial expertise assures potential investors and creditors (Jeanjean & 
Stolowy 2009). Although Lewis et al. (2014) showed that the conservatism of 
directors with law backgrounds resulted in them disclosing less environmental 
information. However, Said et al. (2013) and Shukeri, Shin and Shaari (2012) 
showed otherwise. Dienes and Velte (2016) failed to relate directors’ expertise with 
CSR reporting. While empirical studies relating directors’ educational background 
and CSR reporting are relatively scarce, it is justifiable that educational background 
has some effect on the level of CSR reporting. The second hypotheses are that: 
 
H2a: Directors who have financial expertise affect company CSR reporting 
H2b: Directors who have law expertise affect company CSR reporting 
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9.5 Method 
9.5.1 Data 
The study sample comprised non-financial companies listed on the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia from 2008 until 2013. Out of 813 companies listed at 31st 
December 2013, only 613 companies have completely lodged their annual reports 
over the six year period. Also, finance companies were omitted given that they are 
subject to different regulatory and disclosure requirements. This is established 
practice, see Mohd Ghazali (2007), Said et al. (2009), Haniffa and Cooke (2005). As 
a result, 136 finance companies were excluded from the sample, reducing the 
potential population to 477 companies. 27 companies with imperfect data were not 
considered as sample. A final 450 companies have been included as shown in Table 
4.3. 
The main source of information was extracted from the six annual reports for 
each company. This is based on several justifications. First, annual report has been 
the most chosen medium to explore CSR information by earlier studies (e.g. Chan et 
al. 2014; Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 2011; Haji 2013). Second, most 
companies mainly use annual reports to inform the public regarding CSR information 
(Hasnah et al. 2006; Chan et al. 2014).  Third, annual report is perceived as the main 
company’s document as it outlines the organisation as a whole (Gray et al. 2001). 
Finally, companies prefer to disclose corporate information in annual report on the 
ground of accessibility and reliability (Othman & Ameer 2010).   
 
9.5.2 Variables 
9.5.2.1 Dependent variable 
This study employs content analysis; a technique used by many accounting 
scholars to investigate CSR disclosures in corporate annual reports (e.g. Abdullah et 
al. 2011; Chan et al. 2014; Haji 2013). Content analysis is a technique used to make 
valid inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff, 1989). It converts 
qualitative information in the annual report to quantitative form (Djajadikerta & 
Trireksani 2012). 
To assess the content of CSR reporting, a checklist of items was constructed 
by examining previous CSR reporting checklists (e.g. Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Barako & Brown 2008). In addition, specifically Malaysian checklists were also 
referenced (e.g. Abdullah et al. 2011; Haji 2013). To ensure conformation of the 
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checklist items to the listing requirement and their relevance to the current Malaysian 
context, the framework launched by Bursa Malaysia in 2006 was also used as a 
reference. It comprises guidelines for PLCs in defining their CSR priorities, 
implementation and reporting. The framework focuses on four dimensions namely: 
Environment, Community, Marketplace and Workplace. However the details on 
what to report under each heading is left to management discretion. In this study, a 
checklist of 22 items developed by Abdullah et al. (2011) was made the benchmark. 
Their checklist was an adoption of the work of Mohd Ghazali (2007) with some 
changes according to the checklists by Hackston and Milne (1996) and Ng (1985). In 
addition, the checklists by Mohamed Adnan (2012) and Chan et al. (2014) were also 
referred to. To ensure validity of the checklist, this study also followed the work of 
Kolk (2010) where CSR expertise was used to review the checklist. After thorough 
revisions and refinements, a checklist of 51 items was finally produced (see Table 
4.4).  
Consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Haji 2013; Rashid & Lodh 2008), each 
company’s disclosure score is derived using dichotomous procedure. Each disclosure 
item is given a score of “1” if it is disclosed and “0” if otherwise. A CSR reporting 
index is calculated by dividing the disclosure score of each company to the 
maximum possible score (i.e 1 x 51= 51) as indicated by the formula below:  
 
    
                                                 CSRI  =
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1
 
 
CSRI = CSR reporting index; nj = number of items expected for jth company; Xij = 1 
if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed. 
 
9.5.2.2 Independent and control variables 
Independent variables in this study are board diversity attributes specifically 
gender diversity and directors’ education background. Gender diversity (BFEMALE) 
explicitly looks at the number (proportion) of female board directors. There have 
been claims that the presence of female directors could enhance company’s corporate 
governance (e.g. Adams & Ferreira 2009; Abbott et al. 2012). This follows 
Sundarasen et al. (2016), Ujunwa et al. (2012) and Hafsi and Turgut (2013). Bantel 
(1993) asserts that diverse educational background leads to better decision making. 
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This study referred educational background as the proportion of directors with 
financial background (BMGT) and the proportion of directors with law background 
(BLAW). This is consistent with the work of Said et al. (2013). 
This study identified a few control variables namely board size, directors’ 
ownership, debt ratio, liquidity, company age, company size, profitability, company 
growth and market capitalisation. Board size refers to the number of directors to 
make up the board (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Jizi et al. 2014). An ideal board size 
would be different across companies. Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the total number of directors as used by Rashid (2013). Despite the 
claim that directors’ ownership helps to congruent the interests of shareholders and 
directors thus motivating them to do their monitoring job effectively (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976), this is not necessarily the case in an environment where ownership 
is concentrated. The opportunity for the directors to own shares has caused them to 
put their interests above all. Directors’ ownership (DIROWN) is expressed as the 
ratio of total director shareholdings to total number of shares. This is consistent with 
Bathala and Rao (1995) and Rashid (2013). 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) believe that the needs for managers of highly 
leveraged companies to generate and retain cash to service the debt might reduce 
their ability to fund CSR activities. Their study suggests a negative relationship 
between leverage and CSR disclosure. On the other hand, companies with high debt 
levels are expected to incur high monitoring costs. Alternatively, they disclose more 
information to reduce the costs (Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012) and to meet the needs of 
their lenders (Abdullah et al. 2011). Following Rahman et al. (2011), leverage (DR) 
was measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
Liquidity is also found to be positively related to both financial and non-
financial disclosure as indicated by Ho and Taylor (2007). They suggest high 
liquidity companies have stronger incentives to disseminate more information as 
compared to companies with lower liquidity. Company liquidity (LIQ) is measured 
as the current ratio (Rashid 2013, 2014). The level of CSR reporting intensifies as 
company age increases. Khan et al. (2013) state that a mature company inclines to 
have high disclosure to maintain their reputation. Company age (AGE) was 
represented by the number of years it has been listed on Bursa Malaysia, expressed in 
natural logarithm. There is almost a consensus on the existence of a relationship 
between company size and the extent of disclosures made. Cormier et al. (2011) and 
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Lu and Abeysekera (2014) confirmed that this result. Availability of money and 
expertise in large companies enable them to engage in more activities (including 
CSR activities), produce more information on these activities and their implications, 
and bear the cost of such processes (Andrew et al. 1989). This study employed 
natural logarithm of total assets as the proxy for company size (SIZE) consistent with 
Das et al. (2015) and Sartawi et al. (2014). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Khan (2010) demonstrate that profitability can 
affect company CSR reporting behaviour. Companies with high profit can report 
more CSR information based on their ability to meet the reporting costs. Profitability 
is proxied by Return on Assets (ROA) following the studies by Rashid (2014) and 
Sartawi et al. (2014).  Fast growing companies have the tendency to acquire external 
financing to invest in various activities. To qualify for such financing, they are 
normally required to disclose information comprehensively (Naser et al. 2006). 
Growth companies are also associated with greater information asymmetry and 
agency costs (Eng & Mak 2003). Hence, it is expected of them to disclose more 
information. Following Rashid (2013), company growth (GROWTH) is expressed as 
percentage of annual change in sales. Referring to Watts and Zimmerman (1990), 
pressure from the public has driven high market capitalisation companies to report 
more CSR information. On the contrary, companies with low market capitalisation 
prefer to have lower disclosure to stay competitive. Market capitalisation (CAP) is 
expressed in its natural logarithm. 
 
9.5.3 The Model 
The model to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
attributes and the extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs is as follows: 
 
CSRIi,t= α + 1BFEMALEi,t + 2BMGTi,t + 3BLAWi,t +  4BSIZEi,t + 
               5DIROWNi,t+ 6DRi,t+7LIQi,t+ 8AGEi,t   + 9SIZEi,t + 10ROAi,t   
               +   11GROWTHi,t+  12CAPi,t + i,t 
 
Where CSRIi,t is CSR index for ith company at time t. BFEMALEi,t is the 
proportion of female directors to total number of directors for ith company at time t. 
BMGTi,t is the proportion of directors with a financial background to total number of 
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directors for ith company at time t. BLAWi,t is the proportion of directors with a law 
background to the total number of directors for ith company at time t. BSIZEi,t is the 
total number of directors for ith company at time t. DIROWNi,t is percentage of 
director ownership for ith company at time t. DRi,t is debt ratio for ith company at 
time t.  LIQi,t is liquidity ratio for ith company at time t.  AGEi,t is number of listed 
years on Bursa Malaysia for ith company at time t. SIZEi,t is natural logarithm of 
total assets for ith company at time t. ROAi,t is profitability for ith company at time t. 
GROWTHi,t is the company growth in sales for ith company at time t. CAPi,t is the 
market capitalisation for ith company at time t.α is the intercept, is the regression 
coefficient and  is the error term. 
Data was tested for multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity 
problems alongside fulfilment of the normality assumption that there is normal 
distribution of the means across samples. Testing of data was based on Residual 
Test/Histogram-Normality Test and the result conformed to the assumption. 
Multicollinearity exists when there are high correlations among the independent 
variables. From the correlation matrix presented in Table 9.1, the correlation 
coefficients between independent variables vary from -0.009 to 0.839. Gujarati 
(2003) views a correlation exceeding 0.80 as having multicollinearity problem. This 
is evident in the correlation value of 0.839 between company size and market 
capitalisation. Further, a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent 
variable was measured to check whether the assumption is violated or not. A VIF 
value exceeding 10 shows multicollinearity is present (Gujarati 2003). Nevertheless, 
the VIF values fall within acceptable levels, indicating multicollinearity was not a 
cause for concern. 
Homoscedasticity is where the error term is constant across all values of the 
independent variables. Accordingly, standard estimation method becomes inefficient. 
Examining the scatterplot of the residuals (ZRESID) against the predicted value 
(ZPRED) of the model in this study showed a classic cone-shape pattern of 
heteroscedasticity.  Thus, the Breusch-Pagan test was further conducted. Both the 
Chi square and corresponding p values proved the problem of heteroscedasticity. To 
correct it, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of the White (1980)'s method 
have been applied. Endogeniety, being another main assumption, emerges when the 
independent variables are correlated with the error terms. Consequently, it causes the 
regression coefficient in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to be biased. 
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                         Table 9.1 Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 VIF 
1 BFEMALE 1.000            1.022 
2 BMGT 0.028 1.000           1.105 
3 BLAW -0.031 -0.132** 1.000          1.079 
4 BSIZE 0.046* -0.176** -0.079** 1.000         1.239 
5 DIROWN -0.061** -0.018 -0.069** -0.089** 1.000        1.062 
6 DR -0.072** -0.038* -0.013 0.007 -0.035 1.000       1.124 
7 LIQ -0.041* 0.090** 0.067** -0.045* -0.008 -0.274** 1.000      1.118 
8 AGE -0.048* 0.123** 0.108** -0.011 -0.177** 0.005 0.063** 1.000     1.206 
9 SIZE 0.022 0.031 0.068** 0.339** -0.181** 0.055** -0.067** 0.337** 1.000    3.895 
10 ROA 0.032 -0.021 0.018 0.084** -0.073** -0.129** 0.049* 0.051** 0.111** 1.000   1.053 
11 GROWTH 0.031 -0.030 0.042* 0.025 -0.009 0.018 -0.059** 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.000  1.014 
12 CAP 0.024 0.062** 0.101** 0.321** -0.156** -0.069** 0.035 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.000 3.738 
                               ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)        * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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To resolve the issue, Instrumental Variable regression is used. The F-test for 
the predicted value of board diversity in this model was considered insignificant. 
Following Rashid (2014), when the CSR index was used as a proxy for CSR 
reporting, F = 1.29 with p = 0.2557. The results showed that: (1) endogeniety is not a 
problem; (2) OLS and Instrumental Variable regression results are consistent.  
 
9.6 Results and discussion 
Table 9.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
BFEMALE 0.0820 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.1069 
BMGT 0.5200 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2061 
BLAW 0.0743 0.0000 0.0000 0.6700 0.0970 
BSIZE 7.2362 6.6859 3.0042 18.1741 1.2960 
DIROWN 0.0438 0.0030 0.0000 0.5680 0.0879 
DR 0.4024 0.3775 0.0030 10.3190 0.3623 
LIQ 3.0531 1.7845 0.0070 96.1110 5.1989 
AGE 13.9782 15.029 6.0000 52.9845 1.6403 
SIZE (log TA) 12.8784 12.6500 9.3690 18.4110 1.4467 
ROA 0.0619 0.0580 -2.8980 5.5470 0.1782 
GROWTH 0.0533 0.0265 -4.9410 8.5780 0.4777 
CAP (log CAP) 18.7976 18.5030 12.3710 24.8100 1.8112 
CSRI 0.2167 0.1961 0.0392 0.7255 0.1198 
 
Table 9.2 shows that on average the level of CSR reporting of PLCs is 
21.67%. While there has been enormous efforts by the regulators and government to 
foster CSR practices, the rate remains relatively low (Lu & Castka 2009). However, 
this is not surprising as transparency and reporting is still rare in Asia (Aaijaz & 
Ibrahim 2012). There are only 8.2% female board directors in Malaysia; an increase 
from 6.3% (Abdullah 2014). Comparatively the result is better than in Nigeria (4.6%) 
(Ujunwa et al. 2012) but is lower than in Germany (13.52%) (Dienes & Velte 2016), 
New Zealand (17%) (Fauzi & Locke 2012), South Africa (10%) (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen 2013) and the USA (10.4%) (Gupta et al. 2014). Abdullah (2014) 
identifies the problem as religion which in turn forms the attitude of Malaysians 
towards gender. Islam and Confucianism, the religion of Malays and Chinese 
respectively, discourage women from being leaders. Meanwhile, directors with 
financial backgrounds represent 52% of total directors and with 7.4% possessing a 
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law background. This is rather foreseeable as accountancy is the top chosen field of 
study in both public and private universities in Malaysia (MWFCD 2014). On 
average, Malaysian PLCs have seven board directors. This result is similar to the 
MCG Index finding from 2009 to 2011 (MCG Index 2011); signifying that 
moderately small boards are preferable and it is also within Jensen (1993)'s 
recommended board size of seven to eight directors. Directors’ ownership is 4.38% 
of total shareholdings.  
Table 9.3 reports the ordinary least square (OLS) regression results. The 
adjusted R2 value in Panel A denotes that the changes in CSR reporting are 37.4% 
explainable by the independent variables. The presence of female directors was 
found to be insignificant to company CSR reporting. This result was rather surprising 
as many previous studies have associated female directors with having attitudes that 
are prone to social responsibility. This result contradicts the studies by Post et al. 
(2011), Kiliç, Kuzey and Uyar (2015), Dienes and Velte (2016), Liao et al. (2015) 
and Frias‐Aceituno et al. (2013). The insignificant result can potentially be 
associated with critical mass theory. Konrad et al. (2008) showed that a critical mass 
of three or more women can cause a fundamental change in boardroom dynamics. As 
the percentage of women in a group increases, they can form coalitions, support one 
another and affect the culture of the group. Given female directors on Malaysian 
PLCs boards are in the minority their presence might not enable this cultural change 
to occur stymieing government’s effort to achieve 30% women participation on 
boards by 2016. In the circumstances the benefits of board diversity in enhancing 
CSR reporting are unlikely to be realised.  
As expected, directors with financial background affects positively and 
significantly company CSR reporting; contradicting the study by Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) in Malaysia and Dienes and Velte (2016) in Germany. Fundamentally, 
financially educated directors have been exposed to the importance of social and 
environmental matters during their study through modules such as social accounting. 
This not only makes them appreciative of the environment but helps enhance their 
level of responsibility thus serving better shareholders’ interest (Shukeri et al. 2012). 
In general, a board’s responsibilities include administering compliance with various 
laws. Possessing law education appears to be relevant as it assists directors to better 
comprehend their legal duties (Yusoff & Armstrong 2012). Contrary to the claim, 
this study found that having directors with law backgrounds does not have any effect 
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on CSR reporting. Collectively, the results above partially support resource 
dependence theory. 
 
Table 9.3 Relationship between board diversity and CSR reporting 
 Dependent variable 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (omitting industry) (including industry) 
 CSRI 
 
CSRI 
Intercept -0.544 -0.596 
 (-21.154)*** (-17.895)*** 
   
BFEMALE 0.013 -0.022 
 (0.734) (-1.183) 
   
BMGT 0.025 0.015 
 (2.391)* (1.442) 
   
BLAW 0.023 0.027 
 (1.092) (1.313) 
   
BSIZE 0.039 0.029 
 (4.517)*** (3.460)*** 
   
DIROWN -0.037 -0.014 
 (-1.545) (-0.613) 
   
DR 0.003 0.005 
 (0.448) (0.999) 
   
LIQ -0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.602) (-0.973) 
   
AGE 0.022 0.027 
 (4.687)*** (5.594)*** 
   
SIZE 0.028 0.037 
 (10.177)*** (13.658)*** 
   
ROA 0.060 0.045 
 (5.521)*** (4.322)*** 
   
GROWTH -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.293) (-0.362) 
   
CAP 0.013 0.007 
 (6.231)*** (3.535)*** 
   
F statistic 112.734 35.694 
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.461 
   
The t tests are presented in the parentheses *p< 0.10;  ** p< 0.010;  *** p< 0.001 
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Other control variables namely board size, company age, company size, 
profitability and market capitalisation affect CSR reporting significantly. A larger 
board size utilizes diversity, better monitoring and workload sharing (Larmou & 
Vafeas 2010). These benefits are transformed into better CSR reporting as exhibited 
in Esa and Mohd Ghazali (2012), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and Akhtaruddin et 
al. (2009). Larger companies have the ability to report more CSR activities since 
costs of disclosures are funded by profits (Brammer & Pavelin 2008). Besides, 
higher CSR reporting is one way of demonstrating the legitimacy of their actions and 
being consistent with good corporate citizenship (Brammer & Pavelin 2008). Highly 
profitable companies are associated with high CSR disclosure due to their capacity to 
absorb the related costs. Consistent with expectation, companies with high market 
capitalisation are likely to produce high levels of CSR reporting; conceivably as part 
of their image building exercise. Finally, mature companies are able to disclose more 
CSR information as information gathering has been continuous since their 
establishment. Hence, CSR reporting might not be as costly as for younger 
companies (Owusu-Ansah 1998).  
Industry has been found to significantly affect company CSR reporting (e.g. 
Gamerschlag et al. 2011; Giannarakis 2014). In light of this, it is necessary to control 
the effect of industry on reporting activities as the sample in this study comprises 
companies from multiple industries. Hence, the model was altered by adding 
INDUSTRY dummies. This study uses a two-digit industrial classification (SIC) 
codes to classify the companies. The new regression model reads as follows: 
 
CSRIi,t= α + 1FEMALEi,t  + 2MGTi,t  + 3LAWi,t  + 4BSIZEi,t  + 5DIROWNi,t 
               + 6DRi,t + 7LIQi,t + 8AGEi,t   + 9SIZEi,t  + 10ROAi,t  +  11GROWTHi,  
               +  12CAPi,t + yINDUSTRY  + i,t 
 
Panel B of Table 9.3 depicts very similar results to Panel A. Female directors’ 
coefficient has changed to a negative sign though it remains insignificant. 
Nevertheless, directors with financial expertise has become irrelevant in explaining 
companies’ inclination to report on CSR information; supporting Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) and Jizi et al. (2014). This denotes that the presence of financial expertise is 
beneficial to certain industries only. Equally, it supports the point made by Dienes 
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and Velte (2016) that it is inadequate to rely on financial expertise only to enhance 
CSR reporting.  
 
9.7 Conclusion 
Globalisation, the rapid deployment of technology and the shifting 
demographics of workforces have made businesses much more complex. Board 
homogeneity can be a hindrance in an increasingly dynamic environment. A diverse 
board enables directors to share their expertise, experience and reputation in 
enhancing the quality of decision making. This study examined the effect of board 
diversity on company CSR reporting. Based on a sample of 450 listed companies 
from 2008 to 2013, the results reveal that board diversity in terms of gender and 
education background are not significant in explaining the variation in company CSR 
reporting.   
The ability of female directors to enhance more CSR reporting has not been 
demonstrated in this study. With only 8.2% women on Malaysian PLCs board of 
directors, they formed an insignificant minority group among board members. 
Although Dienes and Velte (2016) argue that women are likely to influence decisions 
among the supervisory board concerning CSR reporting issues owing to their 
different knowledge and values when it comes to contextual issues, their voices 
maybe unheard due to them being a minority (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013). 
Fernandez‐Feijoo et al. (2014) showed that companies with boards that comprises 
more than three women report more CSR information. Perhaps, when the 30% 
gender quota has been achieved, only then there will be improvement in CSR 
reporting. Culture is possibly one of the factors contributing to the study results. 
Generally in Asian countries, women have constrained leadership roles. As such, 
their views and opinions may be taken for granted. Further, female directors are 
mainly elected based on family ties with the expectation that they will be supportive 
of management’s decisions (Abdullah 2014). Consequently, they are unlikely to 
bring the appropriate skills and might not be fully engaged with company affairs 
(Brennan, Solomon, Uddin & Choudhury 2008).  
Directors with specialised expertise such as law, finance and marketing 
become a valued resource providing guidance and advice in critical parts of the 
business including CSR reporting. However, this study proves otherwise. Prior 
educational background does not completely reflect a board member’s attitudes, 
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expertise and experience. Hence, directors’ educational background is less effective 
in improving CSR reporting.  
While the idea that diversity improves a board’s ability to address the 
concerns of diverse shareholders (Buchholtz & Carroll 2012) has been recognized by 
many; its actual effect seems to vary contextually. It is also worth noting that the 
benefits of having a diverse board may not be immediate apparent since it involves 
changes in human perceptions. To ensure board diversity perhaps a much stringent 
rule should be introduced by the Securities Commission.  
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CHAPTER 10: CEO DUALITY AND CSR REPORTING 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the impact of CEO duality (both CEO and Chair of Board) on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting by Malaysian publically listed 
companies. When these roles are combined, it is believed that it will assist companies 
to produce better CSR reporting as a result of better communication. However, it is 
also argued that when CEO is also the Chairperson, it leads to a concentration of 
power. There is a possibility that a company’s objectives may be more focused on 
satisfying the CEOs needs instead of stakeholders. While the practice of CEO duality 
is normally associated with developing countries due to ownership concentration, 
this chapter found that separating the roles does not impede CSR reporting. The 
result may be influenced by the small percentage of CEO duality practiced among 
the PLCs studied which is suggestive of companies moving towards exercising more 
independence. 
10.1 Introduction 
An issue receiving considerable recent attention in the field of corporate 
governance is whether the posts of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairperson 
of the Board should be held by different individuals or whether it is appropriate for 
both positions to be held by the same person (referred to as CEO duality). This issue 
is important because the leadership structure has a significant impact on corporate 
governance given senior personnel have the greatest influence on the running of a 
company and its performance. Furthermore, earlier studies indicate that reporting 
policies predominantly emanate from the board (Ho & Wong 2001; Gul & Leung 
2004). Therefore, it is expected that the type of leadership structure adopted will 
shape a company’s reporting pattern. 
This chapter aims to examine the relationship between structural 
independence of the board or the existence of CEO duality and company CSR 
practices in Malaysia. Malaysia provides an interesting platform for investigating the 
issue on several grounds. First, ownership structures commonly display significant 
participation by major shareholders in management (Claessens et al. 2000). This 
creates incongruous interests between majority and minority shareholders, potentially 
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leading to corporate misconduct. Second, the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) (2007) strongly recommends as best practise to separate the 
powers between the CEO and chairperson to ensure shareholders’ interests are 
protected. Yet, evidence on the effectiveness of the implementation of this separation 
is lacking and inconclusive. Finally, since 2007 Bursa Malaysia has made CSR 
reporting mandatory for public listed companies. Companies are required to report 
on four areas: Community, Environment, Workplace and Product, however the 
details of the report depend very much on management discretion. Given CEO 
duality is common the level of CSR reporting can be questioned. Given this context, 
together with the paucity of evidence in developing countries, it would be interesting 
to know if this relationship holds in the Malaysian context.  
CEO duality is likely to lead to a concentration of power and self-utility 
maximising behaviour by managers (Dalton & Dalton 2005). Duality gives the CEO 
excessive power over the decision-making process (Jensen 1993) such as the ability 
to influence board composition and tenure, set agendas and control information flows 
and also resist change despite performance decline or instability (Baliga, Moyer & 
Rao 1996). Accordingly, the board as the representatives of shareholders fails to 
exercise its governance role effectively through a reduction in monitoring and 
accountability. When a company is led by a dominant personality, shareholders’ 
interests are likely to be maltreated (Kholief 2008). If the CEO and the chairperson 
are the same person, there will not only be less room for discussion, but also a 
narrower range of skills, knowledge, and expertise to draw on, which could affect 
company performance (Shakir 2009). In addition, Goyal and Park (2002) found that 
it was more difficult for the board to remove a poorly performing CEO when the 
CEO and Chairperson duties were vested in the same individual (Zhang 2012). A 
CEO who is also the Chairperson is in a position of self-evaluating themselves. 
Hence, their ability to exercise independent self-evaluation is indeed questionable 
(Rechner & Dalton 1991; Petra 2005).  
Companies that practice clear separation between CEO and chairperson 
positions are viewed as more reputable by stakeholders (Lu et al. 2015). Separation 
of the two roles has not only been recommended as good corporate governance but is 
now widely adopted in many countries: China Securities Regulatory Commission in 
1992 (Huafang & Jianguo 2007), Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 2006 (Khan et al. 2013) and also the Australian Stock Exchange in 2007. In the 
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U.S. the separation is recommended (Chen, Lin & Yi 2008); resulting in the 
percentage of S&P 500 companies choosing to separate the roles doubling from 20% 
to 40% over 15 years (Krause et al. 2014). In Malaysia, the MCCG (2007) implicitly 
recommends separation of both roles and emphasizing on the importance of having a 
clearly accepted division of responsibilities whenever the roles of chairperson and 
CEO are combined. 
This chapter contributes to an emerging body of literature by showing the 
links between corporate governance and CSR practices, in a different institutional 
setting. Despite the legislative reforms on corporate governance structure, the 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR reporting remains relatively 
understudied. Therefore, this chapter provides interesting evidence on one aspect of 
corporate governance research as well as offering further evidence from an Asian 
perspective. This chapter also adds to the understanding about the impact of CEO 
duality on CSR reporting in an agency setting characterised in many instances by 
family majority shareholdings. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
reviews the literature. The third section describes board practices in Malaysia. The 
fourth section outlines the theoretical framework and hypothesis to be tested. The 
fifth section details the methods and model employed. The sixth section discusses the 
results followed by some conclusions in the final section. 
10.2 Literature review 
There is a clear distinction of what drives companies to undertake CSR 
practices between developed and developing countries. Developed countries like the 
US, UK and Australia generally operate in a shareholder-focused corporate 
governance system where directors and managers run the company only for the 
benefit of its shareholders (Devinney et al. 2013). Therefore, they have a vested 
responsibility to increase the share price as part of shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation strategy. Managers are motivated to be involved in CSR practices as it 
may promote a company’s reputation and thereby increase its share price. In recent 
years, managers are more concerned with other stakeholders’ interests. As a result, 
such obligations have increasingly become part of a company’s responsibilities 
(Devinney et al. 2013). More importantly, failure to consider broader interests such 
as human rights obligations may cause companies to face legal risks (Devinney et al. 
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2013). Hence, operating in an “enlightened shareholder” corporate governance 
regime makes directors accountable to a broad range of stakeholders while acting in 
the interests of a company’s shareholders (Devinney et al. 2013). Consequently, this 
further enhances the practice of CSR. 
While CSR is highly recognized in developed countries, it is viewed from a 
different perspective in developing countries. The domination of closely-held 
companies sees the principal owners of companies also acting as senior managers 
(Abdul Rahman & Haniffa 2005). Profit maximisation plays a central role in the 
companies’ continued existence. This explains why managers have less incentive to 
pursue CSR activities which are generally not cost free. Further to that, stakeholders 
in developing countries are still hesitant to accept the concept of CSR since it 
reduces company’s earnings. Given these issues, developing countries are commonly 
associated with low CSR practices. Nevertheless, CSR has assumed a greater 
prominence in developing countries in recent times. Government and regulators play 
important roles as catalysts to the adoption of CSR practices. In Malaysia for 
instance, publically listed companies are mandated to report on CSR activities (Haji 
2013). Companies also tend to imitate the practice of other superior companies in 
relation to CSR (Amran & Siti-Nabiha 2009) besides the need to expand business 
globally (Visser 2008).   
Companies with sound corporate governance are normally more socially 
responsible (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013). It is not surprising, as a result, that 
governments have begun to promote best corporate governance practices with the 
aim of assisting the companies’ management to better execute their responsibilities to 
all stakeholders (Devinney et al. 2013). This argument provides a strong foundation 
to relate the practise of CEO duality with CSR. CEO duality is common in 
developing countries due to the prevalence of family ownership. As such, there is a 
probability that duality role may affect CSR practices. 
The duality of roles has long been a subject of much debate and research. The 
literature has three main strands: company performance, company value and 
corporate reporting patterns. 
The U.K. Cadbury Report 1993, the first corporate governance code of best 
practice recommended the structural independence of the board "there should be 
clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of the company, which will 
ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered 
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powers of decisions." Many countries also publish mandatory or voluntary corporate 
governance codes, for example, Bouton Report 2002 in France, the Cromme 
Commission Code 2002 in Germany (see Chahine & Tohmé 2009) and Toronto 
Stock Exchange, Canada (see Kang & Zardkoohi 2005). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) was enacted following the corporate scandals in the United States (such as 
Enron, WorldCom) which led to a number of additional checks and balance in place 
to monitor the actions of CEOs (Dey, Engel & Liu 2009).  
Generally, most research on CEO duality seems to focus on how it affects 
company performance. Abor (2007) found significant and positive associations 
between capital structure and CEO duality among Ghanaian companies. Similarly, in 
the U.S., Harjoto and Jo (2008) found a positive relationship between CEO duality 
and company values and performance. Schmid and Zimmermann (2005) studied 152 
Swiss companies. Regardless of whether the roles are combined or separated, 
company value remained unchanged. Likewise, in Egypt, Elsayed (2007) 
demonstrated that CEO duality was insignificant to company performance and 
further suggested that the impact of dual roles on board and company performance is 
different from one country to another. This view seems to support the finding by 
Yusoff and Alhaji (2012). Insignificant results were also reported by Kao and Chen 
(2004), Xie et al. (2003) and Haniffa, Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) on 
the association between CEO duality and earnings management activity.  
The board may also be indifferent towards the duality issue. As long as the 
CEO is capable of undertaking both responsibilities effectively, the board is content 
to let duality prevail (Baliga et al. 1996). It is also argued that duality role will 
improve company performance because management’s compensation is tied to it 
(Rechner & Dalton 1991). Dehaene, De Vuyst and Ooghe (2001) confirmed a 
significantly higher return on assets when CEO duality is practised. The tenacity of 
combining the CEO and chairperson role was justified when several studies reported 
a rather comparable company performance between companies with CEO duality 
and those that separate the two roles (e.g. Rechner & Dalton 1991; Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand & Johnson 1998). This not only suggests that opting for combined role is 
far from being unprofitable but might recognise duality as a superior company 
structure (Baliga at al. 1996).  
Meanwhile, in Australia, Sharma (2004) revealed that when the chairperson 
of the board is also the CEO, the board’s monitoring role is weakened and the 
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likelihood of fraud increases. In China, Lu et al. (2015) confirmed that CEO duality 
adversely influences the effectiveness of the board in performing the governance 
function. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found evidence in a sample of European 
biotechnology companies that concentration of power is negatively associated with 
voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital information. Similar results were reported 
by Huafang and Jianguo (2007) on listed Chinese companies.  
Empirical analysis yields diverse results on the impact of role duality on 
reporting. Companies dominated by a single person led to financial reports being 
issued much later than those with separation of roles (Abdullah 2006). This implies 
that duality role could be detrimental to board effectiveness. Gul and Leung (2004), 
studying a sample of 385 Hong Kong-listed companies, show empirical evidence that 
CEO duality is associated with lower levels of voluntary disclosure.  
Allegrini and Greco (2013) reported a negative impact of CEO duality on 
voluntary disclosure in Italy. To them diligent monitoring through separation of the 
two important roles contributes to greater transparency. In Egypt, duality role was 
found to have a negative bearing on corporate governance disclosure (Samaha et al. 
2012a). Likewise, Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015) reported a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and CSR disclosure of Indian companies. They 
suggest that CEOs in dual positions may not be motivated to be visibly accountable 
to the interests of the broader stakeholders and are likely to avoid the costs of CSR 
disclosure. 
 Alternatively separation contributes to a positive impact on company 
disclosure (Nandi & Ghosh 2013). Nevertheless, contrary to their assumption, a 
study by Al-Janadi, Rahman and Omar (2013) revealed a positive impact of CEO 
duality on voluntary disclosure of companies in Saudi Arabia. They believe that 
duality roles provide a centralised focus to achieve company’s goals. Meanwhile, 
several studies failed to find any relationship between CEO duality and the extent of 
CSR reporting such as Said et al. (2009), Khan et al. (2013), Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2012), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Arcay and Vazquez (2005).  
Proponents of CEO duality argue that the duality role can reduce 
communication barriers. This helps to reduce costs for the company especially when 
transferring critical information between the CEO and the chairperson (Dahya & 
Travlos 2000). Accordingly, Samaha, Khlif and Hussainey (2015) believe that CEO 
duality may result in more voluntary reporting. Sundarasen et al. (2016) showed that 
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CEO duality affects company CSR initiatives negatively; which warrants a further 
examination on the practice of CEO duality in Malaysia. 
Evidently, the practice of CEO duality exhibits conflicting impacts on a 
company’s overall performance, including reporting. On the one hand, CEO duality 
provides significant benefit to the company through efficient leadership when 
expectations of the board and management intersect. On the other hand, it might 
threaten directors’ independence and impair good governance practices. There is 
extensive yet inconsistent evidence on CEO duality and its impacts.  
10.3 Corporate board practices in Malaysia 
Malaysian companies most commonly have a one-tier board structure where 
the company is governed by a unified board performing both management and 
supervisory functions. The CEO is responsible for the running of the board and the 
company’s operation. There is also an overwhelming presence of family ownership 
dominance in the Malaysian corporate sector. The practise of CEO duality in 
Malaysia is very common and increasing. The increasing trend of CEO-duality in 
Malaysia is evident in the study by Abdul Rahman and Haniffa (2005). Despite the 
absence of mandatory separation of the roles the MCCG strongly recommends it as 
best practice. This is to make certain that power and authority is balanced to avoid 
the existence of individual directors having unrestrained power in the decision-
making process (Ponnu 2008). The segregation of these positions is seen as a key 
characteristic of an effective independent board. Nevertheless, should duality exist 
then the MCCG recommends sufficient strong independent board members. 
However, compliance with the MCCG (2007) recommendation remains an issue as 
family owned companies are prevalent in Malaysia. 72% of companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia are family controlled (Himmelberg et al. 2004). It is common for 
companies with this type of ownership structure to practise CEO duality (Ho & 
Wong 2001).  
10.4 Theoretical framework and hypothesis development 
Two contrasting theories: agency theory and stewardship theory, are used 
primarily to explain CEO duality.  
Agency theory is based on the belief that there exists an inevitable conflict 
between parties that delegate (principals) and those who execute (agents) (Jensen & 
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Meckling 1976). As managerial actions depart from maximising shareholders 
returns, this gives rise to agency problems such as moral hazard and information 
asymmetry. Moral hazard is present when there are self-interested utility-maximising 
individuals running the company while information asymmetry occurs when 
management is reluctant to share information regarding the accurate state of the 
company with stakeholders (Hashim & Devi 2008). Fama and Jensen (1983b) assert 
an agency problem to more likely occur when a key decision maker has little or no 
financial interest in the outcome of their decisions. Agency theorists believe that the 
board is the primary internal control mechanism for aligning the different interests of 
shareholders and management (Boyd 1995). Hence, shareholders’ interests are 
safeguarded when different people occupy the two positions of the CEO and the 
chairperson of the board of directors (Kholief 2008). This non duality permits the 
board of directors the means to effectively monitor and control the potential 
shareholder-value-destroying actions of managers. On the contrary, by serving as 
Chairperson, the CEO will acquire a wider power base and locus of control, thereby 
weakening control by the board. This facilitates the pursuit of the CEO’s agenda, 
which may differ substantially from shareholder goals. In the absence of a non-dual 
structure, not only do shareholders suffer from lack of separation of decision 
management and control, it also elevates agency costs (Braun & Sharma 2007) and 
negatively affect company performance. In light of those problems, agency theory 
recommends the separation of CEO and Chairperson’s positions to ensure 
maximization of company performance as well as enhancing reporting levels. 
Stewardship theory embraces a more positive perspective. Directors are 
perceived as caretakers of the company’s assets and want to maximise them 
(Donaldson & Davis 1991). Proponents of stewardship theory believe that the 
combination of the two roles enhance the decision making process and allow a CEO 
with strategic vision to guide the board to implement a company’s objectives with 
the minimum of interference from the board. Stewardship theory claims that 
separating the roles of CEO and Chair deters directors’ autonomy to shape and 
execute the company’s strategy. This lack of authoritative decision making is likely 
to negatively impact the performance of the organisation (Braun & Sharma 2007). 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) view that combining the two roles would facilitate 
company’s effectiveness through promotion of leadership unity and consequently 
lead to higher performance and disclosure.   
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It is argued here that CEO duality reduces overall accountability, thus making 
companies less transparent not only for shareholders but for all relevant stakeholders. 
Based on agency theory, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
H1: CEO duality is negatively associated with company CSR reporting 
10.5 Methods 
This study utilised a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia from 2008 until 2013. The company must have been 
continuously listed on Bursa Malaysia in each year of the six-year period as well as 
producing an annual report. There were 813 companies listed as at 31st December 
2013. However, only 613 companies met the criteria. In general, companies in the 
finance sector are subject to different regulatory and disclosure requirements and also 
material differences in their types of operation. Consequently, prior studies have not 
considered them (e.g. Mohd Ghazali 2007; Said et al. 2009; Haniffa & Cooke 2005). 
So 136 finance companies were excluded from the sample, reducing the potential 
population to 477 companies. There were 27 companies omitted from the sample due 
to missing data. Finally, 450 companies were included as illustrated in Table 4.3. 
The study utilised the six annual reports for each company as the main source 
of information and is based on several justifications. First, the selection of annual 
reports is consistent with other prior studies (e.g. Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & 
Samad 2011; Haji 2013; Abdul Fatima et al. 2015). Second, annual reports including 
social and environmental reporting are presumed to be the main vehicle used by 
companies to communicate information to the public (Hasnah et al. 2006;Chan et al. 
2014). Third, Gray et al. (2001) support their usage because it is the central corporate 
document of the organisation. Given its credibility and accessibility annual reports 
have been the preferred place for company disclosures (Othman & Ameer 2010).   
 
10.5.1 Variable definitions 
10.5.1.1 Dependent variables 
Content analysis was used as it is the dominant technique used by accounting 
scholars to investigate CSR disclosures in annual reports (e.g. Chan et al. 2014; 
Abdullah et al. 2011; Ibrahim & Samad 2011; Haji 2013). Content analysis is a 
technique which replicates and makes valid inferences from data to their context 
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(Krippendorff 1989). It involves both qualitative and quantitative methods and 
converts information in annual reports into scores (Djajadikerta & Trireksani 2012). 
A checklist of items was constructed by examining previous CSR reporting 
checklists (Hackston & Milne 1996; Barako & Brown 2008). Additionally, specific 
Malaysian checklists by Haji (2013) and Abdullah et al. (2011) as well as the 
framework introduced by Bursa Malaysia in 2006 were also referenced. The focus of 
the framework was fourfold: Environment, Community, Marketplace and 
Workplace. To form a comprehensive checklist, checklists by Abdullah et al. (2011), 
Mohamed Adnan (2012) and Chan et al. (2014) were specifically referenced. The 
final checklist containing 51 items is outlined in Table 4.4. 
To compute a disclosure score, this study relies on an unweighted approach; 
assigning a score of “1” if the specific information is disclosed and “0” if it is not 
disclosed. This approach that has been previously employed (e.g. Haji 2013; Haniffa 
& Cooke 2005; Rashid & Lodh 2008) indicates the presence or absence of CSR 
information (Mohd Ghazali 2007). Next, the scores were converted into a CSR 
reporting index by dividing the disclosure score of each company to the maximum 
possible score (i.e. 1 x 51= 51).   
CSRI  =
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1  
CSRI = CSR reporting index; nj = number of items expected for jth company; Xij = 1 
if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed. 
 
10.5.1.2 Independent and control variables 
The independent variable is CEO duality. The presence of CEO duality is 
measured by a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the Chairperson of the 
board and 0 otherwise. This is consistent with Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Rashid 
(2013). 
Numerous studies have shown that CSR reporting is influenced by various 
governance attributes and company’s characteristics. Hence, to eliminate their impact 
on the level of reporting, board independence, board size, directors’ ownership, CEO 
founder, CEO tenure, debt ratio, liquidity, company age, company size, profitability, 
company growth and market capitalisation were conceptualised as control variables.  
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Board independence refers to independent directors who have no affiliation 
with the company except for their directorship (Bursa Malaysia, 2006).  They have 
important impact on monitoring activities (Fama & Jensen 1983a). Board 
independence (BIND) is defined as the number of independent directors on the board 
relative to the total number of directors, which is consistent with Arora and 
Dharwadkar (2011), Harjoto and Jo (2011) and Das et al. (2015). Board size refers to 
the number of directors to make up the board (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Jizi et al. 
2014). Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the natural logarithm of total number of 
directors as used by Rashid (2013). Allegedly, directors’ ownership determines their 
willingness to monitor managers and enhance shareholders’ value (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997). It motivates directors to do their monitoring job effectively. However, 
in owner-managed companies, directors are less concern with public accountability 
due to a relatively small number of outside shareholders. Hence, they tend to disclose 
less CSR information. Directors’ ownership (DIROWN) is expressed as the ratio of 
total director shareholdings to total number of shares. This is consistent with the 
approach adopted by Bathala and Rao (1995) and Rashid (2013).  
CEO founder is associated with greater power by virtue of his/her role in the 
company’s history and his/her influence on the board. As such, the decisions will 
have impact on company’s performance including reporting. Following Daily and 
Dalton (1993), CEOFOUNDER takes the binary code of 1 if CEO is also the founder 
and 0 if otherwise. CEO tenure (CEO TENURE) is represented by the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the post. Mohd–Saleh et al. 
(2012) revealed that long-tenured CEOs are associated with low levels of reporting. 
They feel secure with their positions hence demotivated to continue acting in line of 
shareholders’ interests. There are mixed results pertaining to leverage in relation to 
CSR reporting. Barnea and Rubin (2010) believed that companies with high debt 
levels will incur high monitoring costs which suggest a negative relationship between 
leverage and CSR disclosure. Alternatively, these high debt companies disclose more 
information to reduce the costs (Esa & Mohd Ghazali 2012) and to fulfil the needs of 
their creditors (Abdullah et al. 2011). Following Rahman et al. (2011), leverage (DR) 
was measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
Ho and Taylor (2007) confirmed a positive impact of liquidity on financial 
and non-financial disclosure. These companies are inclined to report more CSR 
information in their annual report. Company liquidity (LIQ) was measured as current 
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ratio (Rashid 2013, 2014; Ho & Taylor 2007). Company age (AGE) was represented 
by the number of years it has been listed on Bursa Malaysia, expressed in natural 
logarithm (Rashid 2009). The level of CSR reporting increases with company age, 
normally driven by reputational concern (Khan et al. 2013). Cormier et al. (2011) 
and Lu and Abeysekera (2014) indicate that size is one of the major factors 
determining CSR reporting. Large companies are normally capable of carrying out 
more CSR activities as they have sufficient funds and expertise. Their ability to bear 
the costs lead to better reporting (Andrew et al. 1989). The natural logarithm of total 
assets as the proxy for company size (SIZE) was used and is consistent with Das et 
al. (2015), Sartawi et al. (2014) and Rashid (2014). 
CSR practices can also be influenced by profit. Highly profitable companies 
are able to absorb the costs associated with CSR activities, thus disclosing more 
information to stakeholders. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Khan (2010) confirm the 
importance of profitability when reporting social information. Profitability is proxied 
by Return on Assets (ROA) following Rashid (2014) and Sartawi et al. (2014). To 
expand the business, companies normally choose to seek external funding. However, 
this requires them to produce a detailed report to convince the creditors regarding 
their eligibility. Indirectly, this induces more disclosures (Naser et al. 2006). In 
addition, due to expansion in size, fast growing companies are faced with greater 
information asymmetry and higher agency costs (Eng & Mak 2003). Through higher 
disclosure, these problems are likely to be minimised. Following Rashid (2013), 
company growth (GROWTH) is expressed as percentage of annual change in sales. 
Market capitalisation (CAP) is expressed in its natural logarithm. While some view 
market capitalisation as representing company size, the investing public considers it 
as an external measure of a company’s importance (Wallace & Naser 1996). Watts 
and Zimmerman (1990) argue that companies with high market capitalisation are 
generally exposed to political attacks, such as demands by the society for the 
exercise of social responsibility or for greater regulation such as price controls and 
higher corporate tax. Such potential action can be minimised by disclosing more 
comprehensively.  
 
10.5.2 The Model 
The model is estimated to examine the relationship between CEO duality and 
CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs: 
Chapter 10: CEO duality and CSR reporting 
 
236 
 
CSRIi,t= α + β1CEODi,t + β2BINDi,t + β3BSIZEi,t + β4DIROWNi,t  + 
               β5CEOFOUNDERi,t + β6CEOTENUREi,t +  β7DRi,t +  β8LIQi,t   +   
               β9AGEi,t + β10SIZEi,t +  β11ROAi,t + β12GROWTHi,t + β 13CAPi,t  + εi,t 
 
Where CSRIi,t is CSR index for ith company at time t. CEODi,t takes the 
value of 1 if the role of CEO and Chairperson is combined; otherwise it takes 0 for 
ith company at time t. BINDi,t is number of independence director to total number of 
directors for ith company at time t. BSIZEi,t is the total number of directors for ith 
company at time t. DIROWNi,t is percentage of director ownership for ith company 
at time t. CEOFOUNDERi,t  is coded as 1 if CEO is also the founder of the 
company; 0 if otherwise for ith company at time t. CEO TENUREi,t is natural 
logarithm of CEO service length for ith company at time t. DRi,t is debt ratio for ith 
company at time t. LIQi,t is liquidity ratio for ith company at time t. AGEi,tis number 
of listed years on Bursa Malaysia for ith company at time t. SIZEi,t is natural 
logarithm of total assets for ith company at time t. ROAi,t is profitability for ith 
company at time t. GROWTHi,t is the company growth in sales for ith company at 
time t. CAPi,t is the market capitalisation for ith company at time t. α is the intercept, 
β is the regression coefficient and ε is the error term. 
Testing of the data for the normality assumption and also the problems of 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeniety was undertaken. The 
assumption of normality asserts that there is normal distribution of the means across 
samples. However, the normality assumption will be relatively insignificant when 
involving large samples (Pallant 2007). The model was tested using Residual 
Test/Histogram-Normality Test and the result conformed to the assumption. From 
the correlation matrix presented in Table 10.1, the correlation coefficients between 
independent variables vary widely. Gujarati (2003) recommends that 
multicollinearity is a problem when the coefficient exceeds 0.80 and the correlation 
between company size and market capitalisation at 0.839 suggests the possibility of 
multicollinearity. Further, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent 
variable was measured to check whether the assumption is violated or not. A VIF 
value exceeding 10 shows multicollinearity is present (Gujarati 2003). However, the 
VIF values fall within acceptable levels, indicating multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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           Table 10.1 Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 VIF 
1 CEOD 1.000             1.038 
2 BIND -0.010 1.000            1.293 
3 BSIZE -0.084** -0.414** 1.000           1.418 
4 DIROWN -0.041* 0.057** -0.089** 1.000          1.066 
5 CEO FOUNDER 0.125** -0.076** 0.034 0.053** 1.000         1.116 
6 CEO TENURE 0.081** -0.090** 0.027 0.016 0.236** 1.000        1.094 
7 DR -0.037 0.085** 0.007 -0.035 0.009 -0.046* 1.000       1.137 
8 LIQ 0.037 0.094** -0.045* -0.008 -0.055** 0.083** -0.274** 1.000      1.135 
9 AGE -0.062** 0.151** -0.011 -0.177** -0.162** 0.024 0.005 0.063** 1.000     1.239 
10 SIZE -0.016 -0.053** 0.339** -0.181** -0.032 -0.024 0.055** -0.067** 0.337** 1.000    3.908 
11 ROA -0.008 -0.009 0.084** -0.073** 0.043* 0.042* -0.129** 0.049* 0.051** 0.111** 1.000   1.057 
12 GROWTH 0.005 -0.029 0.025 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 0.018 -0.059** 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.000  1.011 
13 CAP -0.010 -0.063** 0.321** -0.156** -0.055** -0.047* -0.069** 0.035 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.000 3.705 
               **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)      *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Homoscedasticity occurs when the error term is constant across all values of 
the independent variables. Standard estimation methods become inefficient when the 
error term varies. Examining the scatter plot of the residuals (ZRESID) against the 
predicted value (ZPRED) of the model showed a classic cone-shape pattern of 
heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test was then conducted with both the chi-
square and corresponding p values also indicating heteroscedasticity. To correct it, 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of the White (1980)'s method was 
applied.  
Endogeniety exists when the independent variables are correlated with the 
error terms. This causes the regression coefficients in the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression to be biased. One way of addressing this problem is to use the 
Instrumental Variable approach. The F-test for the predicted value of CEO duality in 
this model was considered insignificant. Following Rashid (2014), when the CSR 
index was used as a proxy for CSR reporting, F = 1.67 with p = 0.1965. The results 
showed that: (1) endogeniety is not an issue; and (2) OLS and Instrumental Variable 
regression are consistent. 
 
10.6 Results and discussion 
Table 10.2 indicates that on average the level of CSR reporting is 21.67%.  
  Table 10.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables         
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
CSRI 0.2167 0.1961 0.0392 0.7255 0.1198 
CEOD 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3500 
BIND 0.4519 0.43000 0.1700 1.0000 0.1281 
BSIZE 7.0000 6.6869 3.0004 18.1741 1.2960 
DIROWN 0.0438 0.0030 0.0000 0.5680 0.0879 
CEOFOUNDER 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3450 
CEO TENURE 6.7255 8.0045 0.4966 46.0625 2.5659 
DR 0.4024 0.3775 0.0030 10.3190 0.3623 
LIQ 3.0531 1.7845 0.0070 96.1110 5.1989 
AGE 13.9782 15.0293 6.0000 52.9845 1.6403 
SIZE (LogTA) 12.8784 12.6500 9.3690 18.4110 1.4467 
ROA 0.0619 0.0580 -2.8980 5.5470 0.1782 
GROWTH 0.0533 0.0265 -4.9410 8.5780 0.4777 
CAP (LogCAP) 18.7976 18.5030 12.3710 24.8100 1.8112 
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This result is lower than CSR disclosure reported by companies in a 
developing country, such as Bangladesh. Khan et al. (2013) in their study reveals that 
average CSR by companies in Bangladesh is 22%. This number is fairly low in the 
context of a developed country, Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) reveal that such 
diclosure is 49% in the US and Europe. The CEO duality result portrays that on an 
average there are only 14% of companies that have the same individual acting as 
CEO and Chairperson. This rate is much lower than that of some other countries. For 
example, 61% in the context of Egypt (Samaha et al. 2012), 41% in the context of 
Italy (Allegrini and Greco 2013) and 46% in the context of Bangladesh (Rashid 
2013). 
 Table 10.3 reports the ordinary least square (OLS) regression results. The 
adjusted R2 value in Panel A denotes that 38% of changes in CSR reporting are 
explainable by the independent variables. CEO duality showed a negative 
relationship with CSR reporting. However, it is not significant enough to affect 
company reporting which contradicts the prediction. This result is in accord with 
Said et al. (2009), Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) and Khan et al. (2013). One 
credible explanation for this result is the relatively uncommon practise of CEO 
duality among companies in Malaysia as compared to developed countries. Given the 
backdrop of family owned companies dominating the Malaysian business setting, 
this result is unanticipated as CEO duality is synonymous with family owned 
companies. The low value seems to suggest that most PLCs, including family owned 
companies, are moving towards a more independent board in order to elevate 
shareholders’ confidence. CEO duality is argued to be the weakest type of internal 
control governance structure (Rechner & Dalton 1989) since it demonstrates that 
leadership and control responsibilities lie in the hands of one dominant person. 
Nevertheless the evidence in this study did not support the relationship between CEO 
duality and CSR reporting. 
The control variables: board size, ownership by directors, CEO tenure, 
company age, size, profitability and market capitalisation were found to be 
significantly related to CSR reporting. Companies with moderately large boards 
perform more CSR activities most likely due to board diversity. Therefore, they are 
able to produce better CSR reporting in accord with Esa and Mohd Ghazali (2012), 
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009). Contrarily, directors’ 
ownership has been found to negatively affect CSR reporting, supporting Chau and 
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Gray (2010), Oh et al. (2011) and Khan et al. (2013). Given investment in CSR 
practices are costly, the result is as anticipated. 
Table 10.3 Relationship between CEO duality and CSR reporting 
                        Dependent variables 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  (Before controlling for  (After controlling for  
  Industry) Industry) 
  CSRI CSRI 
Intercept -0.525 -0.587 
  (-18.460)*** (-16.789)*** 
CEOD -0.004 -0.003 
  (-0.684) (-0.482) 
BIND 0.028 0.016 
  -1.607 -0.959 
BSIZE 0.042 0.03 
  (4.585)*** (3.358)*** 
DIROWN -0.041 -0.014 
  (-1.738)* (-0.619) 
CEOFOUNDER 0.003 -0.001 
  -0.441 (-0.151) 
CEO TENURE -0.011 -0.01 
  (-4.893)*** (-4.456)*** 
DR -0.001 0.004 
  (-0.032) -0.803 
LIQ -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.124) (-0.583) 
AGE 0.023 0.027 
  (4.765)*** (5.513)*** 
SIZE 0.028 0.037 
  (10.239)*** (13.776)*** 
ROA 0.060 0.045 
  (5.569)*** (4.341)*** 
GROWTH -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.243) (-0.394) 
CAP 0.013 0.008 
  (6.228)*** (3.610)*** 
  
 
  
F statistic 106.861 34.707 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.465 
The t tests are presented in the parentheses *p< 0.10;  ** p< 0.010;  *** p< 0.001 
Meanwhile, long tenured CEO may become complacent and confident they 
will not be removed, and therefore loosen their grip on company's management 
(Shakir 2009). They are likely to refuse to adopt to the changing environment such as 
disclosing more CSR information. Hence, extremely long tenures may be detrimental 
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to shareholders' interests (Vafeas 2003). As predicted, mature companies tend to 
disclose more CSR information to demonstrate their already high reputations. Larger 
companies have the ability to report more CSR activities since the costs of 
disclosures are funded by profits (Brammer & Pavelin 2008). Companies with high 
market capitalisation are also more likely to produce high levels of CSR reporting; 
conceivably as part of their image building exercise. 
Kolk (2003) asserts that CSR reporting is industry specific due to different 
interests, priorities, rules and regulations. Earlier studies have confirmed a significant 
systematic disparity across industries concerning their inclination to make CSR 
reporting (Gamerschlag et al. 2011; Brammer & Pavelin 2008). Companies with high 
consumer visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated and intense 
competition disclose significantly more CSR information in their annual reports 
(Hackston & Milne 1996; Mohd Ghazali 2007). It is important to control for the 
effect of industry on reporting activities as the sample in this study constitutes 
companies from multiple industries. Hence, the model was modified by adding 
INDUSTRY dummies. This study used two-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes. The augmented regression model was: 
CSRIi,t= α + β1CEODi,t + β2BINDi,t + β3BSIZEi,t + β4DIROWNi,t + 
               β5CEOFOUNDERi,t + β6CEOTENUREi,t +  β7DRi,t +  β8LIQi,t  +   
               β9AGEi,t  + β10SIZEi,t  + β11ROAi,t  +  β12GROWTHi,t +  β 13CAPi,t  + 
                yINDUSTRY  + εi,t 
 
In general, the results shown in Panel B of Table 10.3 are indifferent when 
industry is controlled. With the exception of directors’ ownership that has become 
insignificant, the remaining variables appear to be not industry specific. 
10.7 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated the impact of CEO duality on firm CSR reporting. 
The findings are as expected in that there is a negative but non-significant 
relationship between CEO duality and CSR reporting. It is to be noted that despite 
various attempts by Malaysian regulators to promote CSR practices, the rate remains 
at a disappointingly low level (Lu and Castka, 2009). The dual leadership structure 
could be one of the contribution factors to this outcome. The findings of this chapter 
support agency theory constructs about CEO duality.  
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CEO duality is depicted as a double-edged sword (Finkelstein and D'aveni, 
1994). Despite its ability to enhance unity of command, having a dominant 
personality can have detrimental effects on a company. Most importantly, it can 
impair the monitoring function of the board due to power concentration. There are 
also potential conflicts of interest. A CEO/Chairperson tends to keep control in their 
hands potentially jeopardising accountability. These effects can restrain good 
corporate governance practice. As a result, shareholders will have less confidence in 
the management of the company. It was the potential costs of CEO duality overriding 
the benefits which lead to the recommendation by the MCCG that the two top 
management roles be separated. Gray (1988) suggests that managers in Asia are 
more inclined to be secretive. Consequently, they have less incentive for transparent 
reporting (Aaijaz and Ibrahim, 2012). Given this and their consolidation of power, 
CEOs may be less accountable to all stakeholders. 
It is desirable for all companies to opt for more board independence to 
reinforce corporate governance system. Nevertheless, regulators need to ensure a 
robust monitoring measure is put in place to ensure the effectiveness of the practise. 
This chapter provides information to assist regulators in their continuous attempt to 
improve corporate governance. While there are many corporate governance attributes 
that can be linked with company’s inclination towards CSR reporting, this chapter 
only focused on CEO duality. Future research could provide additional insights by 
examining the role of independent directors in reporting activities. Inevitably, 
independent directors have a pivotal role in enhancing board independence. Another 
source of weakness concerns the selection of the items in the disclosure score, the 
construction of the score and the content analysis, which are mainly based on 
subjective assessments. 
Chapter 11: Conclusions 
 
243 
 
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The only conclusion that social sciences can draw is: some do, some don’t 
Ernest Rutherford 
 
11.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the nature and extent of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) disclosure by public listed companies in Malaysia during the period from 
2008 to 2013. It investigates the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and CSR reporting. The purpose of this chapter is to reaffirm key results 
as have been corroborated by evidence presented in the previous chapters. The 
implications of this study, research limitations and suggestions for further research 
directions are shown in the last section of this chapter. 
Chapter 1 introduced the topic for this study. It outlines the background, 
justification and the organisation of this thesis. This study has been done with the 
following research objectives: 
1. To examine the nature and extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian 
PLCs 
2. To examine the relationship between corporate governance attributes 
and CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs 
Chapter 2 provides the practice of corporate governance as well as CSR reporting in 
Malaysian context. This chapter offers the basis for understanding of both practices 
and also fundamental to the arguments presented in the subsequent chapters. 
Theories underpinning the motivation of companies to report on CSR information are 
discussed in Chapter 3. This study adopted four theories: agency, neo-institutional 
sociology, resource dependence and stakeholder-agency theory. It is highlighted that 
the trend of CSR reporting in Malaysia is growing and is strongly connected to the 
effect of isomorphism effects emerging from institutional theory. Meanwhile, the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on company’ reporting behaviour are 
based on agency, resource dependence and stakeholder-agency theory. Chapter 4 
discusses the research methodology. This study uses secondary data from non-
financial companies’ annual reports from 2008 to 2013. The sample covers the 
period after CSR reporting is mandated to all PLCs as well as inclusive of a few 
revisions of corporate governance. A total of 450 companies remained in the final 
Chapter 11: Conclusions 
 
244 
 
sample after considering a few factors such as incomplete annual reports. This 
represents approximately 55.35% of all companies listed on the Main Market of 
Bursa Malaysia. The empirical model employed in this study focuses on the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and CSR reporting by 
analysing panel data models. In this study, the CSR disclosure dimensions include 
(1) General (2) Community (3) Environment (4) Workplace (5) Product (6) Other. 
The corporate governance mechanisms employed in this study specifically focus on 
board of directors and ownership structure. To determine the relationship between 
the corporate governance mechanisms and CSR reporting, this study employed 
multiple regression analyses.  
The following sections summarise the findings of this study as explained and 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.  
 
11.2 Summary of the results 
11.2.1 Research objective 1 
11.2.1.1 The nature and extent of CSR reporting 
The first research question focused on the nature and extent of CSR reporting 
of companies in Malaysia. The current practices of CSR reporting by PLCs were 
examined and the results are presented in Chapter 5. The main results of this 
investigations showed that the amount of CSR reporting by Malaysian companies 
increased steadily over the period from 2008 to 2013. Reporting was observed to be 
at the highest after the financial crisis period and also subsequent to the MCCG 
emphasis on sustainability aspects in the 2012 revision. Companies may want to gain 
shareholders’ confidence by demonstrating their accountability acts in various areas 
apart from adhering to the regulator’s call. Besides, rule-based environment forces 
companies to abide the regulations to ensure continuous listing on the Stock 
Exchange. However, in saying that, the content of the report is far from satisfactory. 
This study provides evidence of the low reporting of CSR information. This situation 
is quite distressing as much information which may be pertinent to stakeholders has 
not been reported by companies. Yusoff et al. (2014) and Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006) attribute the problem to the unwillingness of companies to change their 
mindset regarding CSR reporting especially those which are family-owned besides 
shrouded by the secrecy culture as oppose to open reporting. Nevertheless, Li et al. 
(2010) argue that governance environment, in general, evolves slowly. Although the 
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regulators can use their legislative power and enforcement capability to actively 
effect change and promote CSR, culture and social institutions change more slowly. 
Therefore, drastic changes in CSR communications intensity of Malaysian PLCs in 
the very near future are not likely to happen. Despite these arguments, Salleh (2009) 
asserts that there is likeliness that these initiatives to increase quality CSR reporting 
have missed the mark due to lack of appropriate enforcement efforts. 
A detailed examination of the reporting exhibits that the number of 
companies reporting on these themes increases at a promising rate. It was evident 
from the findings that companies’ trend of CSR reporting were mostly focused on 
General theme, followed by Workplace, Environment, Community, Marketplace and 
Other. The prevalence of employees to the companies has in one or another shift the 
trend of reporting from emphasising on Community needs which is common in 
developing countries (Welford 2004; Sharma 2013; Abdulrazak & Ahmad 2014) to 
Workplace theme. Attracting new employees and also maintaining the existing ones 
are imperative to ensure companies success. Hence, providing them with a conducive 
workplace, attractive fringe benefits as well as continuous up-skilling have become 
mainstream. Meanwhile, reporting on product information like R&D under the theme 
“Other” is the lowest among all themes. This indicates that carrying out costly R&D 
to improve products and services may not be a priority to most companies especially 
during post financial crisis. Besides, companies may be reluctant to expose their 
R&D activities to their competitors. A rather surprising result emerge from this study 
is where the culture of reporting on CSR information is dominant in industries like 
utilities and telecommunications. Despite the little attention given on these 
industries, Hamid and Atan (2011) has reported that telecommunication companies 
are among the winners of major CSR awards in Malaysia. This means that the culture 
of CSR reporting has been well embraced by companies in those industries. This 
result slips the expectation that environmental-sensitive industries led the reporting 
practice. Nevertheless, it supports earlier studies (e.g. Naser & Hassan 2013; Ahmad 
& Mohamad 2014) who argue that companies try to elude pressure and extra 
regulations.   
In a nutshell, though the level of CSR reporting falls short of the desired 
level, the progress to some extent indicates that companies have realised the 
importance and benefits of reporting CSR information. The introduction of CSR 
guidelines as well as a growing number of dedicated magazines, newsletters, social 
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media and websites helps contribute to providing an identity to CSR as a 
management concept. Accordingly, companies today are addressing their role in 
society far more coherently, comprehensively and professionally. The result of this 
study is generally in line with prior studies done in Malaysia such as Haji (2013), 
Abdul Fatima et al. (2015), Said et al. (2013) and Esa and Mohd Ghazali (2012) and 
also other developing countries like Thailand (Jitaree 2015) and Bangladesh (Das et 
al. 2015). Hence, CSR is no longer exclusively a developed country phenomenon. 
Perhaps a more rigorous enforcement by the regulators may assist in better reporting 
in the future.  
 
11.2.2 Research objective 2 
Research objective 1 builds the platform to investigate further the factors that 
influence company reporting behaviour. Earlier studies have pointed to the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and CSR reporting (Haji 
2013; Said et al. 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013). Hence to provide evidence on 
these claims, the second research objective is restated: What is the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and CSR reporting? Specifically, this 
study looks at ownership structures comprising directors’ ownership and institutional 
ownership as well as board of directors’ attributes: board independence, board 
meeting frequency, board diversity and CEO duality which have been analysed 
separately in Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10respectively. 
 
11.2.2.1 Ownership structure and CSR reporting 
Chapter 6 sought to explore the effect of ownership structure on company 
behaviour towards CSR reporting. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when 
directors are given the opportunity to own company shares, it indirectly gives power 
to the directors to instruct and monitor the management of the company. This will 
create lesser agency conflicts hence enabling better transparency with higher 
information disclosure. On the one hand, this argument highlights the fact that 
directors’ ownership helps to keep the interest of the management and shareholders 
aligned. On the other hand, several earlier studies (e.g. Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; 
Ghazali & Weetman 2006) associate higher shareholdings by directors with greater 
information asymmetry to enable them to achieve their own interests. Besides, 
substantial shareholdings by directors mean less interruption to their power (Ismail et 
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al. 2014). This study finds support for lower CSR reporting when directors own 
company shares even when the shareholdings rate is low. This result is likely to be 
linked to the strong influence of family ties that exist in the companies. The small 
shareholdings do not jeopardise their capacity to exert influence on the management, 
triggering more conflict between majority and minority shareholders, hence leading 
to disclosure of less CSR information. The result suggests that directors’ ownership 
is a source of agency problems that further intensifies the information asymmetry 
problem. This result implies that eradicating directors’ opportunistic behaviour is 
almost impossible even with the presence of low directors’ ownership. 
Another ownership structure highlighted in this study is institutional 
ownership, which is currently the major investor in global capital market (Mizuno 
2010). Normally, institutional owners’ investments are large that their movements 
would affect share prices. This problem makes them less mobile. As a result, these 
institutional investors develop a strong interest not only in the financial performance 
of the company in which they invest in, but also in the strategies and activities of the 
company (Fauzi et al. 2007). Institutional investors occupy a unique position in a 
company’s corporate governance given their monitoring and control ability. Despite 
the earlier evidence relating institutional ownership with higher CSR reporting, this 
study found otherwise. The presence of institutional investors results in a lower 
dissemination of CSR information. It is assumed that these investors are most likely 
short-term investors who are more concern with reaping short term profit. They may 
not be proactive in governance of companies (Manzaneque et al. 2016). Hence, this 
result seems to suggest that institutional investors are generally not supportive of 
CSR activities. Furthermore, their large shareholdings permit them to access the 
company information internally. Hence, provision of more CSR information to the 
public is not actually their main concern when deciding to invest in a particular 
company. Manzaneque et al. (2016) provide evidence of lack of institutional 
investors influence on management decisions in concentrated ownership contexts. 
These constraints exist when dominant shareholders limit the voting influence of 
institutional investors (Manzaneque et al. 2016). Apart from that, when family forms 
the controlling shareholders, institutional investors normally act as minority 
shareholders. As a result, their ability to monitor the management is restricted; 
leading to a lower reporting of CSR information. Collectively, results from this study 
varied. On the one hand, it contradicts the argument that institutional ownership 
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enhances CSR reporting. On the other hand, it recognises the negative impact of 
directors’ ownership has on dissemination of CSR information. 
 
11.2.2.2 Board independence and CSR reporting 
The abundance of studies on this issue have generally agreed that board 
independence is central in reducing agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers. Independent directors are more inclined towards acting in shareholders’ 
interests since they have no connection with the company; making them more 
objective when making decisions. Besides, their independence are compelled by the 
need maintain good reputation as it determines their human capital value (Fama & 
Jensen 1983a). By performing their watchdog responsibility, it has the ability to 
restrict any deceitful acts by the managers including withholding information (Ho & 
Wong 2003). Based on this notion, the presence of more independent directors helps 
to enhance CSR reporting. 
The statistical analysis done in Chapter 7, however, fails to fully support the 
argument. Independent directors are found to be effectively enhance CSR reporting 
only in certain industry. Intrinsically, this result is in agreement with García Sánchez 
et al. (2011), Said et al. (2009), Haji (2013) and Shamil et al. (2014) but 
contradictory to some written literature (e.g. Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Chau & 
Gray 2010; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008). It exhibits the 
failure of independent directors to provide sufficient level of vigilance to drive 
companies towards reporting more CSR information. The result is relatively 
discouraging owing to the fact that the requirement of having independent directors 
in the board of directors of PLCs has been introduced since the inception of MCCG 
in 2000. In fact, these directors are appointed based on the recommendation by the 
nominating committee to ensure individuals elected are qualified for the position. 
Despite the continuous regulators efforts towards ensuring shareholders’ interests are 
well protected, independent directors are still incapable of being independent. 
Inevitably, there are a number of factors that justify the result. It is a common 
practise in Malaysia for a director to hold multiple directorship. In fact, Bursa 
Malaysia allows up to a maximum of 15 directorship at one time. This commitment 
unquestionably demands great responsibility from the directors. As a result, bonding 
time with each company is limited. Their unfamiliarity with the companies’ 
operations cause them to be incompetent technically (Abdullah et al. 2011). Not only 
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are they not in the position to assist companies in making good decisions, they are 
also prone to rely on management information which may be misleading. In addition, 
independent directors prioritising on financial aspects of the company may also 
divert their attention from CSR issues. However, the most notable issue of 
independent directors in developing countries revolves around the power of 
controlling shareholders which could undermine the independence of directors. It is 
likely that the voice of inside owners may over-shadow that of outside-director 
owners in relation to CSR decisions (Jain & Jamali 2016). It is presumed that their 
appointment is primarily based on personal ties and contractual relationship with the 
controlling family (Chu & Song 2016). Hence their monitoring abilities are risked. 
Likewise, independent directors with close relationship with CEO also exhibit 
similar effect as they are obligated to fulfil the demand of the individual who elected 
them. Although almost half of the sample companies have at least 33% independent 
directors on their board as recommended by MCCG, they have failed to execute the 
proper monitoring level. Taken together, this result which is at odd with most of 
earlier studies, posits that the role of independent directors in family owned 
companies are less effective in enhancing CSR reporting.   
 
11.2.2.3 Board meeting frequency and CSR reporting 
Without doubt, directors must monitor company activities in order to know 
when to exert control. By this assumption, board of directors meetings remain the 
apex of control at companies and seemingly are the only venue where independent 
directors can monitor and exert control for the benefit of shareholders. With regard to 
that, the intensity of board activities is likely to contribute to the effectiveness of its 
oversight functions particularly in matters concerning reporting process. Given that 
view, the fifth research question of this study asks: What is the relationship between 
board meeting frequency and CSR reporting?  
Frequent board meeting, as acknowledged by earlier studies is one of the best 
medium to get enormous amount of companies’ information (Ponnu & Karthigeyan 
2010; Adams & Ferreira 2008). Therefore, directors who attend more board meeting 
are presumed to be well informed and more knowledgeable regarding company’s 
performance. These directors are able to make better decisions for the company 
including pertaining to reporting on CSR information (Ponnu & Karthigeyan 2010). 
Allegedly, directors who attend more board meetings are not only more diligent but 
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provide effective monitoring (Vafeas 1999). These positive attributes are central in 
the effort to protect the interest of shareholders and also aid in the production of 
better CSR reporting. 
Despite the consensus mentioned above, the analysis in Chapter 8 reveals that 
board meeting frequency is unrelated to CSR reporting. This result suggest that 
company’s level of CSR reporting remains indifferent despite the number of board 
meetings held. The results fail to support the notion that better monitoring can be 
promoted through calling more board meeting. Seemingly, the impression that board 
meeting acts as a platform in safeguarding shareholders’ interests has not been well 
demonstrated in the Malaysian context. Vafeas (1999) asserts that board meeting 
should be a tool to deter crises rather than a means to end crises. Hence it should be a 
reactive instead of a proactive measure. However, when directors (especially 
independent directors) are required to attend too many board meetings, it may 
perhaps create stress due to frequent travels needed. This in turn may cause conflicts 
among them and probably ends up becoming counterproductive. In addition, 
frequency of board meeting is not an indication of better decisions being made 
(Menon & Williams 1994) or more decisions being taken especially when larger 
board size is involved (Vafeas 1999). More meeting can prove to be less beneficial 
especially when the meeting is filled with work discussion instead of crucial agendas 
that have the potential to increase company performance. Besides, opportunities for 
independent directors to exercise meaningful control over management are impaired 
when the meeting agendas have been pre-set by the CEO. However, an interesting 
finding from a survey done by PwC in 2012 on ASEAN countries may explain the 
insignificance of frequent board meeting in enhancing CSR reporting. Surprisingly, 
only one out of five companies had CSR issues regularly on its meeting agenda. In 
closing, the results in this study are not in line with the need to have frequent board 
meeting to enhance CSR reporting as proven by prior scholars.  
 
11.2.2.4 Board diversity and CSR reporting 
Chapter 9 addresses an emerging issue which is board diversity. Having the 
right people on the board is evidently vital to ensure the board is able to perform at 
an acceptable level. Hence, boards should take a closer look at the expertise, 
experience and other qualities of each member to ensure the board can provide the 
right expertise (Yusoff 2010). Heterogeneity of experiences, ideas and innovations 
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provide the perspectives needed to effectively address critical topics, which can 
contribute to greater productivity and ultimately a stronger board (Yusoff 2010). In 
view of this importance, Chapter 8 attempts to discover the effect of having a diverse 
board on company’s CSR reporting behaviour.    
The recent spotlight on board diversity has been associated with various 
benefits that it is able to offer. It provides better and diverse access to connections 
and resources. Problems are analysed from numerous aspects; allowing effective 
solutions (Ferreira 2010). Heterogeneous board has the tendency to create more 
debatable discussions which lead to quality group decisions. A diverse board helps to 
increase supervision; ensuring that the interests of stakeholders are well-protected 
(Kang et al.2007). In addition, a board with relevant education is also important in 
order to assist the directors in performing their variety roles (Yusoff 2010). Given 
these positive views on diverse board, it is reputed to improve CSR reporting.  
While many scholars have confirmed the advantage of board diversity on 
CSR reporting (Post et al. 2011; Kiliç et al. 2015; Liao et al. 2015), this study 
discovered otherwise. Having a diverse board is insignificant in motivating a 
company to disseminate more CSR information. One obvious reason that can be 
related to the result is the under-representation of women on the board; currently 
approximately 8.2% (see Table 9.2). This implies that their roles are too small to 
make a noticeable contribution to company’s performance. In fact, their 
appointments tend to be merely tokenist. Jain and Jamali (2016) opined the 
possibility of imposing a minimum quota for women on boards to lessen the 
problem. Malaysia joins several countries like France and Spain to introduce a 
minimum quota of 30% women on board of PLCs to be achieved by 2016. However, 
this alternative proves to be ineffective as the percentage of women on board remains 
low. Perhaps Malaysian culture, which had always challenged the ability of women 
to be leaders has caused such result. Nevertheless, the result may change if the 
assertion by Konrad et al. (2008) that having more women on board can bring 
various fundamental changes proves to be correct. Similar results have emerged in 
relation to directors’ educational background. While possessing and applying skills, 
ability and knowledge that are functional, industry, board-specific and organisation-
specific, can help directors carry out their roles more effectively (Yusoff 2010), this 
ability is not reflected in this study. Having a law background does not necessarily 
encourage directors to increase CSR reporting. Meanwhile, financial experts are 
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found to assist in better CSR reporting only in certain groups/industries. Yusoff 
(2010) reveals that most directors in Malaysia possess accounting or finance 
qualifications. This means they have early exposure to CSR issues through the Social 
Accounting subject which is normally taught during higher learning education. This 
subject features the measurement and communication of information concerning the 
effect of business and its activity towards society and environment (Hamid & Atan 
2011). Given this background, financial experts are more motivated to report on CSR 
information. Nevertheless, companies that are pivoted on profit and less keen to 
share their CSR activities are contented with low reporting despite the existence of 
directors who are financial experts. On top of that, prior education does not describe 
one’s attitude. Clearly, having female directors failed to lead companies towards 
better CSR reporting; contrasting major studies done earlier on this issue. 
Meanwhile, results for financial and law experts in relation to CSR reporting are also 
not in line with prior research although having financial experts on board of directors 
proves to be beneficial in certain industry. However, due to very limited studies that 
looked into these issues, the results from this study help to extend the existing 
literature.  
 
11.2.2.5 CEO duality and CSR reporting 
Chapter 10 of this study looks at the effect of combining the role of CEO and 
the Chairperson on CSR reporting. Although some scholars believe that CEO duality 
provides unity of command and speed of decision making (e.g. Boyd 1995; 
Finkelstein & D'aveni 1994), many seem to agree that duality of roles reflects lower 
board oversight and stronger CEO power (Krause et al. 2014). Its practice poses a 
very real threat to the exercise of independent judgement by the board of directors. 
As a result, it may lead to a managerial abuse of their fiduciary relationship with 
shareholders. Based on this view, this study takes a stance that CEO duality impacts 
negatively company CSR reporting.  
Contrary to many researchers’ believes concerning CEO duality, the result 
from this study found no evidence that CEO duality reduces the reporting level of 
CSR information. It supports the findings of Said et al. (2009), Khan et al. (2013) 
and Razak and Mustapha (2013) which most likely due to the small occurrence of 
CEO duality among sampled companies. In spite of this, although separating the two 
roles had been a major practice in Malaysian companies, it does not have a 
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demonstrably favourable effect on CSR reporting. In the Malaysian context, a 
separate leadership structure does not guarantee board independence because the 
board is still influenced by the controlling shareholders who are sitting on the board. 
They are very dominant due to their substantial ownership in the companies. This 
gives them the power to appoint the Chairperson, who is normally selected from 
within their circle of trust (Mohamed Yunos 2011). Clearly, their controlling powers 
have superseded the merit of separating the board leadership structure. As a 
consequence the separation of CEO and Chairperson roles has no influence on 
enhancing CSR reporting. In brief, the outcome of this study is not consistent with 
many prior studies that exhibit duality of roles has a damaging effect on companies 
CSR reporting. 
In sum, MCCG provided the mechanisms and recommendations to restore 
investor’s confidence and trust in management, and that the recommended 
governance structures in enhancing corporate performance and transparency sets a 
stage for a continuous process to good corporate governance. The initiatives to revise 
the MCCG are meant to strengthen and raise the bar on governance practices and 
provide the necessary platform for the domestic companies to handle developments 
taking place at the international level. Besides, improvement in the corporate 
governance will ensure that it remains robust, current, and able to encourage high 
standards of corporate behaviour to protect the integrity of the capital market. Further 
to that, the revised code basically aimed at rejuvenating the functions of the board of 
directors. This is done with the hope that they would in turn encourage sound 
practices in the form of social responsibility and corporate transparency, thus 
enhancing CSR reporting practices. Notwithstanding these efforts, embracing 
corporate governance in substance, and not just in form, remains a challenge 
(Claessens & Fan 2002). Since these initiatives were adopted, the evidence of the 
implementation effectiveness and the resultant impact has been mixed. Liew (2007) 
points to the possibility that the initiatives were merely rhetorical and superficial 
reforms. Nevertheless, one of the core points that contribute to the contradicting 
results is the prevalent family ownership.  
While many have associated the changes in CSR reporting with corporate 
governance mechanisms, on the whole, this study has failed to prove the influence of 
corporate governance attributes on CSR reporting except related to ownership 
structure. The insignificant findings suggest that the power of the controlling 
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shareholders on CSR reporting process superseded the capability of the board in 
terms of monitoring as well as attempts in obtaining various resources. Hence, this 
study provides a clear indication that in a highly concentrated ownership, corporate 
governance mechanisms are not necessarily effective tools to control management 
opportunistic behaviour. Taken together, this study suggests that a well-governed 
company is important as it offers some protection for investors including better 
reporting of CSR activities.       
 
11.3 Implications of the study 
11.3.1 Theoretical implications 
11.3.1.1 Agency theory 
This study relied on agency theory in explaining the impact of board 
independence and CEO duality on CSR reporting. Based on agency theory, the 
presence of independent directors may provide better monitoring of management 
delinquency, thus protecting the interest of shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1983a). 
Similarly, by separating the roles of CEO and chairperson, it has the ability to avoid 
any overlapping of roles that could jeopardise the independence of directors and also 
opportunistic behaviour of CEO. These practices, in return will help to enhance 
company CSR reporting. However, given the unique principal-principal agency 
conflict in Malaysia, independent directors are found to have bearing on the level of 
CSR reporting of companies in certain industries only. Meanwhile, despite 
separating the roles of CEO and Chairperson, the practise fails to increase CSR 
reporting. The contradicting results are likely to be influenced by the unique 
principal-principal agency conflict in Malaysia. Controlling shareholders prove to be 
very influential in determining company direction. Independent directors feel obliged 
to appease the controlling shareholders since their appointment is essentially based 
on controlling shareholders’ commendations. CEO, while functioning on a different 
role from the Chairperson, is still considered the most powerful individual in a 
company. On account of that, CEO has the capability to influence the Chairperson. 
Hence, this study confirms a limited application of agency theory in aligning the 
interest of controlling and minority shareholders.   
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11.3.1.2 Neo institutional sociology 
Isomorphic forces of neo institutional theory has become the basis for 
understanding the reasons prompted Malaysian PLCs to report on CSR information. 
Companies are inclined to benchmark their activities and disclosures to others within 
their industry. This is one way of staying competitive. A detailed look on the CSR 
items disclosed by companies demonstrates an increasing trend of reporting on 
various items. This generally implies that companies wish to appear similar 
especially with those within the same industry; indicating mimetic isomorphism. The 
government's determination to encourage more CSR practices is reflected in the 
existence of various incentives and awards on top of mandatory CSR reporting to all 
PLCs. These continuous efforts are highly associated with the increasing trend of 
CSR reporting with adhering to the mandatory reporting being the most notable 
reason. This demonstrates the existence of coercive isomorphism. Meanwhile 
normative isomorphism emerges from the introduction of CSR framework 
introduced by Bursa Malaysia. This framework has been recognised by consultants 
and professionals in Malaysia and is the main reporting guideline used by most 
companies. Nevertheless, there are also companies that use the CSR framework 
together with the GRI guideline in preparing their CSR report. Whichever guideline 
that companies opt for, their acts are to institutionalise the reporting activity to 
conform to the current requirement. Evidently, companies CSR reporting behaviour 
seem to be consistent with neo-institutional theory. 
 
11.3.1.3 Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory emphasises on the role of board of directors as a 
liaison to external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). A board is considered to 
have the capability to reach out for resources that are vital and critical for the 
company's success. As a matter of fact, this capacity is enhanced when the board is 
made up of directors with diverse background. Resource dependence theory is 
employed in this study to rationalise board diversity and board meeting frequency. A 
diverse board provides more opportunity to reach out for a variety of resources due 
to extensive networking. Meanwhile, a frequent board meeting reflects better 
decision-making and enhanced monitoring since directors are presumed to be great 
human and social capital. Despite these claims, this study demonstrates contradictory 
results. Having on the board female directors and directors who are law experts and 
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organising frequent board meetings do not make a difference to CSR reporting. Too 
few female directors seem impotent in a male dominated board while law expert 
directors fail to apply their knowledge to assist better performance. On the same 
note, companies will not be at an advantage when board meeting only discusses 
routine matters instead of strategic issues. Nevertheless, directors who are financial 
experts are relevant in promoting better CSR reporting though confined to a certain 
industries. Briefly, there is restricted utilisation of resource dependence theory in 
clarifying changes in CSR reporting in this study.   
 
11.3.1.4 Stakeholder-agency theory 
This study attempts to place ownership structure within the stakeholder-
agency theory framework. The goal was to examine the possible effect of ownership 
by directors and institutions on company tendency to report CSR information. 
According to agency theory, agents are tempted to perform opportunistic behaviour 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Hence, this theory accentuates the alignment of interest 
between the agent and the principal through various incentives and controls. 
Meanwhile, stakeholder theory features manager as the centre of the contractual 
relationship between the company and its stakeholders and always seeks to balance 
the interests of the stakeholders to ensure their satisfaction (Heinfeldt & Curcio 
1997). Taking the two theories together, stakeholder-agency theory rests on the 
notion that managers are accountable not only to shareholders but also to 
stakeholders; financially and morally. Given these arguments, the effects of directors 
and institutional ownership on CSR reporting provided by this study appear to be 
varied. Shareholdings by directors prove to be detrimental to CSR reporting; 
supporting stakeholder-agency theory under the entrenchment effect. Theoretically, 
this result indicates that shareholdings are an effective way of establishing power to 
steer managers into satisfying their interest; hence further enhancing agency costs. 
Contrarily, the presence of institutional investors whom are expected to oversee the 
conduct of the managers has not been proven in this study. When these investors are 
more interested in getting investments return in a short period of time, they tend to 
avoid their fiduciary responsibility towards shareholders. Consequently, they view 
reporting on CSR activities as costly practices that should be evaded. Apparently, the 
failure of institutional investors to uphold their accountability to the company owners 
does not lend support to stakeholder-agency theory. 
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11.3.2 Policy implications 
The results of this study have a number of important implications for future 
practice. They are explained in the following sub sections: 
 
11.3.2.1 Chapter 5 - The extent and nature of CSR reporting 
The government's efforts to foster company’s accountability towards 
stakeholders through mandatory CSR reporting are seen as a noble move. With the 
aid of the CSR Framework introduced by Bursa Malaysia, companies are aware of 
what elements should be reported. Nevertheless, these attempts seemingly able to 
influence companies to report so far only at the minimum level. There is also an 
inclination towards reporting information which can make CSR report more 
impressive but in effect is less beneficial to stakeholders. As a result, stakeholders 
had to be contented with what is presented and this is likely to affect the decisions 
they need to make. The recent introduction of the CSR Framework in 2015 also 
incorporates slight modifications. Given this deficiency, it is deemed necessary for 
regulators to also mandate the content of the CSR report. The outcome of this study 
may shed some lights to the regulators of the current pattern of CSR reporting, hence 
can be treated as a basis for formulating the appropriate content of the report.  While 
this may lead to a rigid pattern of reporting across companies, it is one way to 
habituate companies to a meaningful and comprehensive reporting. Furthermore, 
greater accountability can be demonstrated. A standard reporting format also assist 
investors who rely on companies’ CSR activities as one of their investment criteria, 
to make better comparison. Meanwhile, the existing incentives such as tax rebate and 
CSR awards will motivate companies to report beyond the stipulated content. Above 
all, without enforcement, such efforts may be meaningless. Accordingly, the 
regulators should be more stringent with the rules to ensure the hard work delivers 
the expected results. At the same time, CSR awareness programs should be carried 
out continuously in spite of the increased level of CSR reporting among PLCs. In 
fact, the government should consider expanding the same initiatives, perhaps, to 
small and medium companies, given they are the backbones of the national economy. 
This not only provides them with early exposure to CSR but also enables them to 
embrace the concept gradually. 
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11.3.2.2 Chapter 6 - Ownership structure and CSR reporting 
The negative impact of both directors and institutional ownership on CSR 
reporting generally implies that Malaysian companies are continuously resisting 
acceptance of recurring changes for the betterment of the companies as well as their 
stakeholders. It reflects that companies are operating in a business environment that 
is less than perfect where stakeholders’ interest is clearly set aside to make way for 
the fulfilment of individual goals. This deficiencies signal to the regulators and 
policymakers that immediate actions ought to be taken in order to curb the situation 
from worsening. As a measure to uphold the interests of the stakeholders as well as 
the minority shareholders, the shareholders activism should be made stronger. It is 
highly proposed that the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) should 
play its role actively and efficiently. Since its establishment, many seem to have 
reservations pertaining to the role of MSWG in mitigating conflict of interests 
between majority and minority shareholders.  
At present, MSWG is fully funded by institutional investors (Ameer & 
Rahman 2009). Hence, its claim of independence is highly dubious since the 
institution is actually the representation of the institutional investors themselves. It is 
likely that their interests will take precedence. Considering these problems, the 
regulators should perhaps introduce stringent rules in order to strengthen 
shareholders activism in Malaysia. This initiative may reassure the public that 
MSWG actually represents the interests of minority shareholders. Above all, 
promoting CSR should be an ongoing effort by various parties. To change one’s 
mind towards adopting something that appears to be costly requires some time 
besides determination. After all, CSR is a practise that is just starting to be accepted 
especially in developing countries.  
 
11.3.2.3 Chapter 7- Board independence and CSR reporting 
Without doubt, board of directors are the cornerstone and a focal point of 
good corporate governance. As such their presence should aid in better transparency 
in the company. However, their ability to execute their duty well is constrained due 
to lack of company’s information. To enable them to act as a watchdog or a monitor 
of managers, it is essential for them to have good information. Information, monitors 
and decision makers are relatively interconnected. It is meaningless to have more 
independent directors sitting on the board but at the same time they are hindered 
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from getting information due to difficulty of company to communicate information 
to outside directors. It may ends up with independent directors making blind 
decisions which could be devastating to the company. Thus, companies should be 
well aware of the informational issues before expecting independent directors to be 
effective. As for independent directors, they need a richer set of information to make 
a strategic decision for a company. This means independent directors need to dig in 
deeper rather than rely on publicly available information. One of the important 
channels to get information is through company meetings where all sorts of 
information are presented by the managers. Additionally, independent directors can 
get information from management’s forecasts, analysts’ forecasts, stock market 
trades and also audited financial reports. These pieces of information form the 
informational mix that independent directors draw on when making decisions. 
Doubtlessly, independent directors also need to work hard to get extensive 
information because their reputation is dependent on their ability to make decisions 
that could move the company in the right direction. As for regulators who have been 
anxiously making changes to corporate governance by introducing more independent 
directors in the company structure, they too should be cognizant of the information 
issues to ensure effectiveness of the guidelines introduced.  
Shortage of independent directors is also a challenge for regulators. Perhaps 
this problem can be overcome by gathering outstanding individuals who have 
extensive experience and possess leadership qualities proposed by various agencies, 
companies and government bodies. In addition, it is also crucial for the regulators 
such as Bursa Malaysia to emphasise a balance of the skills of the board members. 
The Mandatory Accreditation Programme and continuing education program 
organised by the Bursa Malaysia are among good channels for directors to enhance 
their competencies. Nevertheless, there is a need to regularly revise the components 
of the program to reflect existing condition in Malaysia. The current practise of 
nominating independent directors is done through the nominating committee. This 
committee's work determines who board leaders will be for many years into the 
future. Hence, the work of the nominating committee has a lasting impact on 
companies. The nominating committee should be well organised, have a clear sense 
of recruiting priorities as well as expectations for individual board members. Poorly 
executed responsibility of the nominating committee may affect the ability of the 
directors to perform their roles effectively. Given this issue, the regulator is in charge 
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of ensuring the nominating committee performs efficiently; possibility by providing 
them with appropriate training. 
 
11.3.2.4 Chapter 8- Board meeting frequency and CSR reporting 
Board meeting is the amount of time board of directors spent on corporate 
matters. Seemingly, the frequency of board meeting reflects the allotted time 
discussing management issues. Hence, board of directors are said to be conscientious 
in meeting their responsibilities. Nevertheless, board meetings are not inexpensive 
and board members are typically very busy people.  Fewer meetings will help save 
the companies money and is likely to increase the chance of having all board 
members present. Apparently, this should be a valid concern in any company 
dedicated to making the best possible use of its resources. This study reveals that on 
average each company conducts 8 board meetings a year. Perhaps company should 
opt for a lesser board meeting to overcome the issues highlighted above.  
During board meeting, directors should not be making routine decisions that 
can just as well be made by others within board policies. Instead, they should be 
concentrating on situations where there is a great deal of uncertainty and novelty. 
Along this line, it is appropriate for a board to spend the greater part of its meeting 
time focusing on the future, addressing strategic issues, key decisions and matters of 
policy direction. This would include accountability issues such as CSR. However, to 
realise this situation, it requires careful preparation of a meeting agendas; prioritising 
on key issues. In addition, a board should also review its meeting frequency from 
time to time. It should neither be anchored to the companies’ tradition nor the 
suitability of the management team. Importantly, board meeting should serve as a 
source for board of directors to fulfil their responsibilities. These are few suggestions 
that can guide PLCs in Malaysia to a more meaningful board meeting and hopefully 
will lead to enhanced CSR reporting and better company performance. Accordingly, 
revising corporate conduct of board meeting is plausible. 
 
11.3.2.5 Chapter 9 - Board diversity and CSR reporting 
It is quite disappointing to see that the percentage of female directors on the 
board remains low despite the various attempts by government and other agencies. 
Inevitably, culture seems to be the main barrier in the efforts to improve the number 
of female directors in Malaysia. Although the government has set a quota of having 
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30% female directors by the year 2016, companies do not seem to be serious in 
achieving this mission. In view of the problem, the government should resort to a 
much stringent rule. One option is to spell out the percentage of female directors that 
should be appointed to the board. However, before this rule can be implemented, it is 
essential to increase the pool of talented female directors. Women especially in 
developing countries are normally less keen to work due to family commitment. 
Thus, to attract them to join the workforce, the government should among others 
provide more child-care facilities at work. Appropriate training should also be given 
to assist them in fulfilling their responsibilities. The government should be 
commended for initiating the special course to train women to be directors. Through 
formal training, it can ensure that women appointed as directors have the 
characteristics of a respectable leader. Hence, this training ought to be continued 
with the involvement of more women and regularly updated modules. Rigorous 
campaign to eliminate the negative perceptions of the ability of women as leaders 
ought to be carried out. With increased awareness, men will be more willing to work 
together with women. In relation to board educational background, there is no 
denying that culture and upbringing have a big role in shaping the attitudes of 
individuals. Despite the exposure of CSR fundamentals during higher education 
level, it is relatively hard to change one’s perceptions especially concerning CSR 
which is rather new in developing countries. Nevertheless, with this issue becoming 
mainstream now, perhaps with more awareness activities carried out, the new 
generation can relate more closely their early knowledge on CSR and the importance 
of embracing the concept.   
 
11.3.2.6 Chapter 10 - CEO duality and CSR reporting 
Argument on separating the role of CEO and Chairperson is often grounded 
on the ability to provide better monitoring and oversight due to them being 
independent. However, despite the separation of roles, this action may ends up 
disastrous especially when there is no clear and defined job description for the 
separate chair position. Without doubt there are distinct benefits to the chair’s 
separated role, including greater attention to the board’s functioning but often lines 
of responsibility are not clear between the two roles. Consequently, CEOs 
and chairmen can often be distracted by struggles over power and territory. In return, 
independence is compromised. Evidently, simply by separating the roles does not 
Chapter 11: Conclusions 
 
262 
 
necessarily improvise company performance which includes reporting of non-
financial information. This is what is indicated by the irrelevance of non CEO duality 
in driving towards better CSR reporting in this study. Aside from that, the 
competence of the chairpersonship is vital to the contribution which boards make to 
their companies. As the chairperson leads the board, good leadership traits is 
required of him. In an environment where ownership is concentrated and family 
companies prevail, CEO, as the owner of the company is able to intervene in all 
matters. With good leadership traits, a Chairperson can easily dismiss any attempt to 
influence him or her. Perhaps the government and other related agencies should take 
proactive measures by providing continuous courses to help Chairperson’s leadership 
skills stay current. At the meantime, regulators may require Chairperson to attend a 
number of pre-determined courses in a year. Although the number of Chairperson is 
not going to increase, the training and courses will aid existing Chairmen to be better 
leaders. 
 
11.3.2.7 Corporate governance 
The results of this study apparently demonstrate the companies’ compliance 
with most good practices of corporate governance suggested by MCCG. However, 
their ineffectiveness in enhancing CSR reporting raise some concerns. Generally, 
these outcomes can be associated with controlling shareholders exerting their powers 
on the management. The occurrence of this situation has much to do with poor 
enforcement of legal protection on shareholders and ineffective market discipline in 
Malaysia. As a result, the controlling shareholders are free to act in their own best 
interest rather than for the company as a whole. The abuse of power leads to many 
issues since it deters corporate governance mechanisms from being effective tools in 
controlling management opportunistic behaviour. To address the problem, it can be 
initiated by strengthening the existing regulations. For instance, regulators such as 
Bursa Malaysia should be given more authority in monitoring companies’ 
compliance towards applicable laws and perhaps review the current listing 
requirements. Given the abundance power of controlling shareholders, it is also 
likely that the court and legal systems will act as effective governance tools. The 
authorities may want to consider refining the law to increase the punishment of 
controlling shareholders who violate their fair share of wealth relative to minority 
shareholders. Apart from that, there is an urgent need for the regulators to strengthen 
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the enforcement of legal protection of shareholders as poor enforcement is one of the 
reasons for highly concentrated ownerships in Asian countries (La Porta et al. 2000; 
Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Clearly, results of this study provide an overview to the 
authorities about the effectiveness of existing corporate governance. It provides an 
opportunity for the authorities to have a better understanding of the agency conflict 
in Malaysia and subsequently considering measures to control the conflict 
accordingly. By doing this, any loophole within the corporate governance system can 
be improved.  
 
11.4 Limitations of the study 
While the study makes several contributions to the corporate governance and 
CSR reporting debate, there are a number of limitations that should be addressed. 
First, this study focuses on a single country. As is commonly known, every country 
is bound by its own regulatory and corporate governance system. Due to this 
uniqueness, the results of this study might not hold true for other countries. 
Similarly, the sample in this study excludes all financial related companies as they 
are regulated by a different act. Hence, the outcomes from this study cannot be 
generalised to these institutions. Second, the annual reports were analysed manually. 
Thus, subjective influences are obvious which may affect the reliability of the 
results. Third, this study focused on CSR reporting in annual reports only. With the 
existence of multiple sources of information dissemination such as environmental 
report, interim report, company newsletters, websites and newspapers, the 
information shown of annual report may exhibits an incomplete picture of CSR 
practices and may not be treated as an absolute and accurate measure of engagement 
in citizenship. In view of this constraint, future study may consider other forms of 
reporting.  
 
11.5 Areas of future research 
Conducting this study has evoked several issues which open up to several 
future research avenues. Firstly, this study has mostly relied on information from 
companies’ annual reports. While the credibility of this source has been 
acknowledged by many researchers, it is highly recommended for future researchers 
to employ other source of information such as interviews and surveys. These 
research methods, if used jointly may complement the archival data method and are 
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likely to provide better insights on the relationship between corporate governance 
and CSR reporting. Besides, interviews and surveys may provide useful information 
that enables comparison between the information required by stakeholders and what 
has been reported by companies. This will in turn assist the companies in producing 
CSR reports that are meaningful and satisfy the needs of various stakeholders. 
Furthermore, studies which triangulate various research methods will enhance the 
validity of the findings.  
Secondly, instead of using unweighted index approach in deriving CSR index, 
future researchers may use weighted index approach. The first approach only seeks 
for the existence of an item without considering the accompanying information 
which may not only be relevant but important. Since the weighted approach represent 
qualitative indicator with the information gathered is more profound, engaging this 
approach may offer better insights of CSR reporting trend.                 
Thirdly, an important extension of this study would be an examination of 
cultural variables as predictors of CSR reporting. Studies have demonstrated that 
culture describes how CSR information is disseminated. Malaysia is a country of 
multi-cultural and races which provides the platform to investigate the effects of 
these elements on company reporting behaviour.  
Fourthly, this study exhibits that independent directors and directors who are 
financial experts are significant in enhancing CSR reporting in certain industry. It 
would be interesting to discover the specific industry (ies) and reveals the factors that 
contribute to the effectiveness of these board attributes in increasing CSR reporting. 
As such, investigation on this issue by future researchers is recommended.  
Fifthly, without doubt board diversity is currently a buzzword among 
researchers. Investigating other types of board diversity such as ethnicity, age and 
work experience could meaningfully extend this study. Besides, the results may also 
assist the regulators in improving corporate governance. Therefore, it is suggested 
that the association of these factors is investigated in future studies. 
Sixthly, since the issue of CSR starting to gain attention of many parties, there 
are many attempts to look into factors that drive companies to report on CSR 
information. However, studies that investigate issues that cause companies not to 
report are rare. Further examination into these factors is strongly recommended in 
order to identify possible reasons for not reporting. Information from these studies 
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may offer input to the regulators who in return, can focus on improving any 
deficiencies and encourage more companies to report on CSR activities. 
Another possible area of future research would be to make comparison of a 
cross-sectional study between Malaysia and other Asian countries like Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam. Beneficial information may be obtained from the 
comparison which can aid in improving CSR practices in Malaysia. 
Finally, this study explores important governance mechanisms which are the 
board of directors and ownership structure. While this study only examined internal 
governance mechanism, it is possible that external governance factors not explored 
here could influence company CSR practices.  
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